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 “Writing a Way Home” examines ways that Cherokees in the latter half of the 20th 
century who have been marginalized through the privileging of state narratives have 
deployed literature as a way to challenge narratives of state domination and to imagine 
and work toward more critical, ethical Cherokee nationhood. I examine the ways that 
Robert K. Thomas and Natachee Scott Momaday used literature during the federal 
Termination and Relocation programs to imagine functioning tribal nations against the 
United States’ assimilation narrative of the time. I further delve into how the Cherokee 
Nation’s state narrative of the Cherokee Freedmen has denationalized Freedmen 
descendants and how, by using the WPA narratives of former Cherokee slaves and Tom 
Holm and Thomas’ Peoplehood Matrix, we can re-narrate the Freedmen descendants into 
a more ethical Cherokee Nation. Finally, I close the study with an examination of Daniel 
Heath Justice’s Way of Thorn and Thunder trilogy that uses storytelling to re-imagine a 
place of reverence for gay and queer-identified Cherokees at a time when the Cherokee 
Nation passed a ban on same-sex marriage, claiming that such relationships defied what 
the Cherokee state narrates as tribal tradition. I aim to show in this study the danger of 
 ix 
uncritically accepting the state model for tribal nations and the importance of periodically 
challenging tribal nations when leaders behave unethically. Likewise, this study 
demonstrates the power of story to not only check the excesses of state sovereignty that 
marginalize people based on their history, politics, race and sexuality, but also the power 
to re-imagine a nation – a home – that welcomes all its relations. 
  
 x 
“I have always believed that the Great Creator had a great design for my people, the 
Cherokees. I have been taught that from my childhood up, and now in my mature 
manhood I recognize it as a great truth. Our forces have been dissipated by the external 
forces, perhaps it has been just a training, but we must now get together as a race and 
render our contribution to mankind. We are endowed with intelligence, we are 
industrious, we are loyal and we are spiritual but we are overlooking the Cherokee 
mission on earth, for no man nor race is endowed with these qualifications without a 
designed purpose. . . .  
 
“Our pride in our ancestral heritage is our great incentive for handing something 
worthwhile to our posterity. It is this pride in ancestry that makes men strong and loyal 
for their principal in life. It is this same pride that makes men give up their all for their 
Government.”  
– Redbird Smith, 1910 speech to Council of Nighthawk Keetoowahs 
 
 
 
“[T]he native intellectual who takes up arms to defend his nation’s legitimacy and who 
wants to bring proofs to bear out that legitimacy . . . is obliged to dissect the heart of his 
people.”  
– Franz Fanon, Wretched of the Earth 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
“Untitled” 
 
From time to time in Tahlequah 
We’d see them – 
two old people – 
man and wife – 
both full-blood Cherokee. 
He had his walking stick 
and she her paper bag. 
Their other hands they held 
while strolling down the street 
 
Now I don’t know what’s “Indian” 
but walking hand in hand 
along life’s long uncertain path 
and facing side by side 
whatever comes – 
that’s Cherokee. 
 
In this poem, Robert J. Conley (United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians) 
reflects on a scene in which an elderly Cherokee couple, likely having seen the tribe 
through the years weather dispossession and upheaval and enact revitalization and 
renewal, walking hand in hand, ready to face the next challenge together. He concedes 
that he does not know what the idea of “Indian” means and relegates it to less than an 
afterthought, but he asserts that the core of what it is to be Cherokee, to him, is an ability 
for Cherokees to walk together, hand in hand, contend with any challenge, and continue 
walking together. When we consider the histories of violent removals and coerced 
relocations, the uprooting and breakdown of families, and the attempted erasure of 
communal epistemologies – and that those narratives often run in the background of 
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communal memory – a Cherokee writer creating a story of Cherokees in their twilight 
years having survived it all and continuing to walk together is a powerful narrative. Such 
a narrative can change how we imagine Cherokee life against more oppressive political 
narratives that have circumscribed what it means to be Cherokee and, in some cases, 
sought to define Cherokees out of existence.  
Indeed, these narratives can also affect how we imagine Cherokee nationhood.   
This study examines how we can use Cherokee literature to conceive of critical and 
ethical nationhood(s). By critical, I refer not only to challenging an accepted, sometimes 
oppressive national status quo, which is often maintained through a privileged state 
narrative, but also to imagining (with the potential to enact) alternative models of 
nationhood outside of that status quo. Additionally, by ethical, I refer to critiquing the 
tribal state when it privileges a narrative that marginalizes a sector of its citizenry, and 
imagining and enacting a nation that is built on an alternative national narrative that seeks 
to ethically include the demographic(s) that otherwise exist in the margins of the status 
quo. 
At the core of such challenges and re-imaginings of Cherokee nationhood is the 
role of stories. With the above poem, Conley gives us a story of Cherokee life – one story 
among countless others in the past and countless more in the future. If, as Thomas King 
(Cherokee) reminds us: “The truth about stories is that’s all we are” (2), then to be 
Cherokee – or any other group for that matter – goes beyond soul and sinew and extends 
into how we imagine ourselves. In the end, we are a composite of the stories we tell about 
ourselves – to ourselves and to others.  Beneath Conley’s story of this Cherokee couple 
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are other stories that create and inform Cherokee nationhood of which Conley’s elderly 
couple is a narrative microcosm. The details of these stories might vary, but each is 
rooted in a tribal history of tradition and change, removal and renewal, that ends, in this 
version, with a Cherokee couple having lived through it all and continuing to live.  
However, not every story has a happy ending. Presently, queer Cherokees and the 
descendants of Cherokee Freedmen, whose own stories have historically contributed to 
the meaning of Cherokee nationhood, are being written out by officials of the Cherokee 
state who privilege national narratives that elide these groups’ historical contributions to 
the Nation. Likewise, BIA head Larry Echo Hawk (Pawnee) issued a statement in 2009 
suggesting that the historical Cherokee Nation is no more and the present iteration is 
merely a successor in interest of the original. Such privileged narratives at once threaten 
Cherokee nationhood in that while the former creates an oppressive state for some 
citizens, the latter challenges whether the Cherokee Nation as it was since time 
immemorial continues to exist at all.  
The historical fissures of families and communities and the narratives that bring 
them together or, in some cases, continue to separate them at various moments in a 
group’s history are often a basis of group identity and survival. This role of the narrative 
warrants analysis and further questioning of how narratives can be used to reconcile 
communities and to build borders around them as needed in a particular era.1 Similarly, 
examining the politics behind privileging certain narratives over others lends insight into 
how individuals and groups who exist in the narrative margins create counter-narratives 
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as a path of creating critical, ethical nationhood that can have tangible effects on real 
people. 
 My study considers the narratives that emerge in Cherokee literature of the latter 
half of the 20th century to the present to understand issues spanning from the Termination 
and Relocation policies of the 1950s to the current debates over the place of Cherokee 
Freedmen descendants and that of queer Cherokees through the administration of former 
Cherokee Nation Principal Chief Chad Smith.2 Just as Conley asserts in his poem that he 
knows what it means to be Cherokee and creates a narrative of two Cherokees coming 
together, each of the writers in this study considers narratives of belonging and critical, 
ethical nationhood that run counter to the privileged legal-political narratives of both the 
U.S. and Cherokee states that circumscribe the participation of some Cherokees at best 
and at worst erase them from the story.  
 These narratives of Cherokee nationhood matter because the stories that 
determine how, or even if, it is composed inform real stakes in the lives of real people. In 
fact, as Elizabeth Cook-Lynn (Crow Creek Sioux) indicates, the tribal nation is the 
apparatus through which Indians obtain the rights and privileges owed them by the U.S. 
per treaty obligations. She writes that, “[i]f we are contemporary Indians in America, we 
have no rights and responsibilities that are not embedded in our tribal nations. In other 
words, Indians have no Indian rights in America or in the world that are separated from 
tribal nation rights and specific geographies” (“AI Studies” 20).3 Here, Cook-Lynn 
asserts that we have a duty to defend tribal nations because without them, the rights she 
mentions that tribal nations won through both conflict and careful negotiation would 
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expire. But defending nationhood means defending the people who comprise it, 
defending them against forces from outside and from within that seek to shunt them to 
the margins and violate those rights their ancestors fought for. One method that my 
project takes up is how Cherokee writers have used literature as counter-narratives to 
write critical nationhood and imagine Cherokee nationhood as more politically 
efficacious and ethical. The threats to Cherokee nationhood don’t go away. Indeed, one 
could argue that the battles haven’t changed; only the stories have. By demonstrating how 
Cherokee writers effect such re-imaginings of nationhood, this project aims to wed 
King’s assertion that all we are is stories with Cook-Lynn’s assertion that tribal 
nationhood gives us the tools to endure physically, mentally and spiritually to continue 
the story, which, in turn, is a continuation of ourselves as people. 
 For this project, I examine the narrative construction of critical, ethical Cherokee 
nationhood both as a way of tying disparate stories back to the tribal body in the face of a 
privileged state narrative and how that, in turn, brings those individuals whose 
experiences are depicted in those counter-narratives back to the tribal whole. The 
endgame of this literary critical nationhood is to imagine a nation that not only lives up to 
its ethical potential by incorporating its marginalized kin, but also that, in the end, these 
constructions of critical nationhood lead to a nation that is more politically effective as a 
result. One way to examine narratives of critical nationhood at certain points in a group’s 
history is to analyze the literature written by members of the community during that 
period or by those authors of the community who write about the period in question. 
Writing a Way Home is a study of Cherokee narratives of nationhood in the latter half of 
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the 20th century as it is constructed and revealed through the literary production of 
Cherokee writers during key moments in tribal history. Tensions between the privileged 
and counter-narratives are part of this project, and my aim is to analyze those conflicts 
that arise at various historical and political moments.  
This project is divided into two parts. The first section of this study engages the 
assimilative and denationalizing narratives deployed through law by the federal 
government against tribal nations during the Termination and Relocation era. I examine 
the works of anthropologist Robert K. Thomas, a prolific writer who was one of the first 
Cherokee writers to explicitly engage issues of peoplehood and tribalism during the 
Termination period. His career spanned from the late 1950s until his death in 1991, and 
his analyses of tribal life and revitalization gained more esteem in the politically charged 
era that followed, which included the occupation of Alcatraz, the growth of the American 
Indian Movement and the standoff at Wounded Knee. Alongside Thomas’ work, I 
examine the understudied young adult novel The Owl in the Cedar Tree (1965) by 
Natachee Scott Momaday, who is also the Cherokee mother of Kiowa author N. Scott 
Momaday.  
The second half of this study engages contemporary issues in the Cherokee 
Nation with regard to the status of Cherokee Freedmen descendants and queer Cherokee 
citizens at a time when the former group occupies a citizenship limbo and the latter group 
is affected by a ban on same-sex marriage in the Cherokee Nation, margins created by 
privileged national narratives from the Nation. This section offers a critique of the 
Cherokee Nation’s state policy as it pertains to these marginalized citizens, and examines 
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how we can use stories by these citizens to imagine a model of the Cherokee Nation that 
is ethically inclusive. An analysis of Cherokee slave narratives and Daniel Heath 
Justice’s Way of Thorn and Thunder fantasy trilogy reveals the tensions between 
conflicting narratives of Cherokee belonging and nationhood and what it means to be 
Cherokee within those tensions.   
From an academic standpoint, my goal is that this project serves as a document of 
how some Cherokee writers conceived of and re-evaluated narratives of critical, ethical 
nationhood through literature from the Termination era to today to engage the writers’ 
lived realities with respect to their given historical moment. I also hope this project serves 
as a base for future scholars of Cherokee literature to build on, and that it becomes a 
resource into examining what 20th-century Cherokees were writing about with regard to 
politics and the aforementioned narratives. Additionally, I aim to contribute to the 
conversation of how Cherokees and other Indian writers use literature as a tool to 
continue challenging the privileged narratives that we take for granted and to create new 
ones.  
From a communal perspective, I aim through this project to address the anxiety 
about conforming to one privileged narrative and to demonstrate that some of our greatest 
thinkers sought ways to construct counter-narratives of nationhood in order to meet the 
challenges of the day. That said my goal is not to provide concrete answers, but rather to 
offer more questions and open a space for a continued discussion of Cherokee narratives 
of nationhood. When faced with the question of what constitutes a tribal narrative, one of 
the worst things we can do is answer it in a way that takes the narrative into a place of 
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inertia and forecloses on alternative possibilities that might prove essential at another 
time. What constitutes narratives of nationhood and who gets to tell them depends on 
when one asks the questions, and I feel the most ethical approach I can take with this 
study, in addition to outlining how these writers construct counter-narratives, is to also 
create more questions. By asking more questions, we as scholars and community 
members challenge and construct narratives, and practice nationhood in a way that 
ensures that, as Jace Weaver (Cherokee4) states, the people might live. 
 
Critical Overview 
 In Writing a Way Home, I am heavily influenced by American Indian Literary 
Nationalism, a theory of examining tribal literature developed by scholars such as Jace 
Weaver (Cherokee), Daniel Heath Justice (Cherokee Nation), Craig Womack (Creek), 
Robert Warrior (Osage) and Lisa Brooks (Abenaki), who demand that scholars interpret 
tribal literature in explicitly political ways that speak to and attend to the real-world 
social and political needs of tribal communities. In his foundational essay “Towards a 
National Indian Literature: Cultural Authenticity in Nationalism” (1981), Acoma scholar 
and writer Simon Ortiz outlines several of these real-world needs that scholars and 
writers must invest their effort in attending to, including sovereignty, control of tribal 
natural resources, sexism and economic oppression to name a few. I’ll elaborate further 
on Ortiz’ contribution later in this introduction, but I introduce his influential article here 
as a way to both outline the stakes of responsible scholarship in Native American and 
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indigenous studies and to highlight the stakes that drive my own analysis on Cherokee 
literature in this study.  
 I am fortunate and grateful to have developed as a scholar of Native American 
and indigenous studies at a time when I can take for granted the idea that responsible 
literary analysis goes hand in hand with responsibility to people. American Indian 
Literary Nationalism is indeed a response to earlier interpretive theories such as 
postcolonial theory, theories that assume a Native American “Renaissance” and 
mixedblood, or “hybrid,” theory, each of which essentializes indigenous nations in 
various ways and, worse, depoliticizes them and their literary output in favor of studying 
tribal literature in terms of ethnic and cultural aesthetics. In this study, I join the 
aforementioned as well as other literary nationalists who insist on honing literary analysis 
to re-politicize tribal literature in ways that shift the focus from ethnic and cultural 
voyeurism to pragmatic considerations of tribal nationhood.  
 Before going further, I must confess that while I generally reject postcolonial 
theory as a way to interpret tribal literature in a larger sense, my approach is informed 
partially by the works of some of its representatives such as Partha Chatterjee and 
Edward Said (Palestinian).5 I use their work, respectively, to articulate a general theory of 
nationalism that I work with and in introducing Warrior’s interpretation of “secular 
criticism,” an extension of Said’s work that informs my view on critical tribal 
nationhood.6 My primary concern with using postcolonial theory to interpret tribal 
literature is that it necessarily situates the tribal community as the Other, which only 
reiterates settler privilege, and it often views work coming from these othered 
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communities as a simple “writing back,” as if the work by itself has no value apart from 
contending with the settler state. To demonstrate the necessary othering emergent in 
postcolonial theory, I point to Chatterjee who writes that, “[n]ationalism . . . seeks to 
represent itself in the image of the Enlightenment and fails to do so. For Enlightenment 
itself, to assert its sovereignty as the universal ideal, needs its Other” (qtd. in Bhabha 
“DissemiNation” 293). Chatterjee argues that the continued othering of subjugated 
communities feeds the privilege of the dominant group, and as such I do not wish to 
couch tribal literature in terms of it being the literary output of Others and, in essence, 
just re-inscribe the hierarchy of nations that postcolonial scholars ostensibly endeavor to 
challenge.  
I also find postcolonial theory lacking in that while it often celebrates Others’ 
gaining a voice and writing back to the dominant group, analyses frequently stop there. 
The Others finally get their say and perhaps gain power in an imagined sense, but in 
many ways the actual colonial dynamic doesn’t necessarily shift in their favor. I instead  
seek to empower Cherokees through Cherokee writing. I argue that while work from the 
Cherokee margins can certainly “write back to” or challenge the privileged U.S. and 
Cherokee national narratives, I also insist that there exist an endgame of critical 
nationhood informed by the counter-narrative that has the potential to inform a more 
ethical nation and put actual strategies into play to make that change possible. Finally, my 
distance from full-on postcolonial theory is a semantic one in that, as Weaver points out, 
“post-” implies “after,” as if colonialism has ceased in Indian Country, which, of course, 
it has not.7   
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 My privileging of American Indian Literary Nationalism also speaks to how the 
theory responds to earlier interpretive frameworks used with Native American and 
indigenous literature that essentialize and depoliticize tribal communities and their 
nations. One early theory is the approach that sees contemporary Native American 
literature as part of a general native Renaissance, a term coined by Kenneth Lincoln from 
his 1985 book Native American Renaissance. Lincoln locates the genesis of the Native 
American Renaissance in 1969 with the publication of N. Scott Momaday’s The House 
Made of Dawn for which Momaday received the Pulitzer Prize. As with the European 
Renaissance, this theory focuses on the aesthetics, in this case of those in Native 
American literature, as well as how Native American literature differs from mainstream 
American literature, eliding the political realities of tribal nationhood.8  
Likewise, as James Ruppert has identified, the idea of a renaissance assumes that 
American Indian writers weren’t creating relevant work before 1969, and it elides 
important earlier work by writers such as Momaday’s mother, Natachee Momaday, and 
Ruth Muskrat Bronson (Cherokee), Todd Downing (Choctaw), Ella Deloria and Zitkala-
Sa (Dakota), Luther Standing Bear and Charles Eastman (Lakota) and D’Arcy McNickle 
(Salish) to name a few.9 This supposed renaissance is also problematic in that it assumes 
that Native American literature wasn’t relevant until it gained mainstream attention when 
Momaday won the Pulitzer Prize, a point mentioned by James Cox in a review of 
Lincoln’s book on the 25th anniversary of its publication.10 This stance devalues tribal 
communities’ appreciation of their own work and assumes that such work only gains 
value when it is met with non-Native acclaim. 
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 In addition to Lincoln, other early scholars of Native American and indigenous 
literature are guilty of having focused on essentialized, and often romanticized, notions of 
shared Indianness that, while expressly different from mainstream U.S. culture, fails to 
account for how diverse tribal nations are expressly different from one another. For 
example, in the opening pages of American Indian Literatures (1990), LaVonne Ruoff 
writes of American Indians:  
 Divided into numerous cultural and language groups, native North Americans 
 practiced many different religions and customs. However, there are some 
 perspectives on their place in the universe that Native American groups shared 
 and continue to share. . . . Although individual Indians today vary in the extent to 
 which they follow tribal traditions, their worldviews and values continue to reflect 
 those of their ancestors. (2) 
Ruoff gestures here to the fact that Indians come from “numerous cultural and language 
groups” (note: not nations). However, she assumes that tribal communities all share a 
certain “perspective” and that, despite that every other group of people has the 
opportunity to change intergenerationally as needed, tribal communities are somehow 
inextricably bound, for better or worse, to their ancestors with regard to their values and 
worldviews. This essentializing framework, which makes no gesture toward political 
efficacy of tribal nationhood, reflects Weaver’s observation that some non-Natives desire 
that their Indians “remain flies in amber, beautiful, pristine, and ultimately cold, dead, 
and sterile” (AILN 4). As a nationalist, like Weaver, I reject the notion that American 
Indians – and only American Indians – must remain in a stasis that lends itself to 
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essentializing and, ultimately, undermines the possibility of critical nationhood, an act 
that requires reflection and, more importantly, the freedom to change.11 
Though Lincoln and Ruoff’s early work are but two examples of scholarship that 
risk essentializing tribal communities and ignores tribal nationhood, the work of scholars 
who trade in hybridity theory go a step further and not only essentialize but in some cases 
actively resist tribal nationhood. Scholars of hybrid theory such as Louis Owens 
(Choctaw-Cherokee-Irish)12 and Elvira Pulitano turned the focus of literary criticism to 
questions of identity rather than politics, Owens crafting his “mixedblood” theory and 
Pulitano insisting that scholars such as those who developed American Indian Literary 
Nationalism who are ancestrally mixed somehow “confess” their hybridity instead of 
advocating for their tribal nations.13 I engage Owens who has examined a “mixedblood” 
identity that is processual and the result of both historical and cultural determinants. 
Owens’ collection of essays Mixedblood Messages: Literature, Film, Family, Place 
(2001) assembles his thoughts on the hybrid identity expressed by “mixedbloods” like 
himself who through family photos and narratives craft their identities not as Choctaw or 
Cherokee in Owens’ case, but as a “mixedblood.” This abstraction is an identity unto 
itself, a liminal hybrid identity informed by Indian and European strains while not fully 
existing in either space. Owens’ mixedblood is a deviation from the idea of a “pure” 
Indian identity to which those of mixed ancestry cannot reconcile themselves; therefore, 
“mixedblood” becomes a new point of reconciliation. The following passage highlights 
both his idea of the mixedblood and how he figures himself as one. He writes: 
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 I come from families of mixedbloods, Oklahoma Cherokee on my mother’s side 
 and Mississippi Choctaw on my father’s. Anyone who has ever tried to mix 
 disparate elements knows that it is very hard to achieve a pure blend. In the 
 end, despite the long struggle for ‘survivance,’ there are empty gaps and voids, 
 dangerous pockets of  emptiness that can burst unpredictably, but the process of 
 mixing itself requires motion, the swirl of the blender, the whirl of  contrary 
 elements in the bucket or bowl. Mixedbloods, I am suggesting, are the 
 products of motion. (149) 
Here, Owens’ mixedblood is not only the result of the cultural blending that produced 
him, but this blending is also a process that the mixedblood undergoes as he tries to make 
sense of what he sees as disparate identities operating inside him.  
Just as Cook-Lynn has long been an advocate for reading tribal literature in 
nationalist ways, she also has been outspoken against “mixedblood” authors who 
supplant literature’s political potential with an obsession over identity.14 In a 1998 
keynote address at Yale, Cook-Lynn spoke about a body of Indian literature and 
scholarship that she deems a deficit in terms of the tribal community and the political 
realities they face – the promotion of an individual and, some might argue, depoliticized 
“mixedblood” identity in literature of the last couple of decades that not only fails to 
ethically uphold tribal nations, but creates characters who are “pathetic.” She adds that a 
focus on individual identity detracts from more relevant and urgent concerns in both the 
Native Studies field and tribal nations. On the issue of identity in literature and literary 
criticism, Cook-Lynn has argued that only tribal governments can assign Indian identity 
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because the federally recognized state is the apparatus through which Indians procure 
their political rights. She writes: 
 The truth is, the endless argument over ‘Who is an Indian’ is the poorest coin we 
 trade with as responsible scholars in the disciplines because it is not our question 
 to answer, nor our commodity to buy or sell. It is a question which belongs to the 
 First Nations of America, as it always has since the beginning of time, not to 
 scholars, professors, agents, publishers, nor to self-proclaimers. (“Literary” 39)  
 Like Cook-Lynn, I agree that questions of individual identity are meaningless in an 
ethical production of literature and criticism, that is unless they find a way to reconcile 
the conversation to the immediate realities and needs of the tribal communities. 
 While I certainly understand and respect Owens’ argument that identity is a 
process and is socially and historically informed, I also can empathize with Cook-Lynn’s 
perspective and see why she would tire of it all. If Cook-Lynn’s charge is that Indian 
literature and literary criticism be useful to Indian communities and attend to the 
communities’ political needs, a charge I take seriously, I have trouble accounting for how 
novels and studies that focus on individual identity offer anything in this service.  
Similarly, I fail to see how articulating a distinct, at times self-indulgent, identity as a 
“mixedblood” reflects a tribal commitment or serves the tangible needs of a tribal 
community when the identity itself is constructed outside the tribal body. While a 
“mixedblood” identity might psychologically empower individuals, I fail to see how it 
empowers nations. By telling his story from a “mixedblood,” not a specifically Choctaw 
position, he stands to dispossess other Choctaws in a similar position of a point from 
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which they can imagine themselves as part of a critical Choctaw nationhood. Owens 
could have just as soon – and arguably more responsibly – called his collection Choctaw 
Messages and have created in literary form a site of critical Choctaw nationhood that 
attends to the same concerns he outlines and that other Choctaw readers in his position 
could learn from and find a place for themselves as part of the Choctaw body. This 
perspective is more empowering both to the individual and the tribal body than a mere 
reckoning of an individual identity that happens to be partially informed by Choctaw 
ancestry. This approach would have made the collection a literary form of nationhood 
instead of a depoliticized account of someone with mixed Choctaw ancestry trying to 
maintain a foothold in both Indian and European spaces. My study of Cherokee authors 
accounts for the social and historical realities that Owens identifies and the competing 
narratives that inform identity, but in each of these authors I see and explore that identity 
specifically as a Cherokee identity, not a depoliticized abstraction that is only informed 
by an author’s Cherokee ancestry.  
 Similarly, I engage American Indian Literary Nationalism because the evidence 
of the damage incurred by rationalizing away tribal nationhood has unfortunately been 
recorded for posterity in Pulitano’s problematically titled book Toward a Native 
American Critical Theory (2003). Throughout her study, Pulitano argues that because 
Indians are “hybrids,” racially, culturally and intellectually, there can exist no tribal-
national discourse or perspective, and Indian scholars must recognize an inherent 
complicity in operating through what she claims is a dominant discourse. She adds that a 
tribal-specific approach, as explicitly advocated and preferred by Womack, for example, 
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is not only impossible, but is also another form of essentialism.15 She writes: “Any form 
of discourse involving notions of tradition, sovereignty, and commitment to communities 
should first acknowledge the level of complicity between Native intellectuals . . . and the 
dominant academic discourse” (76). Pulitano’s belief here is that as scholars we 
recognize, and in doing so privilege, dominant discourses and concede her claim that 
because Indians are not “pure” in a sense that she imagines, the “flies in amber” as 
Weaver notes, that there can therefore never exist a truly tribal-national approach to 
examining literature in ways that attend to tribal communities’ needs. Womack, of 
course, points out the absurdity of such a claim when he notes that it is impossible to 
teach Blackfeet or Creek students, as he has, and tell them to their faces that there is no 
Indian or tribal perspective.16 If, as Weaver explains, the goal of American Indian 
Literary Nationalism is to privilege indigenous perspectives as a way to study and teach 
Native subjects in ways that aid in the real-world struggles of tribal communities, we 
have to employ approaches that not only acknowledge tribal discourses, but also allow 
them to manifest as the communities see fit.17 It is in this regard that I align my study 
with the values of American Indian Literary Nationalism. 
 Lest I be accused in my analysis of earlier scholars of “presentism,” or of using 
my position today to take to task those who espoused perspectives that were perfectly 
acceptable in their time, I remind readers that these words are still in print and still 
circulating and that, as Womack memorably demonstrates in his thorough critique of 
Pulitano’s work, these words have real-world effects. It’s precisely because of these 
effects that I privilege American Indian Literary Nationalism because I believe that, at 
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least for now, it is the framework that provides the most potential for scholars of Native 
American and indigenous literature to do responsible work that can empower tribal 
nations.  
 
Nation(s), imagined and lived, and their stakes 
 Cook-Lynn is correct in her assessment that the tribal nation is the apparatus 
through which Indian communities secure their treaty rights and, therefore, writers and 
scholars of Indian literature are responsible for upholding the tribal nation. However, as 
history – and this study – shows, the tribal nation as an apparatus, at least defined in 
terms of a state as it presently is, is susceptible to manipulation, oppressive excesses and 
outright destruction both from without and from within. Such potential perils often are 
written in national narratives that privilege one community demographic over other 
people, or one system of defining nationhood over other possibilities, necessitating the 
need for counter-narratives that critically engage the nation in ways that make the tribal 
nation more formidable, equitable and that, in the end, better uphold its national 
sovereignty.  As such, while supporting the tribal nation and its sovereignty is a worthy 
and necessary endeavor, an uncritical acceptance of the nation as the only framework 
through which to articulate not only political rights but also communal belonging is not 
only methodologically myopic but also ethically flawed. 
 Indeed, when we examine the history of the development of nations, it becomes 
clear that both the ideological concept and the lived reality of the nation are often 
inextricably tethered to a history of violence and abuse. My work considers these 
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histories of oppression and marginalization in the name of nationhood and sovereignty 
and how such oppression is disseminated, rationalized and justified through the 
privileging of national narratives. More specifically, I focus on how the United States has 
used its sovereign might to write tribal nations into a position of truncated sovereignty 
and political sideration and how the Cherokee Nation has used its sovereign status to craft 
national narratives that usher queer Cherokees to the margins and erase the descendants 
of Cherokee Freedmen from the page. 
 Though in this study I focus on these narratives of oppression at the more 
microcosmic level of the United States and the Cherokee Nation, my analysis of 
nationalism on a broader scale is informed by the work of scholars such as Partha 
Chatterjee and Ernst Renan who have examined, respectively, the role of violence in 
forming nations and the subsequent forgetting of said violence as a way to maintain the 
nations’ presence and power. I also draw on Renan’s argument that the central 
component of nationhood is the will of the people to behave as a nation. My framework 
of general nationhood in this study is a composite of Chatterjee and Renan’s theories 
through which I argue that in order for nations to manifest, the will of one group often 
trumps the will of others through acts of violence and oppression, which then leads to the 
“vanquished” group(s) being written to the margins in the subsequent national narrative.18 
To highlight the violence with which Chatterjee associates nationhood, I point to a 
passage from his book Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative 
Discourse (1993) in which he asserts:  
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 Nationalism as an ideology is irrational, narrow, hateful and destructive. It is not 
 an authentic product of any of the non-European civilizations, which, in each 
 particular case, it claims as its classical heritage. It is wholly a European export to 
 the rest of the world. It is also one of Europe’s most pernicious exports, for it is 
 not a child of reason or liberty, but of their opposite: of fervent romanticism, of 
 political messianism whose inevitable consequence is the annihilation of freedom. 
 (11) 
While I concur with the general thought of this passage, it does bring up a couple of 
points with which I contend, one being the issue of “authenticity” and the European 
derivation of nationhood with regard to tribal nations. While Chatterjee disowns 
European notions of nationhood for what he considers colonized communities on the 
basis of their origin, I again turn to Womack who has argued that tribal nations, though 
many are constitutional in a European sense, are no less “authentic” for having adopted 
this model nor do we necessarily need to avoid European epistemologies.19 Likewise, 
while Chatterjee takes for granted that nationalism is itself always violent, my study 
considers alternative methods of reckoning tribal nationalism such as those described by 
Jace Weaver (Cherokee), Daniel Heath Justice (Cherokee Nation), Jeff Corntassel 
(Cherokee Nation), Taiaiake Alfred (Mohawk) and Robert Warrior (Osage) among others 
that they build on a foundation of Indian, tribally-derived or strategically-appropriated 
European principles that operate outside of the settler-state model.20 Such a staunch 
position on nationhood that Chatterjee takes, while useful at times, can also be delimiting 
as Simon During notes. During writes: “To reject nationalism absolutely or to refuse to 
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discriminate between nationalisms is to accede to a way of thought by which intellectuals 
– especially postcolonial intellectuals – cut themselves off from political action” (139). I 
agree with During here, who I can see in conversation with Cook-Lynn, that a rejection 
of nationhood is a rejection of political efficacy. However, lest I appear to be at once 
invoking Chatterjee then throwing him under the bus, I agree with the core of his 
statement that nationalism as it is developed through a settler-colonial apparatus such as 
the contemporary tribal state lends itself to the same oppression that he attributes to the 
forming of other nations and their subsequent states that inevitably privilege the will of 
one over the will of many. I invoke Chatterjee here to offer a theory for readers to 
consider while I discuss later the United States’ undermining of tribal nations in the 
narrative of its own nation-building as well as the marginalization of the Freedmen and 
queer Cherokees as the Cherokee Nation further develops its own sense of nationhood, 
specifically through the privileging of singular national narratives. I then demonstrate 
how Cherokee writers use their literature as a way write critical nationhood through 
counter-narratives that resist the oppression that Chatterjee ascribes to nationhood as it 
develops in a settler relationship. 
 Writing these critical, ethical nations from the margins is important because, as 
Renan argues, the nation run by a privileged sector of the wider community mandates the 
forgetting of the oppression or violence, such as that described by Chatterjee, that formed 
the nation to begin with.21 Renan writes: 
 Forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in 
 the creation of a nation . . . . Indeed, historical enquiry brings to light deeds of 
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 violence which took place at the origin of all political formations, even of those 
 whose consequences have been altogether beneficial. . . . . Yet the essence of a 
 nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have 
 forgotten many things. No French citizen knows whether he is a Burgundian, an 
 Alan, a Taifale, or a Visigoth, yet every French citizen has to have forgotten the 
 massacre of Saint Bartholomew. (“What is a Nation?” 11)  
Here Renan asserts that in terms of peoplehood, no French citizen can supply proof of, 
and perhaps no French citizen even knows, from which specific ethnic group he or she 
descends. However, in order to coalesce as a singular “French” nation, acts of horrific 
violence committed by one group of people against others must be erased and replaced by 
a new national narrative that explains the origin of the new “French” nation. This study 
examines similar narrative moves by the United States and the Cherokee Nation that 
depend on strategic forgetting in order to promulgate a single national narrative written 
and disseminated at the expense of the stories of lived experience from subjugated groups 
within the nations. Where nations exist through forgetting, stories can spark memory and 
initiate action to make the nation live up to its ethical potential.  
 This interpretation of nationhood that I use at this point in my study refers to the 
“modern” nation developed on European concepts as outlined by scholars such as 
Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm.22 As Scott Lyons (Ojibwe-
Dakota) reminds us, however, Indian nations before European encroachment indeed were 
nations too, but he refers to their sense of nationhood as one of cultural resistance.23 He 
notes that while Indians were frequently cast as subjects of other sovereigns, churches or 
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corporations, these relationships were founded on treaty-making from a nation-to-nation 
position.24 This fact demands the question that Lyons poses: “If our old-time Indians 
weren’t nations in the way we think of nations today (which is, remember, always a very 
modern thing to do), what were they? Or, more to the point, what were they doing?” 
(118-119). This question demands that we think about how tribal nations viewed 
themselves as distinct political and cultural entities pre-1492 and to consider the 
implications of recasting contemporary tribal nationhood in terms that exist outside of the 
European-derived state model, a task I take up in the first half of this study. Lyons does, 
however, argue that the Indian nation as we know it is “as modern as anyone else’s 
nation, but that doesn’t mean its origins aren’t as old as the hills” (121). I pay close 
attention here to Lyon’s assertion of tribal nations being as “old as the hills,” a statement 
that locates tribal nationhood not with the state model that exists today, a model that 
Renan and Chatterjee show to be vulnerable to violence and oppression, but rather with 
the land, an entity that is neither violent nor oppressive; it simply is. Where states are 
imagined and are, thus, open to interpretation, manipulation and at worst erasure, the land 
is permanent and tangible. I consider methods of redefining critical tribal nationhood in 
ways that take into consideration tribal epistemologies, land being one factor, and that, as 
a result, have the potential to build the nation outside of a model that is open to 
oppression.  
However, to think of modern tribal nationhood only in such terms elides that fact 
that, to date, the tribal nation – the one that Cook-Lynn asserts is the apparatus through 
which Indians obtain rights – is tied to the state model. And indeed, states are unlikely to 
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go anywhere any time soon. During argues that “the nation-state is, for better or worse, 
the political institution which has the most efficacy and legitimacy in the world as it is. 
Modernity reproduces itself in nation-states, [and] there are few signs of it happening 
otherwise” (“Literature” 139). The nation-state, for now, is here to stay. And as I 
mentioned earlier, the rights that Cook-Lynn argues for are articulated and conferred 
through the state, an imaginary and sometimes oppressive model of framing nationhood. 
This fact demands that we examine tribal nationhood from this reality; however, from 
there we can imagine critical, ethical nationhood outside this model. I engage Cherokee 
literature to see how Cherokee writers, and how we as readers, can argue for and obtain 
rights outside of a state model and through a more critical, ethical model of nationhood. 
At the core of my analysis is the argument that if narratives can oppress, counter-
narratives can liberate. Indeed, Ben Okri (Urhobo) asserts this claim in his collection A 
Way of Being Free (1997). He writes that, “we live by stories, we also live in them . . . . 
We live stories that either give our lives meaning or negate it with meaninglessness. If we 
change the stories we live by, quite possibly we change our lives” (47). This study, 
therefore, considers the theory of “ethically constitutive stories” as developed by political 
scientist Rogers Smith who reiterates the role of national narratives in the subjugation of 
marginalized communities. He writes: “Even when people’s statuses are being imposed 
by direct coercive power, those wielding that power inevitably rely on some sorts of 
stories or accounts of how their political society should be constituted . . . . There cannot 
be ‘imagined communities’ without mental images of what those communities should be 
and who should be in them” (48). In this passage, Smith refers to Benedict Anderson’s 
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theory of nations being “imagined communities,” or an entity of people who perceive 
themselves as existing as a nation.25 However, he inserts the element of narrative 
privilege into the project of nation-building and demonstrates how stories parse out who 
is going to be a part of the nation and what status they are narratively fated to occupy. 
Smith adds that such national narratives inform the real-world implications that some 
communities will experience by being included or excluded from the nation. He writes 
that privileged national narratives “clarify and justify to [those in power] who is to be 
conquered, who is to be turned away or expelled, who is to be segregated or killed, and 
who is instead to be fully included as an equal” (48). As a result of this narrative 
endgame that oppresses some members of a nation while extoling others, Smith invokes a 
theory of “ethically constitutive stories” that can operate as a counter-narrative. These 
stories, as Smith explains, focus on traits of people that the people deem inherently 
valuable that inform belonging in their nation and inspire a sense of worth. Specifically, 
he refers to religion, language, history and ancestry among other factors that can 
constitute a group’s identity “in ways that both affirm their worth and delineate their 
obligations” (65). Smith’s ethically constitutive stories, then, focus not on the 
asymmetrical power relations that Chatterjee and Renan argue are inherent in 
nationalism, but rather on the elements that inform how a people define themselves using 
terms derived by themselves.26 One interesting element of ethically constitutive stories is 
that, unlike historical narratives in which certain facts can be proved or disproved, the 
narrative in an ethically constitutive story does not always, and sometimes need not, 
conform to the rigidity of empirical evidence. An example Smith points to is of Jewish 
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people believing they are “God’s chosen people.” While many Jewish people subscribe to 
this belief, and this story informs in part how Jewish people view themselves as a distinct 
group, there simply is no way of empirically proving or disproving whether a higher 
power has in fact chosen to act more favorably toward Jewish people over other ethnic 
groups. Nonetheless, such a story maintains its purchase in the formation of a Jewish 
sense of self, however empirically agnostic. I extend this phenomenon of the ethically 
constitutive story by suggesting that because we can neither prove nor disprove the 
narrative itself, the ethical step in terms of constructing critical tribal nationhood is to 
choose narratives, or rather choose among competing interpretations of these ethically 
constitutive stories, that have the potential to effect the greatest ethical good in the 
nation.27  In thinking about the role of story as a counter-narrative of critical nationhood 
against privileged national narratives, I am reminded of Chicana scholar Emma Perez’ 
thoughts on the mutable quality of stories and how stories can effect positive change by 
invoking the imagination and transcending the arbitrary (and often Western informed) 
confines of the real versus the imagined. Perez opens her landmark study The Decolonial 
Imaginary: Writing Chicanas into History (1995) by critiquing the discipline of history as 
one that privileges colonial narratives as fact before arguing that the “historical” narrative 
is only one story out of many. She further argues that subjugated groups can use their 
own narratives as a means to decolonize themselves. Perez writes: “There is no pure, 
authentic, or original history. There are only stories. That is not to say that the stories are 
not real and are only imagined in a post-modern sense . . . That which is real for some is 
imaginary for another, especially if the wish is to rectify that decades later” (xv). Here, 
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Perez speaks to the possibility of counter-narratives to rectify colonial wrongs by 
challenging the privileged narrative. In the case of the Cherokee writers I’m studying, I 
engage their narratives of nationhood as a form of oppositional consciousness28 and the 
articulation of their rights from the U.S. and Cherokee states – and the act of imagined 
sovereignty through writing – as a form of resistance that ultimately informs the 
formation of a more ethical nation.  
While I see the benefit of critically analyzing national narratives, I am aware of 
the controversy of the practice, especially in Native Studies. Cook-Lynn has argued that 
the question of who is Indian is not one for scholars to address and that scholars of Native 
Studies have a responsibility to view it strictly in terms of the political rights of a 
recognized nation. However, before one can conceive of the rights inherent to Indians 
through sovereignty and national citizenship, one has to contend with the state narratives 
that outline what a sovereign tribal nation is and who is a citizen to begin with, and by 
what terms he or she is depicted, or not, in that narrative. Additionally, as several have 
noted29, the nation-only approach forecloses on other methods of demanding political 
rights and other narratives of critical nationhood, as if Indians cannot think of themselves 
as a people and advocate for their rights without an administrative body that is beholden 
to the federal government for continued recognition. I engage this line of argument in the 
early chapters that depict how Cherokees had to create counter-narratives outside of a 
sovereign nation model during the risk of Termination when several Indian nations no 
longer had that model to use. 
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 Taiaiake Alfred (Mohawk) expands on the perils of a singular approach, in this 
case through nation and the excesses of sovereignty, by arguing that it elides other 
indigenous ways of imagining critical nationhood and the assertion of political goals. I 
examine this line of thinking more closely in the latter half of the project that deals with 
privileged Cherokee state narratives. Alfred writes: 
 The unquestioned acceptance of sovereignty as the framework for politics today 
 reflects the triumph of a particular set of ideas over others . . . Justice demands 
 recognition – intellectual, legal, and political – of the diversity of languages and 
 knowledge that exist among people, indigenous peoples’ ideas about 
 relationships and power commanding the same respect as those that used to 
 constitute the singular reality of the state . . . The idea that there is only one right 
 way to see or do things is no longer tenable. (62-3) 
Perhaps justice is the endgame of this particular debate, a goal that Alfred argues cannot 
be achieved by theorizing politics and tribal reckoning in only one way. Because ideas of 
critical and ethical nationhood amount to more than theoretical abstracts and have real 
effects on real people, the line between embracing these narratives and critiquing them is 
one to tread carefully. 
 With this idea in mind, it is essential that in the end the work we do as scholars 
ultimately supports the social and political goals of those Indian communities. In his 
landmark essay “Towards a National Indian Literature: Cultural Authenticity in 
Nationalism,” Simon Ortiz (Acoma) outlines the stakes and the aim of American Indian 
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Literary Nationalism, a practice, as I’ve said, I am not only indebted to but one to which I 
dedicate this project and future endeavors. Ortiz writes: 
 It is also because of an acknowledgement of Indian writers of a responsibility to 
 advocate for their peoples’ self-government, sovereignty, and control of land and 
 natural resources; and to look also at racism, political and economic oppression, 
 sexism, supremacism, and the needless and wasteful exploitation of land and 
 people, especially in the U.S., that Indian literature is developing a character of 
 nationalism which indeed it should have. (12) 
Ortiz outlines the tangible stakes scholars must keep in the front of their minds, and 
Cook-Lynn argues that only a focus on recognized, administrative nations can ensure that 
we responsibly advocate for the political rights that address these issues. One has to 
consider, however, the risk of wholesale support of this model in cases in which the 
Indian nations themselves manipulate national narratives and policy as a way to 
disenfranchise its constituents. In cases such as these, we must take care not to place the 
blame squarely on the concepts of nationhood or peoplehood, but rather attribute it to the 
individuals who are responsible for such abuses. In an interview with Alfred, Vine 
Deloria, Jr. (Standing Rock Sioux), expresses disdain at Indians’ lack of willingness to 
hold their leaders accountable when they act unethically. Deloria argues: “‘Before 
Western individualism took over, people were held accountable by their family, clan, and 
community, and they used shame to bring people around. Today we are so polarized 
between Indian and white that no one dares criticize an Indian leader publicly, so we let 
them get away with murder’” (qtd. in Alfred 69). Deloria continues his argument by 
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suggesting a return to alternative forms of peoplehood, which, I argue, can extend into 
critical forms of ethical tribal nationhood. Deloria adds: 
 We should teach the old clan and kinship responsibilities, and make deliberate 
 efforts to carry them out, perhaps even set up some deadlines to accomplish 
 certain kinds of goals – calling people within the family by the relative name, like 
 ‘father’ or ‘sister,’ and reviving the custom of doing things for them. Then we can 
 move on to more complicated things. There was a sense of civility that the old 
 traditional ways brought that we do not have now, and we should return to them. 
 (68) 
I quote Deloria at length because I believe in these same goals and refer to these ideas to 
show how literature can be a tool that imagines nationhood and the incorporation of 
marginalized groups in a way that attends to Deloria’s concerns. At the heart of both of 
Deloria’s points is the collection of political rights that are at stake in the conversation 
with narratives people use, or those that are imposed on them. These are the stakes and 
causes we are responsible for considering and upholding. But responsibility cuts two 
ways. In our mission to uphold these political rights for Indian nations, communities, and 
individuals, we must also critique the institutions and individuals who manipulate these 
narratives in unethical ways. That said, my goal with this project is not only to examine 
how Cherokee writers conceive counter-narratives of critical, ethical nationhood, but also 
how those concepts of nationhood that emerge from them, reflected through literature, 
create a tool for recognizing, acquiring, promoting – even demanding – political rights. 
 31 
My aim is to demonstrate the usefulness of analyzing these works and how they 
reckon counter-narratives of critical nationhood, ultimately arriving at how these 
narratives speak specifically to theories of tribal peoplehood. My approach in this 
analysis keeps in mind the charges raised by Alfred and Warrior to critique the excesses 
of sovereignty and privileged narratives, but balances it with Ortiz and Cook-Lynn’s 
charge that our work be responsible and keep the health of the tribe at the center. A 
literary study can serve these functions when the literature is examined with these real 
world implications in mind. For example, Cherokee playwright Lynn Riggs once 
expressed the demand that literary work, in his case drama and theatrical productions, 
extend beyond entertainment and instead reflect a responsibility to a greater society. He 
writes: “The theatre is an excellent medium through which to attack or embrace the 
world. Any play which makes no attempt to realize this function is bad.  It is 
intellectually shoddy to use the theatre for entertainment alone” (qtd. in Braunlich 151). 
While I cannot argue authorial intent, my aim is to show how the authors’ works of 
literature in this study could be used to imagine critical nationhood that could have 
existential effects in the world. 
 
Methodology 
To achieve this analysis, I will hone in on four key points in Cherokee history 
when privileged narratives of nationhood, Cherokee and U.S., have been variously 
deployed and resisted, challenged and actively redefined. Because one of my primary 
arguments deals with narratives of peoplehood and nationhood outside of the state model, 
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I begin this study in the 1950s at the height of the Termination and Relocation programs 
when the concept of a sovereign tribal nation as a political apparatus was rapidly waning. 
The other historical points I will examine are the era of the late 1960s and early 1970s 
that include the growing American Indian Movement and the reinstating of the Cherokee 
Nation’s political sovereignty.  
I also examine the contemporary moment in which the privileged state narrative, 
with regard to the Freedmen descendants and the position of queer Cherokees, is 
presently being challenged and redefined. I analyze here how the Cherokee writers of 
these eras negotiate these competing narratives and how their creation of counter-
narratives through literature attends to the political goals of the day. My goal, however, is 
not to confine my analysis to a historical rendering, but rather to avoid such a voyeuristic 
approach by focusing on Riggs’ directive and asking how the various narratives 
expressed in these works engage the surrounding political environment. Additionally, my 
desire is to analyze these Cherokee works in a way to demonstrate how they, and by 
extension my study of them, can be useful to Indian communities as a tool to teach and, 
most importantly, challenge ideas of the creation and privileging of some national 
narratives and offer a record of how necessary counter-narratives of critical nationhood 
have emerged in the past. 
 To this end, I have chosen authors who are all Cherokee and who write, either 
implicitly or explicitly, about ways to create critical nationhood. Each of these writers has 
a close relationship to issues of Cherokee nationhood, ranging from Robert K. Thomas, 
who dedicated his life to reclaiming Cherokee tribal customs and practice during 
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politically hostile moments, to the Freedmen descendants who have had their Cherokee 
status intermittently affirmed and challenged throughout history.  
 My method considers Womack’s charge that we both recognize and respect, and 
subsequently privilege, tribal-specific perspectives where we can. As Womack notes in 
Red on Red: Native American Literary Separatism (1999), the stakes of recognizing tribal 
communities’ right to interpret their work and themselves through their own 
epistemologies are great, namely sovereignty. Womack’s description of how and why 
Creeks privilege their origin stories over origin theories developed and espoused by non-
Creek scholars reflects my own choice to privilege work by Cherokees and indigenous 
people in this study. He writes: 
 For many Creeks, their own narratives about Creek origins are more important for 
 explaining Creek beginnings than the anthropological and historical mythologies. 
 This is  a right that belongs to Creeks and other Native people. When Creek 
 people assume they have the inherent right to interpret their own literature and 
 history, even when their interpretations differ from those of dominant culture, 
 they are setting themselves apart as a nation of people with distinct worldviews 
 that deserve to be taken seriously. This is an important exercise of sovereignty. 
 (29) 
Taking this charge from Womack into account, I first sought out sources for this study 
who are Cherokee, including Cherokee literary scholars, lawyers, political scientists and 
sociologists. I then privilege the work and perspectives of non-Cherokee Indians and 
global indigenous communities before finally engaging non-Native sources. My choice to 
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use sources grounded in Cherokee, American Indian/indigenous and non-Native 
perspectives, in that order, should not be read as a hierarchy of value. I do not posit that a 
Native scholar’s work is inherently more valuable than that of non-Natives, and I 
certainly don’t believe the reverse. As Womack clearly shows in Red on Red, despite 
some non-Native scholars like Arnold Krupat30 and Robert Dale Parker’s31 apparent 
inability to see it, non-Native sources are valuable and can be usefully employed so long 
as the end justifies the means, the end being scholarship that upholds tribal nationhood 
and attends to the real needs of a tribal community.32 My privileging of Native sources 
and inclusion of non-Native sources follows the “kitchen table” model expressed by Lisa 
Brooks (Abenaki) in that I welcome the input of guests so long as they mind their 
manners in the host’s home and reciprocate the hospitality in responsible, ethical ways.33  
Finally, my methodology will include analyses of under-examined authors such as 
Robert Thomas and Natachee Momaday who have been largely ignored in the criticism, 
but who have important perspectives to consider. Additionally, because our field is by its 
nature interdisciplinary, a study of narratives of critical nationhood demands a study of 
the group in a variety of human contexts.34 To this end, my project will examine other 
non-fiction writing by Cherokees such as Thomas’ anthropological works and the WPA 
narratives of Cherokee Freedmen, alongside works of fiction that appear in more 
conventional literary analyses. As Warrior notes in The People and the Word: Reading 
Native Nonfiction (2005), the bulk of writing by American Indians historically has been 
non-fiction, and it often speaks in a direct way to Indian experience, which Warrior 
deems as a crucial framework for literary criticism.35 Warrior writes: “Nonficiton writers 
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have brought us impassioned pleas on behalf of Native peoples, accounts of crucial 
moments in Native history, profiles of people in contemporary Native communities, and 
explorations of dysfunctions, like substance abuse, in the Native world” (xx). These 
examples of Native non-fiction, he adds, reflect Native experience and are thus worthy of 
critical attention. Along this line, I engage a wide breadth of Cherokee literature, fiction 
and non-fiction36, to demonstrate the ways that crafting counter-narratives of critical 
nationhood is at the forefront and expressed through literature as a practice of nationhood 
in a manner to carry Cherokees through the trials of the day. Finally, my methodology 
and purpose for this project is indebted to the work of Jeff Corntassel (Cherokee Nation) 
who argues for the need for scholars to create work that is pragmatically applicable and 
that has a chance to effect useful, existential change in the world, even if some in the 
academy continue to resist such a charge and dismiss it as polemic or activism.37  
 
Chapter summaries 
 The first two chapters show Cherokee writers engaging critical nationhood at a 
time when the Cherokee Nation had yet to be fully reinstated politically, and the last two 
chapters examine the Cherokee Nation operating as a tribal sovereign that, unfortunately, 
oppresses its Freedmen and queer communities. While several studies examine the 
formation and change of the Cherokee Nation prior to the beginning point of my analysis, 
the 1950s, I begin with the era of Termination and Relocation because it was a time when 
the state apparatus of tribal nationhood was most recently threatened. I begin with this 
 36 
period to highlight the need for imagining critical nationhood because this period shows 
us that nationhood as articulated through the state model is always vulnerable.38 
This study begins with an analysis of the writings of Cherokee anthropologist 
Robert K. Thomas. Writing in the 1950s at the height of post-World War II termination 
of tribal nations, Thomas examined ways that Cherokees and other Indians could 
articulate themselves as a distinct people and how through that construct they could also 
advocate for their political rights that are outlined in treaties.39 Thomas began his prolific 
career at a time when the apparatus of a federally recognized Indian nation was 
deteriorating before his eyes during a period of immense U.S. patriotism and a renewed 
pride on the part of mainstream America in its pioneer history and the nation’s expansion 
across the continent.40  Throughout his 40-year career, Thomas contended with the need 
to articulate shifting notions of Cherokee peoplehood and how to use those ideas of 
peoplehood to ensure Cherokee survival and political efficacy in the era of termination 
and relocation, and beyond. 
 My study of Thomas in this section focuses primarily on his 1953 thesis that 
details the history of the Redbird Smith Movement. Considering the time he was writing 
about the movement and the events that surrounded the Redbird Smith Movement itself, I 
draw comparisons between Indian Territory during the movement and the environment 
around the termination era of the 1950s and argue that just as Smith exhorted Cherokees 
to remain a tribal unit, Thomas also advocates for Cherokees of the day to retain their 
tribal practices even as the communities are being fractured. Through this examination, I 
argue that Thomas creates a Cherokee narrative that challenges the U.S. assimilation 
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narrative of the time and creates a space where Cherokees can effect critical nationhood 
by holding on to tribal ways as the U.S. attempts to make them vanish. I examine through 
his early work how his focus on Cherokee-specific traditions and tribalism functioned as 
his frame for articulating Cherokee peoplehood at a time when the U.S. initiated policies 
to reassign specific tribal identities into a catch-all U.S. identity. Both socially and 
politically, Indians could never truly belong in this reckoning of assimilated identity, but 
the program nonetheless attempted to fulfill the federal government’s mission of Indian 
erasure and the abnegation of the government’s responsibility to indigenous 
communities. I argue that as the U.S. began to strip away at the narrative of Indian 
political sovereignty by terminating individual Indian nations, Indians themselves began 
to gather intertribally and narrate their position from a civil rights discourse once the 
recognized nation model was no longer available. 
 Thomas was born in 1925 in Kentucky to Cherokee parents. His family left 
Kentucky during the Great Depression and settled in Oklahoma near the Arkansas River 
where Thomas was raised from childhood near his maternal Cherokee grandparents who 
brought him up to speak Cherokee. After serving with the Marines in the Pacific theater 
during World War II, Thomas worked on the railroad and in copper mines in Arizona 
where he later enrolled in the University of Arizona and earned a degree in geography. 
He later earned a Master’s degree in anthropology and wrote his thesis on the Redbird 
Smith Movement. He then enrolled in the anthropology program at the University of 
Chicago where he became an activist anthropologist. Thomas left for North Carolina to 
conduct fieldwork with Cherokees in the east, and he never finished his doctoral studies. 
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 Thomas accepted a teaching position in Detroit, and in the late 1950s and 1960s, 
he organized several workshops for Indian students where they discussed issues that 
affected the tribal population. He also played a major role in organizing the American 
Indian Chicago Conference in 1961 where Indians and non-Indian allies gathered to 
discuss federal Indian policy and possible changes. Thomas returned to Arizona in 1981 
to teach at the University of Arizona where he established one of the earliest graduate 
programs in American Indian studies. Throughout his tenure he strived academically to 
create more space for American Indian studies. At a political and personal level, he 
worked to engage various tribal nations and people to work together to combat the 
political undermining and cultural erasure of Indians perpetrated by the U.S. through 
assimilation programs such as those mentioned earlier. As a Cherokee, Thomas strived to 
demonstrate the vitality and importance of Cherokee epistemologies both to outsiders and 
Cherokees themselves, working in areas of Cherokee-language revitalization and 
reintroducing Cherokee spiritual practices, culminating in the return of the Sacred Fire to 
the Eastern Band Cherokees in 1990 for their Green Corn Ceremony. He died the 
following year. 
 While Thomas’ prolific career spanned four decades, my study of his work will 
focus on his writing from the early 1950s. I examine the models of how Thomas 
reckoned Cherokee peoplehood and the politics that extended from it outside of the 
federally recognized nation at a time when the United States was reneging on its political 
obligations to Indians and terminating the political arms of their nations. Likewise, I read 
his work, much of which remains unpublished, through the context of the Indian 
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relocation program that was established to dismantle tribal communities and to assimilate 
them into “mainstream” U.S. life in urban centers such as San Francisco, Chicago, 
Phoenix and Dallas. At a time when the U.S. was dissolving nations and rupturing Indian 
families and other kin communities through relocation, Thomas wrote about the 
importance of tribalism and revisited the Redbird Smith Movement, a movement pursued 
by traditional Keetoowah Cherokees to fight allotment of Cherokee land and the 
subsequent breakup of Cherokee communities before Oklahoma statehood. By analyzing 
Thomas’ work and the social and political realities of the period in which he wrote them, 
I contend with Cook-Lynn’s assessment that the federally recognized nation, a model that 
in many ways is nonetheless beholden to the U.S., is the only apparatus to engage Indian 
political rights. I argue that Thomas’ ideas of Cherokee peoplehood focused not on a 
federally recognized-nation model, but rather on tribal communities’ successfully 
negotiating the political climate of the 1950s through the early 1970s, promoting 
Cherokee culture41 and tradition while also giving Cherokees and intertribal communities 
a platform from which to assert their rights as indigenous people in the United States. 
In Chapter 2, I study the work of Mayme Natachee Scott Momaday whose young-
adult novel The Owl in the Cedar Tree (1965) engages questions of retaining tribal ways 
while adapting to a tribal community’s contemporary needs. Aside from a collection of 
poems, The Owl in the Cedar Tree is Natachee Momaday’s only published work and is 
an understudied contribution to Cherokee letters. I study the narrative alongside the 
economic troubles several tribal nations faced as a result of termination and 
assimilationist policy of the 1950s and 1960s as a way to imagine critical nationhood and 
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advocate for Indian rights. In this chapter, I show how Momaday – and even Thomas by 
this time – were operating as Cherokees within an intertribal collective and how this 
dynamic during the period offered another possibility for Cherokee nationhood and 
resistance to oppressive U.S. state narrative that curtailed Indian political identity and 
rights. Natachee Momaday and her novel, thus far, have only appeared in scholarly 
conversation in a three-page analysis in Jace Weaver’s That the People Might Live: 
Native American Literatures and Native American Community (1997) and two short 
scholarly articles. I aim in this section is to demonstrate the value of her work and to start 
a conversation that I hope will lead to her work being brought to the forefront of 
Cherokee literary studies and Indian children’s literature.  
Momaday was born in Kentucky in 1913 and named after her Cherokee great-
grandmother, Natachee. According to her son, Kiowa-Cherokee author N. Scott 
Momaday, she became interested in her Cherokee ancestry as a teenager and eventually 
left Kentucky to attend the Haskell Institute. After a short stay, she tired of formal 
education and sought to travel and work as a journalist in Indian Country. She later 
married Al Mammetady, a Kiowa whose family disapproved of their union. N. Scott 
Momaday writes: “‘As far as they were concerned, she was an outsider who had 
insinuated herself into their midst, and they set out to make her life miserable’” (38). 
With her in-laws not accepting her, the Momaday’s left for the Navajo Nation, where The 
Owl in the Cedar Tree takes place, after a friend invited them to work there as teachers. 
The family later relocated to Jemez Pueblo where her son, N. Scott Momaday’s, Pulitzer 
Prize-winning novel, House Made of Dawn, takes place.  
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Natachee Momaday’s novel tells the story of Haske, a Navajo boy coming of age, 
who at the outset is described as being pulled between the teachings of his great-
grandfather and the “progressive” ideas of his parents. Weaver refers to the narrative as a 
conflict between “progressives and pullbacks,” and the conflict centers on the boy at a 
time when the circumstances affecting Indians in the U.S. were changing. The narrative 
details one boy’s struggle to situate himself in tribal and colonial worlds and reflects the 
reality that Indians faced in the late 1960s and early 1970s during the Red Power 
Movement. This era was a time when Indian political resistance became more intertribal 
and militant after many Indian veterans had returned from the Vietnam War and found 
that their communities often were no better off than those they left behind in Southeast 
Asia.  
In my analysis of the novel, I argue that Momaday establishes a narrative of 
critical nationhood that allows space for Indians to hold to ancestral traditions and 
practices while incorporating elements of the contemporary day, especially economically, 
as a means to resist, a practice often needed in intertribal communities where individuals’ 
own tribal traditions differ from those of others. Momaday’s experience as a Cherokee 
who worked with the Navajos and Pueblos at this time exemplifies this intertribal 
dynamic that emerged when Indians began fighting not only for their nations but on 
behalf of one another as Indians at a time when the U.S. had terminated political relations 
with many tribal nations. Read alongside such works as D’Arcy McNickle’s (Salish) 
Native American Tribalism: Indian Survivals and Renewals (1973), Momaday’s novel 
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reflects a counter-narrative in which Indians embrace the old and adapt to the new as a 
way to forge ahead and continue to resist.  
I take up the debate over the place of the Cherokee Freedmen as Cherokee 
citizens in Chapter 3 and argue that we can use their stories alongside the Peoplehood 
Matrix, a model of peoplehood developed by Cherokees, to craft a counter-narrative of 
critical nationhood that imagines an ethical Cherokee Nation that includes the Freedmen 
and recognizes their contribution to the Nation. This chapter highlights points of black 
and Cherokee intersection not only in the slave trade in the American South, but it also 
examines the relationships that emerged between the groups as a result of it. I also detail 
the political and legal elements that have defined Cherokee Freedmen identity in the past 
such as the Treaty of 1866 and the Dawes Commission rolls to the current moment when 
Cherokee Freedmen descendants were voted out of the Nation and provisionally 
reinstated pending the outcome of a case that Principal Chief Chad Smith turned over to 
the federal court.  
In this chapter, I analyze a series of Cherokee Freedmen slave narratives that were 
recorded as part of a WPA project in the 1930s – narratives that descendants refer to 
today when articulating themselves as Cherokees – through the lens of Thomas and Tom 
Holm’s (Cherokee Nation) Peoplehood Matrix to see how Cherokee Freedmen have 
forged and maintained a place as Cherokee through history and today. I examine how 
Cherokee Freedmen descendants use ideas similar to those articulated through the 
Peoplehood Matrix to establish a narrative of critical nationhood and to resist the 
privileged state narrative that seeks to erase their presence and participation in Cherokee 
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history. Through the Peoplehood Matrix, I demonstrate how Freedmen conceived of 
themselves as Cherokees through shared land, language, sacred history and ceremonial 
cycle and how this narrative today can challenge the Cherokee state narrative that 
circumscribes black participation in the nation. 
 This citizenship limbo that Cherokee Freedmen descendants find themselves in is 
as old as the 1827 Constitution that legislated that a black woman could not produce a 
Cherokee citizen. However, the current political moment regarding the place of Cherokee 
Freedmen dates to 1980 when then Principal Chief Ross Swimmer, fearing the Freedmen 
descendants would back his political opponent, initiated legislation that required voters to 
produce a CDIB before casting a ballot, effectively disenfranchising black Cherokee 
Freedmen descendants who had previously held citizenship in the Nation.42  
Since that time, Freedmen descendants have been in and out of citizenship and in 
the late 1990s, Freedmen descendants such as Marilyn Vann (Cherokee Nation) and 
others began to organize and advocate for their place and rights as Cherokees. In 2003, 
Principal Chief Chad Smith asked the Cherokee Supreme Court to rule on the Freedmen 
issue. Then-justice Stacy Leeds (Cherokee Nation) ruled that the Cherokee Constitution 
did not specify a blood requirement, only that prospective citizens trace an ancestor to the 
Dawes Rolls, asserting Cherokee Freedmen’s citizenship. In a move similar to 
Swimmer’s, Smith knew the Freedmen would back his opponent – Leeds – in another 
election, and he established a referendum to amend the Cherokee Nation constitution to 
require that citizens trace to an ancestor on the By-Blood portion of the Dawes Roll. 
Though only a small percentage of citizens voted, those who did overwhelmingly chose 
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to vote out the Freedmen again. The Nation, under Smith, rewrote the constitution 
without BIA approval, and after rising discontent from Freedmen descendants and their 
supporters, Smith turned the issue over to the federal court.  
 Apart from the blatantly racist overtones such as those in an e-mail that circulated 
and admonished Cherokee voters to protect their daughters from the “infiltration” of 
black Freedmen, detractors have not only used legal arguments but also contended that 
Freedmen have not had the historic relationship they claim to support their position and 
have no right to the Cherokee estate and citizenship. Freedmen supporters, however, 
argue that the group has had a relationship to the tribal body that was essential to the 
survival of the Nation. 
 In addition to the Freedmen descendants, another group of Cherokees that has had 
its status curtailed by the Cherokee state is the tribe’s gay and lesbian population. In 
Chapter 4, I examine how queer Cherokees have imagined critical nationhood outside of 
the legal circumscription of the Cherokee state narrative by exploring the role that Two 
Spirit-identified Cherokees have played and continue to play in the Nation. For this 
section, my study will focus on Daniel Heath Justice’s (Cherokee Nation) Way of Thorn 
and Thunder trilogy alongside an examination of Two-Spirit and queer theory and 
history. Justice is an outland43 Cherokee citizen who was born and raised in the mining 
town of Victor, Colorado, and presently lives and teaches in Musqueam Territory (or 
“British Columbia,” as the colonizers call it) in Canada, where he is also a citizen.  
 The issue of queer Cherokees resisting the state narrative emerged in the early 
2000s when Kathy Reynolds and Dawn McKinley, both lesbian Cherokee Nation 
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citizens, filed for a marriage license to wed in the Nation and, though it was granted 
initially, the registry office refused to file the completed form on the grounds that 
marriage in the Nation – a kinship relationship – is reserved exclusively for heterosexual 
couples.  Though the couple legally wed, tribal lawyer Todd Hembree (Cherokee Nation) 
filed an injunction against the marriage, claiming that same-sex marriage was illegal, not 
tribally traditional and would tarnish the image of the Cherokee Nation. The Nation 
subsequently adopted its own version of the Defense of Marriage Act and the couple’s 
marriage license remains unregistered. 
The kinship element in the story is vital because prior to this incident, McKinley 
was denied visitation at the hospital when Reynolds fell ill because the state did not 
recognize their relationship as one of family, despite that the couple has been together for 
several years and are raising a child together. This refusal to recognize the couple’s 
kinship relationship, even if it does fall outside of the heteronormative strictures of the 
Cherokee state, speaks to the need for developing counter-narratives to the state to which 
Cherokees can reconcile themselves in order to find a place to open new potential for 
resistance as a wider body of Cherokees. I examine this topic through the lens of kinship, 
marriage being a form of kinship that queer Cherokees are prohibited from practicing, 
and through the traditional roles that Cherokee Two-Spirits have served in their 
communities. Using Justice’s fantasy trilogy, I focus on how Cherokee Two-Spirits 
recover their bodies, per Qwo-Li Driskill’s (Cherokee) theory of “sovereign erotic,” then 
reconcile their kin relationships and roles as Cherokees when the political state denies 
them.  The Cherokee state codified in law the privileging of heteronormative kin 
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relationship and marginalized same-sex relationships. This narrative is the backdrop 
against which I argue that we can use Justice’s fantasy trilogy to articulate a counter- 
narrative that recognizes the value of Two-Spirit Cherokees and creates a space for their 
participation in the Nation. Because the fantasy genre allows for more imagination than a 
historical rendering of an event, Justice is able to use the genre itself as a way to develop 
queered characters who are analogous with Two-Spirit Cherokees today and as such 
demonstrate that gay and Two-Spirit Cherokees have a place in the Nation. In addition to 
the trilogy and the fantasy genre’s facilitation of alternative ways for this community of 
Cherokees to imagine critical nationhood through their roles as Cherokees, I argue that 
the trilogy itself becomes a site through which future Cherokees can find a place in the 
nation and resist both local Cherokee and U.S. federal imposition. 
 Driskill’s article “Stolen From Our Bodies: First Nations Two-Spirits/Queers and 
the Journey to a Sovereign Erotic” (2004) details the need for gay Cherokees and 
Cherokees who identify as Two-Spirit to not only reclaim themselves as Cherokees but to 
start by reconciling themselves to their sexual identities and in doing so, recover their 
sexual bodies from colonial programs such as the conservative Christianity that has been 
adopted by several tribal communities.44  Driskill writes: “I find myself obsessed with the 
notion of ‘home’ on many levels. I have not only been removed from my homeland, I 
have also been removed from my erotic self and continue a journey back to my first 
homeland: the body” (53). By claiming and reconciling the erotic self, Driskill argues, 
one can them reclaim one’s role in a larger community, in this case Two-Spirits 
reclaiming a dual-gendered identity on which their traditional roles depend.  Because 
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Justice’s trilogy deals with Removal and is a fantasy, I am particularly interested in the 
generic conventions of fantasy and how it creates a space to articulate alternative 
narratives that can usher in such a reclamation and resistance.  
 Expanding on these arguments, I focus on how queer and Two-Spirit Cherokees 
imagine an ethical and critical nation by re-imaging and reclaiming their roles in the 
tribe. By examining how queered characters in Justice’s trilogy relate to one another and 
the Kyn tribe, I also examine the historical and anthropological context of Indian Two-
Spirit and queer identity in resistance to the state narrative, primarily through the work of 
Brian Gilley (Chickasaw), Mark Rifkin, Sabine Lang and Walter. L. Williams.  
Gilley’s work, for example, makes use of interviews from Two-Spirit Indians and 
details how these Indians see themselves as functioning in a meaningful way as part of a 
tribal whole through roles assigned to Two-Spirits. One participant in Gilley’s study, 
“Ben,” states: “‘The Two-Spirits were the ones who continued the culture: the 
spiritualism, the naming, the ceremonies: There was nobody else to do it. We were 
revered and considered as powerful people’” (97). These roles, Gilley’s participants 
argue, are what separate Two-Spirit Indians from Indians who happen to be gay. This 
Two-Spirit discourse, Gilley argues, provides these tribal people a framework to imagine 
a place in creating critical nationhood through their traditional roles and creates a space 
from which Two-Spirit-identified Indians can resist the privileged narratives that aim to 
dispossess them of their kin roles and relationships in the tribe. 
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The study and its stakes 
In the end, I agree with Cook-Lynn that scholars and writers of American Indian 
literature should take tribal nationhood seriously. I do, however, often wonder if those of 
us who are willing to critique the nation and challenge it to be better are in fact the ones 
who truly take tribal nationhood seriously as opposed to those who advocate for 
uncritical, fulsome support of the nation in the name of sovereignty.  
I’m reminded of conversations I’ve had with a Cherokee friend about goings-on 
in the Nation, specifically regarding the ban on same-sex marriage and the then-emerging 
issue of Freedmen citizenship, issues that make up the last two chapters of this study. 
With regard to the first issue, both of us being Texan, we discussed the 2005 referendum 
in which the State of Texas sought to amend its constitution to make marriage officially 
an institution between one man and one woman, and we discussed the Cherokee Nation’s 
decision to do the same. As Texans who respect equal rights, we both naturally voted 
against the amendment. As Cherokees, however, he a citizen and myself a descendant45, 
he saw the ban in the Cherokee Nation as an act of sovereignty. I saw marginalization 
just the same, be it in the Cherokee Nation or Texas, a state that I’d be remiss as a Texan 
if I failed to mention was also once a nation.46 Where my friend saw same-sex Cherokee 
couples being no worse off than they already were under Oklahoma law, I saw an 
opportunity for the Cherokee Nation to be better than the state that imposed itself on 
Cherokee land a century earlier – and failing to step up to the challenge. When we 
discussed the Freedmen issue at a later date, my friend saw the Freedmen’s 
disenfranchisement by referendum, again, as an act of Cherokee sovereignty. But things 
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changed when I posed the question: “What if Americans voted to strip the descendants of 
slaves brought here of their U.S. citizenship?” He replied: “That’s ridiculous, Bryan. 
Where would they go?” Indeed, if the Freedmen lose their place in the Cherokee Nation, 
apart from Cherokee voting rights, access to some tribal services and perhaps a sense of 
belonging, a Freedmen descendant technically is no worse off than any other American 
who is not also a Cherokee citizen. As U.S. citizens, the descendants of Cherokee 
Freedmen would retain the right to remain on the land and to live and work here as they 
always have. There is little material change that comes with losing their Cherokee 
citizenship, at least in the minds of people who think little of casting a ballot to have it 
revoked while they take their own Cherokee citizenship for granted. If the U.S. were to 
dispense with the citizenship of slave descendants, however, the result would be 
devastating, as they truly would have no other place to call home. 
Returning to the question of who takes tribal nationhood seriously, I wonder if the 
reason some people so flippantly invoke sovereignty to rationalize oppression in tribal 
nations is because the U.S., in some ways, acts as a buffer, an entity that in the end will 
be held accountable for upholding one’s basic civil rights regardless of citizenship in, or 
even the existence of, a tribal nation. Hearing the various rationales, it’s almost as if those 
who uncritically deploy sovereignty conceive of the U.S. as a nation and tribal nations as 
clubs – nice if you can get in, but if not, you still have a home to return to in your own 
neighborhood.47 To take tribal nationhood seriously, then, is to recognize that the stakes 
of casting off individuals such as the Freedmen or curtailing the rights of those such as 
same-sex couples in tribal nations are just as serious as if the U.S. were to threaten or 
 50 
actually enact the same policy. After all, how do we take tribal nationhood seriously if we 
don’t hold it up to the same moral and ethical standard of even the U.S., a nation we 
ostensibly do take seriously? To take tribal nationhood seriously is not to rely on the U.S. 
to be a “safety net” of rights for tribal members who are exiled from their nations, while 
paternalistically allowing tribal nations to get away with moral offenses for which the 
international community would hold the U.S. and other nations accountable.48 It requires 
that we periodically pause and examine whether tribal nations are living up to the ethical 
standards their citizens demand of them and deserve. And if they aren’t, it requires that 
we resolve to critically analyze where the nation has run afoul and to examine how we 
can contribute materially, spiritually and intellectually to the same nation to make it more 
equitable and sovereign for all.   
My goal through this project is to demonstrate how our stories have the power to 
articulate critical nationhood in a way that narratives can spur resistance to domination 
both outside and inside the political state. I also aim to show that how we narrate 
ourselves can, and often must, change to meet the challenges of the moment and to 
ensure that we continue to have a voice through which to narrate ourselves at all. 
Ultimately, I conclude that tribal literature is an ideal medium through which to articulate 
such ideas because it presents such a narrative and in some ways instructs us on how to 
create our own. 
However, not everyone agrees that literary analysis can have a tangible effect on a 
community. In Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (1999), 
Maori scholar Linda Tuhiwai Smith argues that while there is some use in examining 
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indigenous literature from an academic standpoint, the practice is largely aesthetic and 
does not effect any material change in indigenous communities. She argues: “Taking 
apart a story, revealing underlying texts, and giving voice to things that are often known 
intuitively does not help people improve their current conditions. It provides words, 
perhaps, an insight that explains certain experiences – but it will not prevent someone 
from dying” (3). While turning the academy’s focus to indigenous literature might throw 
some light on Indian experience in the classroom, she asserts, the idea that Indian writing 
and the analysis of it can lead to change is only a pipedream of delusional scholars. 
I couldn’t disagree more strongly.  
When we examine the works of our best thinkers, even ones who have fallen 
under the radar, we learn ways that they resisted and asserted themselves as indigenous 
people in a social and political climate that would sooner have them erased from the 
landscape. We can take their lessons and apply them to our situations today and, in some 
cases, carry on the legacy of crafting words, words that might appear in a piece of 
legislation that affirms treaty rights that can give the tribe the tangible sustenance to 
survive, or words that appear in our language and stories of our families and communities 
that bring us together and give us a reason to survive.  
 Words can also pose a threat as seen in the 2009 Echo Hawk decision. Larry Echo 
Hawk (Pawnee), head of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, issued a statement in the battle 
between the Cherokee Nation and the United Keetoowah Band to put land in trust that 
could have grave consequences on the Cherokee Nation. Even a short footnote in the 
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decision creates a narrative that one could use to justify terminating the Cherokee Nation. 
Echo Hawk writes, 
 The CNO has long maintained there is no distinction between it and the historic 
 CN (Cherokee Nation). By closing the rolls in 1907, Congress effectively 
 imposed a sunset provision on its relationship with the historical CN. The Federal 
 relationship would exist as long as its members survived. This is consistent with 
 Congress’s expectation that the government of the historical CN, like the 
 governments of the other Five Civilized Tribes, would not be permanent. (3 n.2) 
Words such as these pose a risk of defining Cherokees out of existence when peoplehood 
and nationhood are tied solely to the relationship between the U.S. and Cherokees, an 
example of a privileged narrative. However, the words of Cherokee writers in this study 
speak to alternatives that can ensure tribal survival. Womack, again, speaks to the need of 
Indian academics to address the issues that affect tribal individuals, using words as a 
catalyst for action. He writes: 
 Not enough Indian artists are talking about the things that matter. Novelists, 
 literary critics, and musicians – such as myself – have a responsibility to deal with 
 the real world, not solely mysticism regarding love of earth and respect for all 
 relations. One must also evaluate whether or not such philosophies are ever 
 enacted. To conclude we should say nothing about these matters because we are 
 ‘only’ artists could produce a silence with disastrous results-and perhaps it 
 already has . . . Too much Indian writing and criticism remains easily within the 
 safety zone. Where is the risk, the vulnerability? (Art as Performance 113-114) 
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Coming on 60 years after the Termination program, Echo Hawk has given Cherokees a 
reason to feel vulnerable again. My hope is that this project is only one of many that 
assume the risk of challenging it. 
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1 Daniel Justice (Cherokee Nation) has argued convincingly that while we need to critically engage the 
boundaries we establish and maintain their adaptability, it is important that they don’t become 
“amorphous to the point of absolute inclusiveness” (23). See Justice Our Fire Survives the Storm: A 
Cherokee Literary History (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2005).  Likewise, Craig Womack (Creek) 
mentioned in a conversation that while we need to maintain borders, we also have to consider who is 
being left on the outside and under what circumstances. These are questions that drive this study. 
 
2 Chad “Corntassel” Smith was the Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation from 1999-2011. He was born in 
1950 in Michigan and grew up in Nashville, Tennessee. He is the great-grandson of Cherokee traditionalist 
Redbird Smith. He worked as a lawyer prior to leading the Cherokee Nation. Under Smith’s tenure, the 
Cherokee Nation rapidly expanded its business operations, leading to an improved tribal economy.  
3 Cook-Lynn has been one of the most vocal and prolific advocates for supporting tribal nationhood in 
scholarly studies. See also Cook-Lynn Why I Can’t Read Wallace Stegner and Other Essays: A Tribal Voice 
(Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1996); “American Indian Intellectualism and the New American Story.” 
American Indian Quarterly 20.1 (1996): 57-76; “American Indian Studies: An Overview.” Wicazo Sa Review 
14.2 (1999): 14-24; “Who Gets to Tell the Stories?.” Wicazo Sa Review 9.1 (1993): 60-64; and “Who Stole 
Native American Studies?”. Wicazo Sa Review 12.1 (1997): 9-28. 
 
4 Throughout this study my goal is to privilege Cherokee voices and perspectives. I have included as 
Cherokee sources citizens of the Cherokee Nation, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians and the United 
Keetoowah Band, and I note their national affiliation next to their names. Likewise, I have included 
unenrolled Cherokees who, though not citizens, are recognized communally as Cherokee by other 
Cherokees, and I have listed them simply as “Cherokee.”  
5 Later in the introduction, I explain that I privilege the perspectives of indigenous people in this project.  I 
note Said’s being Palestinian here because I consider Palestinians to be indigenous to the land that is now 
called “Israel.”  Indeed, considering how the U.S. imposed the state of Israel on Palestinians after World 
War II, I consider Israel the “Oklahoma of the Middle East,” owing to the similarity of the strategy of 
displacing tribal nations through the imposition of a settler state. While the designation of Palestinians as 
indigenous is not without controversy, several studies speak to Palestinian history on the land and how 
Palestinians view themselves as indigenous to the land. See for example, Rashid Khalidi Palestinian 
Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness (New York: Columbia UP, 1997); Walid 
Khalidi Before Their Diaspora (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestinian Studies, 1984); Keith Whitelam 
The Invention of Ancient Israel: The Silencing of Palestinian History (New York: Routledge, 1997) and 
Staughton Lynd, Sam Bahour and Alice Lynd, eds. Homeland: Oral Histories of Palestine and Palestinians 
(New York: Olive Branch Press, 1994). For a literary perspective, see Barbara McKean Parmenter Giving 
Voice to Stones: Place and Identity in Palestinian Literature (Austin: U of Texas P, 1994). For a comparative 
study that engages Palestinian and American Indian perspectives, see Steven Salaita The Holy Land in 
Transit: Colonialism and the Quest for Canaan (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse UP, 2006) is an important 
intervention.  
 
6 While I don’t think post-colonialism is the best framework for analyzing American Indian literature in 
ways that explicitly promote tribal nationhood on tribal terms, I do appreciate post-colonial theorists’ 
interventions in scholarship. In particular, I am indebted to them for being an early group that recognized 
and challenged the asymmetrical power binaries that exist between dominant and subjugated groups and 
for demonstrating how literature can be used to critically upset that dynamic.  As I explain later, I just 
don’t see post-colonialism going far enough in ways that can conceive of empowered tribal nationhood in 
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an existential way. Nonetheless, a few of the post-colonial texts that have been useful to me are Aime 
Cesaire Discourse on Colonialism (1950); Franz Fanon Wretched of the Earth (1961); Edward Said 
Orientalism (1978) and Culture and Imperialism (1993) and Albert Memmi The Colonizer and the Colonized 
(1965).  
 
7 See Weaver’s discussion about his and Gerald Vizenor’s terminology with regard to post-colonialism in 
“Splitting the Earth,” American Indian Literary Nationalism (AILN), 39. For a more in-depth analysis of why 
a post-colonial colonial approach is not optimal in analyzing American Indian issues, see Weaver “From I-
Hermeneutics to We-Hermeneutics: Native Americans and the Post-Colonial.” Other Words: American 
Indian Literature, Law, and Culture (Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 2001), 280-305. The evidence for 
continuing colonialism in Indian Country emerges in the higher rates of poverty, unemployment, 
substance abuse, incarceration, depression and suicide in American Indian communities than in the 
communities of their white counterparts. See Joseph P. Kalt The State of Native Nations: Conditions under 
U.S. Policies of Self-Determination (New York: Oxford UP, 2008).  
 
8 Cook-Lynn has long advocated for Native American Studies to be considered a separate field. See Cook-
Lynn, “Who Stole,” 24. Similarly, Womack has argued that Native American literature should be studied 
on its own terms and not seen as a mere “minority extension” of the American canon. See Womack Red 
on Red: Native American Literary Separatism (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1999), 76. 
 
9 Despite the critical shortcomings of the term, Ruppert does note that between Momaday’s publication 
of House Made of Dawn (1968) and Leslie Marmon Silko’s publication of Ceremony (1977) the output 
from American Indians writers did increase. See Ruppert “Fiction: 1968-Present” Cambridge Companion 
to Native American Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005), 173-188. Though the term might 
rightfully point to a time of renewed abundance of literature by American Indians, Cook-Lynn argues that 
it shifts the focus away from what is important, namely nationhood and how literary output affects real 
lives. In “American Indian Studies: A Keynote,” Cook-Lynn notes a conference description she once 
observed that suggested that the Native American Renaissance was a “blending of a tribal world with the 
Euro-American worldview” and sought “to combine the best of American Indian cultures with the 
American mainstream” (21 original emphasis). Cook-Lynn adds: “Is this what we’ve come to? Blending in? 
Saving the ozone layer? Well, there’s nothing wrong with that, surely. But one must ask: is this what the 
development of Native American Studies as an academic discipline had in mind since 1960 when we 
fought off Termination and Relocation? When we looked hard at Federal Indian Policy as a policy of 
continuing genocide? When our rivers were assaulted, and our rights and territories diminished? When 
we came close to the end as nations of people? I think not.” See Cook-Lynn, “AI Studies,” 21. 
 
10 See Cox, Rev. of Native American Renaissance by Kenneth Lincoln. E3W Review of Books: Imperialism, 
Nationalism, Globalism (2008): 85-86. 
11 For more on how some non-Natives have historically viewed Indians through an image that is frozen in 
time, see Robert F. Berkhofer The White Man’s Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to 
the Present (New York: Vintage, 1979). For a study on how non-Natives have appropriated American 
Indian imagery, usually stereotyped, for their own purposes of identity and organization, see Shari 
Huhndorf Going Native: Indians in the American Cultural Imagination (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2001).  
 
12 I add Owens’ European heritage only because that is how he identified himself. Because other scholars I 
mention identify tribally, either as citizens or descendants, regardless of their actual ancestral make-up, I 
only list their tribal affiliation where necessary. 
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13 See Womack “The Integrity of American Indian Claims, Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love My 
Hybridity,” AILN, 91-177.  
 
14 By “mixedblood,” Cook-Lynn doesn’t refer to authors who are from mixed heritage. Rather she refers to 
those like Owens who construct a singular identity as a “mixedblood” that exists on its own and is only 
informed by one’s mixed heritage and, more importantly, is often read as apolitical though it could have 
political potential if deployed in that service. Scott Lyons, for example, reminds readers that Ortiz, in 
“Towards an National Indian Literature,” argues that cultural hybridity has allowed tribal nations to 
endure. The point, Lyons adds, is that hybridity theorists tend to neglect to account for how this 
continuity has empowered tribal nations politically and instead focus on the hybrid elements themselves. 
See Lyons X-Marks: Native Signatures of Ascent (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2010), 157. 
 
15 See Womack Red on Red: Native American Literary Separatism (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1999) 
for Womack’s tribal-specific approach to analyzing American Indian literature. In his section of AILN, 
Womack challenges Pulitano’s “hierarchy” of Native critics in which she favors Greg Sarris (Pomo), Louis 
Owens (Choctaw-Cherokee-Irish) and Gerald Vizenor (White Earth Anishinaabe) over Womack (Muscogee 
Creek), Robert Warrior (Osage) and Paula Gunn Allen (Laguna Pueblo), the former group who she argues 
are willing to engage the non-Indian world and the latter group who she argues, erroneously, are not. See 
Womack, “Integrity,“ AILN, 95-99. 
 
16 See Womack, “Integrity,” AILN, 121-122. 
 
17 See Weaver, “Splitting the Earth,” AILN, 43. 
 
18 I recognize, as does Benedict Anderson, for example, that not all nations are founded on violence. 
However, it is impossible to speak of U.S. nationhood, especially in relation to tribal nationhood, and elide 
the violence inherent in its formation. For this reason, I adopt Chatterjee and Renan’s models of 
nationhood being built on violence, oppression and forgetting because it best fits best the theoretical 
context and lived reality of U.S.-tribal nation relations.  
 
19 Womack addresses how though tribal governments might have adopted the constitutional government 
from Europeans, the core of the Creek political organization, the talwa, or town, remains. This is one 
example of a tribal nation’s ability to incorporate non-Native tools while retaining a distinctly tribal core, a 
fact of tribal life that undermines Pulitano’s uninformed assertions to the contrary. See Womack, Red on 
Red, 35. 
 
20 Weaver notes that several tribal communities exist outside of the nation model. Some of these 
communities to consider include urban and rural; local and outland; and church and stomp ground 
communities among others. He also describes the concept of “communitism,” a combination of 
“community” and “activism,” through which communities can imagine themselves serving purposes such 
as those laid out by Oritz. See Weaver That the People Might Live: Native American Literatures and Native 
American Community (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997). Daniel Justice also discusses the concept of being a 
“good Cherokee.” He writes: “Enrollment, while important, isn’t to my mind the only significant factor in 
determining Cherokee identity – kinship and being good Cherokees seem to me to be also important” (23 
original emphasis). See Justice Our Fire Survives the Storm: A Cherokee Literary History, (Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 2005).  Jeff Corntassel’s work also articulates the need to consider tribal nationhood outside 
of the nation-state model. See Corntassel Forced Federalism: Contemporary Challenges to Indigenous 
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Nationhood (Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 2008). See also Corntassel “Practicing Sustainable Self-
Determination: Indigenous Approaches to Cultural Restoration and Revitalization.” Brown Journal of 
World Affairs 18.11 (2012): 151-162 and “Indigenous Governance Amidst the Forced Federalism Era.” 
Kansas Journal of Law and Public Policy 19.1 (2009): 101-115. Taiaiake Alfred’s work that discusses tribal 
nationhood outside of the nation-state includes Peace, Power, and Righteousness: An Indigenous 
Manifesto (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999) and Wasase: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom (Toronto: 
U of Toronto P, 2005). Also see Ch. 3-4 in Scott Lyons X-Marks: Native Signatures of Ascent (Minneapolis: 
U of Minnesota P, 2010) for an engaging discussion of current issues of tribal nationhood and how Lyons 
argues that nations can be effectively built by creating citizenship criteria that recreate what the nation 
wishes to reproduce. 
 
21 In the original French, Renan writes, “tout citoyen français doit avoir oublié,” with regard to the fact 
that in order for French nationalism to persist, citizens have to forget the uglier side of it. I note the 
original because in Martin Thom’s translation, the line is “every French citizen has to have forgotten.” The 
construction that Renan uses implies agency and a deliberate action on the part of French citizens to 
actively forget the atrocities that led to French nationhood. I feel like Thom’s translation, while technically 
correct, loses this important linguistic nuance in that his translation can be read more passively, 
suggesting that the French at least must happen to have forgotten the aforementioned massacre, for 
example, through the passage of time or neglect to tell the story, not as a deliberate choice to actively 
forget. See Renan’s essay in French at <http://identitenational.canalblog.com/ 
archives/2008/10/02/10803170.html>. 
 
22 See for example Benedict Anderson Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983) and Ernest Gellner Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 
1983). See also Eric Hobsbawm Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991). 
 
23 Lyons, X-Marks, 119. 
 
24 Lyons, X-Marks, 118. 
 
25 Anderson coined the term “imagined communities” in which he describes nations as a groups of people 
who see themselves as a nation based on a mutual, imagined affinity for one another. See Anderson, 
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, (1983).  
 
26 Examples of “ethically constitutive stories” that Smith mentions include Jews, Christians and Muslims 
believing they descend from Abraham and the belief in wartime on the part of both sides of combatants 
that God is on their side. Neither of these stories can be proved or disproved empirically, but the stories 
still function in identity formation and action as a community. I take this term further and focus on the 
ethical part in that we can construct critical nationhood by choosing interpretations of stories that 
produce the greatest ethical good regardless of whether the actual content in the narrative can be proved 
or disproved. 
 
27 Without a doubt engaging in ethics is tricky in that historically even some of the vilest and most hateful 
people could rationalize their actions through an argument of ethics. By “ethical,” however, I refer to 
promoting good in that the rights of marginalized people are recognized through our narrative choices. I 
also focus on creating an ethical outcome that can be quantified even if the story that facilitates that 
outcome cannot. For example, opponents of same-sex marriage often engage in slippery slope and 
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hyperbolic arguments in the name of ethics that breach the border of ridiculous. On his May 11, 2009, 
program, for instance, conservative pundit Bill O’Reilly suggested that legalizing same-sex marriage will 
lead to people marrying turtles.  Proponents of same-sex marriage, however, often engage arguments 
that focus on the tangible and equal rights that same-sex couples would have through marriage such as 
hospital visitation, inheritance, insurance and spousal benefits that straight couples presently enjoy. In 
this example, for my purposes, an “ethically constitutive story” is one that would lead to the latter 
outcome because we can conceivably (and logically) imagine it coming into fruition. And of course we can 
look to nations where same-sex marriage is legal and see that no one there is marrying turtles. Because 
the latter outcome, if not the story that leads to it, can be proven objectively, and the former has no basis 
in reality, the story that leads to the second outcome is “ethical” per my use of the word. For more about 
O’Reilly’s comments and a response by the Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD), see 
<http://www.glaad.org/2009/05/13/bill-oreillys-evolution-marriage-equality-thing-will-lead-to-unions-
with-a-goat-duck-turtle-dolphin/>. 
 
28 Chicana feminist scholar Chela Sandoval developed the concept of “oppositional consciousness,” which 
she argues allows subjugated groups to navigate multiple oppressions such as those based on class, 
gender and race by strategically switching tactics with regard to ideology and how they view themselves 
in the power dynamic at the moment. She writes: “As the clutch of a car provides the driver the ability to 
shift gears, differential consciousness permits the practitioner to choose tactical positions, that is, to self-
consciously break and reform ties to ideology, activities which are imperative for the psychological and 
political practices that permit the achievement of coalition across differences” (15). For more about 
oppositional consciousness, see Sandoval’s landmark essay “U.S. Third World Feminism: The Theory and 
Method of Oppositional Consciousness in the Postmodern World." Genders 10 (1991): 1-24. 
 
29 In particular Alfred and Corntassel. See supra note 20. See also Vine Deloria, Jr., who was one of the 
most outspoken people against the model of “sovereignty” for tribal nations and the state model, 
especially Deloria and Clifford M. Lytle The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian 
Sovereignty (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984).  
 
30 See Womack’s analysis of Arnold Krupat’s review of Red on Red in which Krupat takes umbrage at 
Womack’s joke that teaching non-Indians about Indians is like “teaching hogs to sing,” a line that actually 
appears in one of the fictional interludes of Womack’s book. See “Integrity,” AILN, 166. 
 
31 In a footnote in his 2003 book The Invention of Native American Literature, Parker argues that 
Womack’s tribal-specific approach in Red on Red is essentialist and discounts the input of non-Native 
scholars.  See page Parker The Invention of Native American Literature (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2002), 196. 
For Womack’s response to Parker’s claim, see “Integrity,” AILN, 102-103.  
 
32 For a long, but by no means exhaustive, list of non-Native and non-Creek sources that Womack pulls 
from in Red on Red, see Womack, “Integrity,” AILN, 104-105. 
 
33 For more on Brooks’ “kitchen table” metaphor, see her afterword “At the Gathering Place” in AILN, 
especially pages 232, 246.  
 
34 Weaver has argued effectively the need for scholars in Native American Studies to be interdisciplinary, 
regardless of what their own specialties are. See Weaver “More Light Than Heat: The Current State of 
Native American Studies.” American Indian Quarterly 31.2 (2007), 233-255. See especially pages 234-236. 
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35 For more on Warrior’s concept of the role of Indian experience in criticism, see Warrior The People and 
the Word: Reading Native Nonficton (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2005), xxiii-xxx. 
 
36 Considering Warrior’s idea that we should use experience as a framework for analysis, I don’t subscribe 
to the arbitrary boundary that exists between fiction and non-fiction as “literature” and “history,” 
respectively. As Emma Perez points out, the story that gets privileged as “history” often has more to do 
with who has the power to write “history” than with its accuracy or non-fiction quality. Because one can 
relay an experience through a novel or poem, or through a sermon or a non-fiction account with equal 
effect, -- and these are all stories -- I refer to all expressions of experience as “literature” here to avoid the 
trap of privileging “history” over fiction.  
 
37 See Corntassel “An Activist Posing as an Academic?,” American Indian Quarterly 27.1/2, Special issue: 
Native Experiences in the Ivory Tower (2003), 160-171. Here, Corntassel recounts his time working at a 
university in Virginia that he calls “Yonega U” in which he has run-ins with everyone from colleagues to 
campus police with regard to his being Cherokee and practicing Cherokee culture. He notes that the title 
for the piece comes from an accusation lobbed at him from someone on a hiring committee. In noting 
that scholarship and activism don’t have to be (and really shouldn’t be) mutually exclusive, he says in the 
article that he was proud “knowing that [his] dedication to Tsalagi people and indigenous communities 
did not conveniently fit into a Western conception of ‘objectivity’” and that he was further proud that 
“these guardians of disciplinary turf so clearly recognized the applied nature of [his] research and 
community outreach” (160-161 emphasis original). Corntassel’s essay drives my study, and I refer to it 
often as it continues to inspire how I see the potential of scholarly work.  
     I also ground my work in what Corntassel calls “insurgent education,” or using the discomfort caused 
by unsettling colonial boundaries of discourse as teaching moments. For more about Corntassel’s theory 
of “insurgent education,” including his four steps for putting it into practice, see Corntassel “Indigenizing 
the Academy: Insurgent Education and the Roles of Indigenous Intellectuals.” Canadian Federation for the 
Humanities and Social Sciences, Jan. 2011. Web. 12 Feb. 2012. < http://www.ideas-
idees.ca/blog/indigenizing-academy-insurgent-education-and-roles-indigenous-intellectualsx>. 
 
38 Though I begin in the 1950s, several scholars have studied the Cherokee Nation as it was prior to this 
date. Here is a partial list of some of the texts that examine Cherokees before the era in which my own 
study begins: Clarissa W. Confer, The Cherokee Nation in the Civil War, (2007); Robert J. Conley, The 
Cherokee Nation: A History, (2008); David H. Corkran, The Cherokee Frontier: Conflict and Survival, 1740-
62, (1962); Cynthia Cumfer, Separate Peoples, One Land: The Minds of Cherokees, Black, and Whites on 
the Tennessee Frontier, (2007); Frank Cunningham, General Stand Watie’s Confederate Indians, (1959); 
Edward Everett Dale, et al, Cherokee Cavaliers: Forty Years of Cherokee History as Told in the 
Correspondence of the Ridge-Watie-Boudinot Family, (1995); Andrew Denson, Demanding the Cherokee 
Nation: Indian Autonomy and American Culture, 1830-1900 (2004);  John Ehle, Trail of Tears: The Rise and 
Fall of the Cherokee Nation (1988); John R. Finger, Cherokee Americans: The Eastern Band of Cherokees in 
the 20th Century, (1991); Rudi Halliburton, Red Over Black: Black Slavery Among the Cherokee Indians 
(1977); Kenny E. Franks, Stand Watie and the Agony of the Cherokee Nation, (1979); Carolyn Johnston, 
Cherokee Women in Crisis: Trail of Tears, Civil War, and Allotment, 1838-1907, (2003);  Henry Malone, 
Cherokees of the Old South: A People in Transition, (1956); William McLoughlin, After the Trail of Tears: 
The Cherokees’ Struggle for Sovereignty, 1839-1880 (1994), Cherokees and Missionaries, 1789-1839, 
(1995) and The Cherokee Renascence in the New Republic (1992); Tiya Miles, Ties that Bind: The Story of 
an Afro-Cherokee Family in Slavery and Freedom (2005) and The House on Diamond Hill: A Cherokee 
Plantation Story, (2010);  Patrick N. Minges, Slavery in the Cherokee Nation: The Keetoowah Society and 
the Defining of a People, 1855-1867 (2003); Celia E. Naylor, African Cherokees in Indian Territory: From 
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Chattel to Citizens (2008); Theda Perdue,  The Cherokee Nation and the Trail of Tears (2007), Cherokee 
Women: Gender and Culture Change, 1700-1835, (1999), Slavery and the Evolution of Cherokee Society, 
1500-1866, (1979); John Oliphant, War and Peace on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, 1756-63, (2001); Rose 
Stremlau, Sustaining the Cherokee Family: Kinship and the Allotment of an Indigenous Nation (2011); 
Rennard Strickland, Fire and the Spirits: Cherokee Law from Clan to Court, (1982); Circe Sturm, Blood 
Politics: Race, Culture, and Identity in the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma (2005);  Robert Walker, Torchlight 
to the Cherokees, (1931); Morris L. Wardell, A Political History of the Cherokee Nation, 1838-1907 (1938). 
Thurman Wilkins, Cherokee Tragedy: The Ridge Family and the Decimation of a People (1938). For a recent 
and interesting study of Cherokee identity and the concept of racial shifting, see Sturm, Becoming Indian: 
The Struggle over Cherokee Identity in the Twenty-First Century, (2011). 
 
39 At the time Thomas was writing, the Cherokee Nation itself wasn’t facing termination because it was no 
longer fully sovereign per the Curtis Act (1898) and the Five Civilized Tribes Act (1906). The Curtis Act was 
an amendment to the Dawes Act (1887) to include the so-called “Five Civilized Tribes” – the Cherokees, 
Choctaws, Chickasaws, Creeks and Seminoles – who had earlier been exempted from the Dawes Act, 
which was designed to denationalize tribal nations and allot their land. In 1906, the Dawes Commission 
informed Congress that there were still parcels of land to be dealt with, and they couldn’t sell or allot it if 
Congress terminated the Five Tribes’ nations as called for in the Curtis Act. Congress subsequently passed 
the Five Civilized Tribes Act, which allowed for these tribal governments to continue until Congress 
decided otherwise and stipulated that the federal government would appoint tribal chiefs. Cherokees 
themselves wouldn’t officially vote for their own chief again until 1971. The Five Civilized Tribes Act was in 
some ways “life support” for tribal nations in that while they weren’t fully sovereign as a result of the act, 
they weren’t outright terminated either and were, thus, able to be reinstated in 1970 with the Principal 
Chiefs Act. The Indian Reorganization Act (1934) restored self-governance to tribal nations, but the act 
excluded the Oklahoma nations. Congress then passed the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act (1936) to give 
the same provisions of self-governance to Oklahoma nations though the Cherokee Nation chose not to 
reorganize under its terms. The Cherokee Nation was federally recognized again in the 1970s and drafted 
a constitution in 1976. However, the Curtis/Dawes Acts included a “sunset provision” that indicated that 
the federal government’s responsibility to tribal governments would cease when the last original enrollee 
of the Nation died. The last Cherokee original enrollee, Lula M. Hickey Hall, died in April 2012 at the age of 
107. She was 1 when she was enrolled with the Dawes Commission. So far, no action from the federal 
government has taken place regarding the original “sunset provision” though BIA head Larry Echo Hawk 
(Pawnee) has ruled that the Cherokee Nation today is not the original Cherokee Nation but only a 
modern-day “successor in interest” with the United Keetoowah Band. See D.S. Otis The Dawes Act and the 
Allotment of Indian Lands (Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 1973); Francis Paul Prucha Documents of United 
States Indian Policy (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 2000). For more about Lula M. Hickey Hall, see “CN loses 
last original Dawes enrollee.” Cherokeephoenix.org. Cherokee Phoenix, 25 April 2012. Web. 25 April 2012.  
<http://www.cherokeephoenix.org/Article/Index/6202> 
 
40 From a literary perspective this resurgence of U.S. patriotism in the 1940s and 1950s is probably best 
noted in the rising popularity of American musicals such as those produced by Rodgers and Hammerstein. 
Cherokee literary output was not untouched by this explosion of U.S. patriotism as can be observed in the 
duo’s treatment of Lynn Riggs’ Indian Territory play Green Grow the Lilacs (1931) on which they based 
Oklahoma! While Riggs’ play depicts the anxiety that Indian Territory residents and Indian national 
citizens felt in the days before Oklahoma statehood, the musical celebrates that statehood and U.S. 
expansion at a time when the U.S. was imposing its presence in other areas of the world such as the 
Pacific. Paul Filmer, Val Rimmer and Dave Walsh argue that the musical and a romanticizing of pioneer 
history reflect U.S. toughness coupled with co-operation that needed to be portrayed during the country’s 
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war effort in Europe and the Pacific. They write: “Pioneers carving out a new state out of what had been 
called Indian Territory and setting up a community which embodied the values of North American 
paternalism constituted an idealized, utopian context in which to place the anxieties for the future of the 
USA, having emerged from a crippling depression and confronted the consequences of involvement in 
World War II” (385). See Filmer et. al “Oklahoma!: Ideology and Politics in the Vernacular of the American 
Musical.” Popular Music 18.3 (1999): 385-95. 
 
41 Cherokee culture varies from community to community and from family to family and between nations. 
Even individuals might have different ideas of what constitutes “Cherokee culture” for themselves; 
therefore, I note here that my discussion of elements of Cherokee culture in this study should not be 
taken as representative of how all Cherokees practice culture.  
42 A CDIB is a Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood issued by the BIA that indicates one’s blood descent 
from an Indian ancestor whose blood quantum was recorded on a tribal roll. The Dawes Roll is divided 
into By-Blood and Freedmen portions. Indians were listed with a blood quantum on the By-Blood portion 
while Freedmen were listed on their own portion without an Indian blood quantum, though many were 
mixedbloods of black and Indian ancestry. Because the Freedmen were listed on the Dawes Roll, they are 
entitled to citizenship in the Cherokee Nation; however, because they are not listed on the By-Blood 
portion, they do not have recorded Indian blood and, therefore, no CDIB. Not everyone considers 
possession of a CDIB a true marker of Indianness, however. James F. Hamill recounts meeting a woman 
who was active in her tribal nation’s affairs who said that a CDIB card was a good “‘scraper for your 
windshield but it is not enough to be an Indian’” (280).  Hamill adds that to this woman, characteristics 
like community participation and cultural aptitude were more important and that the CDIB was nothing 
more than a document from the federal government that communicates little about one’s being Indian. 
See Hamill “Show Me Your CDIB: Blood Quantum and Indian Identity Among Indian People of Oklahoma.” 
The American Behavioral Scientist 47.3 (2003): 267-281.  
 
43 “Outland” in the context of Cherokee citizens refers to those Cherokees who reside outside of the 
Cherokee Nation’s political boundaries.  
44 Brian Gilley delineates a difference between gay Indians and Two-Spirit Indians, noting that while being 
gay is a sexual orientation, being Two-Spirit implies the individual also plays a social and cultural role and 
takes up kinship obligations outside of his or her sexuality.  All Two-Spirit Indians are gay, notes one of his 
sources, but not all gay Indians are Two-Spirit. 
 
45 Invariably when citizens and descendants of tribal nations disagree on any matter, the perennial line 
deployed to silence dissent is that the descendant has no right to speak of matters regarding his or her 
ancestral nation because he or she is not a political citizen. I like to remind people that the “It’s an internal 
affair” line of logic used to rationalize around disagreement has an unsavory history.  For example, when 
the United Nations asked former South African President P.W. Botha about how black South Africans, 
most of whom are indigenous, were being treated under Botha’s apartheid system, he argued that 
outsiders should stay out of it because his treatment of black citizens was an internal affair. More 
recently, the Israeli Foreign Ministry decried a joint letter written by four European nations condemning 
Israel’s continued Jewish encroachment into Palestinian land as “meddling” in their domestic affairs. I 
believe human beings have a moral imperative to look out for one another and as such, I consider human 
rights issues more than simply “domestic affairs.” However, while input from the outside can be valuable, 
obviously final decisions are made by those with a vote. 
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    I don’t invoke the likes of Botha here to be sensational or to impede disagreement. On the 
contrary, I find disagreement and ensuing dialogue productive. We can disagree with regard to who has 
authority to comment on any variety of matters, and as a result choose to listen or not. However, when 
we’re tempted to silence dissent outright, we should at least be mindful of the rhetorical company we 
keep. For a transcript of Botha’s 1985 address, see Botha, “Address by State President P.W. Botha, August 
15, 1985.” Nelsonmandela.org. Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory, 2012. Web. 9 Aug. 2012. 
<http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/ 
site/q/03lv01538/04lv01600/05lv01638/06lv01639.htm> 
For the New York Times story about the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s response to the joint statement 
issued by the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Portugal, see Isabel Kershener “Israel Accuses 4 
Countries of Meddling in its Affairs.” NYTimes.com. New York Times, 21 Dec. 2011. Web. 24 Dec. 2011. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/ world/middleeast/israel-says-4-european-countries-are-
meddling-in-its-affairs.html?_r=0> 
 
46 Texas was an independent sovereign from March 2, 1836, when it became independent from Mexico, 
until Feb. 19, 1846, when it was annexed into the U.S. Despite some Texans’ present-day nostalgia for an 
independent Texas that we never directly experienced, life in the republic was incredibly difficult 
economically. See William Ransom Hogan The Texas Republic: A Social and Economic History (Austin: 
Texas State Historical Association, 2007). Texas does have a Cherokee connection as well. Before 
Removal, Chief Bowles moved his band to what is now north Texas before the band was violently 
removed by Mirabeau Lamar. See Dianna Everett The Texas Cherokees: A People Between Two Fires, 
1819-1840 (Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 1995) and Mary Whatley Clark Chief Bowles and Texas Cherokees 
(Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 2001). Also, the first president of the Republic of Texas, Sam Houston, was an 
adopted Cherokee and given the name Golanv, or Raven, by John Jolly. For more about Houston, see 
Marquis James The Raven: A Biography of Sam Houston (Austin: U of Texas P, 1988). For a fictional 
biography, see John Oskison (Cherokee Nation) A Texas Titan: The Story of Sam Houston (New York: 
Doubleday, 1929). Finally, during the Civil War, some Cherokees and citizens of other tribal nations from 
Indian Territory fled the violence and settled in Texas, primarily in Rusk and Smith counties, forming the 
Mount Tabor community and later being called the Texas Cherokees and Associated Bands (TCAB). The 
TCAB was part of the Cherokee Nation until the Nation was reinstated politically in 1971, and Cherokee 
chief W.W. Keeler was chairman of the group’s executive committee. Today, while some TCAB are 
Cherokee Nation citizens, others whose ancestors never returned during allotment are not. 
 
47 Scott Lyons also notes how some tribal nations operate in ways akin to a club rather than a sovereign 
nation by focusing more on who a person is and neglecting the citizenship roles he or she should 
undertake in giving meaning to the nation. See Lyons, X-Marks, 174. 
 
48 One of these offenses that has emerged recently is the act of disenrolling tribal citizens. While other 
nations around the world often revoke citizenship only in cases of treason or if an individual accepts 
citizenship in another nation, several tribal nations, especially in California, have simply kicked out citizens 
at a time when per capita payments from gaming have begun to increase. As I point out in Chapter 3, the 
Cherokee Nation under Chad Smith attempted to exile the Freedmen descendants during an election 
when the Freedmen were largely supporting Smith’s opponent, a similar move executed by Cherokee 
Principal Chief Ross Swimmer in the 1980s. While Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) allows tribal 
nations to establish their own criteria for citizenship, several writers have argued that tribal nations are 
simply letting go of citizens for financial gain. See for example, David E. Wilkins (Lumbee) “Depopulation 
in Indian Country, 21st Century Style.” IndianCountryTodayMediaNetwork.com. Indian Country Today, 19 
Mar. 2012. Web. 19 Mar. 2012. <http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ict_sbc/ depopulation-in-
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indian-country-21st-century-style>. For news about the Chuckchansi and the Pechanga Band of Luiseno 
Indians’ efforts to disenroll citizens, see “Disenrollments Boost Pechanga Per Capita Monthly Payments to 
$30K.” IndianCountryTodayMediaNetwork.com. Indian Country Today, 16 May 2012. Web. 14 May 2012. 
<http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2012/05/16/disenrollments-boost-pechanga-per-capita-
monthly-payments-to-30k-113361> and “Gaming Revenue Blamed for California Tribes Disenrolling 
Members.” IndianCountryTodayMediaNetwork.com. Indian Country Today, 14 Dec. 2011. Web. 3 Jan. 
2012. <http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/12/14/gaming-revenue-blamed-for-california-
tribes-disenrolling-members-67718> 
 Cherokees are not without controversy in the matter of disenrolling citizens. The Eastern Band of 
Cherokee Indians (EBCI) in North Carolina proposed an audit of their roll at a time when gaming income 
there is also on the rise. The EBCI also proposed using DNA testing to determine the validity of their 
citizens’ claims for inclusion.  See David Tell “Outside audit questions tribal membership rolls.” 
MaconNews.com. Macon County News (NC), 25 Nov. 2009. Web. 3 April 2010. 
<http://www.maconnews.com> and Giles Morris “Cherokee enrollment quandary leads to talk of DNA 
testing. “ SmokyMountainNew.coms Smoky Mountain News (NC), 19 May 2012. Web. 7 June 2012. 
<http://www.smokymountainnews.com/issues/05_10/05_19_10/ fr_cherokee_enrollment.html>           
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"We must not surrender . . . until we shall fall to the ground united”: Robert 
Thomas, Redbird Smith and Writing Cultural Nationhood during the Termination 
and Relocation Era 
 
In their 1859 Laws of the Keetoowah, Cherokee traditionalists known as the 
Keetoowah Society laid out a proclamation, stating that despite the ever-expanding 
encroachment by Euroamericans on traditional Cherokee land and lifeways, the 
Keetoowahs would remain united in their effort to remain distinctly Cherokee until the 
very end. If we fast-forward through time and stop to examine the contentious, often 
violent, divisions between Cherokee traditionalists and their more assimilated 
counterparts during the Civil War, the break-up and redistribution of Cherokee land 
during allotment and the imposition of Oklahoma statehood in 1907, it becomes apparent 
that the Keetoowahs’ charge to themselves had become progressively more difficult to 
sustain. As United States citizens expanded their presence across the continent, they also 
crafted cultural and national narratives, especially through law, that privileged their 
dominance over tribal nations, which they took for granted. These narratives, such as 
those that cast tribal nations as backward or their citizens as savages, formed the 
foundation from which missionaries, outlaws and politicians – and people who were 
perhaps a mix of these – rationalized their increasing assaults of tribal land and lifeways 
in the name of emerging U.S. nationalism.  
However, the tribal nations on which the mounting empire encroached did not go 
away silently. Though the privilege that is often assumed in history and the law might 
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give intruders who prevail a space from which to write their dominance into perpetuity, 
those who are displaced retain, if little else, a voice. After land has been stolen, 
traditional lifeways dissolved, and nations erased from the map, voice and the ability to 
tell stories remain and allow the dispossessed to, as the Keetoowahs implored in their 
1859 Laws, “not surrender . . . until we shall fall to the ground united” – even if the 
opening lines are written from the margins.   
A study of contemporary Cherokee narratives that emerge from the alterity of 
various privileged narratives from the U.S. state can probably find no better beginning 
than in the era of Termination and Relocation of the 1950s and 1960s. While the United 
States’ responsibility to its treaty obligations with tribal nations has waxed and waned 
through the generations1, the generation of this era witnessed the United States’ complete 
abdication of this responsibility and with it, the last bit of integrity of the United States’ 
role in the relationship with tribal nations. I begin this study with this period not only 
because it demonstrates the ease with which an act of Congress can undermine tribal state 
sovereignty, but this period is also recent enough that many still remember it. Many 
people remember their families moving to faraway urban hubs for the promise of a better 
life, at least as mainstream, white America saw it, only to have reservation poverty 
exchanged for urban poverty in the city, minus the stability and support of extended 
family and tribal community.2 
 This period of Indian history is also an ideal starting point to study the power of 
counter-narratives of critical and ethical tribal nationhood because it’s a period that others 
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have forgotten.3 Donald Fixico (Shawnee-Sac and Fox-Creek-Seminole) recounts his 
experience growing up during the time of Termination and Relocation. He writes: 
Most Indians knew very little about it – unless, that is, they were citizens of the 
tribes that had been terminated, like the Menominee of Wisconsin or the Klamath 
of Oregon. In fact, most of America knew very little about termination while it 
was happening, and they still don’t know. It’s almost as if this dreadful Indian 
policy was and is a big secret. (3)   
The ease with which some politicians and citizens deploy the term “sovereignty” in 
describing their tribal states’ relationship to the federal government would indicate that 
Fixico’s assessment might be true. While true tribal sovereignty pre-dates the United 
States and was not a concept simply handed down to Indians by John Marshall, the 
concept has, for generations, been recast in a relationship between the United States and 
tribal nations as one of subordination in which the United States’ national sovereignty is 
always a given, but tribal national sovereignty is granted and can ostensibly be revoked.4  
 This threat became a reality for some tribal nations in the 1950s5, and it’s a threat 
that always dwells under the surface of the interactions between the United States and the 
tribal nations within the country’s fictive borders. Playing on the fear of losing federal 
recognition appears to be a go-to strategy when U.S. citizens want to exert pressure on 
tribal nations. One recent example of this approach occurred when Senator Diane Watson 
and the National Black Caucus urged the United States to sever its relationship to the 
Cherokee Nation when the Nation held a vote to disenfranchise Cherokee citizens of 
Freedmen descent by changing the citizenship criteria.6 While retroactively stripping 
 67 
citizens of their rights in the state for anything other than treason – and especially to gain 
an edge in a close election7 – is certainly deplorable, strong-arming a tribal nation 
through the threat of revoking its sovereign status is equally so. Such a situation makes 
tethering tribal identity and sovereignty strictly to a narrative of colonial-state recognition 
problematic and necessitates the crafting of alternative narratives of critical nationhood.8  
Important but understudied examples of such narratives are found in the works of 
Cherokee writers Robert K. Thomas and Natachee Scott Momaday. At a time when the 
federal government was terminating the sovereign status of Indian nations and revisiting 
a policy of assimilation into mainstream American life that had been briefly repudiated 
just 20 years earlier9, Thomas, in his study of the Redbird Smith Movement, creates a 
narrative that describes how to reconcile oneself to the tribal body amid imperatives to 
assimilate. In doing so, Thomas adds, Indian communities can resist the encroachment 
that comes from U.S. narratives of Indians as politically impotent and culturally 
backward. Specifically Thomas’ work can be read to show him contending with the 
economic pressure that the United States exerted on tribal communities to force them to 
acquiesce to its desire for Indians to assimilate into mainstream urban life. This policy 
was narrated under the pretense of extracting Indians from poverty10 – poverty that U.S. 
policy created in the first place. The United States’ aim, however, in the Relocation and 
Termination process was to erase Indians politically and culturally and to renege on the 
country’s responsibility and obligations to those tribal nations.11 
Thomas creates a counter-narrative that combats the United States’ assimilation 
narrative that the country facilitated through economic pressure. Thomas, in the 1950s, 
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took a distinctly Cherokee separatist approach, focusing on a return to traditional tribal 
lifeways, including tribal economy, as opposed to Natachee Scott Momaday, who I 
discuss in Chapter 2, and who, in the 1960s, writes a narrative of functional integration, a 
practice of adapting to colonial ways on tribal terms while maintaining the integrity of a 
distinctly tribal core.  By focusing on how Thomas and Momaday contend specifically 
with economic pressure to be written into an American assimilation story, we can 
approach their works from a perspective of how they engage economics to find ways to 
reconcile the tribal body. In doing so, we discover how they create counter-narratives in 
which they can resist tribal break-up and assimilation during the Termination and 
Relocation era. 
 
The economics of tribal termination: a brief background 
Economics is a key factor both in the United States’ attempt to dismantle tribal 
communities and the communities’ resistance to that effort because, as Taiaiake Alfred 
(Kahnawake Mohawk) has argued, economic self-sufficiency is one road to true tribal 
self-determination. He writes, for example: “Meaningful progress towards self-
determination can never be made until Native communities are free of economic 
dependency. . . . Native communities must expand their land bases and gain control of 
economic activities that take place on their territory” (136). For such change and 
independence to come to fruition, Indian communities or nations must have a recognized, 
sovereign land base and the ability to conduct economic activity on their own terms in 
their communities. These two elements – a sovereign claim on the land and economic 
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opportunity – were two major components that came under attack during the Termination 
and Relocation era. Between 1953, when Public Law 280 passed, and 1958, the federal 
government terminated the sovereign status, and by extension the land claims, of more 
than 100 nations and threatened scores more until the National Congress of American 
Indians (NCAI) put a stop to it, persuading then Secretary of the Interior Arthur Watkins 
to agree that tribal nations wouldn’t be pressured to accept the terms of the termination 
program.12 Some nations were terminated in the 1950s and to this day have yet to regain 
their sovereign status.13 Furthermore, through the Indian Vocational Training Act of 
1955, the federal government offered job training to tribal communities, but did nothing 
to effect local economic development in communities where, according to Alan L. 
Sorkin, unemployment was as high as 90 percent.14 When an individual completed 
training, the only jobs available were in relocation hubs such as Chicago, Dallas, Denver, 
Los Angeles or Phoenix. So while Relocation, on paper, was officially voluntary, a 
family with no economic opportunity at home often had little choice but to relocate, 
risking the fracturing of the tribal community and being pushed toward assimilation. 
This poverty that led some Indians to having little choice but to relocate has long 
been present in some Cherokee communities. Leslie Hewes studied Cherokee 
communities in the 1930s and found that the average annual income for a rural Cherokee 
family at the time was about $95, or about $1,600 when adjusted today for inflation, and 
that relative to their non-Cherokee counterparts, the Cherokee Nation counties were less 
developed and had fewer agricultural assets in the form of farm land and produce. 
Likewise, Albert L. Wahrhaftig, in the 1960s, observed that Cherokee families earned a 
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median per capita income of between $450-$650 a year (or $3,550-$5,129 in 2014 
dollars) and that half of Cherokee families subsisted on welfare, mostly as a result of the 
dearth of long-term, well-paying jobs in the area. 15 He notes that Cherokees earned their 
income “from the stingiest and most precarious sources” (415) and that Cherokees did 
“work that is heavy, dangerous, and dirty for employers who often provide no workmen’s 
compensation and no social security. . . . They work for employers who lay them off a 
week before they would qualify for unemployment insurance and then hire a new crew” 
(453).16 Wahrhaftig adds that as a result of this hard labor, between 42 percent and 66 
percent of Cherokee men he interviewed had chronic or permanent disabilities that 
precluded them from further wage-earning work.  
In addition to the scant supply of available work, Wahrhaftig attributes the lack of 
educational opportunities in Cherokee Country to the poverty that existed in the area at 
the time of Termination and Relocation. He notes that at a median of 5.5 years of 
schooling, rural Cherokees in the 1950s and 1960s had one of the lowest levels of 
education in the U.S. The lack of available schooling, then, led to a population in which 
40 percent of people were functionally illiterate and less than 40 percent had attended 
school beyond the eighth grade17 (Wahrhaftig 1970 28-30).  
Apart from the lack of steady jobs that paid a living wage and educational 
opportunities, Wahrhaftig argues that the Cherokee Nation at the time, as a governing 
entity, had little to offer traditional Cherokees. He writes: “The present Cherokee tribal 
government represents the most recent expansion of alien power over tribal Cherokees. 
Organized in the 1940s . . . . it was first constructed as a legal fiction that enabled a 
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coalition of Oklahoma attorneys and businessmen of Cherokee descent to file suit in the 
Indian claims court” (Wahrhaftig and Lukens-Wahrhaftig 229). He adds that the 
Cherokee Nation at the time was run by “Indian individuals who were raised as 
conservative generalized Americans, often generations removed from any participation in 
culturally Indian life” (Wahrhaftig 96, emphasis original).  Wahrhaftig argues that 
Cherokees traditionally view power as primordial and sacred, not secular. This belief that 
individuals possess sacred power, and that power cannot be gained, manifests in the 
traditional manner of governance by communal council, not a nation-state. He writes:  
Cherokees are surrounded by whites who conceive of power in secular and 
 political terms. This power is something that is gained – by conquest, political 
 delegation, industriousness, or the manipulation of superior resources. To 
 Cherokees, this order of power seems neither a certain nor legitimate basis for 
 life, for it is not eternal. (Wahrhaftig and Lukens-Wahrhaftig 231) 
Wahrhaftig concludes that because the Nation at the time existed primarily to facilitate 
business between the Cherokee Nation and the federal government, and that traditional 
Cherokees did not recognize its power anyway, the Nation, traditionals believed, could 
not offer them a respite from poverty.18  
 Given the economic plight felt in several rural Cherokee communities, the BIA 
propaganda supporting Relocation and Termination made the policy all the more enticing 
for Indians looking for a way to better financially support their families. Fixico describes 
a brochure that was widely circulated in tribal communities that outlined the purported 
benefits of relocating. The imagery, in particular, was deceiving. Fixico writes: “Pictures 
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of executives dressed in white shirts, wearing ties, and sitting behind business desks 
insinuated that similar occupational positions could be obtained by Indians. Photos of a 
white frame house with shutters enticed the women. The scene suggested that Indians 
could provide their families with similar homes in suburban America” (139). Though the 
BIA sold a dream of prestigious jobs and subsequent affluence, the reality was that 
several Indian workers faced a lack of even unskilled jobs and more often than not 
experienced employer discrimination if they did find one. Likewise, the only homes 
many could afford were in derelict areas of town. In fact, as Fixico notes, by 1955 the 
Muskogee, Oklahoma, relocation office reported a sharp decline in the number of people 
willing to participate in the program. This intersection between desperation and dreams 
caused much confusion with regard to the long-term outcomes of the Termination and 
Relocation programs. 
Though the hard numbers and subsequent lived experience of relocatees make the 
Termination and Relocations programs look like an obvious losing prospect, the reaction 
to the programs among Cherokees was divided. Among Cherokees, the decision to pursue 
complete self-governance apart from the auspices of the federal government or to 
maintain the mutual trust relationship between the two nations has historically met with 
controversy. As W. David Baird argues, during the implementation of the Indian 
Reorganization Act (1934), apart from the Keetoowahs who favored the provisions of the 
act, most Cherokees “reacted with horror” at the policy. Specifically, he cites a 1934 
article in the Muskogee Daily Phoenix in which Cherokee O.K. Chandler describes the 
IRA’s policy as an affront to the “‘personal and political liberties’” of tribal citizens in 
 73 
Oklahoma and that the policy was a “‘flagrant slap at Indian intelligence’” and that John 
Collier wanted to force “‘the red man from the channels of commerce and send . . . him 
scurrying back to his tepee’” (qtd. in Baird 13). While the culturally conservative 
Cherokees tended to favor a return to tribal governance, mutually recognized and 
respected by the federal government and Cherokees, more assimilated Cherokees, 
especially those who were well-off like Chandler, preferred that tribal governments take a 
more hands-off approach. 
Like the intratribal conflict over what measures to take with the IRA, deciding 
whether the Cherokees and other tribal nations in Oklahoma should support the 
Termination and Relocation programs was no less contentious. Cherokee citizen Reed 
Buzzard, for example, wrote to Congressman George Schwabe in 1946, requesting 
termination. He writes: “‘I am Republican and an Indian, interested in the success of the 
Party and final settlement with the Indians. This idea of going on forever with this Indian 
business is both silly and expensive” (qtd. in Fixico 17). Schwabe replied, telling Buzzard 
that he agreed that the continued trust relationship was a “drain upon taxpayers19,” 
ostensibly non-Native Americans. But Buzzard wasn’t the only Oklahoma Indian to get 
on board with the Termination program. Fixico notes that during this period, nations such 
as the Wyandots, Ottawas, Eastern Shawnees, Quapaws, Seneca-Cayugas, Miamis, 
Modocs and Peorias supported limitations in their federal trust relationships. However, 
other Oklahoma Indians believed the Termination program would devastate already 
impoverished tribal communities. For example, Cherokee citizen Ruth Muskrat Bronson, 
then Secretary of the NCAI, argued in 1955 that the Termination program would lead to 
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the cultural extinction of tribal communities. She writes: “If the official policies of the 
Federal Government, as reflected by the current policies of the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
and the 83rd Congress, continue to be pursued, the American Indian (like that other living 
creature associated with him in history, the buffalo) is likely, to continue to exist only on 
the American nickel”20 (492). Bronson adds that because American politicians, as is 
much of the American populace, are ignorant of the history and current realities of tribal 
life, impulsive changes in Indian policy, even under the pretense of making amends, 
could have unforeseen adverse consequences. She writes: “If this action is founded on 
superficial or inaccurate knowledge rather than on thoughtful study or familiarity with 
fact and reality the result can be exceedingly serious. . . . This is true in the case of the 
termination bills since these jeopardize the Indian’s very existence and unquestionably 
would lead to his eventual – literal – extinction” (492). Bronson later argues that the 
federal government, if they truly had Indian Country’s best interests in mind, should 
attack poverty, low school enrollment and poor health at their sources, not falsely 
attribute these social ills to tribal governance and communal living. Finally, in her 
criticism of the policy she asserts that any discussion of policies that affect Indian 
Country should include input from Indians. In her appeal, she writes:  
More than one theorist has stated that “the solution to the Indian problem” is the 
 absorption of the Indian into the culture, race and society of the European-
 oriented American way. Shouldn’t the Indian have something to say about this? 
 Should the Indian be forced to give up his beliefs, his way of conducting his 
 affairs, his method of organized living, his kind of life on the land he is a part of, 
 75 
 if he chooses not to? Shouldn’t the Indians have the same right to self-
 determination that out government has stated, often and officially, is the 
 inalienable right of peoples in far parts of the world? (494). 
Given the economic realities that many Cherokees, especially those in conservative, 
traditional communities, faced at this time, Bronson appeals to readers to challenge 
Termination policy and recognize tribal communities’ right to retain the dignity inherent 
in conducting their lives as they see fit. By appealing to dignity, Bronson lends a depth to 
the discussion of Termination policy missed by others, like Buzzard, who only saw the 
fate of tribal nations in terms of their own pecuniary interests; she argues that Indians are 
people worthy of respect.21 And for those who possess little in the way of riches, dignity 
and respect are sometimes their most valuable assets. 
 
Termination and the rise of postwar U.S. patriotism 
While 1953 was the year that Congress passed this official resolution to terminate 
Indian nations and to pressure families into relocating, it was also the year that a then up-
and-coming Cherokee activist, Robert K. Thomas, wrote his Master’s thesis on the 
Redbird Smith Movement. Whether the timing was intentional is difficult to ascertain, 
but regardless it was certainly apropos. In the same year that the federal government 
kicked off its insidious program of tribal break-up and erasure, Thomas writes about an 
important nativistic22 movement, the members of which sought to resist similar attacks 
and encroachment by settlers and the federal government in the years preceding 
Oklahoma statehood almost 50 years earlier. Thomas’ study of the origins of the Redbird 
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Smith Movement is simultaneously a Cherokee narrative of resistance and critical 
nationhood because it not only demonstrates how revitalizing tradition and the tribal body 
is a powerful form of resisting assimilation, it also shows that under duress such tradition 
can be recovered or re-created from the very beginning, even out of a generations-long 
absence. Thomas’ work in this era creates such a narrative by privileging Cherokee 
economic and cultural separatism, and he crafts a counter-narrative of true Cherokee self-
determination at a time when the United States myopically sought to crush it.  
 What makes Thomas’ appeal to Cherokee-specific separatism so pertinent at the 
time he is writing is that the entity he sought to separate from – mainstream white 
American society – had opposite plans for Indian Country. While the federal 
government’s plan for tribal political termination and community dispersal had begun to 
germinate as early as the mid-1920s,23 the rise of intense patriotism following World War 
II provided a timely push to start to bring those plans into fruition. A postwar re-
imagining of America and who America now included gave the federal government an 
occasion to revisit ways of integrating rural and reservation Indians into urban U.S. 
society at a time when the U.S. began to formulate a new, more collective identity.  
George McKenna describes how the net of postwar U.S. patriotism started to widen to 
include historically marginalized communities as equally American as the upper class 
white Protestants who had previously enjoyed the exclusive purview to establish the 
standard of mainstream American identity. McKenna writes: “More than military might, 
more than big government, the most formidable asset of the United States was its broadly 
shared sense of fraternity” (250). Furthermore, he adds that postwar patriotism “was 
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much more inclusive, welcoming into its embrace southerners, Catholics, Jews, and 
others who had been left out in the past. The World War II years produced the gold 
standard of American patriotism” (260). While McKenna argues that the U.S. in the 
postwar years aimed to be more inclusive with regard to who could now be defined as 
“American,” it bears clarifying that this sentiment implied absorption into mainstream 
white society, not an acceptance of non-whites as they actually were. As Nancy Anne 
Dawe, a writer who reflects on her life during WWII, notes, for the upsurge in collective 
patriotism, discrimination nonetheless abounded. She writes:  
 Despite the hard work of our troops overseas and citizens on the home front, there 
 was clear discrimination against Americans who were black, Japanese and 
 German. African Americans, many of whom were war heroes (like the famed 
 Tuskegee pilots) were placed in segregated Army units, while Japanese 
 Americans were herded into internment camps for the duration of the war, a clear 
 violation of their rights. (par 15) 
While some previously marginalized Americans now were accepted as full citizens in the 
postwar U.S., with the specter of homogenizing patriotism emerging, the question of 
what America now stood for and where the nation would go next also entered the 
national conscience.  
 With the United States having played the role of liberator on the international 
stage, the nation had to decide what direction it would take next. McKenna points out 
that, “Americans had to struggle with the legacy of those epochal wartime years. A great 
world war was over. What was America to do now?” (260). As the great war effort in 
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Europe and the Pacific drew to a close, America turned its efforts inward and part of the 
answer regarding what to do next involved figuring out what to do with the Indian 
community.  
The method of integrating Indians into mainstream America through the federal 
relocation program served two goals of the postwar approach to dealing with the United 
States’ so-called “Indian problem.” Through the program, the United States sought to 
denationalize Indians and help the country “get out of the Indian business” as was 
outlined by then Secretary of the Interior Arthur Watkins, while establishing a less 
seemingly insidious pretense of rescuing Indians from poverty. The reality of the 
program, however, was that in most cases people remained in poverty and in fact never 
did smoothly integrate into the American mainstream.  
Elaine Neils describes how jarring the disruption of local tribal life and the 
movement to urban centers really was. She writes: “For the Indians, this is a movement 
within a basically alien culture, indeed to the centers of that culture, and so there are 
additional problems of practical adjustments and cultural reconciliation” (2-3). Because 
the effects of the Relocation program, the intertribal communities that formed and the 
Indian activism that developed as a result have been so exhaustively studied,24 I will not 
belabor that element of this period in my study. I will only point out the early realities of 
the program to highlight the economic pressure that the United States imposed on tribal 
communities through which we can read Thomas’ Cherokee separatism as a form of 
narrative resistance and critical nationhood. 
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Economic coercion and the Relocation program 
 Part of what made the relocation program so insidious is that it had the 
appearance of being voluntary; it gave a sense that Indians who left their tribal 
communities for life in the city did so completely on their own volition. Such a 
perspective not only elides the United States’ subtle strong-arming of Indians to effect 
their own tribal demise, but it also gives the impression that Indians who participated in 
the program freely chose the potential of extinguishing tribal ties and lifeways in 
exchange for a chance to adopt the lifeways and values of the American mainstream. This 
retelling of Relocation history whitewashes the atrocities visited upon some who 
relocated,25 and it closes the door for examining ways that such a situation could be 
prevented in the future through reconciling to tribal economic and cultural practices. 
 This question of the supposed voluntary nature of the Relocation program is 
pertinent to understanding Thomas’ work at the time he was writing it. Understanding the 
economic environment of many tribal communities during the 1950s is key to 
understanding Thomas’ separatist approach through reclaiming traditional economic 
practices. Stephen Cornell notes that while participation in the program was voluntary on 
paper, in practice relocating was frequently the only option some individuals had to 
improve the welfare of their families. He writes:  
 To some extent participation was voluntary; officially it was intended to be so, 
 and many Indians eagerly took the road to the cities. In practice, sometimes it was 
 not. On occasion students who had completed schooling and vocational training 
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 were asked to which city they wished to relocate. Returning to the reservation was 
 not presented as an option. (131) 
Congress passed the Indian Vocational Training Act (1956) through which the federal 
government taught Indians more than 125 trades such as carpentry and auto mechanics. 
On the surface, such a program looks like a magnanimous gesture from the United States 
to Indian Country, but because there was no effort to also develop local tribal 
communities through the legislation, no jobs were available at home where participants in 
the training program could ply their new trade. So while the military didn’t frog-march 
Relocation participants to Dallas or Los Angeles at gunpoint, the lack of jobs in their own 
communities meant someone with a family to feed often had no option but to move. And 
that was the point. As Cornell writes: “Alternatives were generally limited. As long as 
reservation economies languished, relocation had the force of necessity” (131).  If 
economic pressure was the means through which the United States coerced Indians into 
assimilating into mainstream urban society, then relieving that pressure was necessary to 
resisting the move.  
 However, relieving that pressure through tribal methods was incumbent on 
individuals taking a stand and insisting on being themselves as uniquely tribal to begin 
with. As with any history of cultural contact, and imposition in some cases, centuries of 
exchange between distinct groups often blurred the lines of that distinction, resulting in 
contemporary generations having to negotiate the social, political and economic effects 
that exchange. For those nations such as the Cherokees26 who had historically adapted 
and adopted various European ideas and practices for generations, Termination and 
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Relocation was a time when Indian assimilation appeared as if it could become complete 
and as such was an ideal time for tribal communities to examine themselves in contrast to 
the United States’ mainstream they were being thrust into. An examination of Thomas’ 
early work shows a young Cherokee who insisted on drawing a sharp line not only 
between Cherokees and whites, but also between traditional Cherokees and those who 
had overly assimilated white values. At a time when the pressure to assimilate mounted, 
Thomas argued for the need to reconcile to tribal tradition and to resist the American 
assimilation policy through Cherokee separatism to re-imagine Cherokee nationhood.  
 
Thomas’ and the Keetoowahs’ movement between intertribal and tribal specificity 
To read Thomas’ work in the 1950s as Cherokee specific necessitates an analysis 
of Thomas himself and how he positioned himself as primarily Cherokee. Apart from 
Steve Pavlik’s edited collection of essays about Thomas, scholars have written little at 
length that focuses strictly on Thomas and his work on its own. Apart from the occasional 
citation of Thomas’ work in other studies, a scant amount of published work concentrates 
solely on Thomas, and those who engage Thomas seldom focus on him strictly as a 
Cherokee but rather as a Cherokee operating intertribally in the 1960s and 1970s, post 
Relocation, during the nascent Red Power Movement. Much has been written about the 
development of intertribalism, and specifically as a result of Indians of various nations 
relocating to urban centers, so I won’t recount it here at length. I’ll simply mention that 
Thomas was a leader in the intertribal movement, advising the National Indian Youth 
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Council and Chicago Conference27 as well as mentoring future leaders such as Vine 
Deloria, Jr., while a professor at Arizona State University.  
Because much of Thomas’ work gained visibility as it was published in this era, 
his work is largely associated with intertribal efforts of the same period. However, 
examining his earlier work and noting how his approach changed over the years, it 
becomes clear that his position as a Cherokee functioning intertribally is one he took later 
in his career. His work from the 1950s and into the early 1960s demonstrates a clear 
Cherokee tribal-specific focus that has heretofore been understudied.28 I recognize 
Thomas’ intertribal work as that of a Cherokee in an intertribal setting and, therefore, it is 
Cherokee work. I am, however, more interested in the Cherokee-specific work from his 
early years because it is important work that has yet to surface frequently in 
conversations involving Thomas. This work demonstrates Cherokee tribal resistance and 
a re-imagining of Cherokee nationhood at a time when Cherokees had no fully sovereign 
national status of their own,29 and the United States was seeking to break up Cherokees 
alongside other tribes through Relocation, a history Thomas recognized was repeating 
itself. That said, while I can say much about Thomas’ intertribal work, my aim here is to 
demonstrate Thomas’ approach to critical narrative nationhood through a framework of 
Cherokee culture and values as well as encourage the use of Thomas’ earlier work in 
future conversations about him.  
One of Thomas’ early works is his Master’s thesis, The Origin and the 
Development of the Redbird Smith Movement (1953). While Cherokees today generally 
associate Redbird Smith and the Nighthawk Keetoowahs, stomp dances and other cultural 
 83 
practices that emerged from the movement as traditionally Cherokee, it is essential not to 
overlook the fact that the movement’s origins were intertribal, even if the goal was to 
“get back what the Keetoowahs had lost.”30 Thomas describes how the Redbird Smith 
Movement and the revival of Cherokee traditional lifeways and social organization in the 
face of white encroachment was largely informed by non-Cherokee Indians. He mentions 
that the Natchez and Creeks provided much substance to the Cherokee nativist 
movement. He writes: “The revival of Cherokee ceremonies was made of a composite 
group of Cherokees, Creeks and Natchez. Each of these groups contributed. Some traits 
were ‘aboriginal’ traits while others were those which they had taken from the Cherokee 
in earlier times and preserved even though the Cherokee had dropped them from their 
culture” (135). Thomas adds that while Cherokees and Creeks had historically been 
rivals,31 “Creek culture is closer to Cherokee culture than that of any tribe and the history 
and interests of these two tribes have been intimately tied up during the last two 
centuries. And Creek culture has had a great deal of influence on Cherokee culture” 
(138). Thomas notes that the Creeks reintroduced several dances and the Notchees,32 
Natchez who lived with the Cherokees, “had a reputation among the Cherokees for 
knowing medicine and the old time ways” (140). Additionally, C.P. Cornelius, an Oneida 
lawyer who visited Oklahoma several times beginning in 1915 to, Thomas speculates, 
promote the Lolomi Plan,33 brought knowledge and practices from the Six Nations that 
the Keetoowahs integrated into the Cherokee cultural revival. Cornelius told members of 
the Redbird Smith Movement that among the Six Nations a story circulates about a 
seventh nation, a seventh fire, that migrated elsewhere and that he believed the Cherokees 
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were that seventh nation. He brought ashes from a fire “back east” and added them to the 
Illinois District fire, the lead fire among Keetoowahs at the time.  
At this time, the Redbird Smith Movement that began intertribally had begun to 
take on a Cherokee-specific identity, mainly because the ashes from the east made the 
Keetoowahs feel that “they had never lost the (Keetoowah) rule, that the Fires had never 
really gone out” (Thomas 183). George Smith,34 one of Thomas’ sources for the study, 
said Cornelius had taken the fire from “Natchez rule” to “Keetoowah rule,” and 
Cherokees began to change ceremonies that they had revived with the help of the Creeks 
and Natchez to ones with more Cherokee elements. An example of this change, still 
evident today, is the configuration of stomp grounds, which used to have four35 arbors 
around the fire and now have seven36 arbors in a semi-circle with an opening to the east, a 
sacred direction in Cherokee cosmology. Likewise, Keetoowahs insisted that members 
have a clan. Members who did not have a clan or who couldn’t remember their clan often 
had their clan divined by elders, revitalizing the clan system that had fallen away in some 
Cherokee communities through intermarriage and the adoption of a Western-style 
centralized state in place of traditional clan rule.37 Thomas quotes Stokes Smith, another 
of Redbird Smith’s sons, downplaying the Notchee role. He writes: “‘Some people say 
that the fire out there is a Notchee Fire, but that is not so. It never was a Notchee fire . . . 
When he (Redbird Smith) started the Fire over here at Black Gum Mountain, it was a 
Cherokee fire’” (183-4). This history of the Redbird Smith Movement is important to 
know because though the movement began intertribally, by the time Thomas was writing 
about it, it had become strictly Cherokee in the imagination of its Cherokee creators and 
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participants. Though the method might have been intertribal, the goal from the very 
beginning was to re-narrate Cherokee culture at a time of white incursion and widespread 
assimilation and to resist that incursion as Cherokees. It is through this historical lens that 
I interpret the Redbird Smith Movement and Thomas’ invoking of the movement at a 
time of similar cultural erasure and communal upheaval as resistance and rewriting 
critical nationhood in a distinctly Cherokee way. 
 
The line (in the sand) between Cherokee and American worldviews 
Before one can re-imagine and re-narrate critical Cherokee nationhood based on 
Cherokee tradition, it is essential to understand what exactly one is seeking to re-create. 
Thomas demonstrates Cherokee-specific separatism in an early essay called “Cherokee 
Values and World View” (1958) in which he offers a distinct delineation of who a 
Cherokee is and what he or she necessarily values at a time when the imperative to 
abandon those lifeways had grown stronger. Simply writing such an essay at the time of 
Relocation sends a clear, unequivocal message: Cherokees possess a unique worldview 
and values that distinguish them from others. Thomas, however, goes a step further and 
argues that conservative, or traditional, Cherokee lifeways are truly Cherokee, and he 
makes a point that Cherokees who have assimilated in some ways, though not exactly 
white, are not exactly Cherokee either. While this essay would certainly raise a few 
eyebrows and likely be dismissed as essentialist in today’s diverse Cherokee Nation,38 in 
its time it was a brave call to action for Cherokees to reconcile Cherokee lifeways and to 
create boundaries to resist cultural erosion as a result of continued colonization.  
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Thomas first describes traditional Cherokee values and worldview before delving 
into an analysis of how these values differ drastically from those of mainstream white 
America. In doing so, he not only establishes Cherokees as separate and distinct from the 
American mainstream, but he also argues that reclaiming traditional Cherokee values is a 
form of resistance that can bring Cherokees back to a place of full autonomy and 
improved overall well-being. At the core of Thomas’ analysis of Cherokee values is the 
assertion that, above all else, Cherokees stick together. We can imagine the weight of this 
charge when the federal government was coercing tribal communities to disband. Thomas 
writes:  
Let me briefly state what I think is the core of this value system. The Cherokee 
 tries to maintain harmonious interpersonal relationships with his fellow Cherokee 
 by avoiding giving offense, on the negative side, and by giving of himself to his 
 fellow Cherokee in regard to his time and his material goods on the positive side. 
 I think  this value system is a source of some reward in the average conservative 
 Cherokee . . . he is part of one of the most highly developed social security 
 systems in the world. (1)  
Here, Thomas outlines the traditional Cherokee principle of not causing unnecessary 
quarrel and of giving of oneself generously as strictly Cherokee values, but he also 
stresses the importance of maintaining such beliefs – security. The security might be 
psychological or material, perhaps both, but at the outset Thomas asserts the need for 
Cherokees to give of their time and possessions to one another when needed, which can 
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only be accomplished when Cherokees remain engaged with other Cherokees and take 
responsibility for one another’s welfare.   
Thomas goes on to establish a Cherokee separatist stance by explaining how 
traditional Cherokees at his time conceived of themselves as distinct from other humans 
and how this view informs their allegiance to other Cherokees. He writes that, “the 
conservative Cherokee sees himself as a special kind of human being, different from all 
nationalities, created by God and ordained to be different and separate from the beginning 
of the world to the end of time” (15). In these early writings, Thomas clearly articulates 
that not only are Cherokees culturally distinct, but that per tradition the Creator made 
Cherokees as such, lending a natural, somewhat divine, quality to the idea that Cherokees 
are separate from others. Similarly, this quality also informs how, to Thomas, a true 
Cherokee is one who recognizes his duty to his fellow aniyvwiya, or Real People, and, 
therefore, living out that duty is a marker of a true Cherokee, a distinction that Thomas 
adds is born of necessity. He writes: “A conservative Cherokee is first a Cherokee, 
secondly an Indian, and thirdly a human being, and his obligation is to people in that 
order. Certainly on an abstract level he sees all men as having some claim on him . . . But 
this generalized common humanity is very tangential to his feeling that he is a different 
order of man – a Cherokee” (15). Given this hierarchy of duty that Thomas describes as 
part of a traditional Cherokee mindset, the peril of Cherokee communities being 
dispersed is not only one of a breakdown of mutual obligations to fellow Cherokees, but 
also an undermining of the Cherokee self as it has to navigate a world in which 
Cherokees are not a priority. 
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Key to understanding this value is understanding and accepting the traditional 
story that explains that the Cherokees are the Real People.39  One must know the story 
and identify him- or herself as part of it. However, as Thomas points out, the other half of 
being Cherokee involves “doing,” for example, choosing to affiliate with and to direct 
one’s priorities to fellow Cherokees. On this point Thomas transitions from articulating 
Cherokee-specific values and worldview and begins to show how adhering to these 
terms, or choosing not to, creates a distinction between those he names as truly Cherokee 
and those he refers to as “white Indians” or, in some cases, simply white. To Thomas 
being culturally Cherokee and having a sense of duty to fellow Cherokees is a choice, as 
he articulates in his study of the Redbird Smith Movement, and these are traits that one 
can acquire later in life with dedication and that can always be revitalized. It is the choice 
to align oneself with Cherokees, to choose to be Cherokee and to perform one’s duty to 
other Cherokees that distinguishes who is in or out of the community.40  
In his analysis of this distinction, Thomas names individuals as examples of who 
are truly Cherokee not based not on their ancestry, but rather on their way of life and 
dedication to Cherokees. He argues: “If a non-Cherokee speaker is the offspring of two 
Cherokee speakers he will grudgingly be called Indian, but certainly rarely a ‘full Indian.’ 
In many contexts these people are spoken of as white Indians because of their white 
cultural orientations and, thus, are not really conceived to be true members of Cherokee 
society” (16).  It is interesting to note that Thomas singles out language acumen as a 
major identifier of Cherokeeness. As Circe Sturm (Choctaw) has argued in her study of 
the Cherokee Freedmen and race formation, language represents “time shared” with 
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Cherokees,41 and Thomas names shared language as one of the four elements of his 
Peoplehood Matrix.42 In addition to language, though, Thomas identifies cultural 
orientation with whites as one element that situates what he calls white Indians against 
real Cherokees at a time when a choice had to be made whether to stay traditionally 
Cherokee, or to reclaim those values, or to disappear into the urban white mainstream. 
Nowadays because political citizenship has become the primary identifier of 
Cherokeeness for some Cherokees, conceiving of someone as “less Cherokee” because of 
his or her cultural leanings is often seen as a gauche. In Thomas’ day, however, such a 
distinction was necessary as the threat of assimilation loomed. Lines must periodically be 
drawn. After all, if the definition of Cherokee keeps widening, at what point does it cease 
to define anything distinct at all?43 In the 1950s,Thomas recognized the need to draw a 
strict boundary around Cherokee identity to protect it from the assimilation imperative of 
the day.  
These distinctions, he adds, often caused rifts in families. He writes: “These 
classifications are important interaction–wise because they cross cut kin groups and tear 
asunder many extended families. Many Indians will have closer relations with other 
Indian friends than they do with ‘white Indian’ . . . cousins” (16). Much of Thomas’ focus 
here on maintaining Cherokee language and choosing to participate in Cherokee 
community life, among other possible values, comes from his tutelage under his mentor, 
Andrew Dreadfulwater, who, like Thomas, was a Christian Keetoowah. Dreadfulwater 
believed that language and communal affiliation were the two elements that were 
essential in maintaining Cherokee lifeways. In a speech at the North American Indian 
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Ecumenical Conference in 1974, Dreadfulwater outlined his focus on language and 
community participation. He stated: “If we want to change to white people, the Indian has 
got to do it himself. First, we could stop teaching our own language. Second, we could 
marry overseas people. Then by the third generation there won’t be no Indian. We’ll still 
dance, sing – have feathers in our hats – but we won’t be no Indians. That’s my teaching” 
(354). While Thomas could have included a variety of traits and behaviors in his study of 
Cherokee values and worldviews, his choice to focus on language and remaining a part of 
the community was likely informed by his long friendship with Dreadfulwater. Where 
Dreadfulwater, however, envisions a permanent, more fatalistic outcome from Cherokees 
not speaking the language and living with non-Cherokees, Thomas, probably from his 
own life experience, argues that Cherokees who do have more tenuous ties to language 
and community can and should return to the fold. Thomas demonstrates a separatist 
approach by arguing that despite one’s actual ancestral make-up, one must choose to 
remain Cherokee or to cast one’s fortune with a life aligned with whiteness. And to 
Thomas, to choose whiteness is, by its nature, to reject Cherokee.44 
Again, this separatist binary might be labeled as essentialist today, but that term 
too often gets deployed when a group simply insists on articulating and protecting its own 
values on its own terms. Understanding how this binary functions in Thomas’ early work 
necessitates an analysis of how Thomas casts white people in the traditional Cherokee 
imagination. This analysis not only lends urgency to the choice of being Cherokee in the 
1950s, but it also creates a contrast that provides a framework for his Cherokee 
separatism that appears in his work dealing with the Redbird Smith movement.  
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Thomas pulls no punches in his analysis of white people in the traditional 
Cherokee imagination. Considering how whites have historically dispossessed Indians 
and that the federal government was pushing for Indians to relocate and to assimilate into 
white society, Thomas argues that white values are, by their nature, antithetical to truly 
being Cherokee. In Thomas’ analysis, Cherokees stand in for moral superiority and 
cooperative collectivity cast against white cutthroat individualism. Though his approach 
might sound simplistic, it does memorably highlight the urgency of Cherokees’ choosing 
to retain or recover those values at this time. Thomas writes:  
 The white to the conservative (Cherokee) is the great “bugaboo.” He is the cause 
 of most of the ills of the Cherokee. He is smart, but his behavior is seen as erratic 
 and unpredictable. He is, however, going to do ‘bad things’ consistently to the 
 Cherokee. Whites may even be superior in intelligence and general competence to 
 the Cherokee, but they are morally inferior to the Cherokee. (17)  
Thomas again demonstrates a notable difference that distinguishes Cherokees from 
whites, a difference that Cherokees must maintain lest they lose sight of themselves: 
moral superiority. He asserts that while whites might be “smart” and competent, those 
attributes only facilitate their proclivity to commit harm. While whites’ traits might serve 
them in an individualist, capitalist society, these values have no place in a traditional 
communal Cherokee economy based on kinship duty where values such as trust and good 
ethics are essential. Furthermore, we can read this passage as Thomas asserting that a 
Cherokee placed in a white-dominated community is always in a subordinate, perilous 
position. After all, whether a Cherokee sees a white person as morally inferior is 
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immaterial to the white person’s ability and willingness to do “bad things” to him. If a 
white person cared about his moral standing, according to Thomas, he wouldn’t be 
“erratic and unpredictable.” That said, an Indian in a white world is in a space where 
white values have a direct, adverse impact on him, but Indian values have no effect on the 
white people who also inhabit the space. By extension, we can read Thomas’ claim as 
stating that the only space where Cherokee morality has any purchase is in a Cherokee 
society, among Cherokees who recognize and respect those values. 
Much of Thomas’ maligning of white people, ironically, stems from a white 
epistemology that Cherokees borrowed. Thomas notes that what makes white society so 
insidious in the traditional Cherokee view is the conservative belief that whites are bound 
by their “blood,” or nature, to behave incorrigibly whereas Cherokee nature is more 
malleable. This claim operates two ways in terms of Cherokee separatism during the 
1950s. It casts whites as always and irreconcilably malicious, making Relocation a losing 
prospect, but casts Cherokee nature as more flexible, inviting a return to traditional 
Cherokee values and lifeways on the part of white Indians who might have strayed. 
Thomas writes: “Indians and whites inherit different natures. The idea resembles the old 
white southern idea of ‘blood,’ except that the Cherokee conception of nature admits of 
being alterable, and the white conception of ‘blood’ does not” (18-19). Here, Thomas 
privileges Cherokees as more complex, while, in some ways, making a straw man out of 
whites by assuming they’re static. Thomas continues: “To the conservatives, however, 
too much departure from the Cherokee ethic is seen as becoming ‘crooked.’ The white 
man by nature is ‘crooked’ and so if one becomes like a white, one becomes ‘crooked’” 
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(18-9). Thomas asserts in no uncertain terms that whites are inherently crooked, making 
white values and Cherokee values mutually exclusive. Cherokees, he adds, hold whites to 
their own definition of blood, meaning once a crook always a crook on down the 
generational line.   
However, according to Thomas, Cherokees afford their own nature, as it were, 
more latitude, lending Cherokees who might have transgressed in the past an outlet of 
redemption and reconciliation. This designation between the way that whites and 
Cherokees view man’s “nature” is another way Thomas articulates how Cherokees differ 
from their white counterparts. It also distinguishes Cherokees as more complex people 
than seemingly one-dimensional whites, a nod to the worldview that Cherokees are a 
higher order of man. In terms of reconciliation to the tribe, we can read Thomas’ 
argument that Cherokee values create a space for wayward Cherokees to return to the 
fold. To whites, Thomas argues, character is inextricably tethered to a sense of morality 
and because one’s character is static, one who breaches the moral code is irrevocably 
immoral. Cherokees, he adds, value harmonious relationship and a “sin” as such is only a 
disruption of that harmony. And harmony can be restored. Thomas continues, arguing 
that whites might believe that “[i]f a man is drunk in public he will probably continue to 
get drunk in public again and he no doubt, also, beats his wife, doesn’t provide for his 
children, etc. The Cherokee conception allows for no such prediction. An act is judged at 
the time, and if a man stops doing bad things, he can be ‘readmitted’ to his former status” 
(20).  This fluidity as inner nature facilitates various returns to establish Cherokee 
harmony.  
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Establishing and maintaining harmony is the cornerstone for order and a good 
life.  This “good life” that Thomas mentions is incumbent on Cherokees practicing 
Cherokee values, a proposition that has no currency in a white world. He writes: “If the 
Cherokees live according to the Cherokee value system (the Cherokee moral code) then 
the order is restored and the ‘good life,’ which is the norm in Cherokee eyes, accrues” 
(22, emphasis original).  To restore order, then, is to resist those who disrupted it to begin 
with. If such a resistance to this disruption is to occur, Cherokees much first return to the 
values of the traditional tribal core.  
 
A prototype of possibility: Redbird Smith and a path back to Keetoowah ways 
This method of Cherokee tribal resistance and re-imagining nationhood perhaps 
finds no greater example than in the Redbird Smith movement, the first post-Removal 
Cherokee nativistic movement to demonstrate that rebuilding traditional epistemologies 
was possible. The Redbird Smith movement grew out of the Keetoowah Society, founded 
in 1859,45 who sought to separate physically and culturally from the growing mixedblood 
communities who were further accumulating white Southern values, which included 
slaveholding. The fullbloods, to use Thomas’ term, experienced increasing hostility from 
the mixedbloods, which culminated just before the Civil War, largely over the issue of 
slavery.46 The violence and resentment, however, was a holdover of the contentious 
relationship between supporters of the Ross party who fought Removal and those of the 
Treaty party, or Ridge party, who facilitated it through an illegal and treasonous treaty 
with the United States. The Keetoowah Society eventually comprised about 3,000 
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fullbloods, though for the purposes of the Keetoowah Society, the term “fullblood” often 
referred more to one’s social and cultural values being aligned with traditional Cherokee 
values rather than one’s actual ancestral admixture. The Society sought partially to break 
away and part with other Cherokees over alliances in the Civil War, but also to restore 
the tribal lifeways that mixedblood, or “progressive,” infusion had begun to undermine.  
Thomas indicates that the crux of the Redbird Smith movement involved the 
revival of forms of social organization. These forms of social organization included 
ceremonial institutions and later clans, both of which operated on a reconciliation of 
traditional Cherokee values such as living the White Path47 and communal governance.48 
These social traditions helped to reconcile the cultural elements that made Cherokees 
Cherokee and provided a platform from which Keetoowahs could successfully extricate 
themselves from the incursion of white culture brought through intermarriage and 
Christianity. Another form of social organization, gadugi,49 while also being a framework 
of communal governance, functioned economically and allowed members to participate 
in an economy based on communal support. Wahrhaftig credits elements of traditional 
Cherokee social organization to Cherokees’ ability, at the time of Termination and 
Relocation, to manage on little money. He writes: “There remains a network of person-
to-person relationships within a Cherokee settlement that is a pathway for an efficient 
distribution of resources and labor through sharing. So long as these person-to-person 
relationships do not break down, the Cherokees are not so poor as they might be” (455). 
This traditional economy operates outside of the U.S. capitalist system based on excess 
and surplus material goods that had been operating in the Cherokee Nation for some time 
 96 
and that caused Cherokee communities to geographically separate in order to farm more 
to keep up with the new economy’s material demands.50  
This history of cultural and economic colonization that operated during the 
Redbird Smith era is eerily similar to the climate during Relocation during which Thomas 
invoked the movement. By analyzing the elements of the Redbird Smith movement at 
that time, Thomas demonstrates the potential for a successful Cherokee separatism in 
which Cherokees can operate as Cherokees outside the narrative of Indian erasure 
facilitated by economic pressure. As such, his narrative stands as one that we can use 
again should this history repeat itself.  And if Thomas’ analysis is any indication, this 
history revisiting us is not a matter of if but of when. 
 
The role of economics and intermarriage in tribal dissolution 
Thomas begins his narrative of the Redbird Smith movement by examining 
traditional Cherokee culture patterns, namely social organization, and how the adoption 
of white values incited the breakdown that the Keetoowah Society and Redbird Smith 
sought to mitigate. He points to the acculturation and dependence on the white economy 
as the changes that precipitated the growing chasm in Cherokee communities, changes 
that were taking hold again during Relocation. Thomas describes how before white 
incursion Cherokee communities centered on small, loosely confederated towns in which 
people practiced gadugi and worked in cooperative units. These units worked the land 
closely, only growing and hunting what the community needed for sustenance and 
supporting one another.  
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Thomas describes how incorporating a white economy changed Cherokees’ 
relationships to the land and to one another, and not for the better. Instead of maintaining 
a strong connection locally through tribal work, the need to cultivate surplus in order to 
operate in a white economy of material goods necessitated a spreading out of 
communities and a conception of the land not as a source of sustenance but as a 
commodity to be used. He writes: “In order to carry on more extensive agriculture it was 
necessary to spread out from the town centers. . . . Many farms began to take on the 
appearance of the individually operated frontier farms. . . . This spreading out of the 
farms no doubt weakened the old town organizational structure” (37-38). This early 
imposition and pressure for the tribe to spread out – and weaken – is a historical 
precursor to the same imposition during allotment during Redbird Smith’s day, which, in 
turn, is remarkably similar to the economic pressures imposed on Cherokees and other 
nations during Termination and Relocation. By demonstrating that Cherokee economy 
and social organization were self-sustaining and that separating Cherokees from one 
another had devastating effects, Thomas also demonstrates the value of Cherokees 
organizing at a time when the federal government would sooner split them up and write 
them out of history. 
Similarly, while Thomas writes a narrative of Cherokee separatism that values 
Cherokee-specific institutions, he also writes of the role that whiteness,51 through 
intermarriage, had in further damaging the Cherokee Nation during allotment, damage 
that the Redbird Smith movement sought to mitigate. In writing about the Redbird Smith 
movement’s resistance to tribal disintegration, Thomas notes that while fullbloods fought 
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by removing themselves and by reviving Cherokee epistemologies, mixedblood 
Cherokees, who Thomas refers to as “white Cherokees,” acquiesced and facilitated 
allotment, Oklahoma statehood and what could’ve been the sunsetting52 of the Cherokee 
Nation. Thomas notes that though “white Cherokees” considered themselves Cherokee, 
the American values they lived by created a rift between them and their traditional 
counterparts. He writes: “These people were American in every way but allegiance. They 
considered themselves Cherokee and were many times very militant about that fact. But, 
because of culture differences, the dichotomy between these two factions was almost 
unbridgeable” (74).  The differences between these two groups include the growing 
patriarchy and race hierarchy in mixedblood communities as well as a prioritizing of 
individual property and interests as opposed to seeing oneself as having a duty to the 
community as a whole. 
Thomas adds that one area in which the factions differed was in how they viewed 
Cherokee land. For the mixedbloods, land was a commodity and though the mixedbloods 
initially fought allotment through legal channels, when that strategy failed they quickly 
agreed to allotment and statehood.53  For the traditionals, he argues, “individual 
ownership of the land struck at the very core of the culture” (74). Thomas posits that the 
mixedbloods’ initial apprehension of allotment was motivated by a loss of wealth and 
status whereas the fullbloods sought to preserve culture amid “civilizing” efforts and 
disapproved of parceling out and owning tribal land. He argues: “The mixed-bloods who 
were against the allotment because of national feeling were also against it, probably, for 
reasons of financial gain” (75). Thomas further elaborates that the parcels of allotted land 
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would be too small for vast herds of cattle that the mixedblood families grew wealthy 
from while fullblood families eked out a more modest living on their land.   
An important note is that, in Thomas’ narrative, despite generations of white 
encroachment, the core of Cherokee culture remained intact. He attributes its staying 
power to the traditionalists’ retreat from Victorian-era white and mixedblood society, 
arguing that the way to maintain the tribal core is through separation. This desire to 
further separate during allotment spurred the Redbird Smith movement. Thomas writes: 
“All through Cherokee history the goals and values of the full-blood Cherokee had 
changed little . . . the core of full-blood Cherokee culture in the nineties was the same as 
before. And out of full-blood Cherokee culture came the Redbird Smith movement” (76). 
Overall, Thomas’ narrative insists that the way for Cherokees to forge a true resistance to 
the onslaught of white assimilation and tribal destruction is for Cherokees to have a space 
and economy in with to maintain culture and live as Cherokee. And this argument 
demonstrates the usefulness of Thomas’ narrative during the Termination and Relocation 
era, a time when Cherokees no longer had the same political sovereignty they once did 
and the pressure to embrace life in mainstream white America was immense. While 
Thomas does not explicitly connect the events during allotment with those of the 
Termination and Relocation era, he does draw connections between allotment and earlier 
events in Cherokee history, demonstrating that such histories predictably repeat 
themselves. By highlighting the devastating effects that the loss of Cherokee 
epistemologies had on Cherokees then, he implicitly argues in favor of the value of re-
creating and retaining them, and his narrative of the Redbird Smith movement then 
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functions as a guidebook to show that such revitalization and re-imagining of nationhood 
is possible again.  
Thomas shows that the assault on Cherokees began with assaults on their 
economy54 and culture,55 targets that the United States eyed again during Termination 
and Relocation. He asserts that Cherokees had a self-sustaining economy based on 
cooperative labor and that the practice of gadugi was concentrated in fullblood 
communities. The pressure to operate in a Western cash economy and the need to break 
up the system of communal labor in order to transition into it led to a growing 
dependence on surplus goods to exchange with traders, usually white intermarried 
citizens, some of whom had questionable scruples. As an example, Thomas writes of one 
trader near Braggs to whom fullbloods deposited cash from their leasing of the Cherokee 
Strip. The trader was an intermarried white citizen of the Cherokee Nation who 
eventually became greedy, stole their money, and fled the Cherokee Nation, leaving 
behind his Cherokee wife and child. Reliance on a cash economy with whites exposed 
Cherokees to the risk of being bilked and having little capital on which to live, a situation 
opposite that of gadugi in which everyone’s livelihood depends on everyone’s 
cooperation. But a functioning system of gadugi, outside the clutch of the white 
economy, not only ensured that Cherokees filled their basic needs such as food and 
shelter, but it also freed time for the community to spend together and to continue 
bonding. If an economic system based on Cherokee principles encouraged Cherokees to 
stick together, then being thrust into a cash economy with whites based on the demand 
for surplus goods weakened the community. Thomas writes: “The full-bloods, because of 
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their comparatively easy economic life, had a great deal of leisure time. The communal 
nature of Cherokee culture brought together groups of people to engage in activities” 
(103).  Some of these activities included fishing, eating meals together and going to 
church. He adds that a result of the disintegration of Cherokee social organization was the 
lawlessness56 that some Cherokees had begun to participate in as evidenced by the 
increasing numbers of public drunkenness and fighting at social gatherings. 
 
Regaining religion as a separatist strategy 
In addition to the breakdown of traditional Cherokee economy, the undermining 
of Cherokee culture, namely spiritual traditions, resulted from the influence of 
Euroamerican colonization, frequently in the form of the Baptist Church.57 Many 
fullbloods took to the teachings of Baptist missionaries and incorporated elements of 
Cherokee belief, such as medicine, in the new faith while dispensing with others, such as 
the place of queer Cherokees, which further fractured the community, a topic explored 
further in Chapter 4. Nonetheless, because the Baptist faith had supplanted some of the 
older ceremonial forms, some traditionalist Cherokees felt as if they had no place in the 
Christian Church and, as a result, no foothold in the spiritual fellowship of the 
community. This religious dynamic and the actions on the part of the Baptist church to 
eradicate Cherokee spirituality led to more feelings of alienation and tribal friction. Many 
of the families who felt disconnected with the Baptists and Cherokee congregants, 
including the Smiths, later formed the core of the original Keetoowah Society that 
reconstructed traditional spirituality. 
 102 
Reconciling traditional spirituality was the first step in the Keetoowahs’ 
articulation of an affirmative, resistant Cherokee identity that had been eroded through 
assimilation. Part of what separated the Keetoowahs from the rapidly growing 
mixedblood community was the revived spirituality that reconciled the value of wampum 
and clan, two epistemologies that Redbird Smith was charged with restoring in “getting 
back what the Keetoowahs had lost.” This history is important in Thomas’ day – a time 
similar to that of Redbird Smith’s day – because Thomas writes a narrative that shows it 
is possible and necessary for Cherokees to re-create tradition to fend off the assimilation 
imperative.  
Re-creating tradition is not only a matter of recovering the practices themselves, 
but also in finding a way to resist through what those practices mean and do. Thomas 
points out that the recovery and reinterpretation of wampum after it had been lost for 
many years was the beginning of the establishment of the tradition that would lead the 
Keetoowahs back to the White Path of peaceful living and peaceful resistance on 
Cherokee terms. Thomas writes: “When the Keetoowah Society first got possession of 
the wampum, they knew nothing of the interpretation of them. They knew that the belts 
were the fountainhead of all Cherokee culture and the organ by which they could ‘get 
back what the Keetoowahs had lost’” (120). Redbird Smith and the older Keetoowahs 
knew little if anything about the wampum. This initial lack of knowledge of the 
wampum’s meaning is relevant because it demonstrates that not only is tradition not 
inextricably and arbitrarily attached to a notion of an unbroken chain of practitioners who 
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maintain strict integrity of the knowledge, but rather that the knowledge and practice can 
be reinterpreted and changed as necessary. Thomas writes:  
The wampums58 were interpreted in the light of older Cherokee culture. Many of 
 their concepts were recovered through the knowledge of ritualized medicine 
 prayers which contained the concepts of Cherokee religion, and after the 
 movement had been underway for a period of time, the interpretations of the 
 wampums had become greatly elaborated. (121)  
Thomas’ focus on the mutability of how to interpret wampum – the fountainhead of 
Cherokee culture in his words – demonstrates that knowledge can and should be re-
created when necessary, a point that is essential for Thomas’ exhortation of Cherokees to 
return to the fold during their own period of coerced tribal upheaval.  
Indeed, while Thomas shows the potential for recovering lost knowledge in times 
of duress, he also explains how such recovery has psychological benefits that can 
strengthen a people in their fight against communal disintegration. The wampum, in 
particular, served a function of inspiring the Keetoowahs to return to the White Path in 
order to effect peace in the conflicts ahead and within themselves. George Smith told 
Thomas that in the middle of the nineteenth century, the wampum were used in intertribal 
meetings as a tool of peace. When representatives of varying nations present at the 
meeting would quarrel, the leaders would retrieve the wampum and the fighting would 
cease. Thomas adds that the wampum belts held by the Keetoowah Society were likely 
those given by the Iroquois in 1770. Redbird Smith and the Keetoowahs interpreted the 
wampum belts as a map to the White Path, which manifested in Smith’s strategy of 
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passive resistance to allotment as opposed to armed, violent measures. This method of 
resistance based on the White Path was seen not only as getting right with God, but also 
ensuring that the Keetoowahs had a peaceful future. John Smith quotes Redbird Smith: 
“‘Perhaps all this trouble is a test and God is saving Cherokees for something better in the 
future’” (qtd. in Thomas 151). At this point in the narrative, and with the benefit of 
hindsight, it would be easy to dismiss the value of returning to the White Path, seeing as 
how this attempt to maintain peaceful relationships with whites did not stave off 
allotment and perhaps even facilitated it. However, the failure is not on the part of the 
Keetoowahs who maintained their word in terms of historical treaties but rather on the 
part of whites who reneged on theirs.  
But while maintaining a tribal land base through peaceful withdrawal and 
diplomacy was one goal of returning to the White Path, this reconciliation also reinforced 
a Keetoowah identity that separated traditional Cherokees from a burgeoning population 
of assimilated Cherokees, many of whom, such as those in the Treaty Party decades 
earlier, were quick to integrate whites and their cultural, legal and economic 
epistemologies into the Cherokee Nation. Redbird Smith insisted that assimilation was 
invited into the Cherokee population when Cherokees abnegated tradition. Thomas, 
quoting Smith, writes: “‘One time a man got mad at another man and used medicine to 
harm him . . . This was the beginning of conjuring . . . Pretty soon, the Indians got so 
mean they were fighting among themselves. . . . They had broken God’s Rule long before 
the white man came here . . . they lost the Fire and were so scared to tell their clan they 
had lost it too’” (150).  Smith’s mentioning that people were scared to tell their clan 
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refers to the fact that knowing someone’s clan is often necessary to conjure against him 
or her. Here, Smith argues that an erasure of tradition not only left Cherokees at the time 
without a healthy sense of self but also legitimized white values that supplanted their 
Cherokee counterparts in the name of “civilization,” a program whose aim was not for 
the benefit of Cherokees in any meaningful way but rather to benefit whites by opening 
the door to further encroachment. This element of warding off assimilation by reconciling 
to tradition would be most important in Thomas’ day as after statehood there was no 
longer a fully sovereign tribal land base to protect. 
Thomas demonstrates that while Oklahoma statehood would eventually become a 
reality, Keetoowahs continued to develop and strengthen their communities. If 
reconciling to the White Path through interpreting wampum created a revival of Cherokee 
traditional identity, the reinstatement of clan was another building block that not only 
added to a renewed Cherokee identity but also revitalized another form of social 
organization, contributing yet another element to the formation of an identity resistant to 
a narrative of assimilation. The reinstatement of clan revitalized the responsibilities 
associated with the clan system, which strengthens community, but it also further 
distinguishes Cherokees as a distinct people, an important concept in the Keetoowahs’ 
eventual search for a land base. For Thomas during Termination and Relocation, the 
reclaiming of clan is yet another example of how one can revitalize a seemingly lost 
tradition and identity to combat assimilation. Additionally, it leads to the possibility of 
greater social organization that can lead to greater communal autonomy when the 
colonizer’s strategy is to make such communities more dependent.  
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While Thomas demonstrates that traditional practices and identity in the face of 
assimilation is possible, he shows more explicitly how that revival is a form of resistance 
by comparing the Redbird Smith movement to the Ghost Dance.59 In the final chapter of 
his study, Thomas spends much of his time on the Redbird Smith movement detailing 
how the Keetoowahs reconciled traditional epistemologies and developed an identity of 
resistance out of it, creating a narrative that promotes a Cherokee identity that runs 
counter to the American Melting Pot narrative of the day. However, Thomas ends his 
analysis with a focus on how Redbird Smith and the Keetoowahs attempted to use this 
renewed identity to prevent tribal disintegration, a specter that the United States 
resurrected during Termination and Relocation. Thomas insists that while reconciling a 
Cherokee identity against assimilation can be beneficial to the community on a 
microcosmic scale, the process has the potential to effect large-scale resistance as well. 
He adds that though the Keetoowahs were initially occupied with revitalizing Cherokee 
tradition to return to the path from which they felt they strayed, they too saw the potential 
of the process to hold the tribe together at a time when allotment sought to rip apart 
close-knit communities. Even after statehood, the Keetoowahs continued to seek a land 
base and communal enterprise. So the movement was a form of psychological resistance 
to the pressure of abandoning traditional lifeways, but also tangible resistance in seeking 
to deploy that identity to advocate for a land base. 
Thomas highlights the resistance of the Redbird Smith movement by comparing 
and contrasting it to the Ghost Dance. He notes that both movements sought to reconcile 
older patterns of living, but that while the Ghost Dance accomplished its revival by 
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adding a new element – the dance – for the Redbird Smith movement, the thrust of that 
resistance was informed by a return strictly to older patterns. Likewise, Thomas writes 
that while the Ghost Dance sought to mitigate the danger of growing encroachment, the 
Redbird Smith movement was a pre-emptive effort to stop allotment. He also points out 
that the Ghost Dance eventually waned whereas the Redbird Smith movement continues 
in various regards among some Cherokees. In addition to comparing the movements 
themselves, Thomas also draws some distinction between leadership. The Ghost Dance 
centered around Wovoka, a Paiute prophet, while Redbird Smith was appointed by the 
Keetoowah Society to get back what the Keetoowahs had lost.  Thomas adds that the 
Redbird Smith movement was a collective effort of Keetoowahs, and even Redbird Smith 
was subject to the Keetoowah council and could, at most, only suggest actions. To be 
fair, Thomas’ primary comparison between the two movements is the focus on resistance 
by re-creating older forms of tradition and social organization as well as developing new 
ones as needed. Ultimately, Thomas’ invoking of the Ghost Dance in his analysis of the 
Redbird Smith movement functions narratively to add a layer of resistance and cultural 
regeneration of the Redbird Smith movement by comparing it to a nativistic resistance 
movement that is more widely known. 
 
Rethinking the movement’s success 
While some scholars who have analyzed the Redbird Smith movement focus on 
the historical account of the movement and describe the process of the Keetoowahs 
developing a unique identity against the growing assimilated mixedblood population, too 
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often they get preoccupied with whether the movement was successful in the end, 
assuming it has ended to begin with. Though this question is indeed a valid one, the 
answer frequently hinges on the asker’s terms of success. In her analysis of the 
movement, Janey B. Hendrix asserts that the Cherokees were doomed from the 
beginning. She writes: “Whatever chance the Cherokees had to be successful as a Nation 
was wiped out by the white man’s bitter war between the states; if, indeed, any chance 
ever existed at all” (7). A mere seven pages into her analysis, in which she is discussing 
the Cherokee Nation during the Civil War, Hendrix concludes that Cherokees were 
destined to perish anyway. Such a pessimistic view from the outset makes one wonder 
why bother to analyze the Keetoowahs’ resistance at all if we simply presume it was all 
for naught? 
Hendrix’ analysis of the Redbird Smith movement depicts a movement of well-
meaning, if naïve, individuals who should’ve known better than to fight allotment and 
acculturation, but who stubbornly carried on only to undermine themselves with petty 
infighting and being too short-sighted to know when someone was taking advantage of 
them. She argues, for example, that Cornelius convinced the Nighthawks that they were 
descended from the Iroquois so he could connect with the Keetoowah Society for his own 
ulterior motives, as if the Keetoowahs had no agency in deciding to incorporate 
Cornelius’ teachings in the movement. Additionally, Daniel F. Littlefield concluded in 
1971 that Keetoowahs had failed to secure a space where they could govern themselves 
and practice their culture, despite that the United Keetoowah Band organized in 1950 
under the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act.60 He writes: “[T]he ‘community reservations’ 
 109 
became little more than names on a map and never became functional social units” (427). 
However, he later notes that the Keetoowahs were able to develop the Kenwood Project 
Area and organizations like the Kenwood Indian Livestock Association as well as work 
with the Soil Conservation Service and the Indian Forest Service on various conservation 
and land-management projects. Littlefield, like Hendrix, also forecloses on the possibility 
that even if the Keetoowahs did not achieve their goal in a prescribed period of time, 
ostensibly during Redbird Smith’s lifetime, they could continue to pursue it to fruition 
later. For example, Littlefield writes:  
The Wheeler-Howard Act was the fullbloods’ last hope for fulfilling their utopian 
 dreams. Years of poverty and disappointment had left a telling mark on them. . . . 
 From the time of Redbird Smith, the fullbloods’ aim had shifted from a desire to 
 be left alone and to live in the traditional tribal ways to a desire for economic self-
 sufficiency. Although the latter desire was the more realistic one, the shift in aims 
 unfortunately reflected the inroads made upon the fullbloods’ thinking by the 
 Anglo-American society, however bitterly he may have opposed that society or 
 however faithfully he resisted it. (427)  
Here, Littlefield problematically suggests that the Keetoowahs’ goal of revitalizing 
traditional culture and self-governance was otherwise impossible without intervention 
from the policies of the Wheeler-Howard Act. Likewise, he submits the fact that the 
Keetoowahs’ plans grew to include economic self-sufficiency – a goal primarily 
informed by the work of Oneida activist Laura Cornelius Kellogg – as somehow 
indicative of not only the failure of the Keetoowahs’ movement but also of their 
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capitulation to Anglo-American lifeways. Additionally, Howard Q. Tyner minimizes the 
role in the later formation of a Keetoowah government and land base played by the 
Nighthawk Keetoowahs, the religious Keetoowah faction led by Redbird Smith after the 
Keetoowah Society split61 during allotment, noting that while Keetoowah Society, Inc., 
the political faction, agitated for tribal recognition, “the Nighthawks refuse to participate 
in the plans . . . and seem content to remain as they are” (95).62  
In many ways, however, success and failure are in the eye of the beholder. Where 
Hendrix sees failure at the outset, I ultimately see success under different terms. For 
Thomas to exhort Cherokees to recover tribal tradition at a time of Relocation, just as 
Redbird Smith did during allotment, indicates that at least during the 1950s he saw the 
potential of Cherokee-specific resistance too. By examining the movement through the 
goals its leaders outlined for themselves, and its effects even today, we can reinterpret the 
Redbird Smith movement as a success and Thomas’ narrative of the movement as one of 
Cherokee resistance to the U.S. assimilation narrative and a path toward redefining 
critical tribal nationhood.  
The two primary goals of the movement that Thomas points out are: 1) recovering 
tribal tradition, or “getting back what the Keetoowahs had lost,” and 2) resisting 
acculturation and allotment and eventually getting a Keetoowah land base. We can 
include the resistance to acculturation under the first category because the latter 
necessarily leads to the former, leaving the recovery of tradition and fighting against 
allotment, or securing a land base, as the final goals.  
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The original goal from the beginning was to “get back what the Keetoowahs had 
lost,” which included reincorporating the teachings of the wampum to lead Cherokees 
back to the White Path and to re-establish traditional ceremonial practices and the role of 
the clan. Establishing the success of this first goal is straightforward. The Keetoowahs 
did recover the wampum belts from Bob Ross, who despite being a Keetoowah himself, 
initially declared the wampum his family’s property. As Thomas indicates, the 
Keetoowahs interpreted the wampum and resolved to follow the White Path. 
 Additionally, the Redbird Smith movement led to the establishment of ceremonial 
grounds that are still in use today. As Thomas notes, members of the movement not only 
re-created the ceremonies with the help of Creeks and Natchez, but later made them more 
Cherokee-specific. Anyone who visits a ceremonial grounds in the communities today or 
participates in a stomp dance owes his or her gratitude to Redbird Smith and the 
movement. Furthermore, the Redbird Smith movement helped to elevate the clan back to 
its proper status, a status that is recognized socially and ceremonially today, if not 
politically as it once was.63 These elements that the Redbird Smith movement restored are 
viable today. The reason Cherokees in Thomas’ day and today have a tradition to return 
to is largely, if not solely, because the Redbird Smith movement recovered it. That 
Cherokees in the 21st century are participating in this tradition – and some Cherokees 
whose families had assimilated earlier are coming back to it – speaks to the success of the 
Redbird Smith movement in fighting permanent acculturation. By extension, Thomas’ 
account of the Redbird Smith movement is a Cherokee narrative that demonstrates that it 
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is always possible to recover or reinvent tradition to fight narratives of Cherokee 
assimilation.  
While the success of the first goal speaks for itself, whether the Redbird Smith 
movement was successful in fighting allotment is a bit more complicated. Allotment, as 
well as the imposition of Oklahoma statehood, did obviously occur, so the simplistic 
answer would be to assume that the movement was a resounding failure in this regard. 
While one goal of the Keetoowah Society was to stop allotment, it was primarily so 
Keetoowahs could retain their own land base where they could practice political 
autonomy as well as traditional lifeways, unmolested by the pressure to assimilate from 
both the outside and from within the greater Cherokee Nation. The Keetoowahs took a 
treaty that had been drafted between Chief Bowles and Mexico when his band had fled to 
Texas, and they went to Mexico to investigate the possibility of the Keetoowahs moving 
south of the border to escape the encroaching United States.64 The Mexican government 
denied the Keetoowahs’ proposal. The Keetoowahs, again, sought Cornelius’ help in 
trying to get a law passed in Congress that would have allowed for a Keetoowah 
reservation. The bill failed to pass. By that time, the Keetoowah Society had split into 
religious and political factions, the Nighthawks and Keetoowah Society, Inc., 
respectively. While Redbird Smith remained a Nighthawk until his death, Keetoowah 
Society, Inc., having turned its focus to the political sphere, eventually organized under 
the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act and was recognized as the United Keetoowah Band of 
Cherokee Indians (UKB) in 1950.65 After the political reinstatement of the Cherokee 
Nation in the 1970s, the Keetoowahs struggled to put land into trust, being stifled by the 
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Cherokee Nation administration on the basis that other Cherokees couldn’t put the 
Cherokee Nation’s land into trust. Finally, in 2010, BIA Secretary Larry Echo Hawk 
ruled that both the contemporary Cherokee Nation (CNO) and the UKB were joint 
successors in interest to the historical Cherokee Nation,66 which, he adds, was to be 
sunsetted with the death of the last original Dawes enrollee, which occurred with the 
death of Lula Hickey Hall in April 2012. This ruling allowed the UKB to finally claim a 
Keetoowah land base.67 
Indeed crediting Redbird Smith with the success of the UKB might be 
controversial as it was Keetoowah Society, Inc., who advocated for and won a separate 
government and eventual land base for the Keetoowahs. However, Redbird Smith’s 
involvement in the Original Keetoowah Society before the split helped to create a distinct 
Keetoowah identity, which, in turn, justified the granting of a separate land base from 
other Cherokees on the basis that they are a distinct people, politically and culturally. The 
second goal of the Redbird Smith movement might not have come to fruition in Redbird 
Smith’s lifetime, but the story continued after his death. A narrative of Cherokee critical 
nationhood can reach its desired end. It’s only a matter of continuing to tell the story. 
  
 114 
 
                                                 
1 Congress officially ended treaty-making between the President and tribal nations through the Indian 
Appropriations Act (1871), legislating that the federal government would no longer consider tribal nations 
as independent sovereigns for the purpose of drafting new treaties, though the terms of treaties prior to 
1871 were technically legally still in effect. In the cases Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock (1902) and Lone Wolf 
v. Hitchcock (1903), the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government could unilaterally withdraw 
from treaty agreements. However, the Snyder Act (1921) changed the provision of federal services to 
tribal nations from operating on a treaty-to-treaty basis for individual tribal nations to single 
appropriations to Indians as a whole, further eroding the concept of Indians belonging to distinct 
sovereign nations. Later, as the U.S. sought to renege on its obligations to tribal nations and passed 
termination legislation in the 1950s, more than 150 nations had their sovereign status revoked. The two 
largest nations that were terminated were the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin and the Klamath 
Tribe of Oregon. Eventually, the Supreme Court ruled in Menominee Tribe v. United States (1968) that the 
federal government could not sweepingly terminate tribal treaties unless they were specifically 
mentioned in congressional legislation, legislation, in this case, singling out Menominee hunting and 
fishing rights. The ruling opened a channel for the eventual re-establishing of treaty rights and self-
determination policy in the 1970s. In 1973, Congress repealed the termination laws. For more about the 
Menominee’s role in the demise of federal termination policy, see Nicolas C. Peroff Menominee Drums: 
Tribal Termination and Restoration, 1954-1974 (Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 2006).   
 
2 Gerald Vizenor (White Earth Anishinaabe) directed the American Indian Employment and Guidance 
Center of Minneapolis where several Indians who were relocated to the city sought services. Of the 
Relocation experience, he writes in a semi-fictional autobiographical account: “Thousands of tribal people 
moved from reservations to urban centers, meaning to leave behind evil, their hunger and grim 
memories, but the federal colonists were waiting like the cockroaches to define tribal places in the city” 
(10). See Vizenor, Wordarrows: Indians and Whites in the New Fur Trade, (1978). For more about Indian 
life in the city during Relocation in general, see Nicolas G. Rosenthal Reimagining Indian Country: Native 
American Migration & Identity in Twentieth-Century Los Angeles (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 2012); 
Reyna K. Ramirez Native Hubs: Culture, Community, and Belonging in the Silicon Valley and Beyond 
(Durham: Duke UP, 2007); James B. LeGrand Indian Metropolis: Native Americans in Chicago, 1945-75 
(Champaign: U of Illinois P, 2002).  
 
3 Though the Relocation program is recent enough that families who were directly affected still remember 
it, native people who were not affected by it, as Fixico notes, might only vaguely recall it. Certainly many 
non-natives in the U.S. have never learned about this policy (or much of any Indian policy for that matter) 
in their history courses. In my own courses that I’ve taught, I have asked students if they had previously 
learned about the Termination and Relocation programs of the 1950s. To date none ever have, 
demonstrating some truth to Fixico’s assertion that the policy is “a big secret.” Nonetheless, I choose to 
begin with the Termination and Relocation programs because narratives of critical tribal nationhood and 
peoplehood find their biggest challenges in a historical context in which outsiders in power attempt to 
erase them.  
 
4 Others scholars who have written critically of the lopsided power balance inherent in the nation-to-
nation relationship between tribal nations and the U.S. include Vine Deloria, Jr (Standing Rock Sioux), 
Taiaiake Alfred (Mohawk) and Joanne Barker (Lenape). See, for instance, Deloria, Jr. and Clifford M. Lytle, 
The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty, (1984); Alfred Peace, Power, and 
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Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto (New York: Oxford UP, 1999); Barker Native Acts: Law, 
Recognition, and Cultural Authenticity (Durham: Duke UP, 2011). Likewise, Steve Russell (Cherokee 
Nation) argues that if tribal nations and the federal government decided to dissolve the sovereign trust 
relationship, that which views tribal nations as “domestic dependents,” and allow tribal nations to truly 
operate on their own, the results would be unpredictable. He writes: “Assuming we do not choose 
dependence now (something none of our ancestors did but something that was rather visited upon 
them), then the possibility of failure is joined at the hip with the possibility of success. . . . To be free, 
Indian tribal governments must accept the burdens of government and understand that foreign aid 
always comes with strings attached. In economic terms, the Mashantucket Pequots become like Monaco 
and the Pine Ridge Reservation becomes like Burundi” (38-39). See Russell “Sovereignty v. Dependency,” 
Sequoyah Rising: Problems in Post-Colonial Tribal Governance (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2010), 
37-40.  
 
5 More than 150 tribal nations lost their sovereign status through the Termination program. These nations 
include the Menominee Nation in Wisconsin and the Klamath Tribe in Oregon, both terminated through 
legislation specifically aimed at them. Other terminated nations include the Confederated Tribes of the 
Grand Ronde Community, Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians, Alsea, Applegate Creek, Calapooya, 
Chaftan, Chempho, Chetco, Chetlessington, Chinook, Clackamas, Clatskanie, Clatsop, Clowwewalla, Coos, 
Cow Creek, Euchees, Galic Creek, Grave, Joshua, Karok, Kathlamet, Kusotony, Kwatami or Sixes, Lakmiut, 
Long Tom Creek, Lower Coquille, Lower Umpqua, Maddy, Mackanotin, Mary's River, Multnomah, Munsel 
Creek, Naltunnetunne, Nehalem, Nestucca, Northern Molalla, Port Orford, Pudding River, Rogue River, 
Salmon River, Santiam, Scoton, Shasta, Shasta Costa, Siletz, Siuslaw, Skiloot, Southern Molalla, Takelma, 
Tillamook, Tolowa, Tualatin, Tututui, Upper Coquille, Upper Umpqua, Willamette Tumwater, Yamhill, 
Yaquina, and Yoncalla, all of whom were terminated under the Western Oregon Indian Termination Act 
(1954). Several rancherías were terminated in California through the California Ranchería Termination Act 
(1958) and through a 1964 amendment to the act, now including the Alexander Valley, Auburn, Big Sandy, 
Big Valley, Blue Lake, Buena Vista, Cache Creek, Chicken Ranch, Chico, Cloverdale, Cold Springs, Elk Valley, 
Guidiville, Graton, Greenville, Hopland, Indian Ranch, Lytton, Mark West, Middletown, Montgomery 
Creek, Mooretown, Nevada City, North Fork, Paskenta, Picayune, Finoleville, Potter Valley, Quartz Valley, 
Redding, Redwood Valley, Robinson, Rohnerville, Ruffeys, Scotts Valley, Smith River, Strawberry Valley, 
Table Bluff, Table Mountain, Upper Lake, Wilton rancherías. Likewise, the Choctaw Nation was scheduled 
to be terminated, but was spared at the last minute when President Richard Nixon repealed the 
Termination policy. While the Cherokee Nation was scheduled to be terminated per the Curtis Act (1898), 
the provisions of the Five Civilized Tribes Act (1905) allowed for a vestigial Cherokee government in which 
the federal government appointed a Principal Chief to facilitate business between the U.S. and the 
Cherokee Nation. As a result of the act, while the Cherokee Nation did not have full political sovereignty 
again until the passing of the Principal Chiefs Act (1970), they were able to maintain a semblance of tribal 
government throughout the Termination era.  
 
6 Diane Watson was a Democratic U.S. Representative from California who served in office from 2003-
2011. The bill she proposed in 2007, H.R. 2824, sought to sever the federal government’s relationship 
with the Cherokee Nation unless the Nation reinstated the franchise of thousands of Cherokee Freedmen 
who had lost their voting rights and citizenship when the Nation rewrote the citizenship criteria prior to 
the upcoming election for Principal Chief. The bill would have revoked federal funding and gaming rights 
for the Cherokee Nation, which could have resulted in massive jobs losses in the Nation. Watson 
discussed her position on the Cherokee Freedmen issue in a 2007 interview with National Public Radio. 
See “Cherokee Nation Faces New Battle” NPR.org. National Public Radio, 22 June 2007. Web. 18 July 
2007. <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11280553>. 
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7 The 2007 disenfranchisement of Cherokee Freedmen citizens coincided with the election for Principal 
Chief that year in which incumbent Chad Smith faced off against Stacy Leeds. Leeds earlier served as a 
Cherokee Supreme Court justice, and in 2006 she ruled in favor of the Freedmen in Lucy Allen v. Cherokee 
Nation, affirming that Freedmen descendants were indeed Cherokee citizens per the 1975 Cherokee 
Constitution. She writes: “When [the Cherokee Nation] adopted the 1975 Constitution, they did not limit 
membership to people who possess Cherokee blood. Instead, they extended membership to all the 
people who were ‘citizens’ of the Cherokee Nation as listed on the Dawes Commission Rolls. The 
Constitution could be amended to require that all tribal members possess Cherokee blood. The people 
could also choose to set a minimum Cherokee blood quantum. However, if the Cherokee people wish to 
limit tribal citizenship, and such a limitation would terminate the pre-existing citizenship of even one 
Cherokee citizen, then it must be done in the open. It cannot be accomplished through silence” (par 3). 
According to Leeds, then, descendants of people listed as Freedmen, whether they had Cherokee blood or 
not, were eligible for Cherokee citizenship.  
In the weeks leading up to the 2007 election, much of the Freedmen community supported 
Leeds in what was going to be a close race, and Smith held a special election in which Cherokee citizens 
voted to strip the Freedmen citizens of their citizenship, thus making them ineligible to vote. Leeds 
narrowly lost the election.  Smith’s tactic was similar to that of Ross O. Swimmer who issued an executive 
order in 1983 mandating that Cherokee citizens produce a CDIB card (Certificate of Degree of Indian 
Blood) in order to vote as opposed to their Cherokee Nation voter cards as in previous elections. Because 
the Dawes Commission did not record Cherokee blood for those assigned to the Freedmen portion of the 
roll, Freedmen descendants do not have a recorded blood quantum and, therefore, no CDIB. Fearing that 
the Freedmen communities were supporting his rival, Perry Wheeler, Swimmer’s mandate that Cherokee 
voters produce a CDIB effectively barred Freedmen descendants from voting and assured him the win. For 
more on the history of the disenfranchisement of the Freedmen, and specifically during the Swimmer 
administration, see Circe Sturm "Blood Politics, Racial Classification, and Cherokee National Identity: The 
Trials and Tribulations of the Cherokee Freedmen" American Indian Quarterly 22.1/2 (1998): 230–258. For 
more background on the issue of race in Freedmen history, see Daniel F. Littlefield, Jr. The Cherokee 
Freedmen: From Emancipation to American Citizenship (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978) and S. 
Alan Ray "A Race or a Nation? Cherokee National Identity and the Status of Freedmen's Descendants" 
Michigan Journal of Race and Law. 12 (2007): 387-463. The text of Leeds’ majority opinion in Lucy Allen v. 
Cherokee Nation can be found at <http://www.cornsilks.com/allendecision.html>. 
 
8 It is possible to view Watson’s proposed sanctions against the Cherokee Nation as an affirmation of - and 
not a threat against - Cherokee sovereignty in that sovereign nations frequently impose sanctions on one 
another. The U.S. has placed travel and trade sanctions on the communist government of Cuba as well as 
against South Africa when the nation operated officially under a system of apartheid under P.W. Botha. In 
doing so, the United States effectively recognizes the nations’ sovereign right to govern as they desire, 
respectively via communism or apartheid; however, by imposing economic sanctions, the U.S. declares 
that they will not support those nations’ actions. One could argue that by cutting off federal funding to 
the Cherokee Nation as a result of its expulsion of Freedmen citizens, that the U.S. is recognizing the 
Cherokee Nation’s sovereign right to do exactly that, to determine its own citizenry, but declaring that it 
does not support the policy of expulsion and disenfranchisement. While such a view appears logical on 
the surface, given the relationship between the U.S. and the Cherokee Nation and the U.S. and other 
sovereign nations, the comparison is a false equivalency. Just as Steve Russell, Vine Deloria Jr. and Renee 
Ann Cramer, among others, point out that tribal nations’ status as separate, sovereign entities depends 
on recognition from the federal government, nations with U.S. sanctions such as Cuba, North Korea or 
Syria operate on an international stage and will still be recognized as sovereign states with inalienable 
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rights, regardless of U.S. policy. Because the tribal nations within U.S. borders do not have access to the 
United Nations and do not have an international presence and recognition as sovereign nations, the 
threat of the U.S. revoking its sovereign relationship with the Cherokee Nation would have much more 
dire consequences than would another nation being repudiated by the U.S. 
 
9 The federal Termination and Relocation programs were a return to denationalization and assimilation in 
U.S. Indian policy that had been briefly abandoned in the 1930s and 1940s in favor of policy in the Indian 
Reorganization Act (1934) that sought to support tribal nationhood and governance. After conclusions 
from the Meriam Report (1928) demonstrated that the policy of assimilation was a failure, having led to 
an increase in poverty and a decline of employment, education and health in tribal communities, 
politicians like John Collier sought ways for tribal nations to return to self-governance and build economic 
self-sufficiency. A surge in postwar patriotism, as well as xenophobic fears of communism and a desire to 
“get out of the Indian business,” led to a return in policy of dismantling tribal nations and mainstreaming 
American Indians. See Lawrence C. Kelly The Assault on Assimilation: John Collier and the Origins of Indian 
Policy Reform (Albuquerque: U of New Mexico P, 1963); Jon S. Blackman Oklahoma’s Indian New Deal 
(Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 2013); Kenneth R. Philp Termination Revisited: American Indians on the Trail 
to Self-Determination, 1933-1953 (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 2002); Michael T. Smith “The Wheeler-
Howard Act of 1934: The Indian New Deal” Journal of the West 10.3 (1971): 521-534. For a digitized copy 
of the Meriam Report, see <http://www.alaskool.org/native_ed/research_reports/ 
IndianAdmin/Indians_Admin_Problms.html>.  
 
10 The Termination program was also informed by postwar fears of communism. While the pretense of the 
program was to supposedly free tribal nations from the yoke of poverty, part of the desire to dismantle 
tribal communities stemmed from a belief that Indians’ communal living and common ownership of tribal 
land were evidence of communism within U.S. borders. The previous Indian policies of the Indian 
Reorganization Act (1934), established by John Collier, who sought to restore tribal governance, were 
seen at this time by some as a backdoor way for communists to infiltrate the U.S. Richard Fried, for 
example, writes that a proponent of the Termination program at the time described John Collier as “the 
voice of Russian Communists in their plans to capture the American Indian and thus start their worldwide 
conspiracy to communize free America” (169). See Fried Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in 
Perspective (New York: Oxford UP, 1990). Additionally, even Friedrich Engels likened tribal societies to his 
vision of communism, pointing to (and romanticizing) what he saw as a lack of hierarchy and private 
property, and a sharing of resources that he subsequently called “primitive communism.” For more on 
this theory, see Engels, The Origin of the Family, (1884). Though we could interpret Thomas’ analysis of 
the Redbird Smith Movement and his defense of traditional Cherokee lifeways as a challenge to general 
accusations at the time of communism developing in Indian Country, because Thomas himself does not 
specifically engage such accusations, I do not either in my analysis of his work. 
 
11 Arthur Watkins (1886-1973) was a Republican U.S. senator from Utah who served in office from 1947-
1959, during which time, as chairman of the senate Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, he authored 
legislation that led to the federal Termination and Relocation programs. Watkins is famous for stating that 
the U.S. needed to “get out of the Indian business” after World War II, and he initiated the Termination 
program by targeting tribal nations in his own state such as the Kanosh and Shivwits Bands of Paiutes and 
the Uintah-Ouray Ute Nation to name a few.  
 
12 The National Congress of American Indians is an Indian-advocacy organization that was founded in 1944 
to challenge the federal government’s developing termination policy and its failure to honor treaty 
agreements. The NCAI was successful in preventing the termination of the Skull Valley and Washakie 
 118 
                                                                                                                                                 
bands as well as the Turtle Mountain Chippewa, Florida Seminole, Salish and Colville Nations. The group 
was also able to influence Secretary of the Interior Fred S. Seaton in his decision to withdraw from a policy 
of forced termination to one of termination by consent of the tribal nations involved. The NCAI later 
helped federal Indian policy transition from termination to self-determination in the late 1960s and still 
advocates for Indian rights today. Ruth Muskrat Bronson and Napoleon Johnson are two Cherokees who 
held leadership roles in the NCAI. See Thomas W. Cowger The National Congress of American Indians: The 
Founding Years (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1999), 115-119. 
  
13 Since the end of Termination, only 78 of the more than 100 terminated tribes have had their federal 
recognition restored. Of the nations that have not yet regained their sovereign status, 24 of these tribes 
are now considered extinct, 10 have state recognition but not federal recognition and 31 do not have a 
tribal land base. 
 
14 Unemployment not only remains a problem for many tribal communities today, but the rate of 
unemployment has not abated much since the Relocation era. In August 2013, Indian Country Today 
profiled 15 tribal nations that have an unemployment rate higher than 80 percent. These nations and 
their rates of unemployment are: Sokaogan Chippewa Community (93 percent), Pechanga Band of 
Luiseño Indians (91 percent), Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge (89 percent), Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe (88 
percent), Apache Tribe of Oklahoma (87 percent), Standing Rock Sioux Tribe (86 percent), Little Traverse 
Bay Band (86 percent), Round Valley Indian Tribes (86 percent), Shoshone Tribe of the Wind River 
Reservation (86 percent), Rosebud Sioux Tribe (83 percent), Walker River Paiute Tribe (83 percent), 
Winnebago Tribe (82 percent), Puyallup Tribe (82 percent), Bad River Band (81 percent) and Shoshone-
Bannock Tribes-Fort Hall (81 percent). Conversely, the rates of unemployment in these tribal nations’ 
respective states are much lower, ranging from a low of 4.2 percent (Nebraska) to 9.5 percent (Nevada) 
on the “high” end. Even among those tribal citizens who are gainfully employed, between 30 percent and 
80 percent of workers nonetheless live below the poverty line. See Vincent Schilling “Getting Jobbed: 15 
Tribes with Unemployment Rates Over 80 Percent.” IndianCountryTodayMediaNetwork.com. Indian 
Country Today, 29 August 2013. Web. 30 August 2013 
<http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/08/29/danger-zone-15-tribes-unemployment-rates-
over-80-percent-151078>. 
  
15 Wahrhaftig states that many of the jobs that were available to Cherokees were temporary or seasonal, 
and low-wage. He writes: “Cherokees are the laboring caste of eastern Oklahoma. They haul rocks and 
carry hod on construction jobs. They frame buildings. They ditch roads and chop brush for the ‘high lines’ 
of utility companies. They harvest beans, peas, and strawberries. They bale hay. They glean huckleberries 
from the woods and sell them to the grocers. They pump gas and wait tables. They plant and pack 
seedlings in commercial nurseries. They grab chickens in the yards of packing plants. They sort fruit in 
canneries. A few are now factory laborers in tribally subsidized industries” (452). See Wahrhaftig, “Making 
Do with the Dark Meat,” 452. Additionally, as the oil industry developed in the early 20th century, several 
Cherokees left the Nation and moved to West Texas and northern Louisiana to work as roughnecks.  
 
16 Wahrhaftig adds that these are jobs that poor whites in Oklahoma did as well. The difference between 
them and Cherokees, however, is that Cherokees are often precluded by local prejudice against Indian 
workers from considering more lucrative employment. See Wahrhaftig, “Making Do with the Dark Meat,” 
453. 
 
17 These figures are further shocking when we consider that the Cherokee Nation, before Oklahoma 
statehood, operated several schools, and that they even built the first institutions of higher education 
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west of the Mississippi River – the Cherokee Male and Female Seminaries, which opened in 1851. The 
Male Seminary burned in 1910 and has been out of operation since. The Female Seminary burned in 1887, 
but was rebuilt and reopened in 1889. The building is now part of the campus at Northeastern State 
University in Tahlequah.  
 
18 As the Cherokee Nation regained its political sovereignty in the 1970s, local whites took an interest in 
Cherokee political affairs. Wahrhaftig notes that in 1971 whites formed the organization “Citizens 
Concerned for Cherokee Leadership” and campaigned heavily for W.W. Keeler in the first Cherokee 
election since Oklahoma statehood. Wahrhaftig argues that white people were invested in the outcome 
of Cherokee politics because non-Indians were the primary beneficiaries of tribal programs. He quotes a 
business manager of the Cherokee Nation in the 1970s who says: “‘The Cherokee tribe is controlled 
essentially by non-Indians. They don’t do anything that will harm non-Indians. Fact, they go even further. 
They don’t do anything that will not benefit non-Indians. Of all the programs that the Cherokee tribe has, 
none were started with the prime objective of helping Indians” (230, emphasis original). See Wahrhaftig 
and Lukens-Wahrhaftig “The Thrice Powerless: Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma.” The Anthropology of 
Power: Ethnographic Studies from Asia, Oceania, and the New World. (New York: Academic Press, 1977), 
225-236. Likewise, Thomas expressed similar sentiments in a 1982 letter. He writes of the “self-
determination” policy: “‘Self-determination’ turned out to be an arrangement whereby an Indian elite 
operates a structure created and enlarged by the federal government; a structure regulated by laws, 
rules, and guidelines set up by the federal government; and a structure which has no real power except 
what is allowed by the federal government. ‘Self-determination's’ lineal descendent, ‘Indian sovereignty’, 
has become primarily a plea for more control over Indians by the Indian elite” (2). See Thomas, “Surviving 
Letter,” (1982) <http://works.bepress.com/robert_thomas/18>. That said, however, the Cherokee Nation 
today employs several thousand tribal citizens in its businesses and provides several health, housing and 
education programs for citizens as well. 
 
19 Watkins likewise suggested that the only reason Indians wanted to maintain the trust relationship 
between their nations and the U.S. was to avoid paying taxes. In a 1954 debate, he contended: “‘May I 
point out also that what the Indian really wants; he wants representation without taxation. He can tax all 
the rest of us and vote for people who do tax us; but he doesn’t want to pay taxes himself even though he 
is able to do so’” (Fixico 105). Watkins’ opponent, Florida Senator George Smathers reminded him that 
many Indians live and work off of their reservations and do indeed pay taxes. See Fixico, Termination and 
Relocation, 105. 
 
20 Bronson refers here to the Buffalo Nickel that was minted from 1913-1938 that features the profile of 
an Indian’s head on the front and a buffalo on the back. 
 
21 See also Bronson, Indians Are People, Too, (1944).  
 
22 While the term “nativist” in the U.S. has frequently been deployed since the 19th century to describe 
the xenophobic prioritizing of the interests of established citizens over those of more recent immigrants 
in the country, the term also can refer generally to a re-establishment of original culture in opposition to 
acculturation. Thomas refers to the latter definition with his use of “nativistic” in his study of the Redbird 
Smith Movement. Though I might describe the Redbird Smith Movement as separatist, I retain Thomas’ 
term “nativistic” here.  
 
23 While the official policy of terminating the sovereign political statuses of tribal nations began in the 
1950s, I locate the broader denationalization of tribal citizens with the passage of the Indian Citizenship 
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Act (1924), also known as the Snyder Act, through which the U.S. made several thousand tribal citizens 
into American citizens, especially for those who served in WWI. Previously, Indians who had become U.S. 
citizens did so through intermarriage, military service or by receiving allotments – acts of agency on the 
part of the Indian recipients. However, the Indian Citizenship Act legislated U.S. citizenship on Indian 
Country. While the pages of U.S. history might narrate this entrance into U.S. citizenship as a “gift” for 
Indian veterans especially, I read this act as an imposition of American citizenship and an early attempt to 
denationalize tribal nations and integrate their citizens into the wider U.S., a policy that grew more 
aggressive in the 1950s. See Kevin Bruyneel “Challenging American Boundaries: Indigenous People and 
the ‘Gift’ of U.S. Citizenship.” Studies in American Political Development 18.1 (2004): 30-43. 
 
24 See Alan L. Sorkin The Urban American Indian (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1978); Alvin M. 
Josephy, Jr., Troy R. Johnson and Joane Nagel, eds. Red Power: The American Indians’ Fight for Freedom 
(Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1999); Joane Nagel American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Red Power and the 
Resurgence of Identity and Culture (New York: Oxford UP, 1996); Larry W. Burt Tribalism in Crisis: Federal 
Indian Policy, 1953-1961 (Albuquerque: U of New Mexico P, 1982); Bradley G. Shreve and Shirley Hill Witt 
Red Power Rising: The National Indian Youth Council and the Origins of Native Activism (Norman: U of 
Oklahoma P, 2011). 
 
25 Alan L. Sorkin notes that some of the issues that relocated individuals had to face in the cities included 
job discrimination, poor housing and homelessness, and limited access to health care and education. In a 
famous article critiquing the Relocation program, Ruth Mulvey Harmer profiled the Bear family, a Creek 
family who had relocated to Los Angeles, and who had, in her words, become “slum dwellers.” The 
mother of the family, Little Light, talk about her husband’s increased drinking, her inability to find a doctor 
for her sick child and her feeling belittled when people stared and laughed at her when she left her home. 
Little Light says she wanted to return to Oklahoma, but the family was stranded in Los Angeles without 
enough money to go back home. She told Harmer: “‘They did not tell us it would be like this’” (56). See 
Harmer “Uprooting the Indians” Atlantic Monthly 197 (March 1956): 54-57. Atlantic Monthly published 
another article a year later that criticized the effectiveness of the Relocation program. See Edith R. 
Mirrielees “The Cloud of Mistrust” Atlantic Monthly 199 (Feb. 1957): 55-59. Federal officials used the 
media themselves to challenge these reports, writing in 1956: “‘As some of you know – if you have been 
reading your magazines lately – that word ‘relocation’ seems to upset certain people – apparently 
because it suggests uprooting the Indians from their serene pastoral environment and plunging them 
down in some kind of nerve-wracking asphalt jungle. For at least a generation, and probably longer, Indian 
families have been moving away from the impoverished environments of reservations and seeking better 
opportunities’” (qtd. in Fixico Termination and Relocation 142). What the federal officials neglected to 
mention, however, was that those Indians who earlier left their tribal communities did so on their own 
volition and had a home to come back to, unlike the experiences of many of those who left their 
communities as part of the Relocation program. 
 
26 See for example W. David Baird “Are the Five Tribes of Oklahoma ‘Real’ Indians?” The Western 
Historical Quarterly 21.1 (Feb. 1990): 4-18. 
 
27 The National Indian Youth Council is an activist organization, founded by American Indian college 
students in 1961, that has focused on issues of civil rights, the environment, voting rights, religious 
freedom and education for tribal communities. Activism of the NIYC took the form of public movements 
such as the fish-in in the Pacific Northwest, which were established to protect tribal fishing rights outlined 
in treaties. For more about the NIYC, see <http://www.niyc-alb.org>. See also Bradley G. Shreve and 
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Shirley Hill Witt Red Power Rising: The National Indian Youth Council and the Origins of Native Activism 
(Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 2011).  
 
28 Though I refer here to Thomas’ early work as Cherokee-specific as opposed to some of his later work, 
which had a more intertribal approach, I want to reiterate that in an intertribal setting, Thomas could and 
did view himself as a Cherokee. As Robert Warrior (Osage Nation) argues, intertribalism recognizes and 
respects tribal differences and nation specificity within larger multi-national tribal settings. “Pan-
Indianism,” he writes, however, “seeks to blend and homogenize Native cultures” (107). When I refer to 
Thomas’ earlier work as “Cherokee-specific,” I mean that at this time he was a Cherokee, writing about 
and focusing on Cherokee issues, ostensibly for fellow Cherokees. By referring to some of his later work 
and actions as “intertribal,” I mean that Thomas was a Cherokee, writing and operating as a Cherokee, but 
focusing at that time on issues that affected Indian Country as a whole. Given Thomas’ lifelong 
identification as a Cherokee and devotion to Cherokees, he could in no way be seen as pan-tribal as 
Warrior defines it, an approach that effaces tribal cultural and national differences in favor of a unified 
Indianness. See Warrior The People and the Word: Reading Experience in Native Nonfiction (Minneapolis: 
U of Minnesota P, 2005).  
 
29 While the U.S. did recognize the Cherokee Nation as a separate government, provisions of the Five 
Civilized Tribes Act (1905) stipulated that the leader of the Cherokee government would be appointed by 
the U.S. President. So while the Cherokee Nation during Termination did have a tribal government, it can’t 
be said to be truly sovereign as Cherokees did not officially elect their own leaders again until 1971.  
 
30 The charge that Redbird Smith “get back what the Keetoowahs lost” commonly appears in scholarship 
of Smith, but is often unattributed. The source of this quotation is George Smith, one of Redbird Smith’s 
grandsons, who recounted the story to Thomas in an interview. 
 
31 The tension between Cherokees and Creeks that Thomas mentions is most notable in the history of the 
Red Stick War, a fight that began as a civil war in the pre-Removal Creek Nation but grew to involve the 
United States when American forces attacked a group of Upper Creeks in the Battle of Burnt Corn Creek 
(1813).  The Red Sticks were Upper Creek traditionalists who fought to reclaim traditional Creek lifeways, 
including religion and governance, from assimilative pressure brought by Americans and the growing 
mixedblood Creek population. After the Red Sticks defeated an American militia at the Battle of Burnt 
Corn Creek, American forces allied with Lower Creeks and Cherokees under Major Ridge. The Red Sticks 
experienced another victory when they attacked Fort Mims in what historians refer to as the Fort Mims 
Massacre (1813), capturing or killing more than 500 militiamen at the fort. The Americans, led by Andrew 
Jackson, and their Lower Creek and Cherokee allies later defeated the Red Sticks at the Battle of 
Horseshoe Bend (1814). See William Henderson Brantley, Battle of Horseshoe Bend, (1955); Gregory A. 
Waselkov A Conquering Spirit: Fort Mims and the Redstick War of 1813-1814 (Tuscaloosa: U of Alabama P, 
2006); Kathryn E. Holland Braund, ed. Tohopeka: Rethinking the Creek War and the War of 1812 
(Tuscaloosa: U of Alabama P, 2012). For more about the relationship between Creeks and Cherokees, and 
Cherokee involvement in the Creek War, see Angie Debo, The Road to Disappearance: A History of the 
Creek Indians, (1941). Also of note, Sam Houston, or Golanv (the Raven), adopted Cherokee and first 
president of the Republic of Texas, also fought at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend.  
 
32 Notchees (from the Natchez term, Nvce) are Natchez people who are Cherokee citizens and often live in 
Cherokee communities. Creek Sam, Redbird Smith’s mentor, as is his family, including Archie Sam and 
White Tobacco Sam, were Cherokee-citizen Notchees. The Natchez’ ancestral homeland is in present-day 
Mississippi, but like several other Southeastern nations, the Natchez were removed to Indian Territory 
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where many began to live with Cherokees or Creeks, taking up political citizenship with their respective 
nations. Many Natchez today are also Cherokee or Creek citizens. See Mary Ann Wells Native Land: 
Mississippi, 1540-1798 (Oxford, Miss: U of Mississippi P, 1994). The present-day Natchez Nation in 
Oklahoma numbers about 6,000, and leaders wrote a contemporary constitution in 2003. Their current 
principal peace chief is Hutke Fields. While there are several Natchez enclaves throughout the Southeast 
U.S., there also exist two state-recognized Natchez tribes in South Carolina, the Eastern Band Natchez and 
the Edisto (Natchez-Kuso) Nation, who the Natchez Nation recognizes as kin. For a short historical 
overview of the contemporary Natchez Nation, see Hutke Fields “The Natchez Indians: A Historical 
Overview” <http://www.backyardnature.net/loess/ind_nat2.htm>. 
 
33 The Lolomi Plan was a program developed by Laura Cornelius Kellogg (Oneida) in the early 1900s that 
was designed to help tribal nations develop economic and political independence through the creation of 
tribally-controlled “industrial communities” based on tribal principles.  Kellogg, one of the founders of the 
Society of American Indians, was the sister of C.P. Cornelius, and the two of them helped the Keetoowahs 
build and operate a cooperative dairy as a way to facilitate local economic development in the traditional 
Cherokee communities; however, the dairy ultimately failed. See Holm, The Great Confusion in Indian 
Affairs, 78. Kellogg, in fact, was so moved by the Redbird Smith Movement’s commitment to tribal 
lifeways that she dedicated her book, which was published after Smith’s death, to Smith. She writes: 
“Lovingly dedicated to Chief Red Bird of the Night Hawk Cherokees, who preserved his people from 
demoralization, and who was the first to accept the Lolomi.” See Kellogg, Our Democracy and the 
American Indian: A Comprehensive Presentation of the Indian Situation as it is Today, (1920). See Chs. 3-4 
of Kellogg for more about the Lolomi Plan. For more on Kellogg’s life and work in the Oneida Nation, see 
Kristina Ackley “Laura Cornelius Kellogg, Lolomi, and Modern Oneida Placemaking” American Indian 
Quarterly 37.3 (2013): 117-138. To learn more about Kellogg’s brief role with the SAI and her work on a 
national scale, see Cristina Stanciu “An Indian Woman of Many Hats: Laura Cornelius Kellogg’s Embattled 
Search for an Indigenous Voice” American Indian Quarterly 37.3 (2013): 87-115. 
 
34 George Smith (1884-1957) is Redbird Smith’s son. He was one of 10 children born to Redbird Smith and 
his wife, Lucie Fields. 
 
35 In Creek and Natchez cosmology, the number 4 often refers to the four cardinal directions. 
 
36 In Cherokee cosmology, the number 7 refers to the seven clans and seven sacred directions, including 
up, down and center. 
 
37 Cherokee clans are matrilineal, meaning the offspring of a Cherokee man and a non-Cherokee woman 
will not have a clan. Belonging as a Cherokee used to be determined strictly by clan membership, but as 
the Cherokee Nation centralized and adopted Western notions of citizenship, laws were made allowing 
the children of Cherokee men to be considered legally and politically Cherokee. Additionally, Tyler 
Boulware observes evidence of the decline of local, clan-centered governance in favor of a centralized 
Cherokee state in the signatures of Cherokee treaties. The Treaty of Hopewell (1785), he notes, 
negotiated peace between Cherokee towns and included a long list of Cherokee towns that were 
represented by the signers of the treaty. In later treaties, however, towns are nowhere to be found, and 
in their place are signatures of individual men who represent the “Cherokee Nation of Indians” (179-180). 
He adds that as Cherokees spread out and the town structure deteriorated, a political vacuum was left 
behind that was filled with “vocal and aggressive regional leaders,” and power became concentrated at 
the national level. See Boulware Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation: Town, Region, and Nation among 
Eighteenth-Century Cherokees (Gainesville: UP of Florida, 2011) and William G. McLoughlin “Thomas 
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Jefferson and the Beginning of Cherokee Nationalism” William and Mary Quarterly 32.3 (1975): 547-580. 
Mary Young adds that the transition from clan norms to state law might have increase the level of 
violence that existed in the Cherokee Nation. She writes: “According to that older system, members of 
one’s own clan might agree to kill a clansman so that no other person of his clan need suffer for his guilt. . 
. . Since by 1839, traditional definitions of relations existed side by side with Anglo-American kinship and 
legal systems, to say nothing of different norms governing the treatment of murder and revenge, blood 
feuds could not be limited so simply. In the Cherokee Nation West, they increased and multiplied. The 
revenge motif persisted; the customs and assumptions that limited its range did not” (520). See Young 
“The Cherokee Nation: Mirror of the Republic” American Quarterly 33.5 (1981): 502-524. 
 
38 Today’s Cherokee Nation includes citizens from a mixture of several backgrounds, including white, 
black, Latino and Asian as well as Native American. The Cherokee Nation only requires that citizens trace 
their direct lineage to one ancestor who is listed as Cherokee on the final Dawes Roll (1907). 
 
39 Cherokee words for the traditional terms that describe the people are Anigiduwagi, or People from 
Kituwah (the Cherokee mother town near present-day Bryson City, North Carolina) and Aniyunwiya, or 
the Real People. The idea of the Real People refers to traditional cosmology that describes the Creator 
having made the Cherokees specifically to dwell in the world, making Cherokees a special people apart 
from others as Thomas mentions. As Wahrhaftig states, this concept informs the idea that Cherokees are 
“permanent and essential to the conservation of the universe” as noted in modern Keetoowah tradition 
that states: “‘For God said, if the Cherokees be destroyed and become extinct,/ Then that will be the 
destruction of the whole world./ This is the word of the forefathers of our land’” (Keetoowah Society 
1972). This belief also informs the idea that Cherokees, having been made by the Creator, live under a 
natural law that guides their behavior. By extension, according to this belief, whites behave erratically 
because they are disconnected from their origins and have no cosmological law to follow. Wahrhaftig 
writes: “Cherokees see whites as having neither a homeland nor recollection of the time of creation, 
when their way was set forth; therefore, white men have no natural way to live under the law. This 
explains why it is in the nature or whites to be ‘mean’ and why they have illegitimately taken over the 
continent” (231-233). See Wahrhaftig, “The Thrice Powerless,” 231-233. Likewise, Andrew Dreadfulwater 
describes the Law, as traditionalists see it, and explains why Cherokees are set apart. In a 1974 speech at 
the North American Indian Ecumenical Conference, he said: “You see God’s Law in everything He made. 
You see the Law in trees. You see the Law in birds. You find everything today as He put it – yet. Apples is 
apples. Peaches is peaches. You can’t go to an apple tree and pick something that is half an apple and half 
a peach – yet. The birds – many birds—many different kinds of birds. In the south we have red, green, 
black, brown – all kinds of birds. If you find a redbird and look at its nest, you’ll find redbirds. You’ll never 
find different birds that live together – yet” (353). Dreadfulwater’s interpretation, perhaps troublesome 
to some in the racially diverse Cherokee Nation, stems from the belief of Cherokees as the Real People 
who were created to maintain the vitality of the universe as opposed to other groups of people. See 
Dreadfulwater, “We’ll Have Feathers in Our Hats, But We Won’t Be No Indians,” A Good Cherokee, A Good 
Anthropologist, 353-354. 
 
40 Steve Russell (Cherokee Nation) describes the importance of Cherokees’ choosing to participate in 
Cherokee life and contribute to other Cherokees. He writes of Cherokees who have more distant tribal 
ties, specifically unenrolled Cherokees: “Could they reestablish themselves with their tribal nations? 
Absolutely. But it would require significant effort beyond sucking air. Indian is not something you ‘are’ but 
rather something you ‘practice.’ It’s not about whom you claim but about who claims you. Being more or 
less Indian is not about blood quantum but about the strength of your tribal ties” (152). See Russell “A 
Word to the Wanabi Nation,” Sequoyah Rising: Problems in Post-Colonial Tribal Governance, 151-157. 
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41 Specifically, Sturm writes: “For most Cherokees, speaking the Cherokee language represents a symbolic 
and practical marker of social connections with and commitment to Cherokee community life. Fluency 
stands for time shared. After all, to become a fluent Cherokee speaker one has to be raised in a Cherokee-
speaking household or community or spend a large portion of time with other Cherokee speakers. The 
inverse of time shared is time apart from Euroamerican society, a realization of which causes many 
Cherokees to tie language to a sense of cultural difference” (121). See Sturm, Blood Politics, (2002), 120-
123. 
 
42 For an analysis of Thomas’ Peoplehood Matrix in relation to the experience of the Cherokee Freedmen, 
see Chapter 3 of this study. For more about the Peoplehood Matrix in general, see Thomas “The Taproots 
of Peoplehood” (1982) and Tom Holm (Cherokee Nation), Diane Pearson and Ben Chavis (Lumbee) 
“Peoplehood: A Model for the Extension of Sovereignty in American Indian Studies” Wicazo Sa Review 
18.1 (2003): 7-24. 
 
43 Just as Thomas sought to define strict boundaries of what constituted “Cherokee” apart from “non-
Cherokee,” so too do Cherokees today. While Cherokees continually create, challenge and change the 
terms that define “Cherokee” at any given moment, the idea that there exists a distinctly Cherokee 
identity always remains. For example, Daniel Heath Justice (Cherokee Nation) writes: “[A]lthough I believe 
Cherokee nationhood to be necessarily adaptive, I don’t believe that it’s amorphous to the point of 
absolute inclusiveness” (14). Indeed, just as Cherokee identity can and must change and adapt, as it 
always has, to different situations, the idea of something or someone being distinctly Cherokee at those 
moments must remain. See Justice Our Fire Survives the Storm: A Cherokee Literary History (Minneapolis: 
U of Minnesota P, 2006). 
 
44 While in this essay Thomas focuses on the values of Cherokees sticking together, maintaining 
harmonious relationships and remaining culturally Cherokee, especially through language, in other works 
of his he discusses the value of recognizing the value of having ties to tribal land, having a connection to 
sacred history and living tribally. See for example Thomas “The Tribe as an Ideal Type." Varieties of Man 
and Society, Journal of University Studies 2.14 (1975): 1-10. 
<http://works.bepress.com/robert_thomas/34> and “The Tap Roots of Peoplehood” Getting to the Heart 
of the Matter: Collected Letters and Papers (Vancouver: Native Ministries Consortium, 1990), 17-23. 
<http://works.bepress.com/robert_thomas/50>.  
 
45 For more about the Keetoowah Society and Redbird Smith, see Patrick Minges Slavery in the Cherokee 
Nation: The Keetoowah Society and the Defining of a People, 1855-1867 (New York: Routledge, 2003); 
Howard Q. Tyner, The Keetoowah Society in Cherokee History, (1949); Benny Smith (UKB), The Keetoowah 
Society of the Cherokee Indians, (1967); Janey B. Hendrix, Redbird Smith and the Nighthawk Keetoowahs, 
(1983); Robert J. Conley (UKB) “The Dawes Commission and Redbird Smith” The Cherokee Nation: A 
History (Albuquerque: U of New Mexico P, 2005), Ch. 24. 
 
46 For more on this history as it pertains specifically to the Keetoowahs, see Minges, Slavery in the 
Cherokee Nation: The Keetoowah Society and the Defining of a People, 1855-1867, (2003), esp. Chs. 3-4. 
 
47 Before the Cherokee Nation adopted a centralized, constitutional government in the 1820s, Cherokee 
towns were autonomous, loosely confederated and led by a White Chief and a Red Chief. The White Chief 
led the town in times of peace, and the Red Chief took over in times of war. The White Path, therefore, is 
that of passive resistance in order to maintain peace. Redbird Smith’s charge to uphold the White Path 
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informed the non-violent element of his resistance to Euroamerican encroachment. For more about 
Cherokee town structure before the Nation’s centralizations, see Tyler Boulware Deconstructing the 
Cherokee Nation: Town, Region, and Nation among Eighteenth-Century Cherokees (Gainesville: UP of 
Florida, 2011). See also Raymond D. Fogelson “Cherokee Notions of Power” The Anthropology of Power: 
Ethnographic Studies from Asia, Oceania, and the New World. Fogelson and Richard  N. Adams, eds. (New 
York: Academic Press, 1977), 185-194.  
 
48 Despite Redbird Smith’s designation as a leader of the movement, he did not unilaterally make 
decisions. In recovering Cherokee epistemologies, especially clan rule, the Keetoowahs of the Redbird 
Smith movement operated on communal governance in which everyone discussed and had equal say in 
the movement’s matters. Raymond D. Fogelson writes: “Red Bird Smith was an appointed leader who 
approximated the Cherokee ideal of a moral and sagacious elder rather than a divinely inspired prophet. 
All major decisions, doctrinal innovations, and even the authenticity of decoded dream messages had to 
be approved by a committee. If Red Bird Smith possessed charisma or ‘power,’ it was a fully domesticated 
and socialized type of power that bound him closely to his constituency, rather than differentiating him 
from it” (189). See Fogelson “Cherokee Notions of Power” The Anthropology of Power: Ethnographic 
Studies from Asia, Oceania, and the New World. Fogelson and Richard N. Adams, eds. (New York: 
Academic Press, 1977), 185-194. More broadly on the demise of communal governance and the clan 
system, see Rennard Strickland, Fire and the Spirits: Cherokee Law from Clan to Court, (1975) and Tyler 
Boulware, Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation, 2011. 
 
49 Gadugi refers to the cooperative labor that Cherokees traditionally undertook to provide sustenance for 
their communities. The labor included tending to crops, hunting, fishing and caring for those in the 
community who were ill or elderly. As Thomas notes, when the need for surplus good increased as 
Cherokees transitioned to a European-style market economy, these labor cooperatives often had to break 
up, so they could spread out and acquire more goods to sell. Dismantling the labor cooperatives often 
resulted in making the protections they provided more tenuous. Wilma Dunaway argues that while the 
gadugi system rapidly declined in the early 1800s, some traces of it were still in effect as late as 1930. See 
Dunaway “Rethinking Cherokee Acculturation: Agrarian Capitalism and Women’s Resistance to the Cult of 
Domesticity, 1800-1838” American Indian Research and Culture Journal  21 (1997): 156-182 and Tamrala 
Swafford The Gadugi Spirit: Community Development Strategies Among the Eastern Band of Cherokee 
Indians, 1934-1984 Dissertation. Arizona State University. Ann Arbor: ProQuest/UMI Dissertations 
Publishing, 2009. (Publication No. 3354467).  
 
50 Thomas specified that as the burgeoning Euroamerican market demanded more surplus goods for sale, 
Cherokees communities had to separate to farm and hunt a wider swath of land to meet those demands. 
David M. Wishart argues that according to the 1835 Cherokee census, around 75 percent of Cherokee 
families in the areas that later became Tennessee and Alabama were producing surplus goods, namely 
corn, while surplus-producing families in the Nation as a whole numbered around 56 percent. See Wishart 
“Evidence of Surplus Production in the Cherokee Nation Prior to Removal The Journal of Economic History 
55.1 (1995): 120-138. 
 
51 While Thomas himself does not use the term “whiteness,” he refers to the Euroamerican values and the 
racial hierarchy in the U.S. that have historically allowed white people in the country to rationalize white 
racial superiority and to justify the marginalization of non-whites, concepts associated with the academic 
use of “whiteness.” For more about whiteness in general, see Toni Morrison, Playing the in the Dark: 
Whiteness and the Literary Imagination, (1992); David Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the 
Making of the American Working Class, (1991); George Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: 
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How White People Profit from Identity Politics, (1998); and the two volumes of Theodore W. Allen, The 
Invention of the White Race, (1994, 1997). 
 
52 In his decision to allow the UKB to hold land in trust, Larry Echo Hawk (Pawnee) argued that because 
Congress had closed the Cherokee rolls in 1907 during allotment, Congress had put in place a sunset 
provision on the federal government’s relationship with the historic Cherokee Nation. A sunset provision 
implies that a law will simply cease to remain in effect after a specified date, in this case the laws 
establishing the sovereign nation-to-nation relationship between the U.S. and the Cherokee Nation would 
expire. I use the term “sunset” here as opposed to “terminate” to differentiate between the 
government’s allowing this relationship to lapse and the U.S. writing legislation to specifically terminate 
the Cherokee Nation. “Termination” implies an immediate withdrawal of the federal government’s trust 
relationship with tribal nations. By “sunsetting,” however, I’m describing the action Congress took to 
create and close a final roll of Cherokee Nation citizens and the fact that the trust relationship with the 
historic Cherokee Nation would expire after the last original enrollee died. 
 
53 Though Thomas writes that many mixedblood Cherokees simply gave up or effectively “sold out” by 
agreeing to allotment, Tom Holm adds more nuance and suggests that many Cherokees, mixedbloods and 
traditionals, wanted more regulation from the federal government because they feared that they would 
lose more if the U.S. abnegated its trust relationship with the Cherokees through the Curtis Act (1898). He 
writes: “[A] number of ‘full-blood’ members of the tribes had petitioned the federal government to 
continue in its role as the guardian of Indian lands and, specifically, to deny them American citizenship. 
Not only did these traditional Creek, Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw believe that they would be 
swindled if the trust relationship with the government was canceled, but they also rejected American 
citizenship in the belief that it would destroy them as a people” (163). Here, Holm demonstrates that not 
all traditionals wanted the Cherokee Nation to sever its relationship with the U.S., but more importantly 
he shows that those who did want to maintain that relationship weren’t just selling out. Holm does, 
however, suggest, as does Thomas, that many mixedbloods only agreed to petition for a stronger trust 
relationship after they had already lost much of their property through allotment. He writes: “‘Mixed-
blood’ members of the same tribes, considered more ‘civilized’ by the federal government, had 
apparently succumbed to the land speculators as well. D.W.C. Duncan, a Cherokee lawyer, stated that, 
prior to the allotment policy, the Cherokee had ‘more than enough to fill up the cup of our enjoyment.’ 
Duncan argued effectively for more regulation, for he, an educated man, had lost the major portion of his 
family estate” (163).  See Holm The Great Confusion in Indian Affairs: Native Americans and Whites in the 
Progressive Era (Austin: U of Texas P, 2005), 163. In Duncan’s 1906 statement to the U.S. Senate, he 
mentions that he had a 300-acre farm that was whittled down to a mere 60 acres during allotment. He 
compared the destruction brought by allotment to the Cherokees to the hurricane in 1900 that hit 
Galveston, Texas, killing nearly 8,000 people. Of his day-to-day experience post allotment, he says: “Under 
the inexorable law of allotment enforced upon us Cherokees, I had to relinquish every inch of my 
premises outside of that little 60 acres. What is the result? There is a great scramble of persons to find 
land . . . to file upon. Some of the friends in here, especially a white intermarried citizen, goes up and files 
upon a part of my farm. . . . Away went my crop. . . Now, that is what has been done to these Cherokees” 
(186) See Duncan’s statement in U.S. Senate, Senate Reports, serial 5013, 59th Cong., 2nd sess., Pt. I, 180-
90. 
 
54 For more about European influences on the Cherokee market and how the market affected the way 
Cherokees lived on and attended to the land, see David M. Wishart “Evidence of Surplus Production in the 
Cherokee Nation Prior to Removal The Journal of Economic History 55.1 (1995): 120-138 and Douglas C. 
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Wilms “Cherokee Land Use in Georgia Before Removal” Cherokee Removal: Before and After. William L. 
Anderson, ed. (Athens: U of Georgia P, 1991), 1-28. 
 
55 Cherokee culture was largely changed early on by missionaries who came to proselytize to Cherokee 
communities, specifically introducing the values and norms of Christianity, and with the transition from a 
clan system of law to a system based on Euroamerican legal practices. Mary Young, for example, writes: 
“In the early nineteenth century, church and state collaborated to present the Cherokee with a unitary 
vision of republican, Christian, capitalist civilization. Their model American lived under written laws 
framed by chosen representatives and enforced by impartial public authority. Law protected property, 
and industrious males strove to increase their property by honest labor at the plow, the forge, or the mill, 
while industrious females kept the family clothed, and the home neatly groomed and governed. All 
worshipped a stern, transcendent, but benevolent God Whose Will was known through His written Word” 
(504). See Young “The Cherokee Nation: Mirror of the Republic” American Quarterly 33.5 (1981): 502-524. 
For more on this topic, see William G. McLoughlin Cherokees and Missionaries, 1789-1893 (Norman: U of 
Oklahoma P, 1995) and Rennard Strickland Fire and the Spirit: Cherokee Law from Clan to Court (Norman: 
U of Oklahoma P, 1975). 
 
56 Robert Conley (UKB) offers four explanations for the seemingly large number of Cherokee “outlaws” 
who appear throughout history. He contends, first, that the lawlessness in Indian Territory at this time has 
its roots in early European contact, and he argues that several of the white people who married into the 
Cherokee Nation early on were social misfits who could not adjust to mainstream life in the states. Walter 
L. Williams agrees that alongside missionaries, the majority of whites in Cherokee communities sought to 
escape restrictions of white society, such as the law. See Williams, Spirit and the Flesh: Sexual Diversity in 
American Indian Culture, (1992), 181. Second, Conley attributes growing lawlessness to a transition from a 
communal clan system, in which behavior and order are structured around maintaining harmony, to a 
Euroamerican system of laws and punishment of individuals, eroding community members’ accountability 
to one another. Third, he points to the rifts that occurred between communities during the Civil War as a 
catalyst of increased violence in the Cherokee Nation, and, finally, he points to the confusing jurisdiction 
over crimes committed in Indian Territory.  
Conley, like myself, differentiates between those Cherokees who were legitimate outlaws and 
Cherokees who are only recorded as outlaws in American history. Cherokee outlaws such as Tom Starr 
and his son Sam and Sam’s wife, Belle Starr, indeed were bank robbers and horse thieves, as were Tom’s 
grandson, Henry Starr, and other outlaws like Bill and Jim Cook, Bob Rogers and “Cherokee Bill” Crawford 
Goldsby. Conley problematically fingers these individuals’ mixedblood status and attributes their 
lawlessness to their European heritage or, more broadly, to the values of the growing mixedblood 
Cherokee community. While I disagree with Conley on this point, I do agree with his portrayal of other 
Cherokee “outlaws” who can be more productively read as Cherokee freedom fighters but who were 
vilified in white courts and American legend. “Outlaws” such as Ned Christie, Bill Pigeon, Zeke Proctor, 
Mose Miller and Charlie Wickliffe were Nighthawk Keetoowahs who resisted white encroachment into 
Cherokee communities and allotment of Cherokee land. Conley writes: “Is it not possible, or even 
probable, that the same government that had created within the borders of the Cherokee Nation a 
lawless territory by denying that nation the right to police its own lands, . . . used that very lawlessness as 
an excuse for imposing its own jurisdiction in that territory? . . . . Is it not possible and even probable that 
same government would find a way to destroy its opposition’s most vocal and influential leaders? I 
believe . . . the so-called full-blood Cherokee outlaws, were not outlaws at all. I believe they were 
Cherokee patriots dedicated to the preservation of the Cherokee Nation. I further believe they were 
victims – singled out, labeled as outlaws, and pursued as outlaws in order to silence their political 
interference with the process of fulfilling what the U.S. government viewed as its manifest destiny” (65). 
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See Conley “Cherokee Outlaws” Cherokee Thoughts, Honest & Uncensored (Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 
2008), 49-65. For more about Henry Starr, see his autobiography Thrilling Events: The Life of Henry Starr, 
by Himself, (1914). For more about Ned Christie, see a study done by one of his descendants Roy J. 
Hamilton (Cherokee Nation) Ned Christie, Cherokee Warrior (Stillwell, OK: Sugartree Press, 2004). For a 
fictionalized account of Ned Christie’s life, see Conley, Ned Christie’s War, (1990). 
 
57 Baptists were one of the most successful Christian denominations to proselytize to the Cherokees 
because the practice of baptism resembled the Cherokee ritual cleansing, going to water. Additionally, 
Baptists also allowed Cherokees and even some slaves to serve as deacons and lay ministers. Several of 
the Cherokees who would make up the Keetoowah Society were Baptists, including Redbird Smith and his 
father, Pig Smith. Budd Gritts, likewise, was a Cherokee Baptist preacher who drafted the Keetoowah 
Society’s constitution. In fact many of the teachings of the revived Keetoowah Society were informed by 
black Baptist ministers in the Cherokee Nation, many of whom were Freedmen. For more on the role of 
black Baptist ministers in Keetoowah thought, see Chapter 3. See also William G. McLoughlin  After the 
Trail of Tears: The Struggle for Sovereignty, 1839-1880 (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1994), 147-151.  
 
58 Though the term “wampum” is often used to refer to one or more than one of the belts, Thomas uses 
the singular and plural interchangeably. 
 
59 Thomas compares the Redbird Smith Movement to the 1890 Ghost Dance movement inspired by 
Wovoka and practiced primarily by Plains Indians. However, scholars such as William G. McLoughlin and 
Russell Thornton (Cherokee Nation) have referred to early Cherokee revitalization movements as ghost 
dances. McLoughlin distinguishes between what he refers to as “true” and “false” ghost dances. A “true 
ghost dance” occurs when practitioners seek spiritual intervention, and a “false ghost dance,” according 
to McLoughlin, is invoked when practitioners want to effect political change. Thornton argues that 
Cherokees have historically initiated such ghost dances, or revitalization movements, when “group 
boundaries are in danger of dissolution in ways that are perceived negatively by the people involved” 
(361). See McLoughlin The Cherokee Ghost Dance and Other Essays on the Southern Indians, 1789-1861 
(Mercer, GA: Mercer UP, 1984) and “Ghost Dance Movements: Some Thoughts on Definition Based on 
Cherokee History” Ethnohistory 37.1 (1990): 25-44; Thornton “Boundary Dissolution and Revitalization 
Movements: The Case of Nineteenth-Century Cherokees” Ethnohistory 40.3 (1993): 359-383; Gail 
Landsman “The Ghost Dance and the Policy of Land Allotment” American Sociological Review 44.1 (1979): 
162-166. 
 
60 The Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act (1936) extended the provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act 
(1934) to tribal nations in Oklahoma who were originally exempted from the legislation. Wary of the 
terms of the Act, the Cherokee Nation did not reorganize under the OIWA. 
 
61 The Keetoowah Society split in 1901 after they held a meeting in which several influential Keetoowah 
leaders agreed to enroll with the Dawes Commission and accept allotments, believing that cooperation 
would ultimately lead to better legislation for the Keetoowahs later on. All Keetoowah leaders except for 
Redbird Smith voted in favor of enrollment. Smith was later jailed and forced to enroll; however, he and 
his followers had by then established a religious faction of the Keetoowah Society who were subsequently 
called the “Nighthawk Keetoowahs” as a result of their vigilance and their practice of meeting at night. 
See Tyner, Keetoowah Society, 68-70. Of allotment, Smith stated: “‘I can’t stand and live and breathe if I 
take this allotment. Under the allotment rules I would see all around me – I see now all around me and all 
the Indians – people who are ready to grab from under us my living and my home. If I would accept such a 
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plan I would be going in starvation. To take a put the Indians on the land in severalty would be just the 
same as burying them, for they could not live’” (qtd. in Tyner 74) See Tyner, Keetoowah Society, (1949). 
 
62 Tyner’s suggestion that the Nighthawks were indifferent to the political effort to establish a Keetoowah 
land base is problematic. The Nighthawks weren’t complacent, as Tyner concludes; they simply disagreed 
with how Keetoowah Society, Inc. wished to proceed. Indeed, the Nighthawks were politically active and 
even attempted, per Redbird Smith’s charge upon his death, to reconcile the Cherokee factions that had 
developed. Tyner, in fact, notes this effort himself when he recounts the formation of the Cherokee 
Executive Council in 1920 that incorporated the Eastern and Western Cherokee Councils, a group of 
Cherokees who lived near Tulsa who called themselves the “Cherokee Executive Committee,” Keetoowah 
Society, Inc., and the Nighthawk Keetoowahs. Though ultimately little was accomplished in this group 
endeavor, it does demonstrate the Nighthawks’ interest in politics and, more importantly, that they were 
not simply withdrawn and indifferent to the thought of securing a Keetoowah land base. See Tyner, 
Keetoowah Society in Cherokee History, 81, 88-89. 
 
63 There are seven Cherokee clans, and clan membership is based either on matrilineal descent or clan 
adoption. The Cherokee clans are: Anitsisqua (Bird Clan), Aniwaya (Wolf Clan), Anikawi (Deer Clan), 
Aniwodi (Paint Clan), Anisakoni (Blue Clan), Anigatagewi (Wild Potato Clan) and Anigilohi (Long Hair Clan). 
Before Cherokees adopted a constitutional government that allowed Cherokee males to bestow Cherokee 
citizenship to their children, Cherokee belonging was determined solely by matrilineal clan affiliation. The 
clans also were responsible for imparting justice in cases of interclan crime before the development of a 
tribal state police force in the early 1800s. The roles that clans played, and by extension the power 
women wielded in Cherokee communities, deteriorated as the Cherokee Nation moved to a centralized 
government and relied more on legislative law as opposed to clan traditions. Part of the Redbird Smith 
movement entailed restoring the clan system in the traditional communities as a way to supplant 
Euroamerican laws, which are based on policing and punishment, by re-creating clan law that is based on 
maintaining communal harmony. See Conley, “Cherokee Women and the Clan System,” Cherokee 
Thoughts, 75-80 and Carolyn Ross Johnston Cherokee Women in Crisis: Trail of Tears, Civil War, and 
Allotment, 1838-1907 (Tuscaloosa: U of Alabama P, 2003), 54-55. 
 
64 The Keetoowahs tried on multiple occasions to establish a tribal community in Mexico and Colombia. 
Robert Conley writes that in 1896 Bird Harris proposed selling Cherokee land and using the money to 
move to Mexico. See Conley, The Cherokee Nation: A History, 196. Daniel F. Littlefield, Jr., discusses the 
long precedent of Cherokees seeking refuge in Mexico. He writes: “The lands of Spain and later Mexico to 
the south and southwest of the United States had long been regarded as a place of refuge by the Indians. 
The first Cherokees of note to take refuge there were followers of Bowl who, dissatisfied with the treaty 
between the Cherokees and the United States in 1817, removed to the Spanish territory of Texas where, 
with scattered members of other tribes, they settled along the Angelina, Neches, and Trinity Rivers. They 
were later joined by Tahchee and other Cherokee chiefs, including Richard Fields” (407). For more on this 
history between the Cherokees and Mexico, see Littlefield “Utopian Dream of the Cherokee Fullbloods, 
1890-1934” Journal of the West 10.3 (1971): 404-427. 
 
65 For a history of the United Keetoowah Band, see Georgia Rae Leeds The United Keetoowah Band of 
Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma (New York: Peter Lang, 2000). 
 
66 Echo Hawk further contends that because the contemporary Cherokee Nation and the UKB are joint 
successors, the historic Cherokee Nation is no more. For the text in which Echo Hawk explains his 
decision, see <http://www.cornsilks.com/aDecision.pdf>. 
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67 Though the BIA affirmed the UKB’s right to put land into trust, the Cherokee Nation, under Principal 
Chief Bill John Baker, in July 2013 petitioned to block the move. In August 2013, the UKB agreed to move 
their casino onto land that the Cherokee Nation has in trust. See Teddye Snell “Chief proposes solution 
after CN petitions to block UKB land trust” TahlequahDailyPress.org. Tahlequah Daily Press, 24 July 2013. 
Web. 24 July 2013 <http://tahlequahdailypress.com/local/x541281295/Chief-proposes-solution-after-CN-
petitions-to-block-UKB-land-trust/print>. 
  
 131 
“Faith in ourselves is necessary”: Functional Integration as Resistance and Critical 
Nationhood in Natachee Momaday’s Owl in the Cedar Tree 
 
 In her book Indians Are People, Too (1944), Cherokee writer and activist Ruth 
Muskrat Bronson states that in order for American Indians to thrive in a world that 
requires contact with mainstream white America, “faith in ourselves is necessary” (92). 
She adds that for Indian children, especially, retaining knowledge of and pride in their 
tribal heritage, amid pressure to assimilate, can often be a daunting endeavor. Describing 
the interaction between Indians and whites as a “personal humiliation,” she adds that 
Indian children too often bear the burden of trying to see value in their tribal lifeways 
while having to learn how to operate in a world outside that does not. She writes: 
“Pressures from all sides are exerted on Indian youth, pressures that cannot fail to injure 
his pride in his racial heritage and, by implication, weaken his confidence in his own 
ability. He sees his people almost universally overwhelmed by the most grievous poverty 
and pauperized by enforced dependency” (92). These pressures, often economic as 
Bronson notes, can erode Indian children’s faith, as it were, in their ability to thrive on 
their own tribal lifeways and make standing at the crossroads of tribal life and life on 
mainstream America’s terms seem almost paralytic.  
This struggle to maintain a foothold as an Indian in an Indian world during a time 
when the federal government was enacting policies to erode such a world took various 
forms, and the tactics used in the struggle were many. The methods of resistance were 
varied, but each laid the groundwork toward achieving a goal of survival and 
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perseverance as Indian on Indian terms. However, under some circumstances it is more 
fruitful to change the terms rather than adhere strictly to ideas of the past that, while still 
valuable in other contexts, might not speak to a volatile present that demands adaptation 
and integration. The 1950s, the era of Termination and Relocation, was one of those 
times in which Indians had to make choices ranging from outright assimilation to spirited 
defiance in defense of tribal values and autonomy.  
 It is in this range of options within the context of postwar Indian policy that 
Cherokee writers of the era explored with regard to how best to assert a tribal identity and 
re-imagine critical nationhood, resisting cultural and political encroachment from a 
federal government that, as seen earlier, was growing more patriotic and narcissistic in 
the years after its victory in World War II.1 As the United States was dissolving its treaty 
obligations with several tribal nations2 and imposing economic arm-twisting to effect its 
mission of Indian assimilation through the dismantling of tribal bodies, Cherokee writers, 
among other Indian writers3, sought to tell different stories, stories of tribal resistance and 
triumph. While one narrative strategy was to assert a traditional, nativist tribal identity to 
combat the assimilation imperative, as seen in Robert K. Thomas’ early writings, another 
option was to identify ways to incorporate elements of the interloping culture – a culture 
that unfortunately wasn’t going anywhere anytime soon – while maintaining a distinct 
tribal identity. Cree-Salish writer and activist D’Arcy McNickle famously accounted for 
this possibility of retaining tribal ties and values while integrating into the dominant 
economy in Native American Tribalism: Indian Survivals and Renewals (1973) in which 
he articulates that while tradition is valuable, Indians also have a tradition of adapting to 
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changing social, political and economic environments. He points out that at a time when 
the United States, again, was enacting colonial pressure on Indian nations, Indians would 
have to invoke this traditional practice and redefine and renew themselves as a way to 
ensure further survival.4 When the federal government robbed Indian nations of their 
status as political sovereigns,5 McNickle argues, it became incumbent on Indians to recast 
themselves as culturally distinct, even if unable to do so politically, and find ways to 
functionally integrate into the dominant economy on their own terms so they would not 
assimilate, but rather thrive distinctly still as Indians.  
 McNickle articulates this theory of functional integration in 1973, but almost a 
decade earlier Cherokee writer Mayme Natachee Scott Momaday explored this option of 
tribal survivance6 in her young adult novel Owl in the Cedar Tree (1965). The novel 
takes place in the Navajo Nation7 and centers on Haske, a young Navajo boy who is 
pulled between adhering to tribal traditions and the need to account for and confront the 
increasing influence of white society on his circumstances to figure out how he fits into 
the world that is taking shape around him. Scholars have written very little about Owl in 
the Cedar Tree, which is unfortunate because the novel has much to say about ways to 
ensure the integrity of tribal identity while being in some ways surrounded by a dominant 
society that wishes to erase it. The novel is of particular value generically speaking 
because it is an account of an adolescent Indian being proud of where he comes from and 
affirming his tribal identity amid great tension both at home and in the world outside, and 
few can deny that our youth need more stories such as these. Still, as of now, only Jace 
Weaver (Cherokee) has written a useful, albeit brief, analysis of the novel in his study 
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That the People Might Live (1997). In the three-page analysis, Weaver describes the book 
as narrating the “tensions . . . between progressives and pullbacks, all of whom, to 
varying degrees, are traditional practitioners” (118). While Weaver is correct in 
identifying the generational tensions between tradition and “progress,”8 concluding the 
analysis at that level is premature and forecloses on a more nuanced reading of a book 
that is only deceptively simple and has much more to offer readers than a simple pointing 
out of a binary conflict. When we delve deeper into these tensions and consider the 
period in which the novel was written, it becomes clear that Momaday crafts a narrative 
of tribal resistance through a re-imagining of critical nationhood. It is a novel that, if read 
through the lens of McNickle’s functional integration theory, lends essential insight into 
how some Indians at the time allayed this tension by redefining themselves against 
tradition and change and emerged, still, as Indians.  
 I juxtapose my analysis of Owl in the Cedar Tree against Thomas’ early writings 
in this section of the study because both Cherokee writers are arguing for ways to re-
imagine the tribal unit in a cultural sense at a time when the federal government was 
threatening to make tribal nations politically impotent by unilaterally relinquishing their 
mutual sovereign relationship. Both of these Cherokee writers of this era who I study 
here argue that rallying around the tribe culturally was a way to strengthen the tribe and 
to assuage pressure to assimilate via tribal disintegration through relocation. However, 
where Thomas takes a strict separatist approach, Momaday accounts for the ability to 
integrate, especially economically, without having to assimilate and in the end retain the 
integrity of tribal identity. Momaday creates a narrative in which tradition still holds a 
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revered place while tribes adapt to and integrate into a dominant society on terms that can 
ensure their continued survival.  
 
Re-reading and recovering Owl in the Cedar Tree 
 Such a reading of Owl in the Cedar Tree is necessary now because in addition to 
Weaver’s short analysis of the novel, only two other scholars in nearly two decades have 
approached this text, both relying on the theme of authenticity, or what they wrongly 
assume as a lack thereof, as the foundation for their analyses.9 Because such a simplistic 
focus on authenticity detracts from the novel’s primary value – the recognition of 
Indians’ ability and periodic need, not to mention intrinsic right, to strategically redefine 
themselves – I will take a moment to address these two scholars’ work and demonstrate 
how the novel has been read in the past and how my approach differs by offering an 
analysis that empowers a novel that is aimed at young Indian readers. 
 Agnes Grant reviewed Owl in the Cedar Tree in 1995 alongside two titles by Paul 
Goble,10 a British children’s author who has made a career from writing about Indians. In 
her short review, Grant addresses teachers and indicates that they might want to double 
check for accuracy the depiction of Navajo life in Momaday’s book, a book written by a 
Cherokee woman who spent several years as a teacher in the Navajo Nation. Likewise, 
Grant implies that the novel’s temporal setting cannot be determined and would be 
inessential anyway. She writes: “The uninitiated reader cannot . . . place the story in an 
historic context. Though this in no way detracts from the story, a teacher concerned with 
historic accuracy will question whether Navahos still live this way” (111). I question why 
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the latter is even a concern to begin with and what a non-Navajo reader would find in a 
search for “historical accuracy” that could make him or her certain that the way Navajos 
live today is somehow divorced from the history that Grant implies lends authenticity to a 
preconceived aesthetic of how Navajos should live. And if Navajos’ lives are different 
today from how Momaday depicts them, both are still “accurately” Navajo.11 I also argue 
that it is possible to place Owl in the Cedar Tree in a historical context and that by 
placing the story in its proper historical context, in this case the rapid change of the mid-
1960s when it was written, lends much needed social and historical insight into the 
narrative and makes the narrative useful for Indian readers. A properly contextualized 
reading of Momaday’s novel illustrates that whether Navajos still live in a traditional 
way, depending on who is defining “traditional,” that it is inconsequential because what 
is ultimately important is that Navajos be depicted as living on their own terms, 
regardless of whether outsiders recognize it as accurately or authentically Navajo.  
 In addition to Grant, Jim Charles likewise published a brief analysis of Owl in the 
Cedar Tree in 2001 in which he, like Weaver, describes the narrative as being focused on 
the conflict between the traditional Old Grandfather and Haske’s more progressive 
parents, with Haske being caught in the middle. While Weaver rightly forgoes the value 
judgments of choosing one side over the other, Charles goes so far as to say that Haske 
does indeed choose a side and that, fortunately for Haske, it’s the “right” choice, the 
choice that indicates that Haske values tradition, which by default insinuates that his 
parents do not. He writes that Haske’s parents,  
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 represent contemporary American Indians, educated in the white man’s science, 
 art, and lifeways. Haske’s parents are skeptical of many of the traditional beliefs 
 of the Navaho. While they are accurate depictions of a significant segment of the 
 American Indian population, to a degree they serve as foils to Old Grandfather 
 who is grounded absolutely in the traditional ways of the Navaho. (60) 
Haske’s relationship with his parents and the parents’ relationship to Old Grandfather are 
more complex than their simply existing as a foil to what is ostensibly the “right” way to 
be Navajo. Furthermore, this description re-inscribes the binary of the real Indian who is 
“traditional” and uncontaminated by white influence while implicitly suggesting that 
those Indians who did get a “white education,” which often was forced on them,12 are 
somehow less Indian and are deficient for lacking a connection to tradition, whether by 
choice or not. The term “foil” implies contrast, and if the parents are to be read as foils to 
Old Grandfather, the implication is that these two communities they represent are 
necessarily at odds, which, again, establishes a right-wrong binary in which Haske must 
choose with whom to align.  
Lost in such an analysis is the fact that Indians of varying connections to tradition 
contribute to the lasting strength of their communities. To view various Indian 
demographics with regard to degree of tradition as somehow in conflict with one another, 
though it does at times occur on some local levels, not only elides the great diversity in 
Indian Country, but ignores how contemporary Indian communities view themselves. 
This perspective also dismisses the social and historical elements that influence a group’s 
make-up with regard to one aspect of Indian life, in this case the degree to which one 
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practices tradition. It again sets up a binary that there exists a right or wrong (or 
authentic/inauthentic) way to be Indian at any given time and that if one makes the wrong 
choice, he or she is no longer a “real” Indian.13  
 The make-up of some contemporary Indian communities – including the 
mixedblood, English-speaking, landless Indians – was influenced as much, arguably 
more, by circumstances imposed earlier on sovereign Indian nations than simply by 
choice on the part of their individual citizens. That said, a Navajo or Cherokee today 
might not be the same as a Navajo or Cherokee a century ago – and that person is still a 
Navajo or Cherokee. By contextualizing Owl in the Cedar Tree with regard to the time 
Momaday wrote it and the social and historical realities Indians faced then and now, I 
recover the novel as a narrative of resistance and of critical, ethical nationhood in which 
its lead character is not stretched on a rack of mutually exclusive identities, but rather free 
to cut his own path in a way to ensure the continued survivance of his community. 
 Furthermore, Charles implies that one lesson that readers, ostensibly Indian 
adolescents, should take away from Momaday’s novel, in addition to strict adherence to 
tradition that might not function the same for them as it did in their elders’ generations, is 
how to romantically die with dignity. He writes: “Having chosen Old Grandfather’s path 
of Navajo traditions and spirituality, Haske must next cope with the old man’s death . . . . 
From Old Grandfather he learns about death, death with dignity on one’s own terms, and 
the spiritual strength required in death” (61). Charles’ romanticizing of Indian death14 in a 
novel that Indian parents are supposed to read to their children is as much viscerally 
disturbing as it is logically problematic. Contrary to learning how to die with dignity, 
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however, I find that Momaday’s novel functions as a primer for how Indian children can 
live with dignity in a world that frequently attempts to undermine it. 
 To escape the tradition-versus-assimilation binary with regard to Owl in the 
Cedar Tree requires a thorough analysis of the novel that is useful to Indian readers and 
that accounts for the time period in which it was written. By examining the economic 
landscape of Indian communities in the 1960s, we can see how Momaday creates a 
narrative in which Haske reconciles Navajo tradition to his own experience and how he is 
able to resist through functional integration. In doing so, Momaday re-examines a path to 
critical tribal nationhood that has purchase in an increasingly blended Indian and non-
Indian society. Such an analysis demonstrates Haske’s agency, and by extension an 
agency that Momaday, as a Cherokee author, implies Indians all possess, in a way that 
has yet to be accounted for in scholarship about her book.15  
 
A look into history and economics surrounding Owl in the Cedar Tree 
 To understand Owl in the Cedar Tree through an economic lens, some 
background into the economic climate of the time is necessary. My aim is not to 
voyeuristically focus on Indian poverty as a condition that plagues Indians and from 
which there is little hope for escape. That focus has been exhausted and forecloses on 
possibilities for Indian communities to extricate themselves from poverty and is, thus, 
useless.16 My aim is to show how the novel offers alternatives to a forgone life by 
showing how characters can compete in a dominant economic system and retain a tribal 
identity.  
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Owl in the Cedar Tree was published shortly after the American Indian Capital 
Conference on Poverty, an event in which Indian leaders argued for Indian inclusion in 
the Economic Opportunity Act (1964).17 During the conference, Melvin Thom (Northern 
Paiute)18 addressed Indian youth and urged them and the federal government to cooperate 
to find ways to alleviate poverty in Indian Country without Indians having to sacrifice 
their way of life and assimilate into mainstream white America. Thom describes the 
presence and effect of poverty in Indian communities of the time. He argues: “Poverty is 
nothing new to us. Many of us grew up in this condition. This condition continues to eat 
at us” (144).  He further argues the need for Indians to be allowed to fight poverty on 
their own terms and to function in the U.S. economy in such a way that does not first 
require an abnegation of one’s tribal ties and identity. He adds that the fear of tribal 
termination must be removed before Indians can successfully and safely enter the U.S. 
economy. He states: “We must recognize and point out to others that we do want to live 
under better conditions, but we want to remember that we are Indians. We want to remain 
Indian people . . . the Indian cannot be pushed into the mainstream of American life. Our 
recognition as Indian people and Indian tribes is very dear to us” (144-45). Marjane 
Ambler likewise argues for the possibility and need for culturally-informed economic 
independence in order for tribal nations to be truly sovereign. She argues that economic 
self-sufficiency need not force a tribal nation to “become an economic island, consuming 
only what it produces on the reservation. A tribe will have reached self-sufficiency when 
it can provide for the needs of community members and determine its own social and 
economic goals for the future without violating its cultural heritage” (8). By taking Owl 
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in the Cedar Tree out of the historic context in which it was written, one misses the 
possible connection between events in the narrative and events that occurred in Indian 
Country just a year before. Where Thom exhorts young Indians to endeavor to find ways 
to combat poverty without losing ties to Indian culture, Momaday outlines a possible 
course of action.  
 
The role of traditional crafts in Navajo culture and economy 
 To understand how economic functional integration through art operates in Owl in 
the Cedar Tree, some context into how traditional crafts operate cosmologically and 
aesthetically, in the text and in Navajo culture, is necessary.19 Haske’s parents subsist on 
weaving and silverwork, two of the most common crafts in Navajo communities. Erika 
Bsumek notes that the act of weaving itself, in particular, holds important cosmological 
significance for craftspeople and their Navajo consumers in addition to yielding a 
finished product that can be sold. She writes that Spider Woman, one of the Navajos’ 
Holy People, taught women to weave as a means to ensure their survival. Gladys 
Reichard adds that Spider Woman built the women a loom and instructed them to hold 
beautiful thoughts as they weave in order to distribute cosmological beauty to the world. 
Bsumek further notes that the practice of weaving spread among Navajo women as 
women began teaching one another the craft, emulating Spider Woman’s generosity 
among themselves. Weaving, then, is not only a practice that Navajo artisans undertake to 
create items that can keep them warm and also be sold for income, but it is also a way of 
connecting to their past and recognizing their place in tribal cosmology. Like weaving, 
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silversmithing also is a medium through which Navajo artisans express culture and live 
out cosmological obligations such as the sharing of hozho, or beauty. Hozho, as Gary 
Witherspoon notes, is a “unity of experience” on which Navajo life in based in which 
artisans seek to express themselves spiritually and intellectually through the creation of 
their crafts (151). Given the role of crafts in Navajo cosmology, it is evident that the work 
that Haske’s family undertakes is imbued with spiritual significance and obligation that 
extend beyond securing an income. 
 However, while traditional crafts historically have held cosmological significance 
for Navajos and provided Navajo artisans a source of income, for Euroamerican 
consumers, Navajo rugs, jewelry and pottery often served more superficial purposes that, 
in the end, ultimately consigned the tribal craftsmen to further marginalization. For the 
non-Indian consumer, Navajo crafts and their production frequently – and quite 
paradoxically – allowed white Americans who were disenchanted with the trappings of 
urban life to reject modernization in favor of what they romanticized as Navajos’ simpler, 
more pristine life, all the while simultaneously allowing them to feel as if they were more 
“evolved” than the craftspeople whose works they purchased for their homes.  
One effect that white consumption of tribal crafts had on Navajos was that the 
wares themselves and the methods of production allowed white buyers to cast Navajos as 
“primitives” who they imagined occupied a simpler, ostensibly better, time. Leah 
Dilworth notes that at a time when society was becoming more urbanized and 
mechanized,20 many white travelers to the American Southwest saw in Navajo products 
evidence that their creators had an organic, tangible connection to nature. She writes:  
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Primitive cultures were authentic, primitivist reasoning went, because primitive 
 people  enjoyed a relatively unmediated relationship with the ultimate reality of 
 nature and the  universe. Whereas the civilized mind was capable of mental 
 abstraction (as well as alienation and neurosis), Indians were understood to have a 
 more direct – a literally hands-on – relationship with the world. (151) 
As Dilworth mentions, the idea that Navajo crafts signified – that their creators were in 
tune with the land in a way their consumers were not – was as much appealing to 
prospective buyers as the items themselves.21 Dealers and traders of Navajo wares 
capitalized on this notion by trading on false dichotomies between Navajos and 
“Americans” such as “frontier and civilization, primitive and modern, Indian and white, 
and handmade and machine made” (Bsumek 111).22 Indeed, art dealers made the 
production of the crafts part of the experience of owning Navajo items. Dealers often 
retained Navajo artisans in their shops and had them work on-site, often in a room 
decorated to reflect stereotypical “primitive” dwellings, as a way to re-inscribe the idea 
that buyers were purchasing items made by people who were denizens of a lost era. 
Bsumek notes that the conditions of several of these working arrangements mirror those 
of modern-day “sweat shops,” with Navajo artisans earning .28 cents an hour.23 The 
conditions in some shops were so atrocious, Oliver LaFarge stated that Navajos 
“work[ed] as if the devil himself were standing over them” (qtd. in Bsumek 35).  
Nonetheless, the image of “primitives” at work was so powerful – and profitable – 
that dealers and consumers even rejected some Navajos’ use of “non-traditional” tools 
like blowtorches and even scissors. Bsumek notes that writers such as Mary Austin, 
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Mabel Dodge Luhan, Elizabeth De Huff and D.H. Lawrence railed against Navajos’ use 
of modern tools, contending that expensive, hand-made Navajo crafts were a status 
symbol for art buyers.24 The narrative of production, often fetishized, indeed contributed 
to the value of the piece and was part of the thrill of acquiring it. For example, of Navajo 
silversmiths, Charles Lummis25 wrote in 1896: “Some of these men, absolutely untutored 
except by tradition, almost without faculties, show remarkable taste and skill. A little 
mud forge, a hammer, a simple punch, a three-cornered file, a stone or a bit of iron for an 
anvil, a little clay for a crucible and some solder, and brains – and there is your aboriginal 
smith” (58). The methods of production, however, also reinstated white consumers’ belief 
that they were further “evolved” than Indians. Note, for instance, Lummis’ 
condescending inclusion of “brains” in the list of tools that Navajo silversmiths use in 
their craft as well as his assertion that they work “almost without faculties.” Because 
Indians worked with their hands and not their heads, the thinking went,26 the creative 
process was more evident and natural, a trait that white consumers felt they lacked in 
their urbanized spaces.  
This belief that Navajos’ lives as “primitives” were more natural than their own 
appealed to white consumers at a time, especially after World War II, when material 
abundance and consumerism had increased.27 Consumers who exotified tribal life often 
contended with existential, albeit shallow, questions in their own postwar urban lives. 
David Shi argues that despite the everyday comforts that some postwar Americans 
experienced (and I would further specify those individuals who could afford to travel to 
the Southwest), several of these would-be naturalists felt their consumer lives were 
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empty. He writes: “Those caught up in the glow of unprecedented national abundance 
also frequently ignored the social, psychic, and environmental costs of rapid urban-
industrial growth. Could a society be defined by its goods? Could the individual and the 
national character really find meaning in plastics, chrome, and neon?” (250). The solution 
to this imagined artifice of postwar American life, according to some consumers of 
Navajo art at the time, was to procure art made by “primitive” hands out of natural 
materials that they felt would connect them to their more natural, national roots. Navajo 
goods also allowed white consumers to simultaneously assuage their postwar ennui while 
also eliding the violent history between Americans and Indians. Erik Trump, for example, 
argues that consumer habits tended to be appropriative in that part of the pleasure of 
attaining Navajo rugs, pot and jewelry was that their white owners could enjoy them 
without guilt. Trump writes: “[T]he Indian arts appealed to white Americans’ concerns 
about labor, modernity, and lost values: Modern America’s ills might be cured by 
contemplating lessons from the primitive past. Such images erased historical conflict and 
ignored present political realities” (160). And while the politics of white consumption of 
Navajo goods might have enlivened modern artifice and let consumers partake in Navajo 
culture on their own ahistorical terms, it also allowed consumers to experience “contact” 
while remaining secure in their positions of privilege. As Bsumek observes, for example: 
“Navajo rugs became emblematic of contact, however distanced it might have been, with 
a uniquely American and supposedly primitive society” (91). The distance Bsumek 
mentions is crucial in understanding non-Indian consumption of Navajo goods because 
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while disenchanted postwar Americans wanted their idea of “primitive” Navajo life, they 
didn’t exactly want to internalize it in their own lives.  
This American desire to straddle the divide between white notions of “savage” 
and “civilized” has a long history in the nation’s literature and national culture.28 Henry 
David Thoreau, for example, describes in Walden (1854) the need for Americans to 
periodically step away from “civilization,” but to always remain tethered to it. He advises 
that the man who can best steel himself against the ennui of urban American life is one 
who “combine[s] the hardiness of the savages with the intellectualness of the civilized 
man” (114). Shi adds that the “simple life” in the American national imaginary, such as 
that expressed by Thoreau and sought by urban whites, operated as a fulcrum between 
notions of savagery and civilization on which American men, especially, strived to 
balance. He writes: “Ideally, then, the simple life could best be led not in the wild or in 
the city. . . . Periodic excursions into the wilderness would provide necessary raw 
materials for the soul, and civilization would provide necessary finished products. Total 
immersion in either, however, was dangerous” (148). White consumption of Navajo 
wares often exemplified this dual characteristic of American men in the Modern and 
post-WWII eras to want to connect with an imagined rugged, natural past but remain 
fully ensconced in the comforts of mainstream, bourgeois society. Bsumek argues that 
non-Indians’ possession of Navajo goods in their urban American homes served as 
“proof” of the owner’s contact with a supposedly less mechanized, urbanized world. But 
because that contact was always brief, possession of Navajo crafts also reminded non-
Indian buyers of their imagined higher standing in the hierarchy of social evolution. She 
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writes: “Handmade, preindustrial, frontier, or seemingly ‘primitive’ goods reminded 
contemporary buyers that they had evolved from producers to consumers of handmade 
wares, fortifying popular beliefs about work, progress, and civilization” (117). So while 
the production of traditional Navajo crafts functions in part as an embodiment of tribal 
cosmology for their creators, such as Haske’s parents, for non-Indian consumers, the 
crafts are often tokens of a “primitive” American past that they imagine they’ve evolved 
beyond, further crystallizing the image of Navajos in the amber of arrested evolution.  
 
‘the sheep is our mother’: Sheep in Navajo cosmology and economy 
The proliferation of Navajo crafting increased during the aftermath of one of the 
most devastating economic downturns the Navajos experienced – the decimation of 
Navajo sheep herds as part of a federal livestock-reduction program of the 1930s. The 
massive loss of sheep and goats led to a greater dependence on wage labor, often in the 
form of craft-making. Though several Navajos had already been earning a living through 
wage labor by working on the railroad29 and in coal mines,30 the immediate decline in the 
traditional shepherding economy resulted in more widespread poverty in Navajo 
communities. Steve Pavlik, for example, writes that economic shift occurred “quickly and 
dramatically” and that “the shift to a wage economy now meant the existence of 
unemployment and poverty, concepts unknown in traditional Navajo society” (193). 
Indeed, poverty and unemployment were only two resulting factors of the forced 
livestock reduction program that engendered further mistrust and resentment of the 
federal government on the part of the Navajo Nation. 
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Shepherding has a long history as a viable economic vocation that also functions 
culturally in some Navajo communities. Edward Spicer argues that Navajos likely 
learned the practice from neighboring Pueblo nations, who themselves adopted 
shepherding from the Spanish. Regardless of the origin of sheep in Navajo culture, 
Navajos integrated the animal into their epistemologies of family. Peter Iverson 
demonstrates this integration by citing Percy Deal (Navajo) who said: “‘My mother 
taught us that the sheep is our mother. They will care for you’” and that another Navajo 
person, from an older generation, who he interviewed said: “‘Dibé wolyéii nimá át’é; 
dibé iiná niliínii át’é’ (“Those called sheep are your mother; sheep are life”)” (qtd. in 
Iverson 23). This connection between sheep and motherhood in Navajo epistemology, 
Gary Witherspoon observes, reflects the security and life-giving qualities that 
shepherding provides Navajo families. He writes: “The central symbol of Navajo 
organization is motherhood. . . . It is not surprising, therefore, that the Navajo[s] find a 
conceptual relationship between sheep and motherhood” (1442). Now that Navajos have 
an even more diverse economy, livestock might make only a nominal contribution to a 
family’s overall income. Nonetheless, Colleen O’Neill contends that, “Navajos still 
invest them (sheep) with emotional and spiritual significance,” and she adds that one of 
her Navajo interviewees said straightforwardly: “‘the sheep are our culture’” (39). 
Needless to say, forced livestock reduction was emotionally devastating over the long 
term and economically crippling in the immediate time after. 
The livestock-reduction program was conceived of and carried out by John 
Collier,31 Commissioner of Indian Affairs who later drafted the provisions of the Indian 
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Reorganization Act (1934). Collier sought to reduce the number of sheep on Navajo land 
on the premise that the animals were overgrazing and actually harming the Navajo 
economy. Scholars such as Iverson and Lawrence C. Kelly, however, argue that the 
federal government and local white ranchers have had a long interest in Navajo sheep, 
usually to satisfy their own financial agendas. Kelly mentions, for example, that the 
federal government sought to profit from scientifically crossbreeding Navajo sheep with 
other varieties of sheep.32 Iverson also argues for the existence of a double standard with 
regard to Navajos and their herds in which, in his words, they were “damned if they did, 
damned if they didn’t” when it came to how they managed their livestock. He writes: 
“Had they reduced their livestock holdings substantially they would have been criticized 
for not being sufficiently productive. On the other hand, by obtaining maximum yield 
from their land, they were charged with overgrazing their livestock” (101).33 Here, we see 
how non-Navajos’ attitudes toward Navajo livestock management put Navajo shepherds 
in a quandary. However, even some Navajos at the time recognized the long-term 
benefits of the livestock-reduction program, but were nonetheless appalled at how the 
program was administered. Tom Dodge (Navajo) observed land erosion in his community 
and appealed to Collier to leave the issue to Navajos to handle themselves. He stated: 
“‘We Navajos should organize in some way or other to at least stop the process of 
erosion. We ourselves should take the lead . . . We should not be driven to it by outside 
people’” (qtd. in Iverson 149). Despite Dodge’s appeal, however, Collier forged ahead 
and imposed the livestock reduction efforts on Navajo families, leading to confusion and 
resentment that would not soon subside.34 
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Much of the aforementioned resentment resulted from how Collier’s agents 
managed the actual reduction of Navajo livestock herds. Marilyn Help (Navajo) 
described the callous method by which families’ sheep, which, remember, have a familial 
role themselves, were disposed of. She recalls: “‘The government came and took the 
cattle and the sheep and they just shot them. They threw them into a pit and burned them. 
They burned the carcasses. Our people cried. My people, they cried. They thought that 
this was another Hwééldi, Long Walk35’” (qtd. in Iverson 153). Likewise, Howard 
Gorman (Navajo) reflected on the long resentment that resulted from the program. He 
states: “‘The cruel way our stock is handled was something that never should have 
happened. . . . What John Collier did in livestock reduction is something the people will 
never forget’” (qtd. in Iverson 153). In addition to the cruel way that agents handled 
Navajo families’ sheep, the economic devastation was equally unforgiveable. Edward T. 
Hall36 notes that the bureaucrats who drafted the livestock-reduction program, which also 
included a nominal payout to Navajo shepherds for their terminated livestock, failed to 
consider the different ways Navajos and whites viewed sheep. He writes: “Sheep and 
money were not interchangeable. Sheep were not a commodity as they were for us. Each 
sheep was known individually. Any Navajo with a herd could tell you how many lambs 
each ewe had dropped and could identify every lamb’s mother” (131). Hall’s insight 
illuminates the disconnect between Navajo ranchers and their white counterparts 
regarding the role of sheep in Navajo communities. However, a statement made by Henry 
Tailman (Navajo) in 1934, in which he pleaded with the federal government against the 
livestock-reduction program, puts the economic effects of the program into startling 
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perspective. He stated: “‘Without livestock we cannot be individuals. . . . With livestock 
we can make a living under the most adverse circumstances’” (qtd. in Iverson 150-51). In 
short, in addition to income and security, sheep provided Navajos autonomy and an 
economy that operated on their terms. With a growing reliance on wage labor and craft-
making for tourists in the aftermath of forced livestock reduction, Navajos would have to 
devise ways to integrate economically in a manner to not only secure income but also to 
reassert tribal autonomy. 
 
Recasting tradition in the narration of critical tribal nationhood 
 Considering both Thom’s charge and that Owl in the Cedar Tree was published a 
year later gives insight into the economic climate of the day and allows readers to 
imagine alternatives to staying statically chained to tradition and to think instead of how 
Momaday’s novel can be an empowering assertion of tribal identity, even if it means 
adapting to the demands of the time. Momaday opens the novel with an image of Haske’s 
family working tirelessly in traditional agriculture and crafts for little money. She writes: 
 During the long winter months food was scarce. There were no prickly pears on 
 the desert and no fat pine nuts in the mountains. All of the stored corn was used 
 up long before the winter was over. In winter, more than any other time, they all 
 looked to Riding Woman, the mother. The sheep belonged to her, and she used 
 the wool to weave into rugs. These she sold or traded for food and clothing at the 
 Trading Post. It took weeks, sometimes months, to weave a rug. She worked very 
 hard, but each winter there was little food. Often the family went hungry. (6-8) 
 152 
Momaday adds that Night Singer, Haske’s father, finds periodic work as a silversmith 
when he can afford materials, and he spends much of his time hauling wood and water 
from afar. I quote this passage at length because it demonstrates that both Haske’s mother 
and father work in traditional roles, but are often barely able to scrape by during the 
freezing winters. While Momaday paints a bleak picture of Haske’s home life, it is 
important to note that she indicates that Haske loves his family and wouldn’t trade his 
family for a supposed better life. She ends a chapter that describes the family’s poverty in 
depth with the line: “Haske would not have traded his home for any other in all the 
world” (Momaday 9). This line might well be the most important in the chapter. Just as 
Thom, in his speech at the AICCP, admonishes some young Indians for leaving home and 
not helping kin when needed,37 Momaday points out that the hard toil and immense 
poverty notwithstanding, Haske loves his family. Haske does not make plans to one day 
leave the Navajo Nation and leave his family in a tedious loop of seasonal labor with 
little hope of financial wellbeing. By interpreting Haske’s upcoming actions through a 
lens of his love for his family, it becomes clear that Haske is not trying to choose one 
path at the expense of some of his family members, but rather he seeks a path that allows 
him to honor tradition while integrating himself into the economy and supporting the 
family he loves. 
 To establish the scenario in which Haske seemingly must choose a path of 
tradition or one of assimilation, Momaday, on the surface, appears to cast Old 
Grandfather and Haske’s parents as polar opposites. She also sets the stage for a possible 
critique of some of the traditional practices in Haske’s community, which highlights the 
 153 
rigidity and potential danger that uncritically following tradition can impose. By 
demonstrating how some traditions negatively impact individuals, Momaday asserts the 
need to periodically examine the efficacy of following tradition in the context of 
contemporary needs and the tangible outcomes of adhering to tradition. While she and 
Thomas both argue for reconciling to the tribal body through tradition and other cultural 
practices, Momaday differs from Thomas’ approach in that she argues that sometimes 
tradition should be altered or discarded to ensure tribal efficacy, and she does not 
necessarily value following tradition simply for tradition’s sake.38  
 One point in the novel where Momaday calls tradition into question is when she 
depicts Old Grandfather’s life as a pariah as a result of his community’s insistence on a 
particular tradition that ostracizes him. Momaday writes:  
 Haske saw a tin cup tied to the old man’s belt. It was for water when he became 
 thirsty . . . It was the only piece of property the old man had. His relatives gave 
 him cast-off clothing once in a while, but he did not feel like the clothing was 
 really his own. Haske was very sorry for his Old Grandfather. Some of his 
 relatives did not treat the old man kindly. They were afraid that he might die in 
 their hogan. They believed that when a person dies in a hogan it must be burned 
 . . . He understood how many of his relatives felt, and he did not want to cause 
 them any trouble. So he wandered around most of the time. (19) 
In this passage, Momaday depicts the end result of adhering to some traditions. Whether 
the spiritual belief that informs this tradition and the outcome are real is not a point of 
argument. Such matters of faith can neither be proved nor disproved. However, we can 
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objectively quantify the end result of Old Grandfather’s choice to follow this particular 
worldview: an elderly man, who we later learn was once a warrior, is forced to wander 
alone, rejected by his family with nothing but a tin cup to his name.  
Of particular interest in this section is that Old Grandfather chooses to wander 
because he feels he will burden his loved ones. Old Grandfather, however, does have the 
option of living with his son because Night Singer does not believe in what he considers a 
superstition, having abandoned the idea at boarding school. Momaday writes: “Night 
Singer and Riding Woman did not believe in this old custom. They had each attended a 
Government Boarding School when they were young and had lived away from their 
people. . . . They knew that much of their way of life was good, and they were proud of 
being Navaho. But they would not hold to the old superstitions” (20). Here, it is apparent 
that the dynamic between Old Grandfather and Haske’s parents where tradition is 
concerned is much more nuanced than a simplistic traditional-versus-progressive binary 
provides latitude for. Haske’s parents do not reject their Navajo community or identity 
outright nor does Old Grandfather necessarily stand for a valorized adherence to the old 
ways. Momaday shows that following tradition can be threatening in some circumstances 
and that, like Haske’s parents, it is possible – necessary even – to practice tradition in a 
way that ensures communal continuity.  
Specifically, Momaday shows how one can rework tradition to integrate 
economically and build tribal autonomy outside the confines of a colonizer state. This 
reworking of tribal tradition to assert oneself as Indian in a time of a federal narrative of 
Indian erasure, written through economic pressure, is perhaps most apparent in Owl in the 
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Cedar Tree in the passages that detail Haske’s growth as an artist. In these areas of the 
novel, Momaday maps out Haske’s artistic trajectory from his desire to become a 
traditional Navajo sand painter to his developing interest and talent in European-style 
painting. Beneath the surface of this transition, though not necessarily explicit, is the 
economic element and the possibility of imagining oneself as Navajo outside of the 
model of a paternalistic colonizer state through achieving economic autonomy. Such an 
interpretation has the power to reclaim Owl in the Cedar Tree, a Cherokee novel, from its 
previous handlings as a story of tradition against assimilation and to recognize it as a 
narrative of resistance and critical nationhood that demonstrates how one can still be 
Indian when a settler state aims to erase the narrative by fighting the economic pressure 
to assimilate and redoubling efforts to stay Indian.  
One way Haske seeks to reconcile himself to his Navajo roots is by inquiring of 
his grandfather how to become a sand painter. Haske visits Old Grandfather and reveals 
his plan to learn to become a sand painter, and Old Grandfather tells him he must reject 
his white schooling and learn traditional practices only. Momaday writes: “To become a 
sand painter, you must become a singer. This will require many years of study in the 
Navajo religion and medicine. You will have to live and work with one who knows these 
things” (69). Haske tells Old Grandfather that when school ends for the summer he will 
spend the time off learning traditional ways in his endeavor to become a sand painter. Old 
Grandfather then asserts that Haske can only choose one path. He says: “‘My grandson, 
you will have to give up the white man’s school. You cannot follow the two trails at the 
same time. The Indian trail goes one way. The white man’s trail goes another. You will 
 156 
have to decide which of the two ways to follow.’ The words trouble Haske deeply” 
(Momaday 69). That Old Grandfather’s conception of following the old ways includes 
Haske’s becoming a sand painter cannot be overlooked. Nancy J. Parezo contends that 
working as a sand painter has historically allowed Navajos to stay close to home and 
gives artists a medium through which to practice and maintain tradition. She writes:  
Sandpainting also allows many people to remain with relatives and friends in the 
 area where they grew up and not have to compete in the Anglo-dominated world 
 by themselves. . . . Sandpainters felt it an advantage not to have to face the 
 hardships, discrimination, and lack of respect for their cultural values which 
 living within Anglo communities often seems to entail. (147) 
Adding to his charge that Haske must follow traditional ways, including working as a 
sand painter, Old Grandfather later admonishes Haske for failing to choose only the old 
ways and says he has offended the Navajo gods, rendering much guilt in Haske. 
Momaday writes:  
 ‘My grandson, you do not know what’s best. You hear my words, but there is fear 
 in your heart. The white man’s teaching is making you sick. Already it has power 
 over you. It is a bad thing to mock the gods. Navaho gods are powerful and will 
 send evil to those who turn from them. When you choose the white man’s trail, 
 you offend the Navaho gods.’ (77) 
Old Grandfather advises Haske to go to the mountains and fast for four days to discover 
what he should do. When Haske tells his parents that he’ll miss four days of school, they 
insist that he attend school and not trouble himself with Old Grandfather’s exhortation. 
 157 
Night Singer assures a frightened Haske that he has not offended the gods and tells him to 
go to school to be able to learn about and strategically engage the changing world. 
Momaday writes: “You must go to school every day and learn the new ways. The world 
is changing fast and we must change with it. Haske felt that a rope was being tied to 
either arm and that he was being pulled both ways at once” (82). Later, at dinner, and 
after Old Grandfather has left the hogan, Riding Woman tells Haske that his future is 
more nuanced than choosing a right or wrong way. Specifically, she tells him:  
 ‘My son, you have made an anthill look like a mountain. You have worried about 
 which trail to follow. There is only one trail. You have come to believe that some 
 things are all good and some things are all bad. This is not true . . . There is only 
 one trail’ she continued. ‘Follow it and keep the best of the old ways while 
 learning the best of the new ways.’ (84)  
In these passages, Momaday frees Haske from the simplistic binary of retaining tradition 
or succumbing to assimilation and later demonstrates how Haske, through art, is able to 
begin to reconcile both extremes and find his place in his community while also earning 
money for them.  
 
Haske’s functional integration through education 
Momaday, herself a teacher, shows that the schools, especially those run under 
the auspices of the tribe like Momaday’s, do not necessarily have to be a site of 
assimilation, but rather can offer students tools to assert their tribal identity and ties while 
still negotiating a changing world.39 One way she displays this dynamic is through 
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Haske’s development as an artist. In the following passage, Momaday describes the 
fervor with which Haske paints images from a story he remembered Old Grandfather 
telling him about a war with Kiowas and Comanches. Momaday writes:  
Thoughtfully he began to sketch the things he remembered. It was as if he and 
 Old Grandfather were on the mountain. Together they fought the Kiowas and 
 Comanches and chased them off the high bluff. His pencil recorded the details of 
 the battle. When the picture was finished, Haske knew it was the best work he had 
 ever done. (86-87)  
Here, Haske exemplifies the idea of incorporating traditional tribal cultural elements, in 
this case his grandfather’s story, and elements of mainstream Euroamerican culture, in 
this case painting on paper in art class at school. Haske eventually learns to paint at 
school and appropriates what is described in the novel as a non-Native medium as a way 
to record one of Old Grandfather’s stories. In addition to Haske’s taking up a 
Euroamerican medium to express his family’s story, the story itself, which before was 
passed down orally, is now recorded, ensuring the story remains even after Old 
Grandfather is gone. Even while alive Old Grandfather frequently forgot the stories. One 
could read Haske’s relinquishing his dream of becoming a sand painter and taking up 
Euroamerican-style painting as a form of assimilation, artistically speaking, but such a 
reading accounts for only half of the equation – the medium. Indians throughout history 
have recorded their stories in various European-derived media such as sermons, letters 
and political tracts since the 1600s,40 and more contemporary artistic media such as 
painting,41 sculpture,42 photography,43 and animation.44 To argue that Haske’s use of a 
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European-derived medium is a form of assimilation would be like saying his art would 
only be truly Indian if it were scratched in the side of a rock. Though the aforementioned 
media might have originated in Europe, Indians have appropriated them and used them 
artistically, legally and politically to ensure their survival against the onslaught of 
European settlement for centuries.45 In an era when the federal government was 
aggressively pursuing an assimilationist angle in its Indian policy, Momaday 
demonstrates through Haske how Indians can use European-derived media to create a 
record of their stories and traditions, a record that can last and be rediscovered by 
subsequent generations who can then re-tell the story should the story ever be suppressed 
or forgotten. Far from assimilation, Haske’s incorporation of Euroamerican art is an 
adaptive strategy that he can use to reconcile his place as Navajo by his being able to 
record and re-tell Navajo stories, and it is a form of resistance in that Haske creates what 
could be a permanent record of the story in a social and political environment that seeks 
to make communities such as his forget.  
 
Haske’s art as economic integration 
Another way to read Haske’s adoption of a European-derived medium to record 
tribal history is through an economic lens in the context of the poverty his family 
struggles with, and the real poverty that afflicts parts of Indian Country today that Thom 
speaks of. By reading Haske’s use of European-derived art as an adaptive strategy 
economically, we can see another form of McNickle’s functional integration that helps to 
break the economic stranglehold the federal government imposed on Indian communities 
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as a way to force tribal dismantling as seen in Thomas’ narrative of the Redbird Smith 
Movement. Where Thomas advocates a cultural separatist strategy to develop economic 
independence, Momaday demonstrates how integration on Indian terms can also lead to 
economic independence without necessarily compromising ties to land, family and 
culture.  
Momaday begins to demonstrate these economic possibilities in the exchange 
between Haske and his teacher, Miss Smith, over Haske’s painting. Haske gives his 
painting to Miss Smith as a Christmas present and, unbeknownst to Haske, Miss Smith 
enters his painting in a contest. She later travels to Haske’s family’s hogan to deliver the 
news about the contest. Miss Smith tells Haske:  
‘Do you remember the painting which you gave me for Christmas? It is because 
 of that painting that I came today. A friend of mine works in a museum in New 
 York. Each year in late spring the museum has an exhibit of children’s paintings. 
 The paintings are judged, the best one is given a prize of one hundred dollars . . . 
 Haske your painting won the prize!’ (104) 
Miss Smith assures Haske that she did not give away his painting and that he’ll have it 
back soon. She then asks Haske to recount the story depicted in the painting, which he is 
able to do with great detail. Miss Smith then suggests that Haske paint pictures of all of 
Old Grandfather’s stories. In this moment, Haske finally realizes that he can use a 
European-derived medium/tradition to record and celebrate Navajo tradition. Momaday 
writes: “Haske thought, ‘Now I can keep the old ways which Old Grandfather loved so 
much by painting all those things he told me about. They will never change. That is better 
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than being a sand painter’” (106). Here Momaday demonstrates that not only is Haske 
able to discover a way to use non-Navajo means, of which he is shown to possess a deft 
talent, to participate tribally and pass on stories, but he is also able to use that skill to earn 
money. Granted, he only earns $100 in an art contest,46 but we can read this scene as a 
microcosm of larger economic possibilities and an affirmation of the possibility to 
integrate tradition with European culture for the economic benefit of the tribe and, 
ultimately, the continual thriving of the tribal culture and identity outside the machination 
of a colonizer state. 
 
Integrating while maintaining tribal lifeways 
To elaborate on the above reading, it is helpful to consider the history of how 
Indians in the 1960s, as they always have since European contact, found ways to maintain 
their cultural and communal cores of what it is to be Indian in a tribal-specific context 
while also incorporating element from their European neighbors on tribal terms. 
Furthermore, to view Haske’s choice to use European-style art to record and tell tribal 
stories as potential for economic independence on a larger scale, it is necessary to 
examine ways that tribal communities have – and continue to – engage with 
Euroamerican culture for the purpose of economic development but in a way that 
maintains and promotes tribal integrity. Reading the exchange between Haske and Miss 
Smith with these ideas in mind helps to establish Momaday’s narrative as more than a 
young-adult story of tradition against assimilation. It becomes a narrative of the 
possibility of simply reconciling oneself as a tribal individual amid the pressure to 
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acculturate and to resist that pressure using tribally-based strategies, leading to re-
imagined nationhood.  
One way to examine Haske’s exchange on a cultural level is through McNickle’s 
work on tribalism. In Native American Tribalism, McNickle details how Indians of the 
1960s and 1970s forged intertribal connections and alliances, but it also describes how 
Indian identity has always been mutable but still Indian, changing as necessary. Such 
analysis undermines the static either/or misconceptions of Indian identity that mainstream 
U.S. takes for granted as true, believing that if an Indian deviates even a millimeter from 
the confines of preconceived, poorly informed stereotypes of “Indianness,” he is no 
longer truly Indian. This either/or binary is not confined to non-Natives. Haske’s 
grandfather throughout the narrative has a vision of how Navajos should live based on the 
experience of his own generation. Haske’s parents and Miss Smith, however, give Haske 
space to find his own way to be Navajo in the context of his generation and his 
community’s current needs. Ideas such as these are articulated throughout McNickle’s 
work. McNickle cites from a talk given by Thomas in 1961 at the American Indian 
Chicago Conference in which Thomas outlines how Indian communities, even if they 
have an outward appearance that looks European, are still Indian if they preserve their 
tribal core values. Thomas argues: 
After ‘long, intensive contact with Euro-American society, the common 
 acculturation pattern is for these small societies to take over, possibly, a great 
 many Euro-American traits and institutions, but to fit them into a context of the 
 older covert Indian patterns of life. More than tentatively, one can say that 
 163 
 American Indian communities, as a whole, are distinct growing communities that 
 still preserve the core of their native style of life.’ (qtd. in McNickle 7) 
Thomas argues that as long as Indians maintain their tribal core values and lifeways, 
European traits they have appropriated are only superficial and serve as tools to negotiate 
a blended world as Indians, not as a means through which Indians can acculturate into it. 
Likewise, where outsiders might see the presence of Euroamerican traits as evidence of 
an abnegation of their Indian counterparts, the decision of which Euroamerican traits, if 
any, to integrate is calculated and made by Indian communities themselves, not 
necessarily imposed by Euroamerican intruders. McNickle writes: “Indians remain 
Indians not by refusing to accept to accept change or to adapt to a changing environment, 
but by selecting out of available choices those alternatives that do not impose and 
substitute identity” (10). Here, both Thomas and McNickle engage ideas that describe 
how amid radical change and Euroamerican encroachment, Indians can and do redefine 
themselves and maintain the integrity of the tribal core while finding ways to integrate as 
a means not of assuaging the conflict but rather of negotiating the conflict on their terms. 
While these ideas demonstrate how individuals recognize themselves as part of their 
tribal core, resistance occurs when that renewed or redefined connection to the tribal core 
becomes a catalyst for fighting further attempts of acculturation and erasure. Resistance 
historically is as much psychological as it is tangible.47 Successful resistance to 
encroachment and the maintenance of Indian lifeways during Termination, then, had little 
to do with the supposed benefits of federal government programs that resulted in federal 
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constructs of tribal nationhood, showing that Indian identity and culture can persist 
outside the purview of the federal government. McNickle elaborates:  
 Resistance went deeper. It had to do with psychological readiness and the realities 
 of the inner life which Indians share among themselves . . . This was one of the 
 realities of Indian existence. It had nothing to do with government subsidies or 
 government control over tribal resources. The termination of trusteeship would 
 add to the difficulties of maintaining a community intact . . . but the reality would 
 continue to influence response. (113-14) 
Through McNickle’s recounting of the history of how Indians resisted psychologically, 
we can read Haske’s decision to learn Euroamerican art in a U.S. government school 
simply as his learning another way to share Navajo stories. Contrary to his grandfather’s 
predictions, Haske’s passion for Euroamerican-style painting actually serves to augment 
Haske’s position as Navajo and secures for him a potential role as a Navajo storyteller, in 
essence showing how Haske ultimately appropriates the “white school” – a historic tool 
of “civilization” and Indian erasure – and finds a way to grow as an artist and as a 
Navajo.  
 
Economic independence and sovereignty outside the federally-recognized state 
While Indians have historically integrated and resisted culturally to combat 
colonization, the cultural element is only half of the analysis. As Haske finds a way to 
participate further as a Navajo through his art, the fact that his art earns him money, 
however little at first, necessitates an analysis that engages the economic elements at play 
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in the novel. Considering too that economic pressure replaced bullets and bayonets 
during the Termination and Relocation era, to fully understand how Haske’s art could be 
read as a form of tribal resistance it is necessary to consider the role of economics in 
tribal life. Several scholars such as Taiaiake Alfred (Mohawk) have argued that for 
Indians to truly be sovereign, they must first possess, among other things, economic 
independence. Dean Howard Smith (Mohawk) has argued likewise that economic 
development with cultural integrity at the forefront is the key to furthering tribal 
sovereignty and self-determination. He writes: 
Only when the individual tribe has control of its resources and sustains its identity 
 as a distinct civilization does economic development make sense. A common 
 misconception sees conflict between maintaining a tribe’s cultural heritage and 
 pursuing increased economic activity on the reservation. However, . . . economic 
 development increases the potential for strengthening and developing tribal 
 culture. (2) 
Smith highlights U.S. Indian policy from one of maintaining peace under Ulysses S. 
Grant, to violence under the likes of Andrew Jackson, followed by “civilizing” efforts to 
the framework that was revisited in the 1950s – the Melting Pot.48 While the United 
States has sought to assimilate immigrants and Indians to uphold the idea of the 
American Dream, what truly makes the nation successful economically is the 
multicultural presence. Smith explains that some Texan families still speak German and 
make traditional German breads and sausages, and he notes the number of Chinatowns in 
the country.  Like Europeans and Asian groups that have immigrated to the United States, 
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Indian communities, Smith argues, must also be allowed to be distinct, not absorbed into 
the mainstream idea of “American.” He adds that much of the foundation of what is 
considered “American” today has its roots in tribal communities and practices. He 
argues:  
 Native American cultures . . . made positive transitions of technology and crops to 
 early European invaders, and the Constitution is based on a Native American 
 form of government. Without Benjamin Franklin’s recognition of the power of 
 separate states (based on the Iroquois Confederacy), the United States would not 
 have succeeded. (61)  
In his book Modern Tribal Development: Paths to Self-Sufficiency and Cultural Integrity 
in Indian Country (2000), Smith outlines a plan for how Indians can develop economic 
resources and break from a dependence on the colonizer state. He does add that economic 
development must be grounded in aims to uphold cultural integrity, otherwise “economic 
development” just becomes a synonym for consumerism. Economic development based 
on tribal values and practice ultimately leads to greater tribal participation while helping 
tribal communities to be competitive in a global market. Considering Smith’s theory, 
Haske’s engagement with the American museum and his willingness to paint more of his 
grandfather’s stories, coupled with his ability to earn money off of his talent, can be read 
as a way that Haske can start earning income that does not compromise his being Navajo 
but rather strengthens it.  
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The Seminoles as a case study for understanding Owl in the Cedar Tree 
 Outside the text we see how tribal economic development frees tribal 
communities to participate more fully in traditional cultural practices. One nation that has 
had much success with a variety of economic ventures and that has experienced much 
cultural revitalization is the Florida Seminoles.49 Jessica Cattelino researched how 
economic development in the Florida Seminole nation has spurred a growth in Seminoles 
taking up cultural practices they had previously set aside because they had to work in 
wage labor. She also discusses how profits have been invested in a Seminole museum 
and language programs among others. I engage Cattelino’s work here to point out only 
one of several real-world examples of how economic development has facilitated cultural 
growth after centuries of the federal government trying to undermine it. Analyzing 
Cattelino’s work alongside Owl in the Cedar Tree, then, will lend some insight into ways 
that we can read Haske’s decision to become a painter in a European style as a similar 
move toward economic freedom, though on a much smaller scale, and how his art acts a 
way for him to recognize himself as a functioning part of the tribal body. 
 Cattelino discusses Indian gaming in particular and challenges accusations by 
non-Indians that Indian gaming, and by extension any other form of economic 
development deemed “not traditional” by outsiders, leads ultimately to a breakdown of 
the tribe’s cultural core. She cites from a 1999 report by the National Gambling Impact 
Commission that reads: “‘[A] common theme among many opposed to Indian gambling 
is a concern that gambling may undermine the ‘cultural integrity’ of Indian 
communities’” (60). She adds that because poverty has become so attached to the 
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aesthetic of Indianness invented by non-Indians and disseminated in the U.S. 
imagination, outsiders conceived of tribal economic success as antithetical to Indian 
cultural authenticity, the terms of which non-Indians frequently have neither the 
hesitation nor the compunction in defining to suit their own purposes. Compounding this 
belief is another belief by several non-Indians that being Indian, like being Italian-
American for example, is simply a matter ethnicity, ignoring the political element that 
often informs Indian identity in terms of tribal citizenship and the federal government’s 
responsibility to tribal nations. Cattelino touches on the double standard at play in the 
expectation by outsiders that Indians preserve only what outsiders identify as legitimately 
“Indian,” however uninformed, in the name of maintaining an arbitrarily defined sense of 
authenticity that caters to outsiders’ cultural fetishes. While other communities in the 
U.S. are free to practice or participate culturally as much or as little as they desire and 
still be identified with the core culture, Indians are forced to tiptoe along the high wire of 
“authenticity” often based on stereotypes. To some, something as common as speaking 
English primarily or even getting an education is enough of a misstep that can have 
disastrous results on tribal sovereignty. Cattelino contends: “For American Indians, the 
question of culture is pressing, in part because their political status in practice often relies 
on maintaining cultural difference that is observable to outsiders and, more important, 
because cultural distinctiveness establishes a meaningful present and ensures a collective 
future for indigenous peoples” (63). With this idea in mind, the need of “cultural 
integrity,” defined by tribal people, alongside economic development is even more 
urgent.  
 169 
 Cattelino interviewed several Florida Seminoles who have noted how economic 
development has led to a renewal of traditional cultural practices. This renewal is 
facilitated by the fact that many Seminoles earn enough money from per capita dividends 
that they have more time to take up such activities like beading and doll making to even 
purchasing chickees, traditional housing. Richard Bowers, a Seminole from the Panther 
clan, says: “‘You have the ability and the economics to do what you want to do . . . We 
have culture classes for people who don’t know, maybe, some of the stories that we heard 
. . . Once we have the economics, I think we can get back our culture’” (63). It is 
important to note that culture does not have to depend on money. While money can 
certainly help tribal communities shift their focus to culture from worrying about finding 
wage work or paying the bills, the culture and traditions always exist. Money and cultural 
practice are not mutually exclusive, but neither is culture unilaterally dependent on the 
inflow of money.  
 In addition to partially facilitating cultural practice, responsible economic 
development can also lead to the financial independence that can make a tribal nation 
truly sovereign outside the purview of the federal government. As the Seminoles earned 
more wealth, they were able to take up more of the administrative duties of their nation 
from the BIA. Cattelino discusses this transition with Greg Maddox who headed the BIA 
Seminole Agency in 2000. Maddox explains that apart from land-trust issues and a few 
grants, the Seminoles took over administration of several social-service programs 
previously directed by the BIA such as job training, housing and education and recast 
those programs with tribal priorities in mind. He noted that the transition represented a 
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step toward true sovereignty and even caused the local BIA presence to dwindle as tribal 
power increased. As he lamented to Cattelino: “‘You kind of feel unwanted’” (Cattelino 
134). By pursuing economic development on tribal terms, either through separatism or 
integration, tribal nations are able to truly write their own path to cultural renewal and 
full sovereignty, regardless of what economic pressure might impose on them to write its 
own narrative of assimilation. 
 One way to combat the narrative of assimilation is to write one’s own narrative of 
resistance and critical nationhood. Indian expression, especially through the arts, is an 
essential vehicle through which Indians can assert their presence and values. Such art, as 
we can read in Haske’s own growth as an artist, can assert the tribal ties of the artist, 
which also establishes a boundary between those outside and those within. McNickle 
adds that such expression creates a collective sense of identity, a force to be reckoned 
with. He writes: “If the Indian race is to be destroyed, the new voices avow, the 
destroying agent will have to contend with an integrating tribal people, not with isolated 
individuals lost in anonymity” (178). Integration, both intertribally as well as with the 
dominant society, is not always at odds with maintaining tribal identity and lifeways. As 
long as the core of those values and expression is distinctly tribal, the assimilation 
imperative imposed from outside stays outside, even if traits visible on the surface seem 
to indicate otherwise. This scenario plays out at the end of Owl in the Cedar Tree after 
Haske has spent the prize money on a horse he has had his eye on for a while. Momaday 
points out how Haske’s earning money in this scene both benefits his family and does not 
undermine his sense of self as a Navajo. Haske pays $75 for the horse and offers Store 
 171 
Sitter, the Navajo trading post proprietor,50 the other $25 for a saddle and bridle. Store 
Sitter, instead, requests a painting in exchange for the saddle and bridle, giving Haske 
another opportunity to paint for a fellow Navajo and demonstrates his newfound 
acceptance as a tribal artist. Furthermore, another element in this scene that must not be 
overlooked is the fact that Haske’s art has purchase locally too. Store Sitter is willing to 
trade a painting for a saddle and bridle. Even if Miss Smith has white friends in the New 
York art scene who are interested in Haske’s work, his work, which he learned at the 
“white school,” already is economically viable in his local trade economy with or without 
Miss Smith’s friends. 
 Additionally, Haske’s work creates opportunities for him to contribute materially 
to his family and community. After Haske initially offers the prize money to his family, 
his mother mentions how having the horse will help the family. Momaday writes: “‘You 
need a horse when you herd my sheep. We first thought of this when Old Grandfather 
was hurt on the mountain. You needed a horse then’” (110).51 Momaday creates a space 
where Haske’s purchase can help his family, and she leaves the story with a focus on 
Haske as an individual proclaiming his Navajo ties. As Haske rides off on the horse, “a 
smile curved on his lips as, in time with the horse’s hoof-beats, Haske began to sing the 
Navajo Happiness Song” (Momaday 116).52 This end is key because it demonstrates how 
Haske, though superficially pulled between assimilation and tradition, chooses instead to 
integrate artistically and economically. As such, he is able to help provide for his family, 
and the story ends with him singing a Navajo song, showing the possibility for him 
integrate without assimilating and, in fact, more strongly celebrate his tribal ties.  
 172 
 As the wave of postwar American patriotism tried to splash down in Indian 
Country, Indians struggled against being pulled back in the undertow. Generations of 
legislative measures, fueled by economic pressure, to rewrite Indians as a race vanishing 
into mainstream America threatened to erase Indian culture, tradition and agency from 
the landscape, not to mention facilitated the abrogation of the federal government’s treaty 
obligations to its tribal nations. A system exists that asserts that in the absence of the 
apparatus of a federally recognized state, Indian political sovereignty becomes a fiction 
and Indian culture becomes yet one more ingredient to stir into the Melting Pot. Thomas’ 
and Momaday’s narratives demonstrate that cultural and economic separatism at times 
and integration at others can function strategically in a way that allows Indian 
communities to break from the stymying tether to the federal government and truly live 
on their own terms without the threat of erasure. In these narratives, resistance comes in 
the form of reclaiming culture and redefining economic practice, and the potential for 
narrative critical nationhood comes in the form of Cherokee voices bravely articulating 
the fact that such a break is possible.  
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1 George McKenna argues that uncritical patriotism has always been prominent as the United States 
developed, and it reached a peak after World War II before being challenged during the 1960s. He writes: 
“Of all peoples in the world, Americans have the highest expectations of their country – and the keenest 
disappointment when their expectations are not met” (260). Moreover, McKenna notes the role of pop 
culture in promoting the United States’ narcissistic patriotism, citing, for example, a film commissioned by 
the War Department starring Frank Sinatra in which the crooner breaks up a fight between a Jewish boy 
and his attackers, sits them down and explains that even American Jews are fighting “the Japs” (250). The 
film was geared toward promoting tolerance among Americans of different ethnicities and religions, 
coalescing into white, mainstream “American” identity. See McKenna The Puritan Origins of American 
Patriotism (New Haven: Yale UP, 2007). For an earlier history of the development of U.S. patriotism, see 
Cecilia Elizabeth O’Leary To Die For: The Paradox of American Patriotism (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1999).   
 
2 Congress officially ended treaty-making between the President and tribal nations through the Indian 
Appropriations Act (1871), challenging tribal nations’ status as independent sovereigns for the purpose of 
drafting new treaties. Additionally, in the cases Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock (1902) and Lone Wolf v. 
Hitchcock (1903), the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government could unilaterally withdraw from 
treaty agreements. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock (1903) was a case in which a Kiowa leader, Lone Wolf, filed suit 
against the federal government, alleging that the federal government had violated the Medicine Lodge 
Treaty (1867) and cheated tribal nations out of their land. The Medicine Lodge Treaty is a collection of 
three treaties in which the U.S. assigned several Plains nations reservations, ostensibly to “protect” them 
from white encroachment. Lone Wolf brought the case to court, arguing that the Dawes Allotment Act 
(1887) violated the treaty. The Supreme Court invoked plenary power and ruled that the federal 
government had the right to unilaterally pull out of treaty obligations with tribal nations. See Blue Clark 
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: Treaty Rights and Indian Law at the End of the Nineteenth Century (Lincoln: U of 
Nebraska P, 1999). 
 Maureen Konkle argues that the presence of treaties legitimates the idea that tribal nations are, 
in fact, real, sovereign nations. She writes: “Despite the historically prevailing view in U.S. society that 
Native governments are not really governments because Native peoples are essentially different from 
Europeans and their societies represent an earlier, primitive moment in the history of mankind, the 
existence of treaties continues to counter that prevailing view” (8). See Konkle Writing Indian Nations: 
Native Intellectual and Politics of Historiography, 1827-1863 (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 2005). 
However, as Deloria notes, the treaties themselves are only as good as their enforcement. He writes:  
“What has happened is that the federal government has stalled for so many years that it now considers 
the treaty promises obsolete and nullified by time. When we look at the problems of other tribes or 
consider almost any aspect of Indian existence, we find the same situation. Violations have been allowed 
to continue for so long that the clearly articulated rights of Indians are regarded as nullified by the change 
of conditions” (60-61). See Deloria, The Indian Affair, (1974). 
 
3 See, for example, Ruth Muskrat Bronson (Cherokee Nation), Indians Are People, Too, (1944); Ella Deloria, 
(Lakota) Speaking of Indians, (1944).  
 
4 Specifically, McNickle writes: “By mid-century most Indians of the United States and Canada had had 
extended contact with the society beyond their traditional boundaries, and this experience had been 
varied. Some adjusted to the dominant society in a positive and useful way. Others, by far the greater 
number, were satisfied with a mixed participant-observer relationship and limited their contacts to the 
traders, missionaries, teachers, government people, and casual visitors who came across their horizon. 
Even among the few who succeeded in making the transition to urban life, only rarely was the tie of 
relatedness completely and finally severed. They tended to commute between the traditional world and 
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the impersonal urban world. This was one of the realities of Indian existence” (114). See McNickle, Native 
American Tribalism: Indians Survivals and Renewals, (1973).  
5 While other tribal nations were being terminated, Cherokees at least had a façade of a tribal 
government during the Termination period. The presence of that government existed as the result of 
federal legislation, legislation that can be undone with the stroke of a pen. It’s easy to write off the 
Cherokees’ provisional government during this period. After all, Cherokees did not elect their leadership, 
and the government was not a representative one; it was a political apparatus that allowed the U.S. to 
conduct business with the Cherokees and maintain a semblance of legitimacy. Such dismissal, however, is 
premature. However limited the Cherokees’ political sovereignty was within this skeletal government, its 
existence facilitated the transition in the 1970s to the more sovereign government Cherokees have today 
in which they vote for their Principal Chief (as opposed to the federal government appointing a leader), 
write a national constitution and outline citizenship criteria. Without this provisional government to 
function as a foot in the door, so to speak, the Cherokee Nation would have been terminated after 
allotment, making the transition to the Cherokee Nation we know today much more difficult, if not 
impossible.    
6 “Survivance” is a term coined by Gerald Vizenor (White Earth Anishinaabe) that combines “survival” and 
“resistance.” For more about this concept, see Vizenor, Manifest Manners: Postindian Warriors of 
Survivance, (1994).  
 
7 While the rest of the chapters in this study examine Cherokee writers who are writing in a specifically 
Cherokee context, this chapter departs from this analytical thread by featuring a Cherokee writer who is 
writing specifically in a Navajo historical and cultural context. Though the inclusion of a Cherokee who 
writes about Navajos might appear out of place in a Cherokee-specific study, given the time in which 
Momaday is writing, this shift is apropos. First, Momaday, though Cherokee, spent very little time in 
Cherokee communities and spent the majority of her adult life with her Kiowa husband teaching in the 
Navajo Nation and Jemez Pueblo. Second, while Robert K. Thomas, in the 1950s, advocated for a return to 
Cherokee-specific epistemologies, Momaday’s narrative of integration with both the U.S. and with other 
tribal nations reflects the intertribalism that was developing in Indian Country at the time as a strategy for 
resisting U.S. narratives of assimilation and denationalization. Momaday’s novel, though not Cherokee 
specific in a cultural context, demonstrates the value of Cherokees and members of other tribal 
communities working across national and cultural boundaries, ultimately to re-narrate and reinforce tribal 
nationhood. For more on the development of intertribalism in this era, see Bradley G. Shreve and Shirley 
Hill Witt (Mohawk) Red Power Rising: The National Indian Youth Council and the Origins of Native Activism 
(Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 2011) and Troy Johnson and Paul C. Rosier Red Power: The Native American 
Civil Rights Movement (New York: Chelsea House, 2007) and Paul Chaat Smith (Comanche) and Robert 
Warrior (Osage) Like a Hurricane: The Indian Movement from Alcatraz to Wounded Knee (New York: The 
New Press, 1997). For another work of young-adult fiction that explains the value of intertribalism, see 
D’Arcy McNickle (Salish), Runner in the Sun, (1954).  
 
8 This dichotomy of traditional versus assimilated, fullbloods against mixedbloods or of “progressives and 
pullbacks,” is common in scholarship of Cherokee history and culture. Despite its ubiquity, however, this 
imagined divide between Cherokees throughout history is false. As Tom Holm (Cherokee Nation) argues, 
Cherokees have long been a diverse group in areas of racial or ethnic make-up, values and class. In one of 
the clearest, most concise essays I’ve encountered that challenges the aforementioned dichotomy, Holm 
writes: “Acculturation was not necessarily coerced. It was accepted more or less on a piecemeal basis by 
most Cherokees in the early nineteenth century. To a Cherokee in that period, whether of mixed ancestry 
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or not, being ‘civilized’ did not mean being ‘Europeanized’ or ‘Americanized.’ Being civilized to a Cherokee 
of that period was simply living according to the rule of law. Because of the intricacies of Cherokee 
kinship, the society itself remained quite egalitarian. The wealthy Cherokees, the so-called elite, 
continued to interact with their less well-off relatives and continue to contribute to the local 
communities. Despite acculturation, nearly every factor of the Cherokee group identity remained intact: 
The language was preserved; what was left of Cherokee territory was still in Cherokee hands; the elders 
passed along their unique sacred history; and the Cherokee people had formulated a religious system 
particular to themselves. In other words, civilization had not meant social disintegration, marginalization, 
or individual alienation. Again, kinship was the glue that held the Cherokees together as Cherokees” (45). 
See Holm “Politics Came First: A Reflection on Robert K. Thomas and Cherokee History” A Good Cherokee, 
A Good Anthropologist: Papers in Honor of Robert K. Thomas. Steve Pavlik, ed. (Los Angeles: American 
Indian Studies Center, 1998), 41-56. 
 
9 Scholars like Elizabeth Cook-Lynn (Crow Creek Sioux), Robert Warrior (Osage) and Craig Womack (Creek), 
among others, have challenged the canard of Indian authenticity as irrelevant to contemporary concerns 
in Indian Country. However, Joanne Barker (Lenape) notes that “authenticity,” specifically notions of 
origin, serve both tribal communities and the federal government. She writes: “I would like to suggest two 
contradictory things about the significance of Native peoples’ pursuit for the culturally authentic: (1) The 
pursuit for the authentic (original) is constructed within U.S. national narrations to further Native 
domination; and (2) there is relevance and importance in Native traditions and teachings (origin points) 
for providing other viable understandings of society, relationships, and social responsibilities” (219-220). 
Barker’s passage speaks to the challenges and realities of national narratives between the U.S. and tribal 
communities that I address throughout this study: a narrative derived by the U.S. as a way to exert 
dominance over tribal communities can be re-imagined in ways that are productive for the pursuit of 
ethical tribal nationhood. See Barker Native Acts: Law, Recognition, and Cultural Authenticity (Durham, 
NC: Duke UP, 2011). 
 
10 Paul Goble is a British writer of children’s books, mostly about American Indian stories and life, who 
immigrated to the U.S. While Goble indeed writes primarily about American Indians, he is nonetheless an 
outsider. Grant’s choice to review Momaday’s work alongside Goble’s and to challenge the narrative’s 
authenticity is problematic in that while Goble is an outsider, Momaday is Cherokee and worked 
extensively with the Navajos as a teacher in their school system.  
 
11 See Robert F. Berkhofer, The White Man’s Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the 
Present, (1979) for more about the fixed, often negative, images situated in a “primitive” past that non-
Indians frequently invoke when they imagine “real” Indians.  
 
12 As U.S. Indian policy transitioned from one of war and forced removal to one of assimilation in the late 
1800s, one apparatus through which this newfound policy was enacted was the Indian boarding school. 
Richard Pratt founded the first boarding school, Carlisle Industrial Indian School, in 1879. The schools 
were intended to strip Indian children of their tribal identities and supplant them with “American” 
identities that included English language and Christianity, and children were often forced to attend. Often 
these assimilation attempts were carried out through acts of violence and humiliation. However, though 
the atrocities imposed on Indian children in boarding schools are undeniable, in some cases the ability to 
attend school, especially if it was tribally run, provided opportunities for children to navigate the changing 
circumstances they experienced that they might not otherwise gain. In fact, in his study of boarding 
school experiences, Michael Coleman notes that some of his interviewees were resentful that their 
parents withheld them from school. Ashie Tsosie (Navajo), for example, stated: “‘If I had been permitted 
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to go to school and to have been well educated I might have been a teacher or a person sitting in an 
executive’s chair as a director. . . . I would teach my children at home along with their regular class work. I 
always will blame my father for [my] being held down in life. Many times when I go to the store or the 
Demonstration School the traders and teachers try to talk to me but I can only stand dumb because I do 
not understand them. The best I can do is just smile.’” (qtd. in Coleman 71). See Coleman American Indian 
Children at School, 1850-1930 (Jackson: U of Mississippi P, 1993). For other studies on Indian boarding 
school experiences, see David Wallace Adams Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding 
School Experience, 1875-1928 (Lawrence: U of Kansas P, 1995), esp. 95-206 and Margaret Archuleta, 
Brenda J. Child and K. Tianina Lomawaima, eds. Away from Home: American Indian Boarding School 
Experiences, 1879-2000 (Phoenix: Heard Museum, 2000) for images and excerpts from letter and 
interviews with boarding-school students.  
 
13 Robert Thomas (Cherokee), tsigesv, makes similar judgments about who is considered fully Indian or 
not, defined along lines of tradition, in some of his early work.  See Chapter 1 and Thomas, “Cherokee 
Values and World View,” (1953). Similarly, Eva Garroutte (Cherokee Nation) discusses the role that culture 
plays in evaluating Indian identity. She writes: “A cultural definition, like the other available definitions of 
Indian identity, functions to exclude at least certain claimants to Indianness. There are a variety of reasons 
why people who can easily negotiate a legitimate identity within a definition based on law or biology may 
fail to do so when measured against a cultural standard. Many of those reasons have more to do with the 
characteristics of the definition than with characteristics of the individual and groups that are its objects” 
(66). Given the complexity of Indian experience and identity, singling out tradition or any other singular 
factor as the one true marker of “real” Indianness, a problematic construct itself, is unproductive and 
ultimately irrelevant. See Garroutte Real Indians: Identity and the Survival of Native America (Berkeley: U 
of California P, 2003), Ch. 3. 
 
14 American literature too has a long history of romanticizing Indian death and absence, in essence 
arguing that American Indians have to either die or assimilate in order for the nation to continue to grow 
across the continent. Examples of American authors whose work exemplifies this problematic treatment 
of its indigenous characters include, but are by no means limited to, Lydia Maria Child, James Fenimore 
Cooper, Jack London, Herman Melville, Frank Norris and Catharine Maria Sedgwick. For an analysis of how 
these authors narrate the demise of American Indians, see James Cox Muting White Noise (Norman: U of 
Oklahoma P, 2006), especially Ch. 5. 
 
15 Owl in the Cedar Tree (1965) is Natachee Scott Momaday’s only novel. She also published a collection of 
poetry, Woodland Princess: A Book of 24 Poems (1931) and edited a collection called American Indian 
Authors (1976). 
 
16 Images of poverty are common in depictions of American Indians, so much so that Indians who are 
financially secure, even well off, are often seen as not being “real” Indians or having relinquished their 
“culture,” as if poverty is inextricable from being Indian. While poverty in tribal communities certainly 
existed at the time Momaday was writing, as it still does in many areas, my aim is to show how, despite 
popular belief, that a viable tribal economy is not evidence of lost culture or inauthenticity. For more 
about the association of Indians with poverty and on “rich Indian racism,” see Renee Ann Cramer Cash, 
Color, and Colonialism: The Politics of Tribal Acknowledgement (Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 2008). 
 
17 The Economic Opportunity Act (1964) was part of Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty that sought to 
limit poverty, improve access to education, help the elderly with health concerns and to create a social 
safety net for those who are unemployed or working poor. Inclusion of Indians under the act, however, 
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would require Indian identity to be framed in terms of an underserved race rather than political 
sovereigns. For more about the act, see G. Davis Garson, “Economic Opportunity Act of 1964,” 
<http://wps.prenhall.com/wps/media/objects/751/769950/Documents_Library/eoa1964.htm>. 
 
18 Melvin Thom (Northern Paiute) was born in 1938 and was one of the founders of the National Indian 
Youth Council, an intertribal civil rights organization focusing on the needs of American Indians. For more 
about the NIYC, see Bradley G. Shreve and Shirley Hill Witt (Mohawk) Red Power Rising: The National 
Indian Youth Council and the Origins of Native Activism (Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 2011). 
 
19 For more studies about the role and significance of Navajo crafts see Alice Kaufman and Christopher 
Selzer, eds. The Navajo Weaving Tradition, 1650 to the Present (New York: E.P. Hutton, 1985); Kate Peck 
Kent Navajo Weaving: Three Centuries of Change (Santa Fe: SAR Press, 1985); Kathy M’Closkey Swept 
Under the Rug: A Hidden History of Navajo Weaving (Albuquerque: U of New Mexico P, 2002); Robert A. 
Roessel, Jr. (Navajo) Navajo Arts and Crafts (Rough Rock, Ariz: Navajo Curriculum Center, Rough Rock 
Demonstration School, 1983); Gary Witherspoon and Glen Peterson Dynamic Symmetry and Holistic 
Asymmetry in Navajo and Western Art and Cosmology (New York: Peter Lang, 1985); Arthur Woodward 
Navajo Silver: A Brief History of Navajo Silversmithing (Flagstaff, Ariz: Northland, 1971); Paul Zolbrod and 
Roseann S. Willink Weaving a World: Textiles and the Navajo Way of Seeing (Santa Fe: Museum of New 
Mexico Press, 1996). 
 
20 While some areas of the U.S., notably New York and other northeastern states, had developed an urban 
majority by the turn of the 20th century, the U.S. as a whole did not become an urban majority until after 
WWI.   
 
21 For more on the semiotics of objects and the abstract concepts they signify, see Roland Barthes, 
Mythologies, (1957). 
 
22 While white traders used a narrative of Navajo tradition, isolation and vanishing as a marketing strategy 
to peddle their wares, in reality Navajos had long been employed in “non-traditional” jobs since the late 
1880s such as working on the railroad and in coal mines. In fact, Navajo wares often featured railroad 
scenes such as one described by anthropologist Gladys Reichard. She writes: “One blanket, for example, 
bore on its surface the evolution of transportation in the West. At its top was a pair of oxen, next two 
mules, then two automobiles and finally two aeroplanes,” and another Navajo woman wove “a fearful 
and wonderful combination of designs of a railroad scene” (153). See Reichard Weaving a Navajo Blanket 
(New York: Dover, 1974). Likewise, the isolation narrative is easily undermined when we consider, for 
example, Navajo participation in the World Wars. Several Navajos, and citizens of other tribal nations such 
as Choctaw and Comanche, served as code talkers who facilitated coded communication between the U.S. 
and Allies. See Tom Holm Code Talkers and Warriors: Native Americans and World War II (New York: 
Infobase, 2007) and Nathan Aesang Navajo Code Talkers: America’s Secret Weapon in World War II (New 
York: Walker & Co., 1992). Additionally, while traders played on the Vanishing Indian narrative as a way to 
market their items as rare, Bsumek notes that the Navajo population since the 1890s has actually been 
increasing. See Bsumek, Indian Made, 93. For more about the Vanishing Indian narrative in general, see 
Brian Dippie The Vanishing American: White Attitudes and U.S. Indian Policy (Lawrence: U of Kansas P, 
1982). 
 
23 The equivalent of .28 cents from the 1930s, the period to which Bsumek refers in her analysis of 
Navajos working in Julius Gans’ Southwest Arts and Crafts Store, is about $3.90 in the 2010s, or roughly 
half of the present-day minimum wage.   
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24 Bsumek mentions that Mary Austin, for example, “believed that people derived their status from their 
role as connoisseurs of ‘Indian-made’ goods” and that people who selected lower-quality souvenirs 
demonstrated their “unimportance.” See Bsumek, Indian Made, 38. See specifically Mary Austin, Taos 
Pueblo, (1930).  For more about the value that white buyers placed on “traditional” Navajo art, see Molly 
H. Mullin Culture in the Marketplace: Gender, Art, and Value in the American Southwest (Durham, N.C.: 
Duke UP, 2001). 
 
25 Charles Lummis (1859-1928) was a journalist and freelance writer from Massachusetts who, after 
working as the editor of the Los Angeles Times while the city was being founded, eventually settled with 
the Ysleta Pueblo in New Mexico and focused his writing on the New Mexico landscape and the tribal 
communities who lived there. He also supported Indian rights, especially in the area of boarding schools, 
and was instrumental in getting the boarding schools in his area to allow Indian children to leave to visit 
their families. After years of poor health, job losses and divorce, Lummis died mostly destitute in his Los 
Angele home. Despite being well-meaning in his writing and activism, Lummis is largely responsible for 
the overly romanticized image of New Mexico and the tribal nations within that appears today and often 
was paternalistic toward tribal communities in some of his writings. See for example Lummis, Some 
Strange Corners of Our Country: The Wonderland of the Southwest, (1892) and The Land of Poco Tiempo, 
(1893).  
 
26 Frank Hamilton Cushing, for instance, studied Zuni pottery and ultimately argued that there existed 
three stages of intellectual development: the biotic, in which early humans had first developed hands to 
climb and fight; the manual, in which humans reacted upon, rather than to, their environment; and the 
mental, in which humans had developed the ability to seek abstract truth. Indian craft-makers, according 
to Cushing’s arbitrary hierarchy, would fall into the “manual” stage while ostensibly “more evolved” 
Euroamericans, who no longer needed to make crafts themselves, would occupy the “mental” stage. For 
more on this theory, see Cushing “Manual Concepts: A Study of the Influence of Hand Usage on Culture 
Growth” American Anthropologist 5 (1892): 289-325. For more about Cushing’s theory and the 
development of “primitivism” as it pertains to Indian artisan crafts, see Dilworth, Imagining Indians in the 
Southwest, 151-57.  
 
27 For a general history of the immediate post-WWII era, see Landon Y. Jones Great Expectations: America 
& the Baby Boom Generation (New York: Ballantine Books, 1980). For a news article giving historical 
context surrounding the idea of the increase in abundance and wealth during this time, see Henry Hazlitt 
“Myth of a Perpetual Boom” Newsweek. Vol. 9 (9 Nov 1953), 77. 
 
28 For a groundbreaking study of Americans’ affinity with nature, see Roderick Nash Wilderness and the 
American Mind (New Haven: Yale UP, 1967).  
 
29 While Navajos had been employed by working on the railroad since the railroad first entered the 
Southwest in the late 1800s, livestock reduction made the wage labor of the railroad a greater necessity 
for Navajo families. Colleen O’Neill notes that those families who were most devastated by the livestock-
reduction program were families with small herds who depended more on their livestock for economic 
sustenance than other families who could afford to lose a few head of sheep. She adds: “It was wage work 
that provided the family with the resources they needed to maintain their small flock and remain on the 
reservation” and that such Navajos became a new working class who “pooled their income from a variety 
of sources, including wages they earned working on the railroad, herding others’ sheep, or selling rugs 
and other craft items.” See O’Neill Working the Navajo Way: Labor and Culture in the Twentieth Century 
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(Lawrence, U of Kansas P, 2004), 82. For more about Navajo railroad work, specifically how Navajos 
incorporated railroad labor into their spiritual epistemologies, see Jay Youngdhal Working on the Railroad, 
Walking in Beauty: Navajos, Hozho, and Track Work (Logan: Utah State UP, 2011). To read about some of 
the dangers of working on the railroad, see “Ex-Rail Workers Sue BNSF Over Illness.” ABQJournal.com. 
ABQ Journal, 22 Mar 2012. Web. 17 May 2013. <http://www.abqjournal.com/main/95652/ 
abqnewsseeker/ex-rail-workers-sue-bnsf-over-illness.html>. This article tells the story of four Navajo men 
who sued the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway, alleging that exposure to toxic ballast rock and coal 
dust caused them to develop lung disease. 
 
30 Navajos also have a long history of working in coal mines on their land. Colleen O’Neill notes that while 
some archeological evidence suggests that Navajos worked in the coal mines as early as the 1880s, the 
industry grew rapidly in the 1920s and 1930s when more Navajo households started using coal stoves. See 
O’Neill, Working the Navajo Way: Labor and Culture in the Twentieth Century, Ch. 2.   
 
31 John Collier (1884-1968) headed the BIA from 1933-1945 and is largely responsible for crafting the 
provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act (1934), legislation that sought to stop allotment of tribal lands 
and to restore tribal governments. Collier, having rejected earlier U.S. Indian policy of forced assimilation, 
worked for Congress to commission the Meriam Report (1928), a study that demonstrated the adverse 
effects of assimilation policy on tribal economy, education and health. The provisions of the IRA aimed to 
attend to the needs of tribal nations as reflected in the Meriam Report. For a list of these provisions, see 
Lawrence C. Kelly The Navajo Indians and Federal Indian Policy, 1900-1935 (Tucson: U of Arizona P, 1968), 
163-164. Though many tribal nations supported the IRA, others, then and how, have been skeptical of 
some of its policy points. For example, Dean Howard Smith (Mohawk) argues that the program likewise 
allowed the federal government to oversee the drafting of what he calls “cookie-cutter” tribal 
constitutions that established tribal governments that were in many ways circumscribed per the federal 
government’s terms.  For more on Collier’s life and policies, see Collier The Indians of the Americas (New 
York: New American Library, 1961) and From Every Zenith: A Memoir (Denver: Sage Books, 1963). See also 
Kelly The Assault on Assimilation: John Collier and the Origins of Indian Policy Reform (Albuquerque: U of 
New Mexico P, 1963) and K. R. Philp John Collier and the American Indian, 1920-1945 (Lansing: Michigan 
State UP, 1968). 
 
32 Kelly notes that since 1900 the federal government has experimented with breeding Navajo sheep, one 
such experiment resulting in “a runty sheep with very greasy wool which the Navajos found completely 
unsatisfactory for weaving” (111). Likewise, Kelly adds that Navajos were not interested in the federal 
government’s breeding program and did not appreciate the government’s attempt to interfere with their 
traditional methods. See Kelly, The Navajo Indians, 111. The federal government also had an interest in 
livestock reduction as it pertained to the Taylor Grazing Act (1934) and the Navajo boundary-extension 
bill. The Taylor Grazing Act allowed the federal government to regulate public land with regard to grazing 
and improving rangeland. The act allowed ranchers to purchase a 10-year permit to graze their livestock 
on unreserved, vacant land. Failure of the Navajo boundary extension to pass combined with the passing 
of the Taylor Grazing Act allowed white ranchers to occupy land claimed by Navajos before allotment, and 
the permit fees also went into the federal government’s coffers. See Ibid., 168-169.  
 
33 Navajos have long been accused of having too many sheep, mostly by white ranchers with sheep 
interests who wanted access to contested Navajo land. Even before Collier’s livestock-reduction program, 
Indian Agent Dennis Riordan, in the 1880s, tried unsuccessfully to have Navajo livestock reduced by up to 
two-thirds. See Iverson, Diné, 101. 
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34 While more than two-thirds of tribal nations accepted the provisions of Collier’s plan as outlined in the 
IRA, the Navajos rejected it by a 8,214-to-7,795 vote. Rejection of the IRA by the largest tribal nation in 
the U.S. embarrassed Collier who, in his annual report, blamed the bill’s failure to pass on outside 
interests who allegedly concocted a connection between the IRA and the livestock-reduction program. 
Nonetheless, the bill’s failure was likely the result of timing as well with the bill being voted on during the 
second phase of the livestock-reduction program and when white ranchers, under the protection of the 
Taylor Grazing Act, were beginning to occupy Navajo land. See Kelly, The Navajo Indians, 167-170. 
 
35 The Long Walk refers to the federal government’s 1864 removal program in which the Army forced 
Navajos at gunpoint to relocate from their homelands in what is now Arizona to land in what is now New 
Mexico, specifically the Bosque Redondo area. More than 200 people died during the forced removal. See 
Ruth Roessel, ed. Navajo Stories of the Long Walk Period (Tsaile, Ariz: Navajo Community College Press, 
1973) and Gerald Thompson The Army and the Navajo: The Bosque Redondo Reservation Experiment, 
1863-1868 (Tucson: U of Arizona P, 1976). 
 
36 Edward T. Hall (1914-2009) was an American anthropologist who lived with the Navajos and Hopis for 
four years in the 1930s. He is most known for his research on how people are defined by their cultural 
spaces.  
 
37 Specifically, Thom implores Indian youth to use their familiarity with contemporary political realities 
and their access to urban areas to lend a voice to their elders who might not otherwise be listened to by 
federal policymakers. He says: “The Indian youth have got to take this upon themselves because in many 
cases our older people do not have the means to communicate . . . and too many of our young people 
have drifted off and gone into American cities and not served the Indians where they are needed” (146). 
See Thom, Statement Made for the Young People, 146. 
 
38 Garroutte notes that among several tribal communities, following tradition, however the community 
defines it, in and of itself, is a marker of being Indian or belonging to a community. See Garroutte, Real 
Indians, Ch. 3. Robert Thomas, however, sees following tribal tradition (or a return to tribal tradition) as 
inherently political and argues that adhering to tradition has psychological, material and political benefits 
for communities that are fighting colonial incursion. See Ch. 1 of this study.  
 
39 Through the Treaty of 1868, the U.S. established compulsory education in the Navajo Nation for 
children ages 6-16. While the U.S. promised to build one school in the Navajo Nation for every 30 
children, the federal government only established a handful of boarding schools that required Navajo 
children to leave their families for long periods of time. In the short term, the absence of children from 
their families meant fewer hands to help around the home. In the long term, however, the fear of forced 
assimilation existed as is evidenced in Momaday’s novel through Old Grandfather’s attitudes toward his 
family. As early as the 1920s, Navajos demanded agency over educational efforts in their nation. Speaking 
in 1925, Hosteen Nez expressed concern regarding the federal government’s handling of Navajo children 
through the school system. She said: “‘With a baby in your arms you kiss that baby a lot. We feel the same 
way about our children. But you want to come in and take the children and rush these poor children off to 
school. . . . We want fair and square treatment. We don’t want our children taken by force. About all the 
children we have left now is one year old, two year old, three year old [sic] – you have all the others’” 
(qtd. in Kelly 177-178). Eventually Navajos adopted the day-school model, which allowed children to stay 
with their families. See Kelly, The Navajo Indians, 171-181. Additionally, Iverson notes that Navajos began 
to take more control over local education, including hiring more Navajo teachers, in the 1960s. See 
Iverson, Dine, 254-257. For more studies about schooling in the Navajo Nation, see Broderick Johnson 
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Navaho Education at Rough Rock (Rough Rock, AZ: Rough Rock Demonstration School, 1968); Hildegard 
Thompson The Navahos’ Long Walk for Education: A History of Navaho Education (Tsaile, AZ: Navajo 
Community College Press, 1975). 
 
40 See for example Samson Occom The Collected Writings of Samson Occom, Mohegan: Literature and 
Leadership in the Eighteenth-Century Native America. Joanna Brooks, ed. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006); 
William Apess On Our Own Ground: The Complete Writings of William Apess, a Pequot. Barry O’Connell, 
ed. (Amherst: U of Massachusetts P, 1992); Elias Boudinot Cherokee Editor: The Writings of Elias Boudinot. 
Theda Perdue, ed. (Athens, GA: U of Georgia P, 1996); Sarah Winnemucca Hopkins, Life Among the 
Paiutes: Their Wrongs and Claims, (1883).   
 
41 Donald Vann, for example, is one of the Cherokee Nation’s most well-known contemporary painters. A 
story about his life and art can be found here: “CN honors artist, veteran’s service to country” Cherokee 
Phoenix.org. Cherokee Phoenix, 18 June 2013. Web. 18 June 2013 <http://www.cherokeephoenix.org/ 
Article/Index/7361>. Other Cherokee Nation painters include Jamison Chas Banks, Verna Bates, Roy 
Boney, Jr., Talmadge Davis (1962-2005), tsigesv; Cecil Dick (1915-1992), tsigesv; Franklin Gritts (1915-
1996), tsigesv; John Guthrie, J. Houston-Emerson, Lara Evans, Tom Farris, Yatika Starr Fields, Brooks 
Henson, Jesse Hummingbird, Sharon Irla, America Meredith, Rom Mitchell, Mary Beth Nelson, Sallyann 
Milam Paschal, Bill Rabbit, Tracy Rabbit, Janet Lamon Smith, Ryan Lee Smith, Dorothy Sullivan, Dianna 
LaFerry Thomas, Kay Walkingstick and Sam Watts-Scott. Painters from the Eastern Band of Cherokee 
Indians include Jenean Hornbuckle, Lynn Lossiah, Lori Reed, Amy Walker and Linda Windell. Virginia 
Stroud (UKB) is also a Cherokee painter.   
 
42 Cherokee Nation sculptors include S. S. Burrus, Roger Cain, Deborah Ann Crossland, Demos Glass and 
Daniel Horsechief. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indian sculptors include David Arch, Goingback Chiltosky 
(1907-2000), tsigesv; Amanda Crowe (1928-2004), tsigesv; Bill Crowe, George Goings, John Grant, Ernie 
Lossiah, Harry Oosahwee, Freeman Owle, and Joel Queen. Virginia Stroud is a sculptor from the United 
Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians.   
 
43 Cherokee photographers include Christina Berry, Lara Evans, Tom Fields, Stephen McClure; and Shan 
Goshorn (EBCI). 
 
44 Joseph Erb is a well-known Cherokee animator. He produced the first Cherokee-language animations 
that tell Cherokee stories such as The Beginning They Told (2003), How the Redbird Got His Color (2003) 
and How the Rabbit Lost His Tail (2003). Erb’s work disseminates Cherokee language and stories to 
Cherokee youth in a contemporary medium they can relate to. Erb also works with fellow Cherokee 
animators Roy Boney, Jr., and Matt Mason. See Kade Twist (Cherokee Nation) “Brave New Worlds: Indian 
Animation Movement” NativePeoples.com. Native Peoples Magazine, Nov 2007. Web. 14 Dec 2007. 
 
45 Arnold Krupat, for example, has previously argued that only oral forms are truly Native American since 
written forms, such as autobiography and fiction, originated in Europe.  In fact, he suggests that even 
those works written by American Indians are inherently a form of orality. He writes, for example: “Of 
course, the texts of Native American literatures are not only theoretically but also in practice what we 
may call oral texts, an oxymoronic rather than self-contradictory appellation” (124). See Krupat “Post-
Structuralism and Oral Literature” Recovering the Word: Essays on Native American Literature. Brian 
Swann and Arnold Krupat, eds. (Berkeley: U of California P, 1987), 113-128. Krupat likewise states: “So far 
as the category of an Indian literature – and along with it the general category of local literature – may be 
useful, it would seem necessary to define it pretty exclusively by reference to the ongoing oral 
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performances of Native peoples” (290). See Krupat The Voice in the Margin: Native American Literature 
and the Canon (Berkeley: U of California P, 1989). The problem with this line of thinking, in addition to 
having little basis in the lived experience of tribal communities, is that it establishes arbitrary boundaries 
of what constitutes true Indian expression. Regardless of whether a text is written and in a traditional 
European form, if an Indian writer uses it to express his or her views, it’s a truly Indian text, oral or not. 
Simon Ortiz (Acoma Pueblo), for example, writes: “This is the crucial item that has to be understood, that 
it is entirely possible for a people to retain and maintain their lives through the use of language. There is 
not a question of authenticity here; rather it is the way that Indian people have creatively responded to 
forced colonization” (10). See Ortiz “Towards a National Indian Literature: Cultural Authenticity in 
Nationalism” MELUS 8.2 (1981): 7-12.  
46 While $100 does not sound like a lot of money by contemporary standards, to put this dollar amount 
into context it’s important to know how much Navajo artisans were earning for their crafts at the time. 
For example, Bsumek notes that Navajo silversmiths in the 1940s earned between $360 and $750 a year 
with some earning as little as $25 a year. Considering the cost of supplies and labor involved in 
silversmithing alongside the average annual income it brings in, Haske’s ability to make $100 from a 
painting that he produced during one class period, using only paper and paint, which are inexpensive 
compared to raw silver, demonstrates the success of functional integration. Haske is able to find a way to 
operate economically such that he can still practice and maintain his tribal traditions but do so in a 
manner that earns him more money with less labor. 
 
47 Domenique Schnapper, for instance, argues that the oppressed can gradually weaken the narratives of 
domination imposed on them that marginalize them by “ceas[ing] to participate in the values, practices, 
and institutions” that the dominant group represents (41). See Schnapper Community of Citizens: On the 
Modern Idea of Nationality Severine Rosee, trans. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998). 
Likewise, Rogers Smith adds that “unwilling subjects can usually resist . . . while sustaining some quite 
distinct, alternative conceptions of the ‘people’ to whom they inwardly profess their allegiance, and for 
whom they seek to act” (36). See Smith Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political 
Membership (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003). 
 
48 The “Melting Pot” as a metaphor for the homogenizing of immigrants into American society, which 
often meant mainstream white society, has existed since the late 1700s. For example, in Letter from an 
American Farmer (1782), Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, a French traveler to the U.S., writes: “leaving 
behind him all his ancient prejudices and manners, receives new ones from the new mode of life he has 
embraced. . . . Here individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of men, whose labors and 
posterity will one day cause great changes in the world" (46). For white Western European immigrants, 
being brought into the Melting Pot meant assimilation into the white mainstream, which often 
necessitated learning English or changing one’s surname to appear more Anglo-Saxon. For those people of 
African descent, Asians, Latinos and others whose phenotypes precluded them from “melting” into white 
America, participating in the Melting Pot meant being situated into (and not challenging) mainstream 
America’s institutions, often in a subordinate position. These institutions included those of labor such as 
slavery and exploited farm and railway work, Protestant Christianity and being subject to segregation and 
anti-miscegenation laws. After World War II, a return to a Melting Pot national ideology was a way to 
bring non-Anglo-Saxon immigrant such as the Irish, Italians, Eastern Europeans and Jews into the category 
of “white” in America, and for American Indians, it was an attempt to reintroduce assimilation attempts 
so the federal government could terminate tribal nations and their legal responsibilities to them.  See 
Thomas J. Archdeacon Becoming American: An Ethnic History (New York: Free Press, 1984); Gordon 
Milton Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion and National Origins (New York: Oxford 
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UP, 1964) and David A. Hollinger “Amalgamation and Hypodescent: The Question of Ethnoracial Mixture 
in the History of the United States” American Historical Review 108.5 (Dec 2003): 1363-1390. 
 
49 I use the Seminole Tribe of Florida in this analysis for two reasons. The first reason is in keeping with 
this chapter’s theme of intertribalism, a strategy that gained strength as Momaday was writing her novel, 
and one that is established through Momaday’s literary and educational work itself with her being a 
Cherokee writing about Navajos and working with Navajos and Pueblo communities. The second reason is 
that the Seminole Tribe of Florida has been one of the tribal nations that has been enormously successful 
with gaming, and Cattelino’s study of the Seminoles in Florida demonstrates a wide breadth of potential 
that functional economic integration, specifically though gaming, can provide tribal nations materially, 
culturally and politically. That said, the Cherokee Nation’s own gaming industry has led to similar 
beneficial outcomes for the Nation. Cherokee Nation Entertainment has created thousands of jobs, more 
than 70 percent of which are held by Cherokee and other tribal citizens. Likewise, casino earnings helped 
develop Cherokee Services Group and Cherokee Nation Technologies, which provide information-
technology services to, respectively, public-sector and commercial organizations. These Cherokee 
companies employ about 250 people, and revenue in 2010 exceeded $24 million. Similarly, the Nation has 
also contributed revenue from gaming and the tribal businesses that have grown from casino earnings to 
the Cherokee Nation’s education programs, in particular to fund language-revitalization programs and to 
develop community centers in Cherokee towns. Additionally, the Nation also donates money outside of 
the Nation to agencies such as the Community Food Bank of Eastern Oklahoma, which provides food to 
more than 460 partner agencies in 24 Oklahoma counties; provided dogs and dog training to Oklahoma’s 
Task Force 1, which rescues victims from collapsed buildings, and provided bulletproof vests to local 
police departments. In all, Cherokee gaming in 2010 brought in more than $455 million that went toward 
cultural programs, health and education and in forging relationships with communities outside the 
Nation. See Cherokee Nation Entertainment Where the Casino Money Goes (Tulsa: CNE, 2010).  
 
50 The presence of a Navajo proprietor of the trading post is a detail that mustn’t be overlooked. 
Historically, as settlers established trading posts in the Southwest, their white proprietors often, at best, 
maintained a patriarchal relationship with their Navajo customers and, at worst, cheated and even 
physically abused Navajos. After World War II, however, Navajos, growing tired of being taken advantage 
of by white trading-post owners, sought to take control of local trade. Iverson, for example, cites Navajo 
council delegates Dewey Etsitty and Roger Davis who spoke in 1948 about the need for Navajos to be 
more directly involved in local trade. Etsitty said, for instance,: “‘The reservation is our home. . . . [W]e 
should have our own people do the trading business on the reservation’” (216). Davis elaborated, saying: 
“‘[T]he people want something done about the traders. . . . They pay us but not enough. They get all the 
money. We pay everything. . . . I feel that twenty-five dollars a year for trading on the Navajo and getting 
rich on the Navajos, sucking the Navajo life is unfair. I think it’s time for the Navajo Tribal Council to get 
down to business and do something’” (216). The Navajo Nation created a trading committee in 1950 and 
by 1955 were successful in installing regulations that were designed to protect Navajo clients and give 
more autonomy to Navajos in the trading business. See Iverson, Dine, 216-218. See also Bsumek, Indian 
Made, Ch. 2 for more on Navajos in the trading economy, especially pgs. 59-73 that detail how Navajos 
used bartering, overstocking and pawnbroking as ways to maintain agency in their dealings with white 
traders. With this information in mind, Momaday’s use of a Navajo proprietor who commissions Haske’s 
art is another example of successful economic integration, a move that not only can be read as a promise 
to protect Haske from what has historically been an exploitative trade relationship between Navajos and 
whites, but also as evidence of tribal economic agency. For more on traders in Navajo communities, see 
William Y. Adams, Shonto: A Study of the Role of the Trader in a Modern Navajo Community, (1963); 
Willow Roberts Powers Navajo Trading: The End of an Era (Albuquerque: U of New Mexico P, 2001). 
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51 Iverson expands on the value of horses in Navajo communities. He writes that while federal agents who 
implemented the livestock-reduction program were particularly scornful of Navajos’ horses, which they 
called “worthless ponies,” the horses’ owners felt they had a duty to protect the animals given to them by 
the Holy People. Horses are used extensively in Navajo ranching communities for transportation, doing 
chores around the ranch or farm, and for food. See Iverson, Dine, 101. Likewise, Spicer notes that among 
the Navajos he met during his studies, horses represented a standard of wealth. He writes: “[A]n 
individual’s status within his band was often measured in terms of the numbers of horses he possessed. 
See Spicer, Cycles of Conquest, 547. 
 
52 The Navajo Song of Happiness is often sung by children and is a way of extending hozho, or 
cosmological beauty. The song is a way to express appreciation for one’s life and community. The 
translated lyrics are: “Where I am,/ Where I am,/ Where I am,/ There is happiness,/ The land of 
happiness,/ Where I am.” See Willard Rhodes, ed., Music of the American Indian: Indian Songs of Today, 
(1987), 12-13.  
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“This Nation look[s] like home to me”: Cherokee Freedmen and Writing Ethical 
Nationhood through the Peoplehood Matrix 
 
While Thomas and Momaday’s literature can challenge the federal government’s 
narrative circumscription of tribal nationhood, at various points in history Cherokee 
Freedmen, the former black slaves held by Cherokees, have had to contend with 
delimiting national narratives from the Cherokee state. When Cherokee Freedman John 
Rogers made an appeal for citizenship in the Cherokee state, he invoked his connection to 
tribal land and his lived experience with the Cherokees in arguing that the Cherokee 
Nation was like home to him.  Rogers’ tactic was sound in that Cherokee Freedmen 
history is Cherokee history, with both groups’ geographical, cultural and temporal 
experiences being inextricably bound. However, one wouldn’t realize the breadth and 
depth of this connection by perusing the stacks of Cherokee literature.  
Despite the long history that African-descended Cherokees share with their Indian 
Cherokee counterparts, the presence of black characters in Cherokee literature is limited. 
While characters who are described as being of African descent occupy major roles in 
works by Robert J. Conley1 and William Sanders2, they only make small appearances in 
work by John Oskison3 and Lynn Riggs4. Furthermore, some of Riggs’ plays such as 
“Green Grow the Lilacs” (1930)5 and “Roadside” (1930)6 feature characters who are 
ambiguously racialized, though evidence exists that suggests their blackness.  
Given the volume of literature, including fiction, written by Cherokees since 1823 
when Elias Boudinot wrote Poor Sarah: or, Religion Exemplified in the Life and Death of 
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an Indian Woman,7 when we consider Cherokee history alongside the Nation’s long 
literary production, the conspicuous absence of black characters in the narratives of 
Cherokee experience is glaring. While I cannot argue authorial intent, the elision of the 
presence of African-descended people who historically suffered alongside Cherokee 
Indians and who also contributed to the continual survival of the Cherokee Nation 
reflects the contemporary real-world erasure of Cherokee Freedmen from the Cherokee 
national narrative as defined through interpretations of Cherokee constitutional law and 
citizenship in the Cherokee state. 
The Cherokee Freedmen have historically shared with their Indian Cherokee 
counterparts language, land, history and ceremonial cycle, elements that inform my 
narrative analysis of their belonging in a more ethical Cherokee state. These facts 
notwithstanding, in 2007 a handful of Cherokee citizens took to the polls to vote in a 
referendum that stood to redefine what it means to be Cherokee8. The vote occurred as a 
result of a petition9 that circulated that asked Cherokees if citizenship in the nation should 
be determined strictly on the basis of having Cherokee blood.10 However, the true targets 
of this inquiry were the descendants of African slaves owned by Cherokees, who are still 
referred to today as Freedmen. The contemporary struggle for Freedmen to be recognized 
as citizens in the Cherokee Nation emerged after the Civil War, and the Freedmen and 
their descendants have at various times been included in and expelled from citizenship in 
the Cherokee Nation. The major question that informed the vote regarded the Cherokee 
Nation’s sovereign right to determine its own citizenry, in this case to make the Cherokee 
Nation a strictly Indian nation based on racial definitions of Indianness.11 
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 But a year earlier, Cherokee citizen Darren Buzzard, a supporter of the expulsion 
of the Freedmen, sent an e-mail message to the tribal council that revealed a far more 
sinister side to the motive behind reconsidering the Freedmen’s place as Cherokee 
citizens. In a missive reminiscent of a Ku Klux Klan circular, Buzzard accused the 
Freedmen descendants of simply claiming Cherokee heritage in order to cash in on tribal 
assets and take advantage of the Nation’s social programs.12 Buzzard writes: “‘Don't get 
taken advantage of by these people. They will suck you dry. . . . Don't let black freedmen 
back you into a corner. PROTECT CHEROKEE CULTURE FOR OUR CHILDREN. 
FOR OUR DAUGHTER[S] . . . FIGHT AGAINST THE INFILTRATION’” (qtd. in 
Knickmeyer par 9, emphasis original).13 Beneath the vitriol of Buzzard’s inflammatory 
message is a narrative that not only pits black Freedmen against their Indian counterparts, 
but also divorces Freedmen from Cherokee culture, a culture that history indicates they 
not only are a part of but also helped to protect.14 
The Freedmen’s battle to procure and maintain Cherokee citizenship has its roots 
in early legislation, beginning with the 1827 Cherokee constitution that precluded blacks 
from citizenship. However, since the Cherokee state was reinstated in the 1970s, their 
claim to citizenship came under fire in 1983 when then-Principal Chief Ross O. 
Swimmer, fearing losing re-election, issued an executive order requiring Cherokee voters 
to show a Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood, which descendants of the Freedmen 
portion of the Dawes roll do not possess.15 Throughout these legal attempts to 
circumscribe Freedmen citizenship and belonging in the Cherokee Nation, the 
commonality that emerges is a narrative that tells a story that the Freedmen are not 
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Cherokee and do not belong in the Nation.  In a stated attempt to enforce its national 
sovereignty, the Cherokee Nation has periodically used its sovereign power to narrate a 
community of Cherokees not only outside the margins of privileged periphery of national 
history, but completely off the page. The Cherokee Nation does have the sovereign right 
to re-shape the demographics of its citizenry, just as the U.S., if it wanted to, could decide 
that its citizens must descend from the Mayflower and retroactively denationalize those 
who don’t. But the more pertinent question remains: just because a nation has those 
rights, is it always right to exercises those privileges, and how are these assertions of 
sovereignty justified? In several cases, such assertions – and in some cases excesses – of 
sovereignty are justified by their supporters by crafting a national narrative that not only 
facilitates decisions that adversely affect entire communities, but also normalizes their 
marginalization. 
One way to critically challenge these privileged national narratives is to develop 
counter-narratives that, even if they don’t ultimately change or at the very least add 
nuance to the privileged national narrative, at least undermine the assertion that the 
national narrative is absolutely true. In this chapter I examine the Freedmen WPA 
narratives as counter-narratives that re-imagine critical, ethical Cherokee nationhood by 
recognizing that the Freedmen are part of the tribal body and, in doing so, resisting the 
Cherokee national narrative that claims they have neither history nor a future in the 
Cherokee Nation.16 Work from other Cherokee scholars such as Steve Russell, Alan Ray 
and Eva Garroutte inform this study of Cherokee law and identity as I use it to interpret 
the Freedmen’s counter-narrative of nationhood. Specifically, I read the WPA narratives 
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alongside Robert K. Thomas (Cherokee) and Tom Holm’s (Cherokee Nation) 
Peoplehood Matrix that identifies four Cherokee epistemologies of peoplehood and show 
how, based on this matrix, the Freedmen are Cherokee. 
 
Straddling the Black and the Red: The Literary Peoplehood of Cherokee Freedmen  
 Leslie Ross17 likes to regale people he meets with facts about his great-
grandfather, Stick Ross, a former slave and rumored illegitimate grandson of Cherokee 
chief John Ross. In an article called “Blood Feud,” Leslie Ross describes how his 
ancestor served as sheriff18 of Tahlequah and as a diplomat for the Cherokee Nation in its 
dealings with neighboring Indian nations, a position for which the Nation chose him 
because of his language skills. Stick Ross also served on the Cherokee tribal council in 
1893.19 Despite this history, however, Ross found the Cherokee citizenship he claims 
through his ancestor in a state of contestation as the Nation’s administration under then 
Principal Chief Chad Smith worked to redefine who counts as Cherokee.20 As the Smith 
administration attempted to codify into a revised law the definition of Cherokee as a 
discourse of blood ancestry, Leslie Ross reminds readers that his great-grandfather’s 
work was essential to the creation of the very nation that recently sought to oust him. He 
asserts: “‘There wouldn’t be a Cherokee Nation if it weren’t for my great-grandfather. . . . 
Jesus, he was more Indian than the Indians!’” (qtd. in Koerner 1).21  
 Not everyone agrees, however. In his State of the Nation address in 2006, then 
Cherokee Nation Principal Chief Chad Smith made a statement that exemplifies the 
anxiety and tension surrounding the Freedmen debate. Smith said: “‘Some Cherokees 
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believe the Freedmen who did not help rebuild the Cherokee Nation in the last 100 years 
should not reap the benefits that the Cherokees have earned’” (“Cherokee chief” par 7). 
While Smith qualified his statement by saying “some Cherokees” and distanced himself 
from that assertion, subsequent action his administration took closely connects him to 
such sentiments. This action included an amendment to the Cherokee Constitution to 
specify Cherokee-blood descent as the basis of citizenship, which led to the ousting of 
citizens of Freedmen descent.  
Naturally, this decision sparked heated debate regarding Cherokee citizenship 
between both opponents and supporters of the Freedmen. Though Freedmen descendants’ 
citizenship and voting rights were temporarily reinstated in 2011 and remain in effect22, 
the question of Freedmen citizenship remains in limbo under current Principal Chief Bill 
John Baker’s administration, and the debate continues.23 Opponents argue that the Nation 
fulfilled its moral obligation to the Freedmen descendants by granting their ancestors 
allotments in the early part of the last century. They also argue that the Treaty of 1866 
does not explicitly mention rights to citizenship24 and further argue that Cherokees were 
coerced into agreeing to the terms of the post-Civil War treaty. 25 Freedmen supporters, 
however, argue that the Treaty of 1866 does explicitly state that former slaves and their 
descendants are afforded all the rights of native Cherokees.26 Additionally, they argue on 
the grounds of ethically including Freedmen descendants based on the service of their 
ancestors, as Leslie Ross mentions in his great-grandfather’s case. The discourse of blood 
as a single indicator of belonging and, by extension, Cherokee citizenship as amended to 
the Cherokee Constitution by the Smith administration elides the relationship the 
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Cherokee Freedmen have shared with Indian Cherokees while ultimately attempting to 
erase the Freedmen from Cherokee history and write them out of a Cherokee future. 
 Because belonging and citizenship under Smith were based on one type of 
peoplehood27 – blood descent28 – one argument for Freedmen belonging is to examine 
ways of devising an alternative system that defines Freedmen descendants as Cherokee 
people based on the generations of intersection between them and Cherokees. Most 
Freedmen descendants do in fact have Cherokee blood. And while citizenship under 
Smith was based on tracing ancestors to the “By Blood” portion of the Dawes Roll, the 
Dawes commissioners erroneously placed several of the Freedmen’s ancestors on the 
Freedmen portion of the roll, which, under Smith’s amendment, would strike their 
descendants from Cherokee citizenship. 29 
However, Freedmen could likewise be viewed as Cherokee through alternative 
reckonings of belonging framed by the elements of Cherokee scholars Robert Thomas 
and Tom Holm’s Peoplehood Matrix – shared language, ceremony/religion, place/land, 
and sacred history. The Matrix demonstrates how critical relationships are forged through 
the interdependence of these elements. One way to demonstrate an intersection of 
peoplehood between Freedmen and Cherokees is to use the Peoplehood Matrix as a tool 
to illuminate how Freedmen are Cherokee through the framework of epistemologies 
identified by Cherokees such as Thomas and Holm, instead of relying on Euroamerican 
concepts of political theory and racialized blood to establish belonging and nationhood. 
Cherokee slave narratives, for example, illuminate how the two groups interacted and 
supported each other through the elements of peoplehood. One of the stakes of this 
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approach to defining Cherokee peoplehood is that it could lend weight to the argument of 
including Freedmen based on the generations of contributions to the Cherokee Nation. 
Conceiving of critical, ethical nationhood through a lens of peoplehood and reading 
Cherokee slave narratives through the Peoplehood Matrix opens a space to claim the 
Freedmen and their descendants as unequivocally Cherokee. 
 
“Blood be damned”: Some grievances against blood identity 
 In a post on his blog regarding unenrolled Cherokee and Freedmen descendants, 
John Cornsilk (Cherokee Nation/UKB) insisted that only the law, not blood, makes one 
Cherokee. He writes: “Blood be damned. So it be for the Delaware, Loyal Shawnee, 
some Nachez [sp], some Creek, some Caucasian, yep fullblood white folks, Negro, yep 
fullblood African, including degrees of mixtures of all these ethnicities and the 
Freedmen. We are Cherokee by law” (Cornsilk).30 Though a controversial figure among 
some Cherokees, Cornsilk’s comment about blood being second to the law as a single 
identifier of Cherokee identity and belonging, alongside the list of various tribes and 
races he includes under the legal definition, speaks to the ways that blood can be limiting 
in that it racializes American Indians, a group that continues to struggle to have its 
position as a sovereign polities respected by the United States.  For Cornsilk, an identity 
based on blood discourse shifts the focus of the settler state away from Cherokees’ being 
a political entity to their being a race, which creates the possibility of the federal 
government disregarding their sovereign political status and perhaps dissolving the 
Nation. 
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 Yet, Cornsilk’s statement is also paradoxical in that while he believes Cherokees 
are defined not by blood but by tribal law, Cherokee identity in terms of citizenship and 
the political rights of Cherokees in the Nation under Smith’s tenure was based on blood 
ancestry that was enshrined in the very law that Cornsilk upholds.  Having amended the 
Cherokee Constitution to specify that citizens must trace to an ancestor on the By-Blood 
portion of the Dawes Roll, the Smith administration and a handful of voters wrote 
Freedmen descendants out of the legal definition of Cherokee. The Nation has 
phenotypically black citizens, but by adding this blood specification where one did not 
exist before, being Cherokee in the political sense had become purely a matter of blood 
kinship to a collection of Cherokees who enrolled with the Dawes Commission between 
1898-1906.  
The paradox of Cornsilk’s disdain for the use of racialized blood in determining 
Cherokee identity coupled with his support of Cherokee citizenship law that, under 
Smith’s tenure as Principal Chief, happened to be based on the same racial ideology of 
blood descent reflects the conflation of blood and law that Circe Sturm identifies as 
having first appeared in 1840.31 Sturm writes that the Cherokee Nation made it illegal for 
“any free negro or mulatto, not of Cherokee blood, to hold or own any improvements 
within the limits of this Nation” (Blood Politics 71, original emphasis). This law 
indicated that only blacks with Cherokee blood could own property in the Nation, and 
those who did not have Cherokee blood could not. Such a scenario must have made living 
in the Nation nearly impossible for free blacks of no Cherokee blood if they could not 
own a home or a business, meaning that the only non-Cherokee blacks who could live 
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there within the law were slaves. Sturm adds that this is the first time the Cherokee 
Nation explicitly conflated ideas of racialized blood with the formulation and execution 
of tribal law. We can go back further, however, and consider voting law as it was laid out 
in the 1827 constitution, which indicates that, “All free male Citizens (excepting negroes 
& descendants of white & Indian men by Negro women who may have been set free) 
who shall have attained the age of 18 years shall be equally entitled to vote” (“1827 
Constitution”). Here, we see that Cherokees were already adopting Euroamerican racial 
ideologies in which being racially mixed with black automatically conferred total 
blackness on an individual and that the tribal government as early as the 1820s was 
codifying in law this racial designation to marginalize their black constituents. 
 This historical analysis of the Cherokee government’s use of racialized blood and 
adopted ideas of blackness in its laws, read alongside Cornsilk’s rejection of the construct 
of Cherokee identity developed through similar ideologies of blood, denotes a 
contradiction that Sturm observes exists in many Cherokee communities. Cherokees, she 
notes, have at once been subjected to racist ideas of blood, but also use a discourse of 
blood to establish Cherokeeness and maintain Cherokee social and legal boundaries. She 
writes: “Cherokees express contradictory consciousness, because they resent 
discrimination on the basis of race and yet use racially hegemonic concepts to legitimize 
their social identities and police their political boundaries” (Sturm “Blood Politics, Racial 
Classification” 231). This contradiction appears throughout Cherokee history in examples 
such as the U.S. forcing Removal and assimilation policies that were legitimized by a 
discourse of Indians being racially inferior and the Dawes Commission putting the 
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allotments of fullbloods and halfbloods into trust because they determined that being “too 
Indian” in a sense of blood meant they were incapable of handling their affairs. However, 
Cherokees also protected their borders from intruders who were frequently distinguished 
from “native Cherokees” in terms of blood or race.32 
 With the history of Cherokees’ simultaneous acceptance and rejection of blood 
discourse established, it is important to consider what this duality means today with 
regard to the Freedmen and how Cherokee identity is constructed legally in a technical 
sense and racially in an applied sense.  Furthermore, problematizing the racial construct 
of Cherokee identity and how it is disseminated legally through the use of the Dawes roll 
to determine citizenship opens avenues for discussing alternative means of inclusion such 
as the Peoplehood Matrix. Steve Russell (Cherokee Nation), a retired law professor and 
trial lawyer, argues that determining Cherokee citizenship by direct descent based on 
blood is a path to the disappearance of Cherokee culture, a culture that Leslie Ross’ 
Freedmen ancestors practiced and that differentiates Cherokees from others.33 However, 
Russell also argues that basing Cherokee identity on blood creates race privilege in a 
nation that has historically included a variety of communities, including Catawbas, 
Creeks, Natchez, Yuchis, Europeans and Africans. He writes: “Citizenship by direct 
descent alone is a guarantee of cultural extinction. In what sense is someone who has the 
blood but no knowledge of language, religion, or culture Indian? Answer: in a racist 
sense. What do you preserve when you define such people as Indian? Answer: racial 
privilege” (172). Here, Russell describes a shift from belonging based on community 
culture and norms to one of a construct of race that a Cherokee is supposedly born with. 
 196 
This set-up creates racial privilege in that, for example, while many Freedmen were 
culturally Cherokee – more so than many mixed-blood Cherokees, as Leslie Ross points 
out – they get shunted to the margins in a narrative that privileges a Cherokee “race” that 
was carved out of the same ideologies that Europeans used to effect and to rationalize 
Cherokees’ own marginalization. Russell further reminds us that trading on race theory in 
terms of biological blood in the context of nation-building has a violent and dangerous 
history. He adds that accepting individuals as Cherokee based on outdated and debunked 
ideas of race only legitimizes those ideas. Cherokees who are citizens by blood and not 
much else, he asserts, are “Cherokees in a racist sense” (173). He clarifies: “I don’t mean 
‘racist’ as a bloody red shirt, or as an all-purpose pejorative. I mean a logical corollary of 
Trofim Denisovich Lysenko’s idea that behavior can be imprinted on the genes” (173).34 
Here Russell refers to Lysenko’s debunked ideas of racial inheritance, but he also adds 
that racialized categories of belonging are not only imbecilic but also violent and damage 
real people, a concern I take up throughout this study with regard to how we can read 
Cherokee literature in ways that have a positive impact on the marginalized communities 
it emerges from. Russell writes:  
 Everywhere we find race theory in its short violent history, it is traveling in 
 disreputable company. Tribal governments are unlikely to have better luck 
 building on this foundation of sand and blood than the colonial governments have, 
 and therefore might want to reexamine the idea of blood in any amounts as an 
 infallible proxy for culture. (173)35 
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Russell asserts here the inherent flaw (and irony) of tribal governments’ use of racialized 
blood to determine citizenship in that it simply re-inscribes colonial race ideologies and 
legitimizes their deployment against tribal citizens by their elected leaders.  
 While the use of race and blood is problematic in determining Cherokee 
citizenship, Cherokee leaders who oppose including the Freedmen have used legal 
definitions of citizenship in an ahistorical way that attempts to elide race in the 
conversation about the Freedmen. In the Nation’s 2006 official statement on the 
Freedmen, Principal Chief Chad Smith insisted that Cherokee citizenship is not based on 
race, but rather it is a matter of the law that mandates that prospective citizens trace to an 
ancestor on the Dawes roll.  Smith writes: “‘[T]he Cherokee Nation Constitution is not 
based on race. People of many different ethnic backgrounds, African Americans, [W]hite 
Americans and Hispanic Americans, have Cherokee ancestors on the Dawes Roll; and 
they are unquestionably entitled to Cherokee Nation citizenship’” (qtd. in Ray 445 
original emphasis). Here, Smith insists that Cherokee law regarding citizenship is 
colorblind, or at least does not consider race.  He goes on to assume that “‘someone will 
undoubtedly play the race card’” with regard to the Freedmen (qtd. in Ray 445). In this 
statement, Smith attempts to divorce race from Cherokee law in ways that are impossible, 
given how race and Cherokee law have been historically conflated. While Smith correctly 
states that some Cherokee citizens happen to also have ancestry from non-Cherokee 
parentage, his statement that what makes them citizens is having a Cherokee ancestor – 
and this is important – based on the Dawes roll, by its nature, imposes race into the 
equation. Making prospective citizens trace to the Dawes roll amplifies the element of 
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race, given that the Dawes Commission’s definition and ultimate decision of who was 
Cherokee and who was a Freedmen was informed by 19th-century race ideologies such as 
those constructed by Samuel Morton and Lewis Henry Morgan.36 
 The use of the Dawes roll in determining citizenship is itself an act of determining 
citizenship by race because the document was constructed in an environment of 19th-
century race ideology. The Dawes Commission determined a tribal citizen’s ability to 
maintain his or her allotment based on the amount of Indian blood he or she had – the 
less, the supposedly more competent. However, the commission also employed race to 
distinguish Cherokees of any blood quantum from black Freedmen, creating separate 
rolls, only one from which the Smith administration would recognize Cherokee descent. 
The use of the Dawes roll is problematic in determining Cherokee ancestry because 
several Afro-Cherokees who had Cherokee ancestry failed to have it recognized by the 
commission and were listed instead as Freedmen. If Smith’s desire is that prospective 
citizens all have a Cherokee ancestor, several Freedmen descendants who do have 
Cherokee ancestry but had that ancestry erased by the Dawes Commission fail to meet 
Smith’s revised criteria. The separate rolls for Cherokees “by blood” and Freedmen 
reflect the separate status that the Nation assigned to the two groups and tried to maintain 
legally through anti-miscegenation laws. However, by the time of allotment, a sizeable 
Afro-Cherokee population had developed.37 As Theda Perdue notes, despite the existence 
of several harsh anti-miscegenation laws, these laws were seldom enforced, which led to 
a growth of the Afro-Cherokee population.38 Cherokee legal scholar S. Alan Ray notes 
that as a result of the race ideologies that permeated the decision-making process of the 
 199 
commission with regard to who was Cherokee at the time the Dawes roll was drafted, 
several Afro-Cherokees were erroneously placed on the Freedmen portion. This 
placement on the Freedmen rolls recorded for posterity the mistaken assumption that 
these Afro-Cherokees had no Cherokee blood, which, by Smith’s revised definition 
means their descendants are not Cherokee. Ray adds that because the Dawes roll was 
created in this historical context, using the Dawes roll to determine Cherokee citizenship 
is fallacious, especially with regard to the Freedmen. He writes: “Because the Freedmen’s 
roll systematically omits proof of Cherokee ancestry where such ancestry could be 
established by independent evidence, and because there is no other Dawes roll on which 
such ancestry can appear, the Dawes Rolls are incomplete and therefore cannot serve as 
an accurate resource for identifying all Cherokees by ‘blood’” (438). In this passage, Ray 
notes the need for devising another method of determining Cherokee citizenship, or for 
simply identifying Cherokees in ways that transcend the racial – and racist – history that 
burdens the Dawes roll.  
 The issue of determining Cherokeeness or blackness based on blood, on the part 
of the Dawes Commission, is not the only questionable element of tracing to the roll to 
decide Cherokee citizenship. Ray calls the accuracy and completeness of the Dawes roll 
into question because of its construction at a time when now-imbecilic race beliefs were 
accepted as truth. However, he notes that on the Cherokees’ end, some traditionalists 
refused to participate in allotment and enrollment, and though “biologically-eligible,” as 
Ray puts it, they might not appear on the roll. He writes that, “biology is limited in its 
ability to establish citizenship when otherwise-eligible persons choose not to participate 
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in the legal process by which biology-based citizenship is established” (439). Ray notes 
that these “otherwise-eligible” individuals were mostly traditionalists, such as those who 
participated in the Redbird Smith Movement, who tended to be “fullblooded” and refused 
to cooperate with the federal government because they did not wish to see their homeland 
parceled out and, thus, violated.39 He later cites Cherokee sociologist Eva Garroutte who 
adds that the descendants of these traditionalists cannot become tribal citizens today if 
their ancestor who resisted did not enroll, thus there are Cherokees “by blood” today who 
do not meet the legal criteria for Cherokee citizenship. While this scenario is different 
from that of the Freedmen in that the traditionalists weren’t being forced on the Freedmen 
roll based on blood ideology, it does point to the need for a method of reckoning 
Cherokee belonging in a way that Cherokees deem legitimate.  Ray re-inserts biology 
into this problem of legitimacy of the legal framework of citizenship. He writes: “The 
plight of the ‘irreconcileables’ shows that biology is a problematic predicate for Cherokee 
citizenship when the legal regime establishing citizenship faces a legitimacy-crisis in the 
eyes of a significant number of biologically-eligible Cherokees” (439). Both of the above 
scenarios highlight how, despite Smith’s assertions to the contrary, citizenship by tracing 
to the Dawes roll, while technically a legal construct, is in actuality citizenship defined by 
race.  
The presence of Cherokees “by blood” who can’t become citizens because their 
ancestors refused to cooperate and the presence of Freedmen descendants who do have 
Cherokee blood that is unaccounted for is a reality to contend with when considering how 
to use the Dawes roll. As a record created at a time of quotidian deployment of now-
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debunked blood and race ideologies, the Dawes roll encapsulates and preserves for all 
time the names of peoples’ ancestors whose identities were defined and legally 
crystalized through such beliefs. By couching Cherokee identity in terms of racialized 
blood as it’s recorded on the Dawes roll, the Cherokee Nation, however inadvertently, 
resurrects that same pseudoscience that much of the world has moved on from. However, 
it also deploys ideologies for reckoning Cherokeeness that some Cherokees themselves 
such as Russell, Ray, Garroutte, Thomas and Holm question the legitimacy of as well as 
their efficacy in creating an ethical, enduring nation. 
 
 
“It’s what we do for family”: Kinship and peoplehood between Cherokees and 
Freedmen 
 
 In an essay on revisiting kinship in literary criticism, Daniel Heath Justice 
(Cherokee Nation), scholar and author of the Way of Thorn and Thunder trilogy that I 
analyze in Chapter 4, reflects on how he once believed there existed one way of being 
Cherokee. He concedes that such an idea is “naïve” and “impossible, especially given the 
long tangled realities of Cherokee history” (135). From this complex history, Justice 
argues, emerge several ways one can interpret the Cherokee past and the lived experience 
today with the goal of preserving and upholding nationhood and community at their core. 
He writes: “Though there are many different ways of understanding what it is to be 
Cherokee . . . each way is still an attempt to give shape to an idea of what it is to be, 
think, and live Cherokee” (153). Out of this realization, Justice states that kinship extends 
beyond what a person is and into what he or she does, requiring a strident effort on the 
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part of individuals in a community to uphold that community and work to ensure that it 
flourishes. Kinship, he writes, “requires its members to maintain it through their 
willingness to perform the necessary rituals – spiritual, physical, emotional, intellectual, 
and familial – to keep the kinship network in balance” (152). While blood ancestry is one 
form of peoplehood and has its roots in tribal cosmology and in reckoning of familial and 
clan belonging, conceiving of blood ancestry as the only means of belonging can be 
delimiting in that it risks disregarding shared epistemologies between groups that have 
historically been interdependent on each other. It also allows for the marginalization of 
individuals who through shared history and experience can be regarded as kin but who do 
not fit within the confines of one kinship system that is privileged over possible 
alternative models of peoplehood. 
 Such shared history and experience are elements of peoplehood that go 
unaccounted for in a discourse of racialized blood, leaving one to wonder why choose 
such a delimiting method when others are more flexible and rooted in tribal 
epistemologies. Writing of her own nation’s use of blood quantum, at 50 percent no less, 
Mohawk scholar Audra Simpson points out that more important elements like 
commitment to the community cannot be quantified in terms of race. She does note that 
Mohawk epistemologies can account for communal duty. Still, she asks, “Why even use 
blood when there are traditional Iroquois practices . . . such as adoption and the clan 
system reckoning of descent? Should rights to membership be given to anyone who does 
not have a clan or a commitment to Mohawk culture and community” (129). Simpson 
likewise adds that even if seen as a sign of kinship, choosing blood over other 
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relationships is political and problematic. She writes: “The question of membership rights 
in any cultural or state context has always been a politicized kinship game, recognizing 
some blood or kin ties and not others” (24).  Alternatives to a singular blood kinship are 
necessary because relying on one form of peoplehood not only limits ways that groups 
can articulate their presence against colonizers who would undermine that community, 
but it also erases the relationships that have proven crucial in the survival of that 
community, be they relationships among Mohawks or a relationship as the one between 
Cherokees and Freedmen.  
One alternative system of peoplehood that could exist alongside blood relations 
that accounts for these social histories is the Peoplehood Matrix developed by Cherokee 
scholars Robert K. Thomas (Cherokee) and Tom Holm (Cherokee Nation). Thomas and 
Holm’s matrix centers the idea of peoplehood on four shared elements: shared language, 
shared ceremony/religion, shared place/territory, and shared history. These four elements 
interrelate to form a matrix that demonstrates a nucleus of a peoplehood through shared 
experience and offers another avenue of communal belonging.40 Holm, along with Ben 
Chavis (Lumbee) and Diane Pearson, argues that this matrix is inclusive in that it 
accounts for a wider scope of interpreting such belonging that makes up the relationships 
between people. He writes: “The factors of peoplehood make up a complete system that 
accounts for particular social, cultural, political, economic, and ecological behaviors 
exhibited by groups of people indigenous to particular territories” (12). Key to the matrix 
is the interdependence of each element on the others that combine to constitute a people’s 
mutually shared experience. Holm elaborates on how the four elements function in 
 204 
relation to one another. He adds: “A group-particular language . . . gives a sacred history 
a meaning of its own, particularly if origin, creation, migration and other stories are 
spoken rather than written. Language defines place and vice versa. Place names 
essentially . . . describe an area within the context of a group’s sacred history and culture” 
(13). Peoplehood, then, emerges from the network of linguistic, ceremonial, historical 
and territorial relationships among people within a group. Analyzing the Cherokee 
Freedmen narratives through the Peoplehood Matrix demonstrates this shared 
relationship and rewrites the Freedmen into a Cherokee history that a discourse of kinship 
linked solely through blood ostensibly erases. 
 Reclaiming and asserting these relationships between Cherokees and Freedmen 
based on shared peoplehood challenges the idea that communal belonging is based on 
race.41 It also reaffirms the Cherokee Nation’s position of being a political, not racial,42 
entity that historically sought to include allies through various relationships, such as those 
mentioned in the previous section, as the federal government encroached further on those 
communities. Peoplehood, Holm adds, “goes beyond the notion of race and even 
nationality. Historically Native American peoples adopted captives of several races. 
Adoption meant that the captive, regardless of race, became a member of a kin group. His 
or her new relatives were obligated to assimilate the new family member in terms of the 
four aspects of peoplehood” (16). Additionally, as Holm points out, engaging peoplehood 
creates an onus for both individuals and communities to reckon belonging through 
tribally specific epistemologies that the federal government tried to erase, which 
simultaneously keeps those cultural aspects alive. That said, it becomes clear that when 
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their stories are examined through the peoplehood matrix, Cherokee Freedmen re-emerge 
as kin who struggled alongside Cherokees to ensure their mutual sovereignty and 
survival. These relationships are ones that Justice argues ought to be re-claimed and re-
embraced. He writes: “There can be no higher ethical purpose than to . . . tend to those 
kin-fires; it’s a sacred trust. It’s what we do for family” (166-7). This conceiving of one 
another as family and dedication, then, to family is another reason to develop ideas of 
Cherokee belonging and nationhood on strictly Cherokee terms. Such terms derived from 
strictly Cherokee epistemologies can speak to the “sacred trust” among Cherokees that 
Justice refers to, a sanctity that is unaccounted for in a discourse of Western law and 
concepts of race. 
 
 
“The minute you say that you’re Cherokee, I’m going to expect something out of 
you”: The shared language of Cherokee Indians and Freedmen 
 
 Bo Taylor (Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians), archivist and Cherokee-language 
instructor at the Museum of the Cherokee Indian in Cherokee, North Carolina, leaned 
forward and told Choctaw writer LeAnne Howe what being Cherokee really means for 
him. “The minute you say that you’re Cherokee, I’m going to expect something out of 
you,” Taylor says,  
 I’m going to expect that you know something. Being Cherokee is about that 
 culture, the language and the history. . . .  If, one of these days if, you know, my 
 great-great-great-grandkids are 1/1000 Cherokee and they're whatever color – I 
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 don't know what color they'll be – but, you know, I would hope that somewhere 
 down the line they're still singing the Cherokee songs. And they're still speaking 
 the Cherokee language. And the Cherokee is always there, and that spiritual fire 
 will always burn inside of them. That's what will make them Cherokee. (Spiral of 
 Fire 19) 
 
Taylor’s assertion of the importance of Cherokee language comes from the film Spiral of 
Fire (2009), a documentary that traces Howe’s journey through Eastern Band Cherokee 
territory. She visits Eastern Band territory not only to learn about her roots as the 
daughter of a Cherokee man about whom she knew little, but also to delve into issues that 
affect the community such as tourism, diabetes, cultural revitalization and, most 
poignantly and, contentiously, what it means to be Cherokee today. Language is one 
subject the film focuses on, and it maintains a place in the Peoplehood Matrix as another 
shared element that signifies belonging within a community.43 
 Several of the Cherokee slave narratives demonstrate that the individuals learned 
and used the Cherokee language throughout their lives in daily tasks such as their labor 
obligations as slaves and in their shared religious ceremonies. However, in addition to 
communicating with Cherokees and fellow slaves in the Cherokee language during their 
everyday lives, the slaves engaged in another essential component of shared language 
that carves out a place of belonging for them in Cherokee Nation history – their fluency 
in multiple languages. Because the slave experience included being bought and sold with 
little notice throughout the southeastern region of what is now the United States, slaves 
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learned to adapt to various communities and geographies, which often resulted in their 
developing a command of several languages, including English and other Indian 
languages. It is essential, therefore, that any analysis of belonging of Cherokee slaves and 
their descendants to a wider Cherokee community through the Peoplehood Matrix’ 
element of shared language take into consideration both slaves’ use of Cherokee and the 
ways that slaves used English and the languages of neighboring Indian nations to effect 
Cherokee diplomacy and ultimately resistance to the encroaching settler state in an effort 
to build and defend the Cherokee Nation. 
 The role of language in the lives of Indian slaves within their communities and the 
place of it as a cornerstone of their identities within those communities frequently 
emerges in the slaves’ narratives of their experience in Indian Territory during a time 
when several Indian nations were rebuilding after Removal. One example occurs in 
Spence Johnson’s account of his Afro-Choctaw mother having been kidnapped near a 
creek by “nigger stealers” and being sold to a slave master in Louisiana. Johnson says: 
“When Marse Riley bought her, she couldn’ speak nothin’ but de Choctaw words. 
Mammy’s folks was all Choctaw Indians . . . Dey was all known in de Territory in de ole 
days” (Minges 160). This example indicates that while some Indian slaves acquired an 
ability to communicate in several languages, for many of them their first language was 
the one of their respective Indian communities.  
Likewise, other narratives demonstrate that having the ability to converse in an 
Indian language was sometimes attributed to having an Indian parent or having grown up 
in an Indian family alongside Indian children and their parents and having been treated as 
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one of the family. In her narrative, Cherokee Freedwoman Patsy Perryman recounts her 
mother’s connection to a Cherokee family that resulted in her mother’s possessing shared 
language with that family. Perryman recalls: “The Taylor family was Cherokees, and the 
mistress and master always treated us mighty good. We didn’t know what whippings 
were. My mother had always been with Mistress Judy Taylor, and she was the only 
mother my mama ever had, least the only one she could remember . . . She was raised by 
the Indians, and could talk Cherokee” (74-5). Here, Perryman singles out her mother’s 
ability to speak Cherokee as an indication not of simply having been a slave who toiled 
on Cherokee land. Rather, Perryman attributes that language ability to the fact that the 
Taylors treated her mother not as a lowly slave, but as a surrogate daughter who the 
Taylors brought in and raised alongside their own children.44 Perryman indicates further 
in the narrative that the kinship connection between her biological family and the Taylors 
was so intense that she “[cried] to stay with her, even when the peace come that set us 
free” (75).  While certainly not all Cherokee slaves had such an endearing experience 
with their owners, Perryman demonstrates that in some instances Cherokee families 
conceived of slaves as surrogate kin and that shared language is a verbal extension of that 
kinship.45 Similarly Johnson’s narrative, though Choctaw, indicates that some slaves’ 
primary language, in some cases only language, was that which they shared with their 
Indian owners, the Indian language being the only linguistic tool they had through which 
to communicate and express themselves.  
 Though these two passages focus on the immediate relationship between slaves 
and Indians through shared language, for other slaves who relocated after abolition, the 
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Cherokee language is a medium that transports them to a place of fondness and 
belonging. Chaney Richardson, a Cherokee Freedwoman who was born near Caney 
Creek, southeast of Tahlequah, recounts in her narrative how the Cherokee language is at 
once a medium of her spirituality and the gentle nudge that wakes dormant memories of 
her childhood with her parents in Indian Territory. Richardson recalls:  
 We had a church made out of brush arbor, and we would sing good songs in 
 Cherokee sometimes. I’ve been a good churchgoer all my life, until I git too 
 feeble. I still understand and talk the Cherokee language, and love to hear songs 
 and parts of the Bible in it, because it make me think of the time when I was a 
 little girl, before my mammy and pappy leave me. (53)   
This passage demonstrates how the Cherokee language among some former slaves was so 
ingrained as part of their identities that it served as vehicle through which they expressed 
their connections in the most intimate arenas such as family and faith. Similarly, the 
Cherokee language is their connection not only to a past lived in Indian Territory, but 
also to a promise of deliverance and a place in the Christian afterlife. 
 While the language carries different means to the same end of shared peoplehood 
between Indians and their slaves and Freedmen, one global commonality that evinces 
itself in the ways both groups use the language is that of Cherokees –  meaning Indian, 
white and black Cherokees – distinguishing themselves from settlers through shared 
language. Sturm argues that among Cherokees today, fluency in the Cherokee language is 
a manifestation of a commitment to Cherokee community and a temporal boundary 
between Cherokees and the colonizer. She writes:  
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 For most Cherokees, speaking the Cherokee language represents a symbolic and 
 practical marker of social connections with and commitment to Cherokee 
 community life. Fluency stands for time shared. After all, to become a fluent 
 Cherokee speaker one has to be raised in a Cherokee-speaking household or 
 community or spend a large portion of time with other Cherokee speakers. The 
 inverse of time shared is time apart from Euroamerican society. (Blood Politics 
 121) 
 
Applying this analysis of contemporary Cherokee communities to the aforementioned 
Cherokee slave narratives, it becomes clear that slaves and Freedmen who developed a 
command of Cherokee, whether by embracing the language through familial relationships 
or learning it as a means of survival, also dwelled in the temporal space of the “time 
shared.” The Freedmen’s place within this shared time designates a linguistic peoplehood 
in terms of constructing a Cherokee identity in opposition to that of the settlers on two 
fronts, both indicating where Freedmen’s allegiances lay. Learning Cherokee to fluency 
indicates Afro-Cherokees not only spent time apart from the settlers, but that they spent 
that time with Cherokees.  
 This time apart from Euroamerican communities might be evident through 
Freedmen’s command of Cherokee language, but the Freedmen also used language to 
create a shared national identity with Cherokees in opposition to the United States. 
Another example of Freedmen’s use of shared language to build the Cherokee Nation 
against the settler state appears in their use of English. While Thomas and Holm’s 
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Peoplehood Matrix accounts for language shared among members of a kin community, in 
the case of Freedmen and Cherokees this singular approach neglects to tell the whole 
story of how Freedmen used English to develop connections to Cherokees by helping 
them forge political resistance against the federal government.  
 Leslie Ross likewise demonstrates Freedmen’s linguistic acumen when he 
describes his great-grandfather, Joseph “Stick” Ross, who served as both a sheriff and 
tribal councilman in the Cherokee Nation. Ross says: “‘He knew sign language and spoke 
Cherokee and Seminole,’. . . ‘He was pretty renown in Tahlequah’” (1). Because slaves 
often had white masters before being sold to Cherokees, several of them spoke English. 
Tiya Miles argues that Cherokees relied on their slaves to serve as both translators and 
teachers of English as the interactions between the Nation and the United States grew 
more frequent and more contentious. She writes: “Without skills in English, Cherokees 
had little hope of negotiating with white invaders with clarity and confidence. And 
without negotiations, Cherokees had no chance of staking a claim that white Americans 
might respect . . . For Cherokees who only spoke their native tongue, slaves would have 
been indispensable” (95). Just as Cherokee slaves and Freedmen often used Cherokee 
language to voice a shared peoplehood with Cherokees, they also forged another 
linguistic connection by interpreting English for Cherokees and teaching some of them 
English, giving Cherokees a voice through which to articulate Cherokee rights and 
sovereignty in their interactions with white interlopers, using language to help Cherokees 
even the political playing field.  
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 The Cherokee Freedmen’s history with Cherokee language and their use of 
English for the benefit of Cherokees is evidence of the transformative quality of language 
in forging connections in a peoplehood system, lending urgency to Taylor’s earlier claim 
that revitalizing and maintaining the language should be regarded as nothing less than an 
“expectation” on the part of people who claim to be Cherokee. Adding to the 
conversation of the importance of language is a Cherokee man cited in Sturm’s book who 
articulates the role of the language in determining who is in fact Cherokee and why it is 
an integral part of communal relationships. He asserts: “‘When the language ceases to 
exist, then we cease to exist.’ . . . ‘When Cherokee becomes a dead language, then we 
may as well throw in the towel’” (121).  
 
“I wants to go where Jesus lives!”: Shared religion between Cherokees and 
Freedmen 
 In her narrative, Cherokee Freedwoman Victoria Taylor Thompson recounts the 
occasions when Cherokee slave masters would take their slaves to witness public 
hangings. While discussing her experience as a Christian, she recalls one hanging during 
which she shared a brief spiritual moment with a Cherokee as he reclined against his own 
casket, waiting to be taken up to the gallows. Thompson recounts: “I thinks everybody 
should obey the Master. He died, and I wants to go where Jesus lives. Like the poor 
Indian I saw one time waiting to be hung. Dere he was, setting on his own coffin box, 
singing over and over the words I just said: ‘I wants to go where Jesus lives!’” (Baker 
424). Thompson’s account details a single, ephemeral moment in which she connected to 
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an Indian Cherokee through a line of a Christian hymn just before his execution, but the 
connection shared between Cherokees and their slaves and Freedmen extends deeper into 
a history of shared resistance through religion. 
 Before describing how some communities of Freedmen and Cherokees eventually 
came together through shared religion to fight mutual oppression in a form of liberation 
theology,46 it is necessary to briefly point out how Christianity and its role in the federal 
government’s “civilizing” project cleared the way for Cherokees to adopt a practice of 
slavery in the first place. In Slavery in the Cherokee Nation: The Keetoowah Society and 
the Defining of a People, 1855-1867 (2003), Patrick N. Minges describes the process 
through which white missionaries brought Protestant Christianity into Indian Country as 
a civilizing tool and how Cherokee Baptists eventually used this theology shared with the 
Freedmen to help create the Keetoowah Society, a group dedicated to preserving and 
returning to traditional Cherokee ways after generations of Euroamerican encroachment. 
Minges describes Andrew Jackson’s civilization plan that involved Christianity and a 
focus on agriculture. Jackson believed that Euroamerican ideas of civilization would 
“‘put into [Indians’] children the primer and the hoe, and they will naturally, in time, take 
hold of the plow; and, as their minds become enlightened and expand, the Bible will be 
their book, and they will grow in the habits of morality and industry’” (qtd. in Minges 
35).47 Minges further states that the Christian value of industry and the increase in 
Cherokee exogamy led to Cherokees’ adopting a plantation society similar to those 
emerging in the United States.48 Miles, however, adds that Cherokees engaged in slavery 
not as a means to assimilate, but rather as a way to stave off further transgression on the 
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part of federal government and its civilizing program. She writes: “In a painful irony, the 
Cherokee Nation borrowed political systems of racial ideologies from the United States 
to avoid becoming more fully American,” . . . Cherokees “participated in antiblack 
racism, not because they admired Americans but because they wanted to be rid of them” 
(113). Though Cherokees did exercise agency in the introduction and perpetuation of 
slavery in the Nation, the complicit role of Christian missionaries in the practice of 
slavery, supported by their religious teachings, is too great to be overlooked. 
 Though some early Cherokees recognized the potential for stemming colonial 
oppression by adopting Christianity, Cherokees and Freedmen also share a history of 
oppression through that religion. While scholars have written volumes on the ways that 
Christianity was used as a “civilizing” framework on the part of the federal government 
and missionaries in Indian Country,49 detailing the shared oppression via religion of 
Cherokees and their slaves requires that we examine how missionaries used religion to 
encourage Cherokees to oppress Africans and Afro-Cherokees while Cherokees 
themselves were often victims of religious subjugation. Though some individual pastors 
might have been opposed to slavery, few would preach against the practice in Cherokee 
communities because whites in the region considered slavery a sign of Indians embracing 
so-called civilization, and these Cherokees were some of the preachers’ most eager 
converts. Likewise, Minges mentions that slaves also were keen to convert, and 
missionaries coveted slaves’ multilingual talent and sought them to translate the Gospel 
into Cherokee. More insidious, however, was the fact that the missionaries would use this 
inroad against both Cherokees and slaves by re-writing Cherokee origin stories in such a 
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way that condoned slavery. Minges writes: “A new creation myth arose among the 
Cherokee that spoke of a common origin for humanity but a specific curse upon the black 
race that ordained ‘that the negro must work for the red and white man, and it has been so 
ever since’” (36).50 Just as missionaries used Christianity to vilify and erase Cherokee 
spiritual practices and other cultural epistemologies, the religion also was a method of 
facilitating the oppression of Cherokee slaves as well as a racialized discourse that 
furthered the rift between Cherokees and their African and Afro-Cherokee counterparts.51  
 This rift continued to build post-Removal as debates over slavery and abolition 
emerged in the Nation. The source of both support and opposition to slavery in these 
debates was often the Bible, and black Baptist ministers influenced their traditionalist 
Cherokee counterparts who later formed the Keetoowah Society as a way to undermine 
Euroamerican beliefs and to reclaim traditional Cherokee ways of viewing community.52 
While some missionaries and Cherokees claimed to be “neutral” about slavery because 
the Bible contains no explicit directive against the practice, black Baptist ministers in 
Indian Territory such as Uncle Rueben, one of Jesse Bushyhead’s slaves, preached a 
message of freedom and equality that reached both African-descent and Indian Cherokee 
audiences. Minges indicates that Baptist congregations were made up primarily of former 
slaves and their descendants, both black and Indian. Within the arbors of makeshift 
churches, black ministers used the invaders’ religion to preach a message of fraternity 
and freedom, a veil for a deeper resistance that surfaced later. Minges writes: 
 At the heart of the Baptist gospel message within the Indian Territory was the 
 universal language of freedom that arose within the prophetic religion of 
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 Aframerindian Baptist churches. This folk community practiced an ‘art of 
 resistance’ that constituted the core of their religious beliefs and practices, and it 
 was a community whose very existence constituted resistance to the ideology of 
 racial supremacy. (66) 
After years of white, Christian incursion into Cherokee communities augmented the 
racial stratification between blacks and Indians, Cherokee Freedmen ministers were able 
to appropriate the faith and spread a message of racial equality. And as the divide 
between pro-slavery and abolitionist Cherokees widened, one group of Cherokees in 
particular was listening closely. 
 Angered by the growth of slavery and the subsequent erosion of pre-Contact ways 
of reckoning communal belonging, a group of Cherokee Baptist ministers gathered in 
Peavine Baptist Church in 1859 and formed the Keetoowah Society, a group that sought 
to reconcile Christianity and traditional religious practices and one that extended itself 
into the social and political arenas. Ministers like Lewis Downing, Budd Gritts, and 
Thomas Pegg, whose religious beliefs were framed largely in the black-influenced 
Baptist church, endeavored to recover the Kituwah53 Spirit. The Keetoowah Laws54 
characterize the Spirit as the belief that “Indians believe in a Great Spirit who cared for 
his people and who desired that they care for each other” (qtd. in Minges 76). Though the 
Baptists and Keetoowahs eventually split, the Society’s origin was rooted in a blend of 
the liberation theology of the indigenized Baptist church and elements of traditional 
spirituality such as stomp dances, ingesting black drink,55 and engaging in ball play.56 
Additionally, this sharing of ceremonial traditions allowed for the inclusion of both 
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Cherokees and African descendants57 as part of the Keetoowah Society in a mission of 
undermining the mutual oppression imposed on Indians and African descendants partially 
through the medium of Christianity. 
 Just as the Baptist churches included both Indian and African-descended 
congregants, the Keetoowah Society mirrored this inclusion, though its bylaws would 
appear otherwise. Chapter II, section 6, of the Keetoowah Laws outline who can become 
a member of the society. It reads: “Only fullblood Cherokees uneducated, and no mixed-
blood friends shall be allowed to become a member” (qtd. in Minges 78). Minges argues 
that the designation “fullblood” here refers not to parentage but rather to the cultural 
definition of one who is committed to the practice and perpetuation of traditional 
Cherokee ways, regardless of what the individual’s actual ancestry is.58 He adds that 
“uneducated” refers to members’ not having been culturally or communally usurped by 
Euroamerican ideas. Minges writes: “If one were literate in the Cherokee language and 
knowledgeable of Cherokee culture, as many African-Americans were, then these were 
the universal bonds of the ‘Kituwah Spirit’ that made one a member of the beloved 
community,” (79). As the previous section notes, several slaves and Freedmen were 
fluent in Cherokee and in some cases spoke only Cherokee. Additionally, as evidenced 
by the missionaries’ teachings regarding race, blacks in the Nation were often unable to 
assimilate into Euroamerican ways owing to their position in the Euroamerican racial 
hierarchy, most prominently displayed through their inescapable phenotypes. The 
Keetoowahs, however, believe all races descend from a common one. Minges argues: 
“Thus, the Cherokee Nation, as understood by the Keetoowah in the ‘old ways,’ would be 
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open to all people regardless of race. It is antithetical to those  . . . who believed that the 
‘Great Spirit who cared for his people and desired that they care for each other’ would 
exclude ones whose history and destiny were so linked to their own” (79). The Indian and 
black members of the Keetoowah Society extended their influence into politics with a 
goal of emphasizing the voices of traditional Cherokees and of upholding Cherokee 
sovereignty against a federal government that failed to recognize it. While the group’s 
political endeavors were significant at a time when the Nation was factionalizing on a 
traditional-progressive line, the Keetoowah Society’s early mission of bringing together 
traditional Cherokees, blacks included, through shared religion solidified the fact that just 
as both groups were marginalized and dispossessed at the hand of Euroamerican 
invaders, it is incumbent on both groups to resist it by crafting and disseminating the 
message that all humans are equal. Doing so positioned the group to live out their creed 
outlined in Keetoowah Law that the society “should be like one family. It should be the 
intention that we must abide with each other in love” (qtd. in Minges 89).  
 Thompson’s narrative is unique in that while several Freedmen talk about being 
Christian, and some describe the similarities between baptism and going to water,59 hers 
is one of the few accounts in which a Freedman describes a lived moment of shared 
religion with an Indian. One line – “I wants to go where Jesus lives” – uttered by a 
condemned Indian and lingering in the memory of a Cherokee Freedwoman, is a spoken 
manifestation of a shared religion tethered to a kinship of resistance to those who would 
break up a community that insists that all its members be treated as family. 
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“The green hills and blooming prairies of this Nation look like home to me”: Shared 
land and Cherokee-Freedmen peoplehood 
Another element of the Peoplehood Matrix through which we can read the 
Freedmen narratives and establish them as Cherokee outside of a racial-political context 
is that of shared land. Land plays a major role in establishing Cherokee identity in that 
defining the boundaries of Cherokee land was the first article in each Cherokee 
constitution. Likewise, in the early days of the centralized Cherokee Nation, citizenship 
was contingent on Cherokees continuing to live within Cherokee borders. Land and 
belonging through shared land also figures historically when we consider Removal and 
that thousands of Cherokees, including Freedmen, had to rebuild the Nation west of the 
Mississippi. Some Cherokees, however, did remain in the traditional homeland, including 
those who today make up the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians in North Carolina as 
well as those Cherokees who stayed in what became parts of Georgia, Alabama and 
Tennessee. Because these Cherokees did not move with the Nation, and in essence no 
longer inhabited Cherokee land, they lost their citizenship60 in the Cherokee Nation.61 
This fact demonstrates the importance of land in defining Cherokee belonging. When we 
consider how the Freedmen not only lived in the homeland, removed with other 
Cherokees to what is now eastern Oklahoma, and helped to rebuild the Nation on the new 
landscape, we can identify ways that they, too, retain their sense of being Cherokee 
through the Peoplehood Matrix epistemology of shared land.  
One example of a Freedmen narrative that invokes this connection to shared land 
is that of Cherokee Freedwoman Chaney McNair. McNair’s narrative demonstrates how 
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growing up on Cherokee land, as did their Indian counterparts, taught some Freedmen all 
they knew and that life outside of that shared space could prove difficult. In her narrative, 
McNair jokes that she was practically useless as a slave when her Cherokee master, 
William Penn Adair, 62 sent her to work for a white family in Kansas during the Civil 
War. Underneath her self-deprecating quip, however, is a statement of her shared 
connection with Cherokees to the land that comprises the Cherokee Nation. McNair 
recalls: “I didn’t know nothin’ ‘cept what I’d learned on Marster William’s plantation. 
First place I went, the woman say, ‘You make a fire in the stove.’. . . There was no wood 
to make a fire. All I could see was piles of black rocks . . . . ‘I can’t make no white folks’ 
fire. I can’t make no fire with rocks’” (Minges 43). This passage from McNair’s narrative 
is based on her labor as a slave, but her admitted inability to function in a white world, or 
outside of a distinctly Cherokee world, evokes a connection to a space shared with 
Cherokees.  
 Outside of their life and labor on Cherokee land, we can also conceive of 
Cherokee Freedmen as Cherokee through the framework of shared land and how, by 
sharing that land, they are indigenous to the Cherokee Nation as a state. It would be too 
simplistic to dismiss the Freedmen’s indigenous claim to the Cherokee state by pointing 
out their ancestors’ African origins, assuming of course a Freedmen of singular African 
descent of which there are few. Though the ancestors of African-descended Cherokees 
might not be indigenous to the land, generations of sharing that land with Indian 
Cherokees before the existence of the centralized Cherokee state makes the Freedmen 
indigenous to the Nation regardless of their ancestors’ geographic origin.  
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One way of understanding the argument of the Freedmen being indigenous to the 
Cherokee Nation through shared land with other Cherokees is by looking at another black 
community that has struggled to gain recognition as indigenous alongside other Indian 
groups – the Garifunas in Honduras. This departure from Indian County to Honduras is 
relevant in that as Honduras seeks to position itself as a multicultural nation, various 
arguments have emerged about how to situate the black population that had existed there 
for centuries and is part of the state’s political and historical imaginaries. One argument 
for Garifunas’ indigenous claim to the land that could be applied to the Cherokee 
Freedmen comes from Eduardo Villanueva whose position as fiscalía de etnias y 
patrimonio cultural of the Honduran government charged him with handling the Garifuna 
claims. He argues: “‘It doesn’t seem just to me to say that negros are not indígenas 
because their primordial ancestors are in Africa. When I say indígena I mean to include 
the Garifuna in the concept because they were here when the state was organized’” (qtd. 
in Anderson 397). Villanueva’s argument poses an interesting question regarding how to 
view indigenous connections to land. He asserts that though the Garifunas were not 
indigenous to the land itself, they were present before the state of Honduras was created 
and are, therefore, indigenous to the nation of Honduras. Extended to Cherokee slaves 
and their descendants, one could argue that because Cherokees and their slaves were 
simultaneously removed to a new space in Indian Territory, both groups are indigenous 
not only to the Nation that rebuilt itself west of the Mississippi but also to the actual 
landscape, sharing a peoplehood connection through shared land described in Thomas 
and Holm’s Peoplehood Matrix.  
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 This shared connection to the land, however, extends long before Removal. Celia 
E. Naylor notes that while some older Cherokee slaves could recall Africa, the 
generations of slaves born on Cherokee land had no other physical reference of origin 
beyond those borders. She writes: “Although their parents or grandparents might have 
recalled an African home far away, the central ideas of home for these enslaved African-
descended individuals, having been born in the Americas, were primarily grounded in 
Indian-dominated spaces and nations” (4). This sharing of land emerged from a shared 
history of Euroamerican invasion, forced removal, and nation rebuilding, but the sheer 
affinity for the land is probably best demonstrated in the choice freed slaves made after 
the Civil War to either stay in Indian Territory or to migrate again to the East. Naylor 
indicates that many “crossland slaves,” those who were removed with Cherokees to 
Indian Territory, were more likely to return to their kin communities from the eastern 
states after abolition than were their children who were born in Indian Territory simply 
because they had a lived experience in a geography away from the Territory. The 
generations of slaves born in the Territory, however, stayed because it was the only space 
and community they ever knew. Older generations of slaves, according to Naylor, also 
tended to experience the brunt of the brutality of chattel more than younger slaves, which 
gave them even more incentive to leave their former Cherokee masters and to start over 
in a more familiar geography.  
This difference between the generations in their preferences to stay or leave the 
land is exemplified in the narrative of Cherokee Freedman Milton Starr. Starr was born in 
Indian Territory to his slave mother, Jane Coursey, and, Naylor suggests, her Cherokee 
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owner Jerry Starr. Milton Starr mentions that the other Starrs treated him like family, so 
he chose to stay in Indian Territory after abolition whereas Coursey returned to 
Tennessee. Naylor gives several reasons why Coursey might have left the Territory, each 
based on her having had a point of origin pre-Removal and owing to how the Starrs likely 
treated her. She writes: “For Coursey, the removal and resettlement processes could have 
represented a dreadful cycle beginning with the forced separation from kin in Tennessee 
and continuing with sexual victimization by Jerry Starr, and possibly others, in Indian 
Territory” (81). For some slaves of this older generation, Indian Territory was a site of 
abuse and a tearing apart of families, while for the younger generation who opted to 
remain, Indian Territory and the Cherokees were the only geographic and communal 
contexts in which they ever existed. Naylor adds that it is this connection to the land, and 
disconnection in Coursey’s case, and subsequent experiences with Cherokees that 
eventually led to Coursey’s leaving for Tennessee and Milton Starr’s remaining tethered 
to the land he shared with his Cherokee surrogate family. Naylor writes: “The longing 
Coursey must have experienced for her kin and friends left behind in Tennessee could not 
be replaced by the birth of her son. Milton Starr’s connection to . . . Indian Territory 
extinguished any ideas about leaving Indian Territory and relocating to Tennessee with 
his mother” (82). Here, Naylor emphasizes that a blood relationship to his biological 
mother did not suffice to supplant his relationship to the land and to Cherokees who 
treated him like family and who, Naylor believes, might actually have been his family.  
 For those Cherokee Freedmen like Milton Starr who chose to stay in Indian 
Territory, that connection to the shared land lent itself to a chance at citizenship in the 
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Nation that was grounded partially in their residing in Cherokee territory, another marker 
of belonging rooted in shared land. Shared land and Cherokee citizenship is outlined in 
the Treaty of 1866 that states that “all free colored persons who were in the country at the 
commencement of the rebellion, and are now residents therein, or who may return within 
six months, and their descendants, shall have all the rights of native Cherokees” (qtd. in 
Naylor 225, emphasis mine). The treaty specifically grounds Cherokee citizenship in 
geography by emphasizing residency in or return to Cherokee territory. This provision of 
the treaty is another articulation of belonging through shared place and, incidentally, is a 
point of contention regarding the contemporary debate of Freedmen’s status in the 
Nation. However, though one could argue for a peoplehood model based in part on 
shared land and framed in nationhood like Villanueva does, the fact that the group’s 
shared physical space pre-dates the Nation means that it also pre-dates the law. Cherokee 
Freedmen Joseph Rogers makes exactly this point in his appeal for citizenship, and 
subsequent communal belonging, by framing his argument in a rhetoric of shared land, 
stating that Indian Territory is the only land he knows. In his appeal, he stated: 
 ‘Born and raised among these people, I don’t want to know any other. The green 
 hills and blooming prairies of this Nation look like home to me. The rippling of its 
 pebbly bottom brooks made a music that delighted my infancy, and in my ear it 
 has not lost its sweetness. I look around and I see Cherokees who in the early days 
 of my life were my playmates in youth and early manhood, my companions, and 
 now as the decrepitude of age steals upon me, will you not let me lie down and 
 die, your fellow citizen?’ (qtd. in Naylor 176) 
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Rogers’ appeal encapsulates the depth of the Freedmen’s connection with Cherokees 
through shared land. In addition to poetically describing the Cherokee landscape as an 
idyllic scene, he asserts a lifelong affinity to the land by mentioning both his birth on that 
land and his desire to die in that space, forever rooting himself, as are many Cherokee 
slaves, in that shared land. Rogers failed to return within the specified six months so his 
claim for citizenship failed to meet national legal criteria. However, by invoking a 
connection to shared land, he based his appeal for citizenship on a history of shared space 
with the only people he cares to know. 
 
“My father and grandfather helped to tow them over”: History shared between 
Cherokees and Freedmen 
 
 The final element of the Peoplehood Matrix to consider in the analysis of the 
Freedmen as Cherokee is the history that the Freedmen share with their Indian 
counterparts. Just as how the history of Removal shaped subsequent articulations of 
identity among Indian Cherokees that they pass through the generations, Indian 
Cherokees weren’t alone in that violent upheaval. As the Freedmen narratives 
demonstrate, the devastation surrounding Removal that Freedmen shared with Indians 
informs Freedmen identity for generations as well, showing that Cherokee Freedmen 
history and that of Indian Cherokees are one and the same.  
In her narrative, for example, Nannie Gordon recounts the story of how her 
ancestors helped bring removed Cherokees across the river and into Indian Territory. 
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Gordon recounts: “They said that when the Georgia (Cherokee) Indians come out to this 
country where I’m living at now, that lots of them Indians was ferried across the river at 
the master’s place. My father and grandfather helped to tow them over” (qtd. in Baker 
170). Gordon’s ancestors physically ferried displaced Cherokees into the land that 
became their new home and the site of the new Nation, but this account is only a single 
incident of a larger shared history of removal and rebuilding between Cherokees and their 
slaves and Freedmen. 
 The history created between these groups is a broad topic, so for the purpose of 
analyzing peoplehood through their shared history, this section will focus on a couple of 
close readings of Cherokee slave narratives that demonstrate the shared experience of 
Removal and the Freedmen’s hand in revitalizing the Cherokee Nation. These narratives 
exemplify the Keetoowah Society’s position that Freedmen history and destiny are 
intertwined with Indian Cherokees’ own.  
 Several of the narratives describe the slaves’ own experiences during Removal 
alongside Cherokees. Freedwoman Eliza Whitmire, who states she was five during her 
family’s Removal from Georgia, recounts in vivid detail the way U.S. soldiers forced 
Cherokees and their slaves from their homes in preparation for a march to unfamiliar 
land. Whitmire remembers: “The women and children were driven from their homes, 
sometimes with blows, and close on the heels of the retreating Indians came greedy 
whites to pillage the Indians’ homes. They even rifled the graves for any jewelry or other 
ornaments that might have been buried with the dead” (qtd. in Minges 34). Whitmire 
goes on to explain the journey itself through the chilling winter and how it is a shared 
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memory between Cherokees and their former slaves. She recalls: “The trip was made in 
the dead of winter, and many died of exposure from the sleet and snow, and all who lived 
to make this trip, or had parents who made it, will long remember it as a bitter memory” 
(34). Whitmire’s experience indicates that the slaves and Cherokees all shared in the 
resulting destruction of Removal, but another Freedwoman demonstrates that the politics 
among Cherokees surrounding Removal carried over into Indian Territory and led to 
more baneful experiences between the groups.  
 Chaney Richardson, the Freedwoman for whom the Cherokee language brought 
back memories of her parents, recalls how the history of Removal and the belligerent 
politics that underlay it between the Ross and Treaty Parties extended into her own 
family. She recounts: “That feud got so bad that the Indians wan [sic] always talking 
about getting their horses and cattle killed, and their slaves harmed. I was too little to 
know how bad it was until one morning my mammy wont off somewhere down the road . 
. . and she didn’t come back” (50). The “feud” Richardson mentions refers to the conflict 
between the Ross and Treaty Parties that erupted over Removal, the Treaty Party having 
signed away Cherokee land in the Treaty of New Echota (1835) and the Ross Party 
opposing removal from the ancestral homeland. This conflict carried over in Indian 
Territory over the issue of slavery during the Civil War, which is how this history extends 
to slave communities in addition to their having both undergone Removal. This Cherokee 
feud resulted in the murder of Richardson’s mother, demonstrating how Cherokee history 
affected individual slaves. The details memorably illustrate how this history adversely 
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affected slaves who shared in the animosity and violence between the two Cherokee 
factions. Richardson says: 
 ‘It was about a week later that two Indian men rid up and ast [sic] Old Master 
 wesn’t  [sic] his gal Ruth gone. He says yes. . . . They find her in some bushes . . . 
 and she been dead all the time. Somebody done hit her in the head with a club, 
 and shot her through and through with a bullet, too. She was so swole up, they 
 couldn’t lift her up and jest had to make a deep hole right alongside of her  and 
 roll her in it, she was so bad mortified.’ (qtd. in Minges 50-1) 
With this detail in mind, it is interesting to note that just as Cherokee history and the 
subsequent politics resulted in Richardson’s mother’s brutal death, it is Cherokee 
language that Richardson find comforting and through which she remembers happier 
times with her parents, an indication of the interrelatedness of these two markers of 
peoplehood in Thomas and Holm’s Peoplehood Matrix. 
 While the shared experiential and political histories of Removal affected both 
Cherokees and their Freedmen in abominable ways, the groups also rebuilt the Nation 
together. Whitmire describes the settling of Tahlequah and how she and her mother 
provided material support through their labor during the reconstruction of the Nation and 
formation of intertribal alliances in Indian Territory. She recalls: “I remember, too, the 
great Inter-Tribal Council, which was held in Tahlequah in 1843, under the leadership of 
Chief John Ross. My mother assisted with the cooking at that gathering, while my duty 
was to carry water to those at the meeting, from the nearby springs” (35). While feeding 
Cherokees in power was a duty of indentured labor, it is impossible to overlook how this 
 229 
labor laid the groundwork for the reconstitution and growth of the Cherokee Nation, 
further demonstrating that shared history of Removal and nation rebuilding that 
Cherokees and Freedmen possess is a relationship rooted in the very existence and 
survival of Cherokees. Lewis Rough, a former Cherokee slave, thought as much when he 
wrote to President Ulysses S. Grant in 1872, asking him to help Chief Lewis Downing, a 
Keetoowah who supported the Freedmen, secure rights for Freedmen who did not make it 
back to the Cherokee Nation in time to be eligible for citizenship per the Treaty of 1866. 
In his letter, Rough invokes the shared history, including the slaves’ labor, that developed 
as they built the Cherokee Nation. Rough writes:  
 ‘Mr. Grant . . . . most of the Cherykees is down on the darkys. The Cherykees 
 says they aint in favour of the black man havin any claim, that they had rather 
 have any body else have a rite than us poor blacks . . . . [Lewis] downing, is for 
 us, Chelater [Oochalata], and mr. Six killer, them tree [sic] is in our favour, and 
 what can they doo with so many [on the other side]? . . .   [We] all think it rite too, 
 after we have made them rich and built their land, doo you [?]’ (qtd. in 
 McLoughlin After the Trail of Tears 254, emphasis mine) 
In advocating for his rights in the Cherokee Nation, Rough argues for the invaluable role 
that slave labor, such as that of Whitmire as well, played in creating the nation that 
Cherokees then and today hold dear. 
 This shared history between Cherokees and former slaves did not always go 
unnoticed in the Nation. The Keetoowahs and other advocates for Freedmen recognized 
the contributions, especially the value of their long-unpaid labor, of former Cherokee 
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slaves in the success of the Cherokee Nation. When Lewis Downing63 was elected as 
Principal Chief, one of his first acts in office was to propose a bill to the Cherokee Senate 
to grant citizenship to former slaves who did not return to the Nation within six months as 
stipulated in the Treaty of 1866. As Rough mentions in his letter to President Grant, 
Keetoowah politicians Oochelata and Sixkiller likewise supported the bill; however, the 
Senate defeated the bill twice. In explaining why the Cherokee Senate voted to deny the 
Freedmen “too lates” citizenship, William Boudinot wrote:  
 ‘We admire the generous feelings which must have actuated the Principal Chief in 
 recommending such a measure. . . . We share [his] sympathy with the unfortunate 
 colored persons whom accident or inability prevented from realizing the greatest 
 boon ever given to any of the Race. But there is one consolation for us. It is the 
 reflection that what land these persons missed accepting still belongs to those who 
 owned it before, and that their shares, already too small, are not further reduced.’ 
 (qtd. in McLoughlin After the Trail 283) 
Through Boudinot’s statement, we learn that the decision to bar the late-coming 
Freedmen from Cherokee citizenship was informed by a fear that Freedmen would have 
access to Cherokee Nation assets, namely land, leaving less for their Indian and white 
citizens. Boudinot’s sentiment that, despite their unremunerated labor and their long 
history with their Indian Cherokee counterparts, the Freedmen were undeserving of a 
share of the Cherokee estate that they helped to build echoes today in Smith’s words that 
the Freedmen “did not help” and in Buzzard’s more vitriolic assertion that the Freedmen 
will “suck (Cherokees) dry.” However, the Senate’s decision did not remain 
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unchallenged, and in an 1872 letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John B. Jones, 
a longtime missionary and advocate for Cherokees, issued a sentiment as pertinent today 
as it was back then. In recognizing the Freedmen’s history and contributions to the 
Cherokee Nation, Jones wrote:   
 ‘[The Senate] did not take into account the fact that these colored people and their 
 ancestors have labored for Cherokees unpaid for many years, and that the fruits of 
 such unpaid toil have afforded the means of defraying the expenses of educating 
 many of the most highly cultivated Cherokees. As far as I am concerned, the class 
 thus educated are the loudest and most influential in opposing the adoption as 
 citizens of their former slaves. (qtd. in Minges The Keetoowah Society par 17)  
Jones points out in no uncertain terms that the Cherokees who benefitted most from 
exploited slave labor are the ones who most vociferously opposed their inclusion in the 
Nation. And back then, as during Smith’s tenure, they also were in a position to use the 
law to craft a national narrative that elided the Freedmen’s contribution to the Nation and 
left the Freedmen denationalized. By invoking the shared history element of the 
Peoplehood Matrix in the Freedmen narratives, today’s Freedmen can invoke their 
ancestors’ voices in their own narrative of critical, ethical Cherokee nationhood. Such a 
narrative not only can secure them the rights for which the Freedmen have fought for 
generations, but it also restores their ancestors’ place as the foundation of the very Nation 
they build upon today. 
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The protean quality of peoplehood and the Matrix as an equitable framework of 
belonging 
 Cherokees such as those I mentioned earlier have articulated the need for an 
alternative reckoning of belonging and construction of Cherokee identity that goes 
beyond the confines of race theory. As Russell and Ray point out, tethering the criteria 
for citizenship and by extension belonging in a discourse of racialized blood or a 
historicized (and flawed) legal definition creates a static framework through which the 
people can in essence effect their own demise. As I have demonstrated through the 
Freedmen WPA narratives, the Peoplehood Matrix, developed by Cherokees, can 
incorporate those individuals who are written out of the national narrative on the basis of 
racism masquerading as objective law. Defining belonging through a concept of 
peoplehood first and crafting a nation out of that framework – instead of the other way 
around – creates a more equitable and ultimately enduring nation. The fluidity of 
peoplehood allows the nation to morph as needed and responds to the reality of its 
constituents’ lives instead of its constituents trying to force their lives into a national 
framework that might not reflect their lived reality.  
However, the fear exists still that defining belonging through the lens of 
peoplehood, more specifically the Peoplehood Matrix, risks re-inscribing the same 
restrictive and confining boundaries of belonging and nationhood that the Matrix aims to 
destabilize. For example, Ojibwe scholar Scott Lyons argues that one can define the 
terms of the Matrix such as shared culture, land and language so rigidly that the People 
effect their own demise.  He draws on an essay by Apache scholar Bernadette Adley-
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Santa Maria who recounts her grandmother telling her that if she ceases to sing Apache 
songs, to tell Apache stories or to speak Apache, she then, in effect, ceases to be 
Apache.64 Lyons writes: “That is precisely the ‘problematic’ part of the peoplehood 
paradigm. If you do not conform to the model . . . if you happen to live away from your 
homeland, speak English, practice Christianity, or know more songs by the Dave 
Matthews Band than by the ancestors, you effectively ‘cease to exist’ as one of the 
People” (139). While Lyons’ assertion here, one of a people defining themselves out of 
existence, is certainly a possibility, it is only one of many possibilities that include 
defining the people with broader terms as times change and with it peoples’ lived 
experience. As John Lie mentions in his study on modern peoplehood, the reality of one’s 
lived experience, let alone those of an entire community, are far too complicated to define 
in the absolute terms that Lyons fears will be used through a strict interpretation of the 
Peoplehood Matrix. Lie writes: “Modern life is too complex and the modern self is too 
inscrutable to provide credible but concise narratives of self. One is – one has been and 
may well become – hundreds and thousands of predicates, with innumerable belongings 
and longings” (9). The flexibility of the Peoplehood Matrix accounts for this complexity 
of human experience that Lie describes. While Lyons points out that one can manipulate 
the Matrix in restrictive ways, the Matrix is still one of the few frameworks of identity 
that can also be broadened as needed and still maintain necessary boundaries. The worst-
case scenario of employing the Peoplehood Matrix is that which Lyons constructs, the re-
inscription of rigid terms of belonging and, by extension, nationhood. However, this 
worst-case scenario is no worse than the restrictive terms of nationhood that are already 
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in circulation such as racialized blood, blood quantum or descent from a historic tribal 
role to name a few. The difference is that while racialized blood, blood quantum and 
descent from historic rolls, for example, can only exclude, the Peoplehood Matrix has the 
potential to move in the opposite direction and be inclusive based on interpretations of 
the tribally-derived elements. The present terms do not allow for the latitude that might 
become necessary to reflect the reality of lived experience while upholding national 
boundaries. If tribal nations determine belonging and citizenship by blood quantum, the 
individual either meets the arbitrary cut-off (and with it possesses the supposed and 
debunked racialized characteristics of Indian blood) or he or she doesn’t. If nationhood is 
defined by descent from a tribal roll, either an individual traces to an ancestor who was 
documented on a particular roll, in a particular place, at a particular point in history, or he 
or she doesn’t. Circumscribing belonging and nationhood through strict interpretations of 
the terms sketched out in the Peoplehood Matrix leaves a community no worse off than it 
already is if it’s using other delimiting terms to begin with. The Peoplehood Matrix, 
however, allows communities to keep the frameworks of language, land, ceremonial 
cycle and history, but define the substance of these categories differently based on the 
contemporary needs of that community. The Matrix allows tribal communities to do 
exactly what Lyons argues they should, require what they wish to reproduce in terms of 
national make-up. In the end, while some current terms of nationhood such as blood 
quantum and descent from a historic roll foreclose on the possibility of adapting to the 
reality of changing times, the protean nature of the Peoplehood Matrix is designed to 
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adapt and to function on more complicated terms and as such operates not on preclusion 
but on possibility. 
The Peoplehood Matrix is based on cultural elements that a people ostensibly 
shares, and as the Freedmen narratives demonstrate, are not defined by biological 
assumptions, but rather learned. Because the elements of the Peoplehood Matrix are 
learned, they can be revitalized and reconfigured as needed outside of a settler-colonial 
relationship that privileges colonial epistemologies such as oppressive race theory and 
European-derived political theory. As a result, belonging, and in a political sense 
citizenship, based on peoplehood actually upholds political sovereignty because it 
prevents the group from being reduced to a denationalized race that can be defined out of 
existence.65 Russell elaborates on the potential of peoplehood. He writes: “All culture is 
learned. No exceptions. Language, religion, customs – all are learned. Leaving aside that 
the idea of inherited behavior is nonsense, it is dangerous because it leads to the 
conflation of Indian blood with Indian citizenship. It makes a ‘racial’ classification out of 
a political classification” (175-176). As Russell points out here, crafting a nation based 
on cultural elements – such as those that comprise the Peoplehood Matrix – enhances 
political sovereignty and avoids the peril inherent in building a nation out of a blood 
discourse.  
As does Lyons, however, Russell too notes that while peoplehood might be a 
serviceable framework of citizenship and belonging in theory, pragmatic concerns could 
impede any potential implementation of it. Indeed, he adds that administering “culture 
tests” can be problematic though he does analogize such a practice with that of the United 
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States making naturalized citizens pass a test through which they demonstrate basic 
knowledge of U.S. history and government.66 However, if we maintain the structures of 
the Peoplehood Matrix elements while being flexible with regard to the substance therein, 
the Peoplehood Matrix can accommodate historical and present realities, including the 
presence of people themselves such as the Freedmen, and create a narrative of critical 
nationhood that lives up to an ethical standard of including everyone who has had a hand 
in the endurance of the nation, even at a time when that nation attempts to write them out. 
For example, though one element of the Peoplehood Matrix is “shared language,” that 
term is loose enough that it doesn’t necessarily have to imply that all Cherokees must 
speak Cherokee. The elements of the Peoplehood Matrix and their relationship in 
defining tribal peoplehood, as demonstrated in the Freedmen example, seem 
straightforward enough. However, as I’ve argued throughout that our concepts of tribal 
nationhood need to be critically examined and at times remodeled, even this model must 
be problematized and occasionally reconfigured to account for the ways that peoplehood 
shifts to reflect social and historical events.  
While the Peoplehood Matrix was intended to be inclusive and to demonstrate the 
elements that all members of a people ostensibly share, the way it has been configured 
risks creating an idealized and confining frame to which all who identify as a member of 
that group must adhere, thereby being no better than the “terminal creeds”67 established 
through racial and legal definitions. Such a rendering of peoplehood could undermine 
Thomas’ goal that the matrix transcend labels and essentializing ideas of Indian 
peoplehood. With regard to Cherokees, for example, one could use the Matrix to argue 
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that only those people who speak Cherokee as their primary language in Cherokee 
communities in Oklahoma, North Carolina or the rest of the Southeast United States, and 
who are Keetoowahs or members of a stomp grounds, are truly Cherokee. Compelling 
arguments can be made in support of such a reckoning of Cherokee peoplehood; 
however, like any other framework of peoplehood, this approach does not account for 
social, historical and political realities that inform tribal peoplehood today or in the 
future. 
The elements of the Peoplehood Matrix, though built on a foundation of 
indigenous epistemologies, must continue to change to reflect present states of 
indigenous peoplehood. Just as the Peoplehood Matrix could be analyzed in such a way 
to reinforce a singular frame of Indian peoplehood, when applied to contemporary 
realities of tribal individuals and communities and considering how Indians are using new 
epistemologies for political advocacy, the Matrix can expand and be the inclusive model 
of peoplehood reckoning that Thomas set out to create. One example is the element of 
shared language and how Cherokee peoplehood must now account for the fact that most 
Cherokees today speak English as their primary language, and few still speak Cherokee. 
 While I absolutely advocate for Indian people to reclaim their tribal languages and 
pass them down in their families and extended communities, the use of English in the 
Cherokee works I examine and in Indian peoples’ everyday lives – and how Indians have 
turned English into a medium through which to challenge social and political onslaughts 
– deserves inclusion in the concept of shared language. This is not to say that just anyone 
who speaks English then “shares language” with Cherokees or any other Indian 
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community. Rather, that Indians have indigenized English in a way to serve their 
contemporary political needs.  Having used English as a trade language for centuries, 
individuals have also used English to argue for political sovereignty, most notably 
perhaps in Cherokee court cases, the Cherokee Phoenix and other tribal newspapers, and 
in various treaties and other political documents. Likewise, Indian people today still use 
English to share their stories and assert their rights, actions that lend English-speaking 
Indians a place in the shared language quadrant of the Peoplehood Matrix. In Reinventing 
the Enemy’s Language (1998) Joy Harjo (Muscogee Nation) memorably argues how she 
and other Indian writers use English to assert their tribal identities and to counter a 
history of assimilation and violent encroachment. “We are coming out of one or two 
centuries of war, a war that hasn’t ended,” she writes:  
 Many of us at the end of the century are using the ‘enemy’s language’ with which 
 to tell our truths, to sing, to remember ourselves during these troubled times. . . . 
 But to speak, at whatever the cost, is to become empowered rather than victimized 
 by destruction. In our tribal cultures the power of language to heal, to regenerate, 
 and to create is understood. These colonizers’ languages, which often usurped our 
 own tribal languages or diminished them, now hand back emblems of our 
 cultures. . . . We’ve transformed these enemy languages. (21-2) 
Here, Harjo champions the possibility that the “enemy’s language” can be usurped and 
serve the needs of tribal communities, but Spokane writer Gloria Bird, who co-edited 
Reinventing the Enemy’s Language with Harjo, argues that English itself is not an 
indigenous language. Rather, the way English is used in tribal communities and in Indian 
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cultural production is what connects Indian people through the English language. So 
while not all Cherokees speak Cherokee, and the Freedmen narratives, as well as other 
works in this study, are in English, the writers’ use of English to assert Cherokee 
peoplehood and political rights is in itself an expression of Cherokee peoplehood through 
shared language of resistance. 
 Like shared language, the element of shared land and tribal peoples’ relationship 
to it in the Peoplehood Matrix warrants further examination to account for not only 
forced removals, but also voluntary migrations that result in a more complex situating of 
Indian people to either their ancestral homeland or a land that they later adopted, either 
by choice or out of necessity. Sean Teuton (Cherokee Nation) describes the multitude of 
ways through which Indians connect to tribal lands through a “tribal realist” approach to 
situating Indian knowledge and experience based on the idea of normative centers. The 
centers are plural because they are many, but normative because the experiences that 
inform those centers are confined to those that a tribal community agrees on, meaning 
one cannot simply create a relationship to tribal land that the tribal community itself does 
not recognize. Cherokees live in places as close to the Nation as Tahlequah, Oklahoma, 
and as far away as Canada68 and the Philippines.69 Teuton argues, however, that people 
can maintain a connection to “shared land” even if they don’t physically inhabit their 
tribal landscape, a concept we can reconcile with the Peoplehood Matrix through an 
expanded definition of “shared land.” 
 While ideally, perhaps, Cherokees would live in Cherokee communities on the 
tribal lands they have always inhabited, Cherokees’ contemporary relationship to shared 
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land must account for removal, relocation and for an individual’s connection to an 
ancestral land he or she might never have visited. Thomas and Holm argue that 
connection to shared land is necessary because a proximity to communities on the 
landscape keeps the communities together, and land informs other elements of 
peoplehood such as the use of local flora and fauna in certain ceremonial practices. They 
also argue, however, that land and shared history inform each other through story. Teuton 
elaborates on story as a way to make the connection to tribal land more inclusive in terms 
of defining tribal communities and grounding tribal experience. He writes: “We might 
remember that while the bones of our families form the earth under our feet, it is the 
stories of their lives that inform the land” (48). Teuton further argues that tribal 
communities who have been displaced from their ancestral homelands, even for several 
generations, maintain a connection to that shared land because the stories of that lived 
experience on that land still inform behavior in those removed communities today. He 
adds: “Native sacred sites are not such only because ancient cultural events transpired on 
them, but also because stories of those places continue to guide moral behavior and 
sustain culture” (49). Additionally, much like the way Harjo conceives of Indian people 
using English to counter colonization, Teuton adds that through stories of sacred tribal 
landscapes, Indian people can reclaim those landscapes in an attempt to effect change by 
maintaining a sense of tribal identity. “Denied their homelands,” he writes, Indian people 
“risk disintegration. To displace Native people to unknown lands is thus an attempt to 
destroy them. . . . Because American Indian placemaking practices are socially-
constructed, however, they can be reconstructed [and] regained in the wake of colonial 
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displacement” (50-1). Furthermore, considering that religions in Cherokee communities 
range from traditional Keetoowah groups to conservative Southern Baptist churches, like 
shared language and land, shared ceremonial cycle, or even spirituality, could also be 
expanded when conceiving of Cherokee peoplehood.  
 The flexible boundaries of the Peoplehood Matrix function, as Thomas intended, 
to transcend the often fractious ideas, such as those of race, gender, nationality and 
sexuality, but the reality, for better or worse, is that when we reckon peoplehood we often 
consciously or unconsciously situate individuals and communities based on these notions. 
Viewing people through these lenses, however, does not necessarily have to be divisive 
and can, in fact, enrich ideas of Indian peoplehood and lend a vocabulary of advocacy to 
smaller groups within the larger tribal community that might be limited, or even silenced, 
in an otherwise circumscribed configuration of nationhood and subsequently citizenship 
as evinced by the Freedmen case.  
 While this analysis demonstrates the flexibility of the Peoplehood Matrix, 
interpreting the Freedmen narratives through the theory illuminates another quality of 
defining peoplehood and nationhood through the Matrix – the value of “doing” over 
simply “being.” Much of this analysis of the Freedmen narratives highlights “being,” or 
how we can conceive of the Freedmen as Cherokee outside of the arbitrary and 
indefensible confines of race. However, the analysis also demonstrates “doing,” or action, 
on the part of the Freedmen to contribute to the overall well-being of Cherokees and the 
Nation. For example, per the Matrix, Freedmen aren’t only Cherokee just because they 
happen to share the same religious beliefs, but also because the Freedmen worked as 
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preachers, sharing their vision of the Gospel as one of resistance and liberation that in 
part informed and inspired the Keetoowah Society’s beliefs. The Freedmen aren’t only 
Cherokee just because they happen to exist on the same land, but because they worked 
the land and had a role in rebuilding the Nation after the upheaval of Removal and the 
devastation of the Civil War. And the Freedmen didn’t just speak Cherokee like other 
Cherokees, but they also used their language acumen to teach English to Cherokees to 
facilitate treaty negotiations and try to level the political playing field between the 
Cherokee Nation and the federal government as well as use language to foster diplomacy 
between neighboring tribal nations. Race, for whatever it means to those who cling to the 
idea, is static and determined, and it emphasizes “being” in a way over which the 
individual has little agency. It doesn’t actively aid the well-being of the Nation. At worst, 
it is oppressive and exclusionary and, as Russell mentions, has a history of violence in 
several cases. At best, race creates citizens that Russell refers to as being Cherokee in a 
“racist sense” – citizens with the race, minus the responsibility. The Peoplehood Matrix 
allows for “doing” – or “participation in kinship,” as Christopher Jocks (Mohawk) 
writes.70 Jocks specifies: “Generosity of time and spirit, respect and politeness, 
willingness to help out, and openness to learn, are what our elders seem to value most” 
(172). None of these traits that Jocks outlines are not bound by race or blood relations. 
Rather, they demonstrate that true kinship is at once an act and a duty – and above all, a 
choice. Far from being deterministic, the Matrix allows people to choose to take an active 
role in creating a better nation – and creating an identity from that participation. The 
Cherokee Freedmen have much to teach about the power of peoplehood because they 
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remained Cherokee outside of strict racial and political definitions, definitions that have 
been usurped in the past by the federal government. Russell, a lawyer by training, 
invokes the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision on the importance of religion when he cites 
from their opinion that religion exists in the “‘inviolable citadel of the individual heart 
and mind. We have come to recognize through bitter experience that it is not within the 
power of government to invade that citadel’” (qtd. in Russell 179). Just as the Supreme 
Court rules here that religion dwells inside the people and not the state, so too do the 
elements of the Peoplehood Matrix. The elements of the Peoplehood Matrix are 
developed and performed not by tribal states that are tethered to the BIA nor are they 
informed by race ideologies imposed from the outside. Peoplehood cannot be taken – 
only surrendered. If we employ the Peoplehood Matrix, the people themselves become 
that “inviolable citadel,” as evinced by the Cherokee Freedmen, who, despite two 
centuries of attacks on their Cherokee peoplehood, have played a role in maintaining that 
peoplehood for Cherokees today. 
 
The counter-narrative and its ultimate stakes 
While the purpose of this project is not to undermine Indian nations’ sovereign 
right to self-determination, it is written with Simpson’s claim in mind regarding some 
systems of kinship being privileged over other forms of peoplehood in determining who 
belongs. When one system takes precedence in a group that has historically employed 
multiple ways of belonging, the question emerges of who makes the cut and who gets left 
on the outside when the definition of who belongs becomes more exclusive. Naturally, 
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real, tangible stakes exist when a nation seeks to purge itself of a community that has 
proven itself in the past as loyal compatriots in the continuing existence of that nation as 
the Freedmen have.  
In some cases the stakes are political in that they involve respecting treaty 
obligations and rights inherent in them as noted by David Cornsilk, John Cornsilk’s son 
and a Cherokee lay advocate for the Freedman, in a 2007 letter to the editor in the 
Cherokee Observer. He writes: “I am a Cherokee by blood and I want the Freedmen to be 
members. I want to honor the promise made by my ancestors to the Freedmen. If the 
United States does not enforce the Treaty, it will be violating my rights along with the 
rights of all Cherokee citizens to enjoy the benefits of the Treaty of 1866” (8). One also 
has to wonder what the consequences will be of severing a relationship that has been so 
vital in the past as the Nation seeks to further establish itself and grow in the future. As 
relationships between indigenous nations and settler states continue to be antagonistic, 
the Cherokee Nation might have to plan for a future without the allies they relied on in 
the past, simply because that demographic of the tribal community is erroneously 
perceived as having “not helped” build the Nation. Reading Cherokee slave narratives 
through the model of a peoplehood alternative to blood discourse in building a critical, 
ethical nation impresses on us the value of the Freedmen contribution and their 
relationship to Cherokees and allows us to claim them through peoplehood. By offering 
another method of reckoning belonging, we perform a gesture that has its roots in our 
ancestral practice of accepting others. This gesture might be essential again as Cherokees 
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continue to exercise sovereignty and build community against a history of shared 
oppression to ensure for posterity a history of Cherokees continuing to overcome it. 
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1 Black slaves appear throughout Conley’s Real People series of novels based on Cherokee history. For 
example, in The Way South (2000), a Cherokee named Carrier ventures to Florida to trade with the 
Spanish and discovers their cruelty, quickly learning that they haven’t only come to trade but also to 
conquer. He then sides with Timucua and Calusa Indians and African slaves against the Spanish. 
Additionally, a character named Asquani (Cherokee for “Spanish”), who is the child of a black slave who 
was raped by a Spaniard, appears in a couple of the novels. In The Dark Island (2000), the reader discovers 
that Asquani has escaped the Spanish settlement in Florida where he is from and has been adopted by the 
Cherokees.  As he comes of age, he finds himself quarreling with his identity and has to decide if he will 
stay with the Cherokees or return to the Spanish. Asquani decides to return to Spanish, but is treated 
cruelly because of his slave heritage and yearns to return to the Cherokees.  In The Peace Chief (2001), 
Asquani appears again, this time as an adopted member of the Wolf Clan who is accidentally killed by his 
best friend, Young Puppy, a member of the Long Hair clan, in a fight with the Ofos. 
 
2 William Sanders introduces a character named Tyrone in his novel The Wild Blue and the Gray (1991) in 
which he re-imagines the fate of the sovereign Cherokee Nation had the South won the Civil War. Tyrone, 
a non-Cherokee African-American, is an aide to Major Culpepper, and his position resembles that of a 
slave though the Confederacy of Sanders’ novel has abolished slavery by the time of the narrative. From 
Tyrone, Cherokee protagonist Amos Ninekiller learns how to wield a straight razor, which he uses to save 
his own life and, ultimately, kill Hitler, and he learns a new strategy of resistance on a smaller scale by 
imagining Indians and blacks in a shared struggle against the state, which is controlled by Euroamericans. 
Invoking this same idea, Steve Russell (Cherokee Nation) argues that, in the light of the Cherokee 
Freedmen controversy, blacks and Indians could more productively resist by working together. He notes 
that the animosity such as that informing the Freedmen controversy is a tool by the colonizer to oppress 
both groups. He writes: “This was American prosperity. Labor stolen from Africans bringing wealth from 
land stolen from Indians, peoples who were taught to hate each other by their exploiters and kept at the 
bottom of the education and economic ladders with the easy metric of color prejudice” (par. 16). It’s 
worth noting, too, that Russell claims blacks as indigenous. He writes: “While blacks and Indians were 
marked for similar roles as victims, blacks had certain disadvantages that did not burden Indians. African-
Americans are tribal peoples completely ripped from their roots. If they escaped, they had nowhere to go, 
no allies” (par. 7). See Russell, “Blacks and Indians Should Stand Together Against a Common Oppressor.” 
Indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com. Indian Country Today Media Network, 20 Aug. 2013. Web. 21 Aug 
2013. 
 
3 John Oskison’s novel Black Jack Davy (1926) features a brief scene in which a black man who works as a 
singer for a snake-oil salesman performs a song advertising the salesman’s longevity tonic called Wizard 
Oil during the opening day of the Indian Payment, or enrollment for allotment, in Big Grove, Indian 
Territory. The man, who Oskison describes as a “negro with a glistening face and rolling eyes,” sings: 
“‘Mah ol’ massa promis’ me/ When he die’ he set me free;/ But mah massa nevah die’ at all/ Bekase he 
use’ dat Wiza’d Oil!’” (172-73). Here, the black man is singing a song about being a slave who has no 
recourse when it comes to the possibility of breaking free from his bondage. While the Cherokee Nation 
officially abolished slavery in 1863 and amended the Cherokee constitution in 1866 to incorporate 
Freedmen as citizens, several “Black Codes” existed, such as those mentioned in this chapter, that 
imposed legal strictures against blacks in the Nation, though after abolition they were frequently enforced 
on an ad hoc basis. Likewise, abolition and the franchise didn’t erase the racism that continued to exist in 
the Nation. I find it interesting that Oskison’s snake-oil minstrel is singing about freedom, or the perpetual 
lack thereof, on the opening day of the allotment of tribal land. The goal of allotment was to terminate 
the Cherokee Nation and create a U.S. state out of Indian Territory. However, though U.S. and Oklahoma 
state governments were to supplant the Cherokee national government, the changing of governments 
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would not improve conditions for black Cherokees. In fact, Oklahoma statehood made life for African-
Americans worse because they were now subject to Jim Crow laws that created a “separate but equal” 
policy of black segregation, which affected their lives in the realms of voting, housing, education and even 
marriage. For more about the history and implementation of Jim Crow, see Jane Dailey, Glenda Elizabeth 
Gilmore and Bryant Simon, eds. Jumpin’ Jim Crow: Southern Politics from the Civil War to Civil Rights 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000) and Leon Litwack Trouble in Mind: Black Southerners in the Age of Jim 
Crow (New York: Knopf, 1998). More locally, the intensified and legally sanctioned racism brought about 
by the imposition of Oklahoma statehood in 1907 led to the Tulsa Race Riots in 1921 in which the 
Greenwood District of Tulsa, which was then the wealthiest black community in the U.S., was burned in 
retaliation of an alleged assault of a white woman by a black shoe shiner in an elevator, leaving hundreds 
dead or wounded and thousands homeless. Tulsa, being just outside the boundary of the Cherokee 
Nation, is home to several Cherokee citizens and descendants, including Freedmen. Some informative 
studies of the Tulsa Race Riots include James S. Hirsch Riot and Remembrance: The Tulsa Race War and its 
Legacy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002) and Scott Ellsworth Death in a Promised Land: The Tulsa Race 
Riot of 1921 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 2002). For a historical study about the development and 
renewal of the Greenwood District specifically, see Hannibal B. Johnson Black Wall Street: From Riot to 
Renaissance in Tulsa’s Historic Greenwood District (Austin, TX: Eakin Press, 2007). 
 
4 Scene 4 of Riggs’ play “The Cherokee Night” features mixed-blood Cherokee kids talking about a black 
man who was murdered during a card game and who supposedly haunts Claremore Mound. They also 
fear that the murderer, another black man, might still be lurking in the area. The kids fetishize black men, 
who they refer to with prodigious use of the word “nigger,” and suggest their supernatural ability to not 
feel pain when they get shot. While the Cherokee kids talk about the black man in his absence, Riggs only 
has the man appear at the end in the background, written in the stage directions. Riggs describes the 
black man with hypermasculine and eroticized terms, describing him as “naked to the waist” with a “black 
body [that] glistens,” and he is also described as a tremendous “dark hulk” (164). Riggs also writes that 
the black man’s “eyes follow the boys; one hand moves itself forward to a blackberry spray, in an 
uncalculated reflex, gathers two berries and lifts them idly to his mouth,” a passage that can be read as 
homoerotic (164-165).  Craig Womack suggests that the black man in The Cherokee Night plays the role of 
eroticized Other in a way that equates blackness with queerness, a queerness that Womack argues Riggs 
tries to communicate through coded language. See Womack’s analysis of “The Cherokee Night” in Red on 
Red: Native American Literary Separatism (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1999), 289-290. For Riggs’ play, 
see The Cherokee Night and Other Plays (Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 2003), 106-211. 
 
5 In Riggs’ 1930 play “Green Grow the Lilacs,” which takes place in Indian Territory as Oklahoma statehood 
is looming, Riggs describes the character Jeeter as being “bullet-colored” (17, 18) Jeeter’s skin color, 
which Riggs also describes as “curious earth-colored” (40) is one of the first traits we learn about him. 
Riggs’ description itself doesn’t lend much explicit insight into Jeeter’s race, but if we consider the color of 
bullets and examine Jeeter’s relationship with the rest of the characters, we can argue the possibility that 
he is of African admixture. Bullets are often made with lead, which gives the bullet a gray appearance, or 
with copper alloy, a mix of copper with gray metals such as nickel, tin or zinc. If we go with the “gray” 
appearance, we can argue that Riggs directs us to imagine Jeeter’s skin color as a mix of black and white. 
If we go with the “copper alloy” interpretation, we can argue that his skin color reflects a mix of bronze 
and gray. Given these possibilities, one could argue that Jeeter’s phenotype reflects a black-white 
admixture, or possibly an Afro-Cherokee admixture. Either case would denote the existence of blackness 
in Jeeter. Likewise, one of the first actions we see Jeeter perform is carrying firewood into the house. 
After he leaves, Curly asks if the man is Jeeter and wants to know why he isn’t working. Curly adds that 
Jeeter has gone to the smokehouse, which Aunt Eller adds used to be a doghouse. Curly then indicates 
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that the doghouse is where Jeeter belongs (18-19). In Scene 3, Riggs describes the smokehouse, Jeeter’s 
home, as dark and dirty with holes in the floor and infested with mice (40). Likewise, in a conversation 
between Curly and Jeeter, Curly comments on a rope Jeeter has and suggests that the rafters in Jeeter’s 
home are sturdy enough for Jeeter to hang himself on. Finally, he adds that while some people would sing 
sad songs after Jeeter’s death, others would accuse him of being a pig stealer, suggesting he should’ve 
been incarcerated long before (42-43). The image of hanging or lynching and baseless associations with 
crime often accompany depictions of blacks in the segregated South. From these bits of evidence, we can 
gather that Jeeter is a laborer and that he has a low social position among the other characters who make 
up the McLain family. This fact coupled with his “bullet-colored” phenotype could support an argument 
that Jeeter is a Freedman with a black and white, or a black and Indian admixture. Because the Cherokee 
Nation abolished slavery in 1863 and “Green Grow the Lilacs” takes place on the eve of Oklahoma 
statehood in 1907, Jeeter could not have been a slave in a legal sense, but he could have been a 
Freedman who continued his labor with the McLain family. See Riggs “Green Grows the Lilacs,” The 
Cherokee Night and Other Plays, 3-105. For more on the manufacturing of bullets and the metals that give 
them their various colors, see James Smyth Wallace Chemical Analysis of Firearms, Ammunition, and 
Gunshot Residue (New York: CRC Press, 2008), Ch. 4.   
 
6 Riggs’ play Roadside is set in 1905, the year that the Five Tribes (Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek 
and Seminole) tried to negotiate with the United States to create an Indian state called Sequoyah. 
Representatives of the five nations drafted a constitution for the state and selected delegates to visit 
Congress, but then-President Theodore Roosevelt said he would not consider a separate state for tribal 
nations.  The plot of Roadside involves a Cherokee named Buzzey who is chasing after his wayward wife, 
Hannie. Hannie and her father, Pap, are leaving in a covered wagon when Buzzey and his hired hands, Red 
Ike and Black Ike, who are named after the color of their hair, intercept them. A runaway outlaw named 
Texas encounters the group on the side of the road as he is fleeing from the Verdigris marshal for having 
escaped from jail. The marshal captures Texas again, and again Texas escapes, this time with Buzzey also 
in pursuit. Buzzey turned on Texas and joined the marshal because he was jealous that Hannie fancies 
him. In the end, Texas, Hannie, Pap and the two Ikes escape in a covered wagon, leaving behind a world 
dominated by white settler law and sellout Indians like Buzzey. This passel of five runaways leaves 
because they cannot operate within the confines of a settler law that they neither understand nor 
acknowledge the legitimacy of. Texas is angry because he finds himself breaking laws for previously 
innocent actions such as spitting and having a little too much to drink. Riggs writes: “‘If I don’t have the 
damndest time! Seems like I’m always breaking some law or other ‘thout knowin’ it. Must be nigh a 
thousand laws in yere country. Why, I break one ever time I turn around to spit!’” (89). In another scene, 
Texas absconds with the judge’s gavel – a symbol of settler law – and throws it in the campfire. During 
their second encounter, Texas tells the marshal, “‘I’m one kind of thing – and you and yer law is 
another’n’” (152). While Riggs does not explicitly identify the race of Texas, the play’s larger-than-life 
hero, textual evidence suggests that Texas might in fact be black. In scenes in which Texas and the 
marshal are about to fight, the two Ikes chant, “‘Fight, fight – nigger and a white.’” In another scene in 
which Texas squares off against the marshal; Buzzey and Ned, a jail guard, Texas tells the marshal: 
“‘You’re the only white man in this whole shootin’ match’” (148). In this scene, Texas indicates that the 
marshal is white, and it is revealed that Buzzey has an Indian allotment, and Ned is likely Indian, having 
not been identified as white along with the marshal. Likewise, Texas explicitly indicates through that 
statement that he is, in fact, not white. These two passages combined suggest Texas’ blackness.  
 Texas’ blackness also would support an anti-assimilation message in Roadside that gets lost with 
an all-white cast, which was used in the handful of times the play was produced. Texas’ blackness works in 
two ways to drive home Riggs’ anti-assimilation message against Oklahoma statehood. One way race 
operates in the play is visually. If Roadside were staged with a black man playing Texas and a white man 
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playing the marshal, then Texas, the character who stands for complete opposition to settler law, would 
stand out in stark contrast to the marshal who embodies American law and westward expansion into 
Indian Territory. Texas’ blackness also works in a second way in that even if the character wanted to 
assimilate, his skin color would preclude him from completely assimilating because he would always stand 
out as an Other, a feat that a mixed-blood Indian who might be phenotypically white would not be able to 
pull off onstage. This essential detail, Texas’ skin color, however, was lost when directors cast Robert 
Bellamy, a white man, in the role of Texas, effectively stripping Roadside of one of its most dramatic 
claims of Indian sovereignty. See Riggs Roadside (New York: Samuel French, 1930.) With regard to the 
casting of Texas as white and what I see as a loss of meaning in Riggs’ text as a result, in particular how 
the black body is used, I refer to Erika Fischer-Lichte’s study of onstage semiotics in which she argues that 
visual representations on stage can affect the interpretation of dramatic works as texts. She writes: 
“Whereas the literary text consists exclusively of linguistic signs, the actor’s body-text is necessarily a 
synthesis of gestural, proxemic, and paralinguistic signs. The drama’s literary text is not, in other words, 
merely transferred into another medium” (192). See Fischer-Lichte The Semiotics of Theater. Trans. 
Jeremy Gains and Doris L. Jones. (Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 1992).  
 
7 John Rollin Ridge’s The Life and Adventures of Joaquin Murrieta, the Celebrated California Bandit (1854) 
is often designated as the first Cherokee novel though Elias Boudinot began to publish Poor Sarah serially 
in 1820. While there is some debate as to whether Poor Sarah, at a mere 14 pages, constitutes a novel 
and, therefore, the first Cherokee novel, I consider it more of a tract, as it was used to promote 
Christianity. Regardless, it is a Cherokee work of fiction that pre-dates Ridge’s. A thorough study of Ridge’s 
life and literary work can be found in James W. Parin John Rollin Ridge: His Life & Works (Lincoln: U of 
Nebraska P, 1991). For more about Boudinot’s life and contribution to Cherokee literature and journalism, 
see Theda Perdue, ed. Cherokee Editor: The Writings of Elias Boudinot (Athens: U of Georgia P, 1996) as 
well as Parins’ Elias Cornelius Boudinot: A Life on the Cherokee Border (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 2006).  
 
8 The history of Cherokees and their slaves is long, dating back to the 1500s when Europeans first 
encountered tribal communities that held other Indians into the era when Europeans began to trade 
slaves in the Americas. Likewise, the story gets more complicated with regard to the centralization of the 
Cherokee Nation, the Civil War and the Dawes allotment era. Because my interest in the Freedmen and 
their narratives deals more with the present conflict with the Cherokee Nation, my focus remains in this 
time period though I periodically highlight historical points in cases where they are relevant to 
illuminating my argument for how we understand the Freedmen situation today. For a general history of 
slavery in Indian Country in the early days of the United States, see Christina Snyder Slavery in Indian 
Country (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2010). For a history of slavery in Cherokee communities, see Theda 
Purdue Slavery and the Evolution of Cherokee Society (Knoxville: U of Tennessee P, 1987) and Michael 
Roethler Negro Slavery among the Cherokee Indians, 1540-1866. Diss. Fordham, 1964. For a study that 
engages Indian slavery during the Civil War, see Annie Heloise Abel The American Indian as Slaveholder 
and Secessionist  (1915); for studies on Civil War- to Dawes-era slavery specific to Cherokees, see Rudi 
Halliburton Red Over Black: Black Slavery Among the Cherokee Indians (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1977); Daniel F. Littlefield The Cherokee Freedmen: From Emancipation to American Citizenship (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 1978); Celia E. Naylor African Cherokees in Indian Territory: From Chattel to Citizens (Chapel 
Hill: U of North Carolina P, 2008). For more information on the contemporary Freedmen issue, see Circe 
Sturm Blood Politics: Race, Culture, and Identity in the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma (Berkeley: U of 
California P, 2002) as well as Sturm “Blood Politics, Racial Classification, and Cherokee National Identity: 
The Trials and Tribulations of the Cherokee Freedmen.” American Indian Quarterly 22.1/2 (Winter-Spring 
1998): 230-258, which is one of the most concise, yet thorough analyses of the history that informs the 
present Freedmen debate I have come across. See also Robert Conley’s chapter on the Freedmen in his 
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collection of essays Cherokee Thoughts: Honest and Uncensored (Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 2008) for a 
perspective on the topic from one of the most well-known Cherokee writers. 
 
9 The text of the final ballot that resulted from the petition reads: 
 
“This measure amends the Cherokee Nation Constitution section which 
deals with who can be a citizen of the Cherokee Nation. 
 
“A vote ‘yes’ for this amendment would mean that citizenship would be limited 
to those who are original enrollees or descendants of Cherokees by 
blood, Delawares by blood, or Shawnees by blood as listed on the Final Rolls 
of the Cherokee Nation commonly referred to as the Dawes Commission 
Rolls closed in 1906. This amendment would take away citizenship of current 
citizens and deny citizenship to future applicants who are solely 
descendants of those on either the Dawes Commission Intermarried Whites 
or Freedmen Rolls. 
 
“A vote ‘no’ would mean that Intermarried Whites and Freedmen original 
enrollees and their descendants would continue to be eligible for citizenship. 
Neither a ‘yes’ nor a ‘no’ vote will affect the citizenship rights of those individuals 
who are original enrollees or descendants of Cherokees by blood, 
Delawares by blood, or Shawnees by blood as listed on the Final Rolls of the 
Dawes Commission Rolls closed in 1906. 
 
“SHALL THE MEASURE BE APPROVED? 
FOR THE MEASURE-YES 
AGAINST THE MEASURE-NO" 
 
10 More than 6,600 Cherokees voted against the Freedmen while only 2,040 voted in their favor, which 
calculates to roughly 77 percent of the Cherokees who voted approving the amendment to define 
Cherokee citizenship on the basis of tracing an ancestor to the By Blood portion of the Dawes Roll.  
Though the percentage of Cherokees who disapprove of the Freedmen being citizens appears high, out of 
more than 300,000 Cherokee citizens, fewer than 8,700 actually voted, which is less than 3 percent of the 
Nation’s citizenry. See Cherokee Nation Special Election Results at 
<http://www.cherokee.org/Government/Election/2007Special/Default.aspx>. 
 
11 For more information on how race becomes complicated in the United States, and particularly how 
racialized Indianness has intersected with notions that inform the racial constructs of other groups in the 
United States, see Jack D. Forbes Africans and Native Americans: The Language of Race and the Evolution 
of a Red-Black People (Champaign: U of Illinois P, 1993); Martha Menchaca Recovering History, 
Constructing Race: The Indian, Black, and White Roots of Mexican Americans (Austin: U of Texas P, 2002.) 
See also Claudio Saunt Black, White, and Indian: Race and the Unmaking of an American Family (New 
York: Oxford UP, 2006); Fay A. Yarbrough Race and the Cherokee Nation: Sovereignty in the Nineteenth 
Century (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 2007). For more on race in the nineteenth century pertaining 
to constructs of whiteness and blackness, see Reginald Horsman Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origin of 
American Racial Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1981) and Scott L. Malcolmson One Drop 
of Blood: The American Misadventure of Race (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001).  
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12 While Buzzard attributes financial gain to the phenotypically black Freedmen’s claim of Indian heritage, 
some scholars have argued that African-Americans also gain psychological benefits by siding more with 
their Indian heritage than with their black heritage. Henry Louis Gates, Jr.’s project African American Lives 
examines the ancestry of several African-American celebrities using genealogy and DNA testing in an 
attempt to demonstrate, as Gates argues, that only about one in 20 African Americans have Native 
American ancestry. In one episode, comedian Chris Rock, who had heard all his life that he had Indian 
ancestry, learned that his admixture was in fact African and European. He demonstrated one 
psychological benefit of African Americans claiming Indian heritage when he quipped that a family story 
of Indian ancestry is more comfortable than having to admit that “grandma got raped” by a white man.  
However, Gates’ use of DNA is controversial and fails to tell the whole story. In another episode, 
he tells actor Don Cheadle that based on his DNA test, which is limited in scope, he has no Chickasaw 
blood as he had been told growing up; however, tribal and genealogical records indicate that Cheadle’s 
ancestors were in fact Chickasaw Freedmen. This is one example of how DNA tests fail to account for non-
racial markers of identity such as adoption, political citizenship, or cultural and historic connection. For 
more information on the controversy over DNA testing and Indian identity, see Kimberly Tallbear “DNA, 
Blood, and Racializing the Tribe.” Wicazo Sa Review. 18.1 (Spring) 2003: 81-107. For a more general study 
of the failure of “genetic markers” to determine ancestry, see Brett Lee Shelton and Jonathan Marks 
“Genetic ‘Markers’ – Not a Valid Test of Native Identity,” <http://www.ipcb.org>. 
Likewise, Laura L. Lovett has claimed that African-Americans have historically claimed their real 
or imagined Indian ancestry as a way to empower themselves in a segregated society that deems black 
people inferior. She writes: “Claiming kinship with Native Americans provided African Americans in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century a way of rebelling against a system of segregation, 
discrimination, and ‘civilization’ imposed on them by White society. This can be considered a route of 
resistance, because White and Black Americans with the aid of cultural images, science, and governmental 
policy, defined Indians as living outside of White society. They perceived Indians to be dangerous for 
having fought the encroachment of society at virtually every step. Native American ancestors could thus 
be empowering insofar as the Native American ancestors embodied the potential in Blacks themselves to 
disrupt social order and White civilization” (209). See Lovett “‘African and Cherokee by Choice’: Race and 
Resistance under Legalized Segregation.” American Indian Quarterly 22.1/2 (1998): 203-229. 
 
13 Buzzard’s depiction of black presence in Indian communities as an “infiltration” has a long history. 
Creek resistance leader Chitto Harjo, angered at the thought of Creek Freedmen receiving allotments, 
said: “‘I hear that the Government is cutting up my land and is giving it away to black people. . . . These 
black people, who are they? They are negros [sic] that came in here as slaves. They have no right to this 
land’” (Grindle and Taylor 221). See Donald A. Grindle, Jr. and Quintard Taylor “Red vs. Black: Conflict and 
Accommodation in the Post Civil War Indian Territory, 1865-1907.” American Indian Quarterly 8.3 (1984): 
211-229.  
As another example, in 1986 then Cherokee Principal Chief Wilma Mankiller was criticized by 
some Cherokees for petitioning to save the Talking Leaves Job Corps program that provided job training 
for underprivileged Indians, whites, African Americans and Latinos around Tahlequah. Objections to the 
program included fears from Cherokees that blacks and Latinos would come into the community and 
commit crime and that the presence of these groups would lead to more intermarriages. See Sarah Eppler 
Janda Beloved Women: The Political Lives of LaDonna Harris and Wilma Mankiller (DeKalb: Northern 
Illinois UP, 2007), 116-17.  
Also, in an op-ed in News from Indian Country, Robert Warrior (Osage) notes the deeper 
psychological and moral implications inherent in the dominant class of Cherokees’ decision to oust black 
Freedmen. He writes: “More, though, is going on here, which is the sometimes heart-stopping recognition 
on the part of leaders of a slave-owning nation that many of those slaves who are so easy to think of as 
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being THEM are in fact US. To be blunt, a history of modern slavery is also a history of rape. To be a slave 
among the Cherokees was to be sexually available to those who controlled your life. By the 1890s, a legal 
distinction between the Freedmen and those who were Cherokee ‘by blood’ emerged, but in the moral 
universe such a distinction was hard to make, and even today the claim of those in the Cherokee majority 
who say they are primarily interested in maintaining their nation for those who can verify that they have 
Cherokee lineage rings hollow alongside the murky history of violence that Cherokee slaves and their 
descendants have inhabited.” See Robert Warrior. “Cherokees flee the moral high ground over 
Freedmen.” IndianCountryNews.net. News from Indian Country, 2007. Web. 3 April 2009. 
<http://indiancountrynews.net/index.php?option=com_content&task =view&id=1106&Itemid=74>. 
 
14 Theda Perdue argues that Cherokees likely first encountered Africans in the 1500s. She notes one 
incident when the African slaves of Lucas Vasquez de Ayllon’s colony on the Pedee River revolted in 1526 
and many fled into Cherokee land. She adds that because Cherokees tended to see African slaves 
alongside Europeans, that Cherokees likely equated the two, having no concept of race. Having seen how 
Europeans treated their slaves, however, Perdue argues that Cherokees began to see the racial dynamic 
between the two and how Europeans regarded their slaves as inferior beings. See Perdue, Slavery and the 
Evolution of Cherokee Society, 36. William McLoughlin, however, traces one of the earliest instances of 
Cherokee race consciousness to 1793 when Chief Little Turkey explained that he would never side with 
the Spanish because he felt they weren’t “real white people,” owing to their olive complexions. Little 
Turkey adds: “‘[W]hat few I have seen of them looked like mulattoes, and I would never have anything to 
say to them’” (339). See McLoughlin Cherokee Renascence in the New Republic (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
UP, 1992). 
 
15 Prior to 1983, Cherokee voters only had to have Cherokee Nation voter cards that had been issued since 
1971 when the Cherokee Nation was again allowed to popularly select its leader per the Principal Chiefs 
Act (1971). Scholars such as Circe Sturm have suggested that Swimmer might have issued the executive 
order because he feared losing re-election to challenger Perry Wheeler, who the Freedmen supported. 
Though Swimmer won re-election and Perry petitioned the BIA to investigate the election and 
disenfranchisement of the Freedmen, the case was defeated. For more on the history of the 
disenfranchisement of the Freedmen, and specifically during the Swimmer administration, see Sturm 
"Blood Politics, Racial Classification, and Cherokee National Identity: The Trials and Tribulations of the 
Cherokee Freedmen." American Indian Quarterly 22.1/2 (1998): 230–258. For an examination of how the 
Creek and Seminole Nations have addressed Freedmen voting, see Claudio Saunt “Jim Crow and the 
Indians.” Salon.com. Salon, 21 Feb 2006. Web. 17 Sept 2009. <http://www.salon.com/2006/02/21/ 
cherokee/>. 
 
16 Linda W. Reese, who pored over several WPA narratives in her study on Cherokee Freedwomen, 
mentions that the narratives should be used with caution, citing a presumed decline in the memory of the 
participants who tended to range in age from their 70s to their early 90s. While age might certainly blur 
the facts, it is too easy and presumptuous to dismiss what the Freedmen and Freedwomen elders have to 
say about their lives by assuming they had poor memories. See Reese “Cherokee Freedwomen in Indian 
Territory, 1863-1890.” The Western Historical Quarterly. 33.3 (2002): 273-296.  My choice to use the WPA 
narratives as they are takes into consideration Christopher Clausen’s idea that “what matters most is not 
whether historical recollection is accurate, but whether it liberates or imprisons” (24). See Clausen “Living 
Memory.” The Wilson Quarterly (1976-) 28.4 (2004): 24-30. By using the WPA narratives as they appear, 
my aim is to allow the Freedmen participants the freedom to narrate their own lives as they deem fit 
without my interference or my challenging their factual accuracy by making ageist assumptions about 
their mental faculties, something I, nor Reese for that matter, can prove or disprove. I’m more interested 
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in how the narratives function as a challenge to the Cherokee Nation’s narrative of the Freedmen. My 
other desire is to empower voices that have historically been denied consideration let alone privilege.  For 
more information on how anthropologists have deployed European concepts of time, especially its 
supposed linearity, on communities whose concepts of memory and storytelling differ, see Johannes 
Fabian’s groundbreaking work Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object (New York: 
Columbia UP, 1983). 
 
17 Leslie Ross, 63, is a retired civil servant from Suisun City, California, whose family is originally from 
Muscogee, Oklahoma, a town with a large Freedmen population that used to be the capital of the Creek 
Nation. A Cherokee citizen, Ross is also one of 25,000 Freedmen descendants whose legal status as 
Cherokee was challenged during the 2007 referendum to change the Cherokee citizenship requirements 
to denationalize Cherokees who trace their ancestors to the Freedmen portion of the Dawes Roll.   
 
18 Stick Ross’ profession as a lawman in the Cherokee Nation also speaks to a connection of peoplehood in 
that Freedmen were often chosen as tribal lawmen because they were familiar with Indian Territory and 
they were familiar with the people of their respective tribes. Because some had also been slaves to white 
masters, they also had experience interacting with white people. This trust from locals in Indian Territory 
and their familiarity with the white world led tribal nations to appoint Freedmen as lawmen to counter 
the corrupt behaviors of white lawmen who worked for the U.S. Marshall’s Office.  
 Because Article 13 of the Treaty of 1866 gives the Cherokee courts jurisdiction only over crimes 
involving Cherokee citizens, the federal authorities took jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian 
Territory involving only U.S. citizens or if a U.S. citizen was a party to a crime with a tribal citizen. Daniel 
Littlefield, Jr., and Lonnie E. Underhill write that because white lawmen were paid in fee for each capture 
instead of a salary, many of them ignored the boundaries between their jurisdiction and the tribes’. They 
write: “The long-time abuse of the fee system and the lack of available courts had made the Indian 
distrust the white officers. [The Indians] liked the Negros better; that fact, in part, explains the success of 
most Negro officers. Too having lived all or most of their lives among Indians and Indian Freedmen, the 
Negro marshals understood their ways” (79). Littlefield and Underhill elaborate by detailing the stories of 
two Creek Freedmen marshals, Bass Reeves ad Grant Johnson, though they also mention Cherokee 
Freedmen marshals such as Isaac Rogers. See Littlefield, Jr., and Underhill “Negro Marshals in Indian 
Territory.” Journal of Negro History. LVI, No. 2 (1971): 77-87. See also W. Sherman Savage “The Role of 
Negro Soldiers in Protecting the Indian Territory from Intruders.” The Journal of Negro History 36.1 (Jan. 
1951): 25-34. On the other side of the law, an interesting study of black and Indian outlaws in Indian 
Territory can be found in Art Burton’s Black, Red, and Deadly: Black and Indian Gunfighters of the Indian 
Territory, 1870-1907 (Austin, TX: Eakin Press, 1991) 
 
19 Several African-descended Cherokees also served on the tribal council through the years. In addition to 
Stick Ross, who served on the Cherokee Nation council in 1893, other black Cherokee councilmen 
included Joseph Brown, who served in 1875, Frank Vann (1887); Jerry Alberty (1889); Ned Irons and 
Samuel Stidham (both 1895). See Starr, History of the Cherokee Indians and Their Legends and Folklore, 
(1921). 
 
20 For a detailed account of the Cherokee Nation’s 1999 rewriting of its constitution, including its 
redefining of tribal citizenship, see Eric Lemont “Overcoming the Politics of Reform: The Story of the 
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma Constitutional Convention.” American Indian Law Review. 28.1 
(2003/2004): 1-34. Because the 1999 Cherokee constitution was never approved by the BIA, it is not 
considered legal. The BIA recognizes the 1975 constitution in which citizenship is defined by tracing only 
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to the Dawes Roll, not just the By-Blood portion. This method of determining citizenship includes 
Freedmen within its scope.  
 
21 Leslie Ross does not elaborate on what he means by Stick Ross being “more Indian than the Indians.” 
However, because he describes his great-grandfather’s ability to speak Cherokee and other Indian 
languages and his service and dedication to the Cherokee Nation as a diplomat and councilman, I 
interpret this line to mean that Stick Ross was culturally and socially more “Indian” than were his 
mixedblood counterparts. Though Cherokee by blood (as was Stick Ross incidentally) and technically 
Indian, many mixedbloods tended to align more with Southern white cultural values than with traditional 
Cherokee culture. Cherokee anthropologist Robert K. Thomas, tsigesv, describes how conservative 
Cherokees define someone as being truly Cherokee, or “Indian,” as opposed to those who might have 
Cherokee ancestry, but are not considered Indian. He writes: “To the conservative Cherokee a Cherokee 
or an ‘Indian’ (Yunwiya) is one who had at least one parent who was a functioning member of 
conservative society and who is himself a functioning member of that society. By a ‘functioning member 
of that society’ I mean one who interacted with other conservative Cherokees, is a real part of the 
community, and who is linguistically and culturally a Cherokee . . . . If a non-Cherokee speaker is the 
offspring of two Cherokee speakers he will grudgingly be called an Indian, but certainly rarely a ‘full 
Indian.’ And in many contexts these people are spoken of as white Indians because of their white cultural 
orientations and thus, are not really conceived to be true members of Cherokee society” (15-16). See 
Thomas, “Cherokee Values and World View,” Unpublished MS (1958), 
<http://works.bepress.com/robert_thomas/40>. Similarly, Circe Sturm notes that in several Cherokee 
communities, the term “fullblood” often refers not to one’s race or ancestry, but to his or her cultural 
knowledge as well as engagement with and dedication to the community, another example of how Stick 
Ross’ language acumen and service to Cherokees would indicate he belonged or was more identifiably 
“Indian” than other Cherokees who were more culturally white. See Sturm, Blood Politics, 140-141. 
 
22 Though the 2,800 Freedmen descendants who had their voting rights stripped in 2011 just before the 
Smith-Baker election retain their citizenship today, the Cherokee Nation’s present citizenship criteria 
reads: “To be eligible for a federal Certificate Degree of Indian Blood and Cherokee Nation tribal 
citizenship, you must be able to provide documents that connect you to a direct ancestor listed on the 
Dawes Final Rolls of Citizens of the Cherokee Nation with a blood degree” (par 2, emphasis mine). Because 
the criteria specifies that prospective citizens must trace to a Cherokee Dawes enrollee with a blood 
degree, Freedmen descendants, at the moment, are ineligible for citizenship as their ancestors were not 
listed with a blood degree. See Cherokee Nation “Citizenship.” Cherokee.org. 
<http://www.cherokee.org/Services/TribalCitizenship/Citizenship.aspx>. 
 
23 Much of the current legal battles surrounding the Freedmen controversy stem from Vann v. Salazar, a 
case filed in 2003 by Freedmen descendant Marilyn Vann after she was denied the ability to vote in the 
Cherokee Nation’s 2003 election. For the past decade, the case has taken several turns as it has been 
variously challenged, dismissed and reinstated in federal court. After the Smith administration proposed 
the 2007 amendment to the Cherokee Constitution that would determine Cherokee citizenship by tracing 
only to the “By Blood” portion of the Dawes roll, Freedmen descendants and their advocates took another 
case to court. After years of lengthy court battles, in the case of Raymond Nash v. Cherokee Nation 
Registrar (2011), Cherokee District Court Judge John Cripps ruled in favor of the Freedmen, reinstating 
their citizenship on the grounds that the 2007 amendment violated the Freedmen’s citizenship rights as 
outlined in the Treaty of 1866. Today, about 2,800 Freedmen descendants retain Cherokee citizenship and 
voting rights as Vann v. Salazar (2003) plays out in federal court after the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court ruled in March 2013 that the Freedmen’s case against the Cherokee Nation could continue. The full 
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brief of the decision in Nash v. Cherokee Nation Registrar can be found at <http://www.cornsilks.com/ 
ralphkeenbrief.pdf>. See also Will Chavez (Cherokee Nation) “Federal court denies tribe’s Vann v. Salazar 
motion” CherokeePhoenix.org. Cherokee Phoenix, 15 March 2013. Web. 17 March 2013. 
<http://www.cherokeephoenix.org/Article/Index/7101>. Other important cases in the Freedmen 
controversy include Nero et. al v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma (1986); Riggs v. Ummerteskee (2001); 
Allen v. Cherokee Nation Tribal Council (2004). While my own study focuses on making the narrative case 
for the Freedmen as Cherokees, details about the legal cases can be found in Sturm, “Blood Politics,” 
(1998) and Ray, “A Race or a Nation?,” (2006).  
 
24 While the treaty and subsequent amendment to the 1866 Cherokee Constitution do explicitly say that 
the Freedmen and their descendants shall enjoy all the rights of native Cherokees, Freedmen opponents 
like Chad Smith have speculated that the drafters of the treaty intended for Freedmen to have rights to 
soil, but not of blood, or rather they have the right to live in the Nation and own property, but not the 
franchise. This dialectic between civil and political rights of the Freedmen is one on which Freedmen 
detractors go back and forth. During allotment, some Cherokees fought the Dawes Commission’s decision 
to allot land to the Freedmen on the basis that while they had rights as citizens, they didn’t have rights to 
Cherokee land. Today, Freedmen detractors argue that while Freedmen are free to live in the Nation’s 
jurisdiction, work and attend school among other things, they don’t have rights as citizens. See Ray, “Race 
or Nation,” 403-414.  In a July 2011 op-ed in the Cherokee Phoenix, former tribal councilman John Ketcher 
argues that the Treaty of 1866, despite guaranteeing Freedmen and their descendants “all rights of native 
Cherokees,” does not recognize Freedmen’s right to tribal citizenship. He writes: “The 150th anniversary 
of the Civil War between the United States has come and gone. Yet the attorney for Cherokee Freedmen, 
John Velie, continues to hammer away at every venue and opportunity to muddy the good name of the 
Cherokees and cause some of our citizens to call us racist, all because our people voted not to accept 
Freedmen who could not prove Cherokee blood ties. Slaves and ex-slaves who chose to mate with 
Cherokees are citizens now, just as other tribal citizens of mixed heritage are part of the tribe from other 
races and nationalities. The Freedmen and their leader, Marilyn Vann, still believe the words at the 
bottom of Article 9 of the 1866 Treaty gave them citizenship in the Cherokee Nation. ‘They further agree 
that all freedmen who have been liberated by voluntary act of their former owners or by law, as well as all 
free colored persons who were in the country at the commencement of the rebellion, and are now 
residents therein, or who may return within six months, and their descendants, shall have all rights of 
Native Cherokees.’ Please tell me or explain how that passage denotes citizenship.” See Ketcher “1866 
Treaty doesn’t mean citizenship.” Letter to the Editor. CherokeePhoenix.org. Cherokee Phoenix, 1 July 
2011. Web. 2 July 2011.  <http://www.cherokeephoenix.org/Article/Index/5031>. In a legal irony, in a 
case filed during allotment, Cherokee Daniel Redbird tried to argue that intermarried whites and the 
Freedmen had no claim to Cherokee land. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, ultimately ruled that they 
did by reaffirming their Cherokee citizenship per the Treaty of 1866, which granted them rights of soil and 
of suffrage, establishing a legal precedent in favor of Freedmen tribal citizenship. The full ruling in Redbird 
v. U.S. (1906) can be found at http://www.cornsilks.com/1906redbird.html.  
 
25 One interpretation of the Freedmen not being granted citizenship in the Cherokee Nation by their 
detractors is that the Cherokees were coerced into accepting the Freedmen as citizens. Cherokee Nation  
At-Large councilwoman Julia Coats, who also developed the Nation’s original history course that is taught 
to Nation employees and at-large citizens, reiterated this idea that the Cherokees were forced to accept 
the Freedmen in 1866 to an audience of Cherokee citizens and descendants at a meeting of the Central 
Texas Cherokee Township that I attended in 2011. Additionally, an editorial about the Cherokee 
Freedmen appeared in Indian Country Today in January 2012, one year after the Freedmen won back their 
citizenship rights after a dispute during the Smith-Baker election. In this editorial, Julianne Jennings 
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revisits the argument of coerced acceptance of the Freedmen in the Treaty of 1866. She writes: “The 
Cherokee are as much a victim in this travesty of status as are the Freedmen. Most wanted neutrality, but 
were forced to adopt a people they otherwise would never have considered as eligible members of their 
Nation” (par. 8). See Jennings “Cherokee Freedmen: One Year Later.” 
IndianCountryTodayMediaNetowrk.com. Indian Country Today,  31 Jan. 2012. Web. 3 Feb. 2012. 
<http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/opinion/cherokee-freedmen%3A-one-year-later-78777>.  
Finally then-Cherokee Nation Deputy Chief John Ketcher, tsigesv, toured Cherokee communities to collect 
signatures for the petition to oust the Freedmen and said: “‘[W]e’ve always been people with Native 
American blood. People now want to come in because in the past some Cherokees held slaves. After the 
Civil War, as part of a treaty, we were forced to accept the Freedmen. It was done by the government to 
punish us. We are trying to rectify this and allow Cherokee people to vote on Cherokee membership.” See 
Ray, “A Race of a Nation?,” 397. 
 While this belief of “forced acceptance” of the Freedmen abounds, its absurdity is quickly 
apparent when one examines how the Creeks, Seminoles, Choctaws and Chickasaws dealt with their 
Freedmen in their own post-Civil War treaties with the United States. With regard to incorporating the 
Freedmen, the Cherokees fell in the middle between the Creeks and Seminoles who accepted their 
Freedmen and even allowed them to hold public office and the Choctaws and Chickasaws who paid their 
Freedmen back wages and promptly dismissed them. The Choctaws and Chickasaws enforced “Black 
Codes” through which they forced their Freedmen who stayed to find employment in the nation or go to 
jail. The Choctaws and Chickasaws also made no provision in their 1866 treaties to allow for the return of 
slaves who had fled during the Civil War, unlike the Cherokees who gave their Freedmen six months to 
return. Choctaw and Chickasaw Freedmen were also barred from voting and holding office. The Choctaws 
eventually recognized their Freedmen more than 20 years after their 1866 treaty, but the Chickasaws 
adamantly refused to do the same. Among the Five Tribes, the vitriol against the Freedmen was at its 
highest in the Chickasaw Nation. In fact, during allotment Chickasaw governor Douglas H. Johnston, in his 
desire to have the Chickasaw Freedmen barred from enrolling with the Dawes Commission, stated: “‘The 
African race is prolific. The Indian race, under present conditions, is not. . . . It will be but a few 
generations until the full blood Indian will be no more, but as the Indian citizen vanished, the Negro 
‘Chickasaw,’ if such be, is made by Congress, will multiply, and the time will not be far distant, if this 
iniquity is visited upon us, when the name of Chickasaw will carry with it approbrium [sic] and reproach 
instead of honor.’” See Grinde and Taylor, “Red vs Black,” 212-213, 223. Given that the Chickasaws were 
allowed to pay off their Freedmen and that they never recognized them in their 1866 treaty, and yet the 
Creeks and Seminoles opted to give their Freedmen citizenship and allowed their political participation, 
there is little evidence to credibly support any claim that the Cherokees – and somehow only the 
Cherokees – were ever “forced” to accept their Freedmen as citizens in the Treaty of 1866. For more on 
the Chickasaws’ history with their Freedmen, see Angie Debo The Road to Disappearance (Norman: U of 
Oklahoma P, 1967); Arell M. Gibson The Chickasaws (Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 1971); Daniel F. Littlefield 
The Chickasaw Freedmen: A People Without a Country (Westport, Conn: Greenwood P, 1980) and Wyatt 
F. Jeltz “The Relations of Negroes and Choctaws and Chickasaw Indians.” Journal of Negro History. 33.1 
(1948): 24-37. For more on how Cherokee Freedmen, women in particular, occupied a space among 
Cherokees between the acceptance of Freedmen shown by the Creeks and Seminoles and the exclusion of 
the Freedmen shown by Choctaws and Chickasaws, see Reese, “Cherokee Freedwomen in Indian 
Territory, 1863-1890,” 273-296.  For more on the Treaty of 1866, see “Treaty with the Cherokee, 1866.” 
Indian Treaties, 1778-1883. Charles J. Kappler, ed. (New York: Amereon Ltd., 1996) and Morris L. Wardell, 
Political History of the Cherokee Nation, 1838-1907, (1938).  
 
26 Article IX of the Treaty of 1866 states: “The Cherokee Nation having, voluntarily, in February, eighteen 
hundred and sixty-three, by an act of the national council, forever abolished slavery, hereby covenant and 
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agree that never hereafter shall either slavery or involuntary servitude exist in their nation otherwise than 
in the punishment of crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, in accordance with laws 
applicable to all the members of said tribe alike. They further agree that all freedmen who have been 
liberated by voluntary act of their former owners or by law, as well as all free colored persons who were 
in the country at the commencement of the rebellion, and are now residents therein, or who may return 
within six months, and their descendants, shall have all the rights of native Cherokees” (emphasis mine). 
See “Treaty with the Cherokee, 1866.” Indian Treaties, 1778-1883. Charles J. Kappler, ed. (New York, 
Amereon Ltd., 1996). 
Similarly, an 1866 amendment to Article 3, section 5 of the Cherokee Constitution (1839) reads: 
“All native born Cherokees, all Indians, and whites legally members of the Nation by adoption, and all 
freedmen who have been liberated by voluntary act of their former owners or by law, as well as free 
colored persons who were in the country at the commencement of the rebellion, and are now residents 
therein, or who may return within six months from the 19th day of July, 1866, and their descendants, who 
reside within the limits of the Cherokee Nation, shall be taken and deemed to be, citizens of the Cherokee 
Nation." See <http://digital.library.okstate.edu/ Chronicles/v011/v011p1056.html>. 
 
27 I use “peoplehood” with a little “p” to refer to the broader anthropological concept of individuals 
belonging to a distinct group based on any number of identifiers shared within that group. I use the term 
Peoplehood Matrix, or the Matrix, when referring specifically to Robert Thomas, tsigesv, and Tom Holm’s 
framework that incorporates the interdependent concepts of shared land, language, history and 
ceremonial cycle. 
 
28 In the debate regarding Cherokee Freedmen, race and the epistemology of inherited “blood” often get 
conflated in the concept of blood descent as it pertains to contemporary definitions of Cherokee 
citizenship. I believe this conflation is the result of how race and blood were accounted for in the 
construction of the Dawes Roll, the document on which the Cherokee Nation bases citizenship. While 
Cherokees have a traditional epistemology of belonging through blood, specifically as it pertains to 
belonging in a maternal clan, “blood” as it is recorded on the Dawes Roll was informed by Western 
pseudoscience of the time, namely the theories put forth by Samuel Morton and Lewis Henry Morgan 
who posited that different races had different bloods. As a result, Dawes enrollees, including Freedmen 
and Indian Cherokees, were placed on separate portions of the roll based on race, despite that many 
enrollees, on both portions of the roll, had mixed black and Indian heritage. Because “blood descent” 
today refers to tracing to the By-Blood portion of the Dawes Roll, Cherokee “blood” in the context of 
determining citizenship in the Cherokee state is already conflated with Western concepts of race by 
default, whereas Cherokees’ traditional concept of inherited blood did not include race.  
 
29 The Dawes Commission’s effort to enroll tribal citizens during allotment was hardly consistent. Several 
Freedmen descendants tell stories about how their mixed Cherokee-African ancestors were placed on the 
Freedmen portion of the roll because the registrar mistook them for black based strictly on phenotype. 
Marilyn Vann, a Cherokee Freedmen descendant and leader of Freedmen-rights efforts, recounts that 
because Freedmen received unrestricted allotments, Congress had incentive to list as many Freedmen as 
they could on the final roll. To further illustrate the carelessness with which the Dawes Commission 
undertook enrollment, Vann mentions the case of Perry Ross who was listed on the Drennan Roll (1852) 
as a native Cherokee and received a Guion-Miller payment in 1908 as a Cherokee, but who was listed as a 
Freedman on the Dawes Roll (1907).  See Vann 
<http://www.freedmen5tribes.com/cherokee%20freedmen%20facts.doc.pdf>.  
 Circe Sturm cites a memorable incident involving Mary Walker, a woman who was 1/8 black, 3/8 
Cherokee and half white trying to enroll as a Cherokee with the Dawes Commission. She writes: “‘When 
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she went to the Cherokee citizenship commission [Dawes] to enroll, they looked at her face and they saw 
a Cherokee woman and said, “through whom do you claim,” you know, what are your parents’ names and 
what is your degree of Indian blood. They put it all down, then somebody comes in and says, “She ain’t no 
Cherokee. She’s a nigger. That woman is a nigger and you’re going to put her down as a nigger.” . . .  So 
the Dawes Commission had to go back and research her family and get all the documentation and tell this 
poor woman that not only are you going to be on the freedmen rolls but so are your children.’” Sturm 
attributes the registrar’s attitude to beliefs about black hypodescent and to Walker’s embodiment of a 
taboo, having been the product of miscegenation, which had been outlawed in the Cherokee Nation. See 
Sturm, “Blood Politics,” (1998), 248.  
 Likewise, in an online post about the Cherokee Latta family, Cherokee genealogist David Cornsilk 
(UKB-Cherokee Nation) mentions that the Latta patriarch was listed as white intruder in 1870, a native 
Cherokee in the 1880 Cherokee census and a Freedman in the 1896 census. See Cornsilk, “Think you know 
a freedmen when you meet one?” Facebook. 4 Nov 2011. Finally, to further complicate matters with 
regard to the Dawes Roll, Cherokee sociologist Eva Garroutte writes about “$5 Indians,” or those white 
people who bribed the Dawes Commission to be included as Cherokee by blood to receive an allotment. 
She writes: “It is impossible to estimate the number of modern-day descendants of those numerous non-
Indian ‘Indians,’ but one might suppose that it could be fairly large. It seems probable that at least some 
descendants have maintained tribal enrollment and the privileges attendant on a legally legitimated 
identity, even while many people of actual Indian descent were and are unable to acquire the same.” See 
Garroutte, Real Indians, 234. 
 
30 John Cornsilk’s observation of the legal definition of Cherokee citizenship including Delawares, 
Shawnees, Natchez and adopted whites, among others, speaks again to the trouble (and irony) of defining 
Cherokee citizenship based in terms of Cherokee blood.  According to the Treaty of 1866, the Delawares 
and Shawnees are legally Cherokees, with or without Cherokee blood, and when these two nations sought 
to remove themselves from the Cherokee Nation and regain their own autonomous nations, Chad Smith 
argued that they could not leave because they were Cherokees per the Treaty of 1866. However, when 
the issue turned to Freedmen, who are mentioned in the same line as the Shawnees and Delawares as 
citizens, Smith argued that the Five Civilized Tribes Act (1906) made the Treaty of 1866 obsolete.  This 
observation is to highlight that when the Shawnees and Delawares tried to leave the Cherokee Nation, 
which threatened to reduce federal money to the Cherokee Nation, Smith argued for their inclusion as 
citizens based in law of the Treaty of 1866, whether they had Cherokee blood or not. However, when the 
issue of Freedmen citizenship arose, he argued the Treaty of 1866 was obsolete and insisted on a blood 
definition of Cherokee citizenship for this demographic. The Shawnees were granted federal recognition 
as a separate nation under the Shawnee Tribe Status Act (2000) and the Delawares reorganized under the 
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act in 2009 after a lengthy legal battle against the Cherokee Nation.  
 
31 The 1840s in the Cherokee Nation was a time when laws against slaves grew both in number and 
severity. The Cherokee Nation adopted slave codes similar to those in the American South, but after a 
series of slave rebellions, the Nation imposed added strictures against their slaves that were progressively 
harsh. These laws included barring slaves from carrying weapons (1841), punishing free blacks or slaves 
who aided fugitive slaves with 100 lashes and expulsion from the Nation (1842), expulsion from the 
Nation of anyone caught teaching slaves to read or write (1848), expulsion from the Nation of any teacher 
“suspected of entertaining sentiments favorable to abolitionism” (1855) and requiring all free blacks to 
leave the Nation (1859). This last law passed the Cherokee legislature but was vetoed by John Ross. See 
McLoughlin “Red Indians, Black Slavery, White Racism,” The Cherokees Ghost Dance: Essays on the 
Southeastern Indians, 1789-1861 (Macon, GA: Mercer UP, 1894), 278-279. 
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32 One case that demonstrates the roll of “blood” and how Cherokees deployed it legally to confer rights 
on some and not others is that of Joseph Hardin Bennett. According to David Cornsilk (UKB-Cherokee 
Nation), Bennett is the only white man who was ever allowed to purchase “by-blood rights,” which is the 
right to own land and vote in the Cherokee Nation. Bennett was a young white man from Kentucky who 
fell in love with a woman who his parents forbade him to marry. The woman was disabled, and Bennett’s 
parents determined that she would not make a suitable wife for their son. Angered at his parents’ 
prohibition of their relationship, Bennett left home, headed west and never returned. When he arrived in 
St. Louis, he informed an innkeeper that he was interested in meeting and living with the Indians in Indian 
Territory. The innkeeper told him that a team of Cherokees had just docked a barge on the riverbank to 
sell their wares, and Bennett rushed over to make their acquaintance. At the riverbank, Bennett met Joel 
Mayes Bryan, an intermarried white man who was leading the group of Cherokees. Bryan and Bennett 
took an instant liking to each other, and Bryan hired the young man to work with the team on their return 
trip to Indian Territory. Bennett followed the team into the Cherokee Nation and never left. 
Bennett worked at Bryan’s trading post and gained a reputation for being a savvy businessman 
and for his fairness to his Cherokee clientele. He eventually married one of Bryan’s Cherokee daughters 
and fathered two Cherokee daughters of his own. Bennett’s wife died in the early 1870s. Because he was 
now a single parent to a Cherokee girl (his other daughter had died), the tribal council, recognizing his 
familial ties, agreed to let Bennett keep his business. Because Cherokee law forbade white ownership of 
property, Bennett risked losing his business when his Cherokee wife died. He was, however, allowed to 
retain his citizenship status he had acquired through marriage so long as he either remained a widower or 
married another Cherokee woman through whom he could claim citizenship.  
 Fate had different plans, and after years of remaining single, Bennett met and fell in love with a 
white woman named Hulda Ringold, who was living in an intruder community outside of Nowata. Bennett 
was determined to marry Hulda despite his Cherokee friends’ warning him that he would lose his status 
and land holdings in the Nation. Torn between his love for Hulda and his love for his Cherokee community 
and kin, Bennett appealed to his friends on the tribal council for help in the matter. Eager to help Bennett, 
the council crafted a law that allowed for the purchase of “by-blood rights,” which constituted an 
administrative form of tribal adoption. The price was $500 and the endorsement of 10 upstanding 
Cherokees. Bennett also had to agree to permanently stay in the Cherokee Nation. Bennett agreed and 
was able to negotiate a deal that allowed him to marry Hulda and still be a Cherokee citizen. The couple 
married in 1878 and raised a family of Cherokee-by-adoption children. These children and the couple’s 
grandchildren were registered with the Dawes Commission as adopted whites. While both Bennett and 
Hulda were initially registered with the Dawes Commission, Bennett was later stricken from the record 
because he died before the rolls were closed. Hulda was later removed from the roll as an intermarried 
white because the law, per Redbird v. the U.S. (1906), indicated that only whites who intermarried into 
the Cherokee Nation before November 1875 could claim a part of the tribal estate. Bennett’s descendants 
are Cherokee citizens today. 
 
33 One could argue that culture isn’t necessary to the survival of a people as long as those people maintain 
their sovereign rights. However, in the context of the relationship between the federal government and 
tribal governments, demonstrating a distinct culture and being recognized as a distinct entity informs the 
criteria for federal recognition. Since 1978 the Bureau of Indian Affairs Federal Acknowledgement Process 
(FAP) through which Indian nations must navigate to gain “recognized” status as political sovereigns has 
included criteria similar to Edward Spicer’s theory that Indians are only distinct people when viewed in 
contrast to Euroamericans. See also Renee Ann Cramer Cash, Color, and Colonialism: The Politics of Tribal 
Acknowledgement (Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 2005); Amy Den Ouden and Jean M. O’Brien (White Earth 
Anishinaabe), eds. Recognition, Sovereignty Struggles and Indigenous Rights: A Sourcebook (Chapel Hill: U 
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of North Carolina P, 2013); Mark Edwin Miller Forgotten Tribes: Unrecognized Indians and the Federal 
Recognition Process (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 2008), Ch. 1. 
 
34 Trofim Lysenko was a pseudo-scientist who worked under Josef Stalin who rejected scientifically proven 
theories of genetics and promoted the idea of “environmentally acquired inheritance,” which argues that 
physiological traits that one develops over time can be passed on to that person’s offspring. With the 
reference to a Soviet scientist whose work has been thoroughly debunked, Russell challenges, and 
subsequently debunks, the notion of “Cherokeeness” being passed on through the blood. For more about 
the pseudoscience that was popular during the Stalin regime, see Nikolai Kremenstov Stalinist Science 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1997) and David Joravsky The Lysenko Affair (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1986). 
I also read Russell’s mention of a “bloody red shirt” as a reference to an opinion piece written by Lakota 
professor Delphine Red Shirt in which she describes that she is offended by Connecticut’s definition of 
“Indian” because she believes, in a racial sense, that the blood of eastern tribes is too diluted to be truly 
Indian. For Red Shirt’s opinion piece and a rebuttal by Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs Kevin Gover 
(Pawnee), see Russell, “Paradox,” 167-168. Daniel Heath Justice (Cherokee Nation) further critiques Red 
Shirt’s racial assessment of Indianness. See Justice, “Go Away, Water!,” 156-159. For more about the 
stereotypes of Indianness that Red Shirt engages and that appear in race-based notions of being Indian, 
see Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr. The White Man’s Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the 
Present (New York: Vintage, 1979).  
 
35 By “disreputable company” Russell refers to Hitler and his use of race ideologies to class Jews as a race, 
complete with stereotypical behaviors that they supposedly pass on through blood, as a way justify their 
eradication. Normally a reductio ad Hitlerum argument is a sure concession of rhetorical defeat, but 
Russell’s Hitler reference notwithstanding, his point that a focus on the ideologies of race and blood can 
lead to actual systematic destruction of entire groups of people still stands in that a people can define 
themselves out of existence based on how restrictive they choose to define their race or blood. While 
some scholars like Ward Churchill have tossed around the word “genocide” freely in terms of Indian blood 
and its dilution, being mixed-blood myself, I hate to think of myself or my children as the end result of 
genocide. Because race and ideologies of blood have been debunked, we have no factual incentive to 
continue adhering to them. As such, blood possesses as much or as little meaning as we assign to it, even 
if that’s no meaning at all. I point to what Bo Taylor (Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians) says in this 
chapter about the thought of his descendants being 1/1000th Cherokee and possibly a different color than 
he. He asserts that as long as they’re speaking Cherokee (shared language) and dancing and singing the 
songs (shared ceremony), they’ll still be Cherokee. These are elements of the Peoplehood Matrix that 
bypass ideologies of race and blood that some people insist on clinging to, and as such the matrix offers a 
viable alternative in determining belonging and forging a more equitable nation. While the U.S.’s killing of 
Indians and forced removals in the early days of the republic certainly can be summed up as genocidal, 
because culture and peoplehood can always be reconfigured and relearned – resurrected in ways that 
bodies cannot – I hesitate to define cultural loss with the same terms. Words like “genocide,” 
“Holocaust,” and references to Hitler actually mean something and should not be deadened through 
repeated gratuitous use; therefore, I’ll refrain from hyperbolic overreaching by not referring to the 
Cherokee Nation’s Freedmen controversy in such terms. See Churchill Kill the Indian, Save the Man: The 
Genocidal Impact of American Indian Residential Schools (San Francisco: City Lights, 2004) and A Little 
Matter of Genocide: Holocaust and Denial in the Americas, 1492 to the Present (San Francisco: City Lights, 
2001). See also MariJo Moore, ed. Genocide of the Mind: New Native American Writing (New York: 
Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2003).  
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36 Ray notes that Samuel Morton’s theories of race form the root of 19th-century race and blood ideology 
that partially informed the Dawes Commission’s concept of who was a Cherokee or a Freedman. Morton 
worked from 1831-1851 and rejected “monogenesis” in favor of the idea that different races in fact 
possessed different bloods on which racial traits, behavior and intelligence (or lack of) were inescapably 
imprinted. Lewis Henry Morgan, whose work influenced the Dawes Commission, introduced a Darwinian 
element to race theory, adding that Indian blood and black blood were inferior to that of whites. He also 
believed that because of this inferior quality, Indians were doomed and could only be saved through 
assimilation, which included intermarriage and the “mixing” of bloods. Because Morton and Morgan 
believed that bloods were separate and carried racial traits, they argued that blood could be quantified, 
meaning Indian blood could eventually be “bred out” by continual intermarriage with whites. For more 
about Morgan’s theories and how they influenced 19th-century race ideology, see respectively Morgan 
Ancient Society (1877) (New York: Gordon Press, 1977. Reprint) and Yael Ben-Zvi “Where Did Red Go? 
Lewis Henry Morgan’s Evolutionary Inheritance and U.S. Racial Imagination” CR: The New Centennial 
Review 7.2 (2007): 201-229. 
As opposed to Indian blood, however, black blood was considered a permanent taint, an idea 
that led to the One-Drop Rule in which a phenotypically white person with a black ancestor from long ago 
would still legally be considered black. See Ray, “A Race or Nation?,” 445. One of the more famous cases 
of the One Drop Rule being applied to a phenotypically white man with black ancestry is that of Homer 
Plessy, a man of 1/8 African ancestry, who bought a ticket to ride in the “white car” of a train in defiance 
of Louisiana’s Separate Car Act (1890). After he took a seat in the white car, Plessy was arrested by a 
private detective. In court Plessy tried to argue that segregation was in violation of his rights guaranteed 
by the Thirteenth Amendment; however, Supreme Court Justice John Ferguson upheld Louisiana’s law. 
See Williamjames Hull Hoffer Plessy v. Ferguson: Race and Inequality in Jim Crow America (Lawrence: U of 
Kansas P, 2012).  
 
37 The Final Dawes Roll lists 4,305 Freedmen and 619 Freedmen minors. Slavery as an institution in the 
Cherokee Nation grew rapidly between the early 1800s and its official abolition in 1863. Between 1809 
and 1860, the number of slaves in the Cherokee Nation rose from 583 to 4,000, which made slaves at the 
time 23.5 percent of the population in the Nation. See Ray, “A Race or a Nation?,” 425. 
 
38 See Perdue, Slavery, 85. 
 
39 Though several traditionalists such as Redbird Smith and Chitto Harjo (Creek) refused to cooperate with 
the Dawes Commission, they were jailed until they acquiesced to pressure to enroll. Other people who 
refused to enroll were sometimes surreptitiously added by neighbors and family members who the Dawes 
Commission paid as informants.  
 
40 Thomas borrows the elements of language, ceremonial cycle and territory from Edward Spicer, an 
anthropologist of the American Indian Southwest with whom Thomas trained. In his own essay “Tap-
Roots of Peoplehood,” Thomas adds the element of shared history. While Spicer takes the three 
abovementioned elements and identifies indigenous groups against the dominant white group, Thomas 
and Holm display how they are interrelated and how they function on their own outside of a binary 
context that depends on the presence of a dominant group against which to define the existence of an 
indigenous group. See Spicer Cycles of Conquest: The Impact of Spain, Mexico, and the United States on 
the Indians of the Southwest, 1533-1960 (Tucson: U of Arizona P, 1967), Ch. 15-17, 19-20. 
 
41 Several studies have documented a genealogy of race formation in the U.S., including Ruth Benedict 
Race: Science and Politics (New York: Viking Press, 1940); Bruce Dain A Hideous Monster: American Race 
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Theory in the Early Republic (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2002); Michael Omi and Howard Winant Racial 
Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s (New York: Routeledge, 1994). Though early 
Indian policy was largely based on the racial ideas of anthropologists at the time, including Morgan who 
introduced Darwinist ideas of blood and Samuel Morton who believed in polygenism, the notion of race 
as a product of biology has been long debunked. On race and belonging, Eva Garroutte (Cherokee Nation) 
writes: “The act of using science (to determine identity) is a technological manifestation of sociopolitical 
ideas of race. Such ideas assert that cultural identity can be conclusively established in an individual’s 
biology. Science cannot prove an individual’s identity as a member of a cultural entity such as a tribe; it 
can only reveal one individual’s genetic inheritance or partial inheritance. The two are not synonymous.” 
See Garroutte, Real Indians, 84. For more studies that debunk the race myth, see Ashley Montagu Man’s 
Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race, 6 ed. (New York: Columbia UP, 2008); Joseph Graves, Jr. The 
Race Myth: Why We Pretend Race Exists in America (New York: Plume, 2005) and The Emperor’s New 
Clothes: Biological Theories of Race at the Millennium (Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers UP, 2003). For an analysis 
of race as a social construct, see Part I of Elizabeth Higginbottom and Margaret L. Anderson Race and 
Ethnicity in Society: The Changing Landscape (Belmost, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 2011). See also 
Stephen Steinberg The Ethnic Myth: Race, Ethnicity, and Class in America (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001) for 
a study of institutionalized discrimination and the myth of cultural ethnicity as it pertains to lived 
experience in the U.S. For a succinct study of how race figures in Indian Country, see Ann McMullen 
“Blood and Culture: Negotiating Race in Twentieth-Century Native New England.” Confounding the Color 
Line: The Indian-Black Experience in North America. James F. Brooks, ed. (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 2002), 
261-292.   
 
42 Academics have indeed debunked the idea of race as biology, or anything tangible and quantifiable for 
that matter. However, I invoke the discussion of race in this chapter because to people like Darren 
Buzzard and other Cherokee Indians who would begrudgingly accept a white son- or daughter-in-law but 
believe “‘you don’t marry black people and you don’t marry Mexicans’” or that Cherokees are “‘just as 
good as the white people’” (Sturm, Blood Politics, 163) race evidently is real or at least means something. 
People such as these have a political voice and can determine the fate of the Freedmen based on their 
notions of race, however indefensible. Because of this reality, I engage race in this analysis, specifically 
with regard to how the Peoplehood Matrix transcends race and can inform a more equitable nation. For 
more on how some Cherokees view race in terms of maintaining a “pure” Cherokee bloodline and on 
Cherokee racial hierarchies with regard to exogamy, see Sturm, Blood Politics, 150-53 and 161-65, 
respectively.    
 
43 For studies on how language functions as an element of identity formation, see John Edwards Language 
and Identity: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009), Ch. 8-10 and John E. Joseph Language 
and Identity: National, Ethnic, Religious (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), Ch. 1-2 and 5. For a 
general study on language as an adaptive strategy with regard to identity, see Pierre Bordieu Language 
and Symbolic Power (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1999). For a study specific to the United States, see 
Walt Wolfram American English: Dialects and Variation, 2 ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 
Ch. 2.1, 6. 
 
44 While one could argue that Perryman is romanticizing her mother’s experience with the Taylor family in 
her retelling, in keeping with my commitment to respect the Freedmen descendants’ stories, I defer to 
Perryman as the expert of her family members’ lives, especially if the story is one that comforts someone 
whose mother might otherwise have lived an unpleasant life.  
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45 On a historical note, scholars disagree with regard to how Cherokees treated their slaves. Theda Perdue 
argues that Cherokee slaveholders “probably treated their slaves much better on the average than did 
their white counterparts” while Carla D. Pratt asserts that slavery in the Cherokee Nation differed little 
from slavery in the U.S. South and that sometimes “Cherokee masters could be as cruel and vicious as 
their white counterparts” (81). See Perdue, Slavery, 98; Pratt “Tribes and Tribulations: Beyond Sovereign 
Immunity and Toward Reparation and Reconciliation for the Estelusti.” Washington and Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights and Social Justice 11.1 (2005): 61-132. McLoughlin, however, argues that life as a slave in the 
Cherokee Nation was neither worse nor better than living in bondage in the U.S. South. He writes: 
“Among these slaveholding Indians we do not know to what extent black slaves had an easier life than 
among white slaveholders. Many slaves did run away from white masters because they thought they 
would have an easier life among the Indians . . . . Nevertheless, there are scattered accounts that tell of 
Indian slaveowners who whipped, maimed, hung, and burned slaves as late as the 1850s in Indian 
Territory (now Oklahoma),” though he does note that the Seminoles were known for their kindness 
toward their slaves. See McLoughlin, “Red Indians, Black Slavery, and White Racism,” Cherokee Ghost 
Dance, 263-264. 
 
46 The term “liberation theology” wasn’t coined until 1966 when a group of African American pastors 
challenged black Civil Rights leaders such as Malcolm X on the idea that Christianity was a white man’s 
religion that supported slavery and oppression. While some Christian pastors at the time of slavery did, at 
best, ignore the slavery issue and, at worst, rationalized its acceptance, black pastors during the Civil 
Rights era renewed their effort to use Christianity in a way that preached tolerance, equality and care for 
the poor and the oppressed. This approach that black pastors took to re-appropriate Christianity in the 
1960s, however, wasn’t new as black and Freedmen preachers in Indian Territory had been preaching this 
version of Christianity from the pulpit since slaves were introduced to the religion. Thus, I use the term 
“liberation theology” not to refer to the Civil Rights era, but rather to describe the content of the sermons 
of black and Freedmen preachers in the nineteenth century in Indian Territory. However, some 
background in 1960s liberation theology and the slave history that informed it could approximate what 
black and Freedmen preachers were discussing in Indian Territory. See Dwight N. Hopkins Down, Up, and 
Over: Slave Religion and Black Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), Part II especially on theology; 
C. Eric Lincoln and Lawrence H. Mamiya The Black Church in the African American Experience (Durham, 
NC: Duke UP, 1990), Chs. 2-3, 5, 7-8 ; E. Franklin Frazier The Negro Church in America (New York: Shocken 
Books, 1964); Albert J. Raboteau Slave Religion: The “Invisible Institution” in the Antebellum South (New 
York: Oxford UP, 2004), Ch. 5-6. 
 
47 In addition to spreading Christianity, the missionaries taught the Cherokees how to farm in ways that 
produced excess in order sell to traders, which was a boon to the Cherokee economy. After several years 
of the missionaries’ presence, however, some traditionalist Cherokees felt the missionaries had done their 
job in integrating the Cherokee Nation into the U.S. economy and that they should leave. They feared that 
Cherokees were becoming too acculturated as evinced in the Nation’s new laws with regard to 
inheritance, property and marriage that contradicted the ways that had worked for traditionals for 
generations. Additionally, these traditionals were noting how missionaries were investing more time in 
the wealthy mixed-blood elite. McLoughlin writes: “The missionaries, who in 1819 had been heroes to the 
rich and poor in the nation for helping to stave off compulsory removal and for bringing free education to 
all, had within a decade become villains to the traditionalists by dividing the nation. Mission schools 
trained the sons of the rich to rise to power but failed to serve the sons of the poor. The missionaries 
preached self-reliance and ‘God helps those who help themselves,’ but the new political and economic 
order enabled the rich to pass laws to help them get rich while leaving the poor to pay taxes and help 
each other” (219). These shifts in culture and divisions of the people spurred the White Path rebellion 
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(1827) in which White Path, a traditionalist leader, gathered with fellow traditionalists and worked to 
restore Cherokee culture that they viewed as being systematically chipped away. For more about the anti-
missionary sentiment by Cherokee traditionalists and the White Path rebellion, see McLoughlin, 
Cherokees and Missionaries, Ch. 9. 
 
48 On Christianity and missionaries as “civilizers,” McLoughlin writes: “When George Washington 
inaugurated the nation’s policy of Indian assimilation in 1789, he expected all of the Indians east of the 
Mississippi (roughly 125,000 in eighty-five different tribes) to be acculturated within fifty years. His goal 
was to teach them English, make them farmers, divide their land among them in ‘severalty’ (that is, as 
individuals). Once they could support themselves individually as farmers, they were to be admitted into 
the republic as full and equal citizens. The Indian nations would then be denationalized and their land not 
actually under cultivation would be ceded to the federal or state governments. The missionaries were an 
integral part of the government’s civilization and Christianization program.” See McLoughlin, Cherokees 
and Missionaries, 1. 
 
49 William G. McLoughlin has written several volumes about the role of Christianity in Cherokee history. 
See, for example, Cherokees and Missionaries, 1789-1839 (1984), Champions of the Cherokees: Evan and 
John B. Jones (1990) and Cherokees and Christianity, 1794-1870 (1994). More generally, see George E. 
Tinker (Osage), Missionary Conquest: The Gospel and Native American Cultural Genocide, (1993); Robert 
F. Berkhofer, Jr., Salvation and the Savage: An Analysis of Protestant Missions and American Indian 
Response, 1787-1862, (1965); Francis P. Prucha, American Indian Policy in Crisis: Christian Reformers and 
the Indian, 1865-1900, (1976); R. Pierce Beaver, Church, State, and the American Indians: Two and a Half 
Centuries of Partnership in Missions between Protestant Churches and Government, (1966); Henry Warner 
Bowden, American Indians and Christian Missions: Studies in Cultural Conflict, (1981); Gustavus E. E. 
Lindquist, Indians in Transition: A Study of Protestant Missions to Indians in the United States, (1951); 
Peter Rahill, The Catholic Indian Missions and Grant’s Peace Policy, 1870-1884, (1953). See Ch. 5 of this 
study for a discussion of the role of Christianity in “civilizing” Indian gender and sexual norms.  For a look 
at how tribal communities have incorporated Christianity in ways that are useful to them, see Tinker, 
American Indian Liberation: A Theology of Sovereignty, (2008) and Spirit and Resistance: Political Theory 
and American Indian Liberation, (2004); Tinker, Homer Noley (Choctaw) and Clara Sue Kidwell (Choctaw), 
A Native American Theology, (2001); Noley, First White Frost: Native Americans and United Methodism, 
(1991); Craig Stephen Smith (Leech Lake Anishinaabe), Whiteman’s Gospel, (1998).  
 
50 McLoughlin notes that missionaries in the Cherokee Nation tended to take one of three stances on the 
issue of slavery: “(1) [they] could hold that slavery was the law of the land and hence a political question 
in which the church could not, or should not, meddle; (2) [they] could take a proslavery position and 
argue that since it was the law of the land and since the Redeemer and his apostles never openly 
condemned the institution, it was not only justifiable by Old Testament example but also beneficial to the 
slaves and to the nation and a blessing to be supported and expanded; or (3) [they] could advocate 
opposition to slavery as a sin against the injunction to love one’s neighbor as oneself.” See McLoughlin, 
The Cherokees and Christianity, 45. Northern Baptists such as Evan and John Jones opposed slavery, but 
after Removal, as slavery became more institutionalized in the Cherokee Nation, the Nation started to 
invite Southern Baptists who did support slavery. See McLoughlin, After the Trail of Tears, 147.  
 
51 While this analysis focuses on how white missionaries in Cherokee communities preached what they 
saw as the virtues of slavery, it is important to remember that not all missionaries in Cherokee country 
took this approach, and many missionaries proved valuable to Cherokees. While Welsh-born Baptist 
missionary Evan Jones favored Cherokee religious acculturation, he disapproved of slavery and adamantly 
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fought against Removal. Likewise in Indian Territory, Evan and John Jones helped traditionalists such as 
Creek Sam and Pig Smith, Redbird Smith’s mentor and father, respectively, organize the Keetoowah 
Society in 1859 as a way to empower fullbloods who had been marginalized politically by the growing 
mixedblood Cherokee  planter population. The Joneses, like the Keetoowah Society and most of the 
traditional Cherokees, were abolitionists and supported the Union during the Civil War. See McLoughlin 
Champions of the Cherokees: Evan and John B. Jones (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1990).  
   
52 While Moravians and Presbyterians also proselytized to Cherokees, the Baptists and Methodists were 
more accessible to Cherokees because they preached from a position of egalitarianism and were willing to 
take as members (and even ordain as ministers) Cherokees who were poor, illiterate, and who were “of 
good heart”. They also did not remain neutral in politics and sided with Cherokees in their fight against 
Removal. Because their missionaries came from the north, early Baptists especially were anti-slavery. See 
McLoughlin, Cherokee and Missionaries, 150-151. 
 
53 Because Cherokee has its own written language, spellings of Cherokee words sometimes vary when 
transliterated into English. For example, one spelling is “Kituwah” as in Kituwah mound, the place of origin 
of Cherokees and the site of the mother town in present-day Bryson County, North Carolina. Others such 
as the Keetoowah Society and the United Keetoowah Band use the “Keetoowah” spelling. Some Cherokee 
speakers will write “gaduwa” or “giduwa,” depending on the pronunciation in the various regional dialects 
of Cherokee. I use these spellings interchangeably as they appear in the documents I’m using or in the 
names of the groups I refer to.   
 
54 The Keetoowah Laws can be found in Appendix A of Howard Q. Tyner, The Keetoowah Society in 
Cherokee History, (1940). 
 
55 “Black drink” is a tea made from a mixture of various roots and leaves that induces vomiting. The 
beverage is usually ingested before religious ceremonies for the purpose of purifying the body. Cherokees 
are among several tribal communities, including the Creeks, Natchez and Timucuas who incorporate black 
drink into their ceremonial practices. For more on black drink, see Charles M. Hudson Black Drink: A 
Native American Tea (Athens, GA: U of Georgia P, 1979). 
 
56 “Ball play,” which is also called “stickball,” is a ceremonial game that is played before stomp dances that 
resembles lacrosse. Using hickory sticks and a ball made of deer hair and hide, players attempt to strike a 
wooden fish placed on top of a pole. Teams are awarded seven points for hitting the fish and two points 
for hitting the pole. In some variations, players must run through a goal and run back onto the field in 
order to score points. While men use sticks, female players use their hands. The game also was historically 
used for settling disputes between communities. Though the game maintains ritual significance as a 
prelude to stomp dances, secular stick ball teams also play for recreation. In addition to Cherokees, other 
tribal nations such the Choctaws and Creeks have a stickball tradition and play different versions of the 
game. For more on stickball, called anejodi in Cherokee, as it is played among Cherokees in North 
Carolina, see Michael J. Zogry Anetso, the Cherokee Ball Game: At the Center of Ceremony and Identity  
(Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 2010). More generally, see James Mooney “The Cherokee Ball Play.” 
American Anthropologist 3.2 (1890): 105-132.  
 
57 It should be noted that not everyone agrees on whether the Keetoowahs included among their 
membership Afro-Cherokees or African slaves. For example, Katja May argues in her book on Cherokee 
and Creek nativist movements that one difference between the two groups’ strategies was that Creeks 
included blacks in their traditionalist movements while the Cherokees supposedly did not. Specifically, she 
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writes: “The term Keetoowah was also an umbrella term for several competing groups known by that 
name. Keetoowah groups did not have African American members, unlike ‘traditionalist’ or ‘nativist’ 
movements in the Muskogee Nation” (79). See May African Americans and Native Americans in the Creek 
and Cherokee Nations 1830's to 1920's: Collision and Collusion (New York: Garland Publishing, 1996). In 
her analysis of the Keetoowah Society, May refers to “competing groups” of Keetoowahs, but the 
Keetoowah Society did not split until the late 19th-century, well after the Civil War. In fact, according to 
David Cornsilk (UKB), after Redbird Smith’s death in 1919, as many as 22 Keetoowah organizations 
operated in fullblood communities. May’s analysis invokes a much later period in Cherokee history, and 
about the Nation as a whole, to issue a blanket claim about the Keetoowah Society as it existed more than 
half a century earlier. Minges also points out that May asserts that the Keetoowahs only supported 
abolition insofar as their traditional Cherokee lifeways were safeguarded from encroachment. What Mays 
fails to account for, however, is that human bondage was an affront to the Keetoowahs’ lifeways, 
meaning that their support for the abolition of black slavery actually is an assertion of their traditional 
beliefs. Finally, May’s assertion that blacks had no part in the Keetoowah movement, for which she 
provides no historical evidence, overlooks the preponderance of evidence that they in fact did play an 
important role. We know that the Keetoowah movement was informed by the largely black Baptist 
church, and we know that Keetoowahs after the Civil War agitated for Freedmen to gain Cherokee 
citizenship. We also know that many slaves were Cherokee speakers and, by their phenotypes, could not 
assimilate into mixedblood Cherokee society, meaning per the Keetoowah by-laws they were eligible for 
membership. Overall, however, as Minges points out, Mays’ assertion that blacks had no part in the 
Keetoowah movement elides the documented history of Freedmen and traditionalist Cherokees working 
together to protect the Nation. He writes that May’s claim “den[ies] the common struggle and the 
horrendous losses of African Americans and Native Americans during the struggle to end slavery and 
reunite a people fought during the years 1861-1865. We can rest assured that just as there were blacks 
protecting the people on the Trail of Tears, there were African sentries posted at Caving Banks to ask the 
question ‘Who are you?’ and to respond ‘I am Keetoowah's Son’” (par 9).  Caving Banks was a Civil War 
battle fought to determine control over that area of Indian Territory, in present-day Tulsa County, 
Oklahoma. The phrase “I am Keetoowah’s Son” that Minges mentions was code used by Pin Indians, 
Cherokee traditionalists who opposed the Confederacy, as a way of identifying fellow Pins. See Minges 
The Keetoowah Society and the Avocation of Religious Nationalism in the Cherokee Nation, 1855-1867. 
Diss. Union Theological Seminary, 1999. Web. 8 Sept. 2011 <http://www.us-data.org/us/minges>. See 
also David Cornsilk “Footsteps – Historical Perspective: History of the Keetoowah Cherokees” 
CherokeeObserver.org. The Cherokee Observer, Oct. 1997. Web. 9 June 2011. 
<http://www.cherokeeobserver.org/keetoowah/octissue97.html>. 
 
58 Because actual blood quantum wasn’t present in the Cherokee Nation until the Dawes Commission 
began using it, terms such as “fullblood” and “mixedblood” tended to denote not actual racial admixture, 
but rather cultural connection and commitment to Cherokees, which is how the Keetoowah Society used 
the term to determine membership and how I use the term in this project. For example, Sturm writes of 
contemporary Cherokees: “[W]e find the full-blood medicine man with green eyes, a full-blood 
Keetoowah man with a CDIB (Certificate Degree of Indian Blood) stating he is only one-eighth Cherokee, 
and a full-blood Cherokee-speaking woman with a white father” (142). See Sturm, Blood Politics, 140-142.  
 
59 “Going to water” refers to the dawn ritual of going to a river or creek and submerging oneself seven 
times in the seven directions, sometimes accompanied by prayer or songs depending on the occasion. In 
Spiral of Fire, Bo Taylor (Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians) jokes that because Cherokees have a long 
tradition of going to water, the Cherokees were “the original Baptists.” Cherokee traditionalist Ryan 
Mackey says there are several ways to go to water, and the method itself can be unique to individuals 
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though the water must always be “living water,” as in not a manmade body of water such as a tank. For a 
brief description of going to water, see McLoughlin, Cherokees and Missionaries, 163. She also Alan Edwin 
Kilpatrick "’Going to the Water': A Structural Analysis Of Cherokee Purification Rituals." American Indian 
Culture and Research Journal 15.4 (1991): 49-58. 
 
60 Article XII of the Treaty of New Echota (1935) outlines the circumstances under which 
Cherokees could stay in the Southeast. It reads: “Those individuals and families of the Cherokee 
nation that are averse to a removal to the Cherokee country west of the Mississippi and are 
desirous to become citizens of the States where they reside and such as are qualified to take 
care of themselves and their property shall be entitled to receive their due portion of all the 
personal benefits accruing under this treaty for their claims, improvements and per capita; as 
soon as an appropriation is made for this treaty. 
 “Such heads of Cherokee families as are desirous to reside within the States of No. 
Carolina, Tennessee, and Alabama subject to the laws of the same; and who are qualified or 
calculated to become useful citizens shall be entitled, on the certificate of the commissioners to 
a preemption right to one hundred and sixty acres of land or one quarter section at the 
minimum Congress price; so as to include the present buildings or improvements of those who 
now reside there and such as do not live there at present shall be permitted to locate within 
two years any lands not already occupied by persons entitled to pre-emption privilege under 
this treaty and if two or more families live on the same quarter section and they desire to 
continue their residence in these States and are qualified as above specified they shall, on 
receiving their pre-emption certificate be entitled to the right of pre-emption to such lands as 
they may select not already taken by any person entitled to them under this treaty. 
 “It is stipulated and agreed between the United States and the Cherokee people that John Ross, 
James Starr, George Hicks, John Gunter, George Chambers, John Ridge, Elias Boudinot, George Sanders, 
John Martin , William Rogers, Roman Nose Situwake, and John Timpson shall be a committee on the part 
of the Cherokees to recommend such persons for the privilege of pre-emption rights as may be deemed 
entitled to the same under the above articles and to select the missionaries who shall be removed with 
the nation; and that they be hereby.” See Kappler, 444. The Cherokees who were allowed to stay were 
mostly mixed-bloods, especially Cherokee women with white husbands; English speakers; formally 
educated and slaveholders who could easily be absorbed into Southern white society.  
 
61 The importance of land is evident in Cherokee constitutions, which frequently begin with an invocation 
of land and the boundaries of Cherokee territory as well as a statement that a Cherokees will lose their 
citizenship if they pack up their effects and leave Cherokee borders. For example, Article I, section 1 of the 
1827 Cherokee Constitution reads: “The boundaries of this nation embracing the lands solemnly 
guaranteed and reserved forever to the Cherokee Nation the treaties concluded with the United States is 
as follows, and which shall forever hereafter remain unalterably the same; To wit: Beginning on the north 
bank of Tennessee River at the uper [sic] part of the Chickasaw Old Fields thence along the main Channel 
of said River [added: including] all the islands therein to the mouth of Highwassee River thence up the 
main channel of said river including Islands to the first Hill which closes in on said river about two miles 
above highwassee Old Town thence along the ridge which divides the waters of the Highwassee Little 
Tellico, to the Tennessee river at Tallassee thence along the main channel including Islands to the junction 
of Cowee & Nonteyalee thence along the ridge in the fork of said river to the top of the blue ridge, thence 
along the blue ridge to the Unicoy Turnpike road thence a straight line to the nearest main source of the 
Chestotee; thence along its main channel, including Islands to the Chatahoochie and thence down the 
same to the Creek boundary at Buzzard roast, thence along the boundary line which separates this and 
the Creek Nation, to a point on the Coosa river opposite the mouth of Wills Creek thence down along the 
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South Bank of the same to a point, opposite Fort Strothers thence up the river [added: to] the mouth of 
Wills Creek, thence up along the east Bank of said Creek to the west branch, thereof and up the same to 
its source & thence along the ridge which seperates [sic] the Tombigby & Tennessee waters, to a point on 
the top of said ridge thence a due north Course to Camp Coffee, on Tennessee which is opposite the 
Chickasaw Island, thence to a place of beginning.” 
 Article I, section 2 on citizenship reads: “The sovereignity [sic] & jurisdiction of this Government 
shall extend over the Country within the boundaries above described, and the lands therein is & shall 
remain the Common property of the nation; but the improvements made thereon and in possession of 
the citizens of the nation, are the exclusive & indefeasible property of the citizens respectively who made 
or may rightly be in possession of them provided that the Citizens of the nation possessing exclusive and 
indefeasable [sic] rights to their respective improvements, [unclear] expressed in this article, shall possess 
no right nor power to dispose of their improvements in any manner whatever to the United States 
individual states, nor to individual Citizens thereof and that whenever any such Citizen or Citizens shall 
remove with their effects out of the limits of this nation and become Citizens of any Other government all 
their rights and privoleges [sic] as Citizens of this nation Cease, Provided nevertheless the legislature shall 
have power to readmit by law, all the rights of Citizen Ship [sic] to any such person or persons who may at 
any time desire to return to this nation by memorializing the General Council for such readmission.” The 
text of the 1827 Constitution can be found at <http://www.cornsilks.com/ 1827Constitution.html>. 
 In several cases, such as those Cherokees who appealed to the military authority to stay in the 
Southeast U.S. during Removal, Cherokees lost their citizenship if the Nation’s boundaries moved and the 
people didn’t follow. These Cherokees can be found listed on the Mullay Roll (1848), the Chapman Roll 
and its addendum the Siler Roll (1851/52), the Act of Congress Roll (1854), the Swetland Roll (169) and the 
Hester Roll (1883). Several Cherokee descendants who cannot enroll with the Cherokee Nation today 
because their ancestors are not on the Dawes Roll have ancestors on these documents. Because 
Cherokees in present-day North Carolina were not required to remove, having bought their own property 
through Will Holland Thomas, the ancestors of Eastern Band citizens also appear on these records.  This 
connection to land also partially explains why Cherokee Nation citizens and Eastern Band citizens differ 
and exist under separate governments. For more about Cherokees who remained in the South and the 
Eastern Band of Cherokees, see Robert Thomas, “Cherokee Communities of the South,” Unpublished 
article, (1978) <http://works.bepress.com/robert_thomas/24> and John R. Finger The Eastern Band of 
Cherokees, 1819-1900 (Knoxville: U of Tennessee P, 1984). 
 
62 William Penn Adair (1830-1880) was a Cherokee statesman who served as assistant Principal Chief, 
justice of the Cherokee Supreme Court and as a delegate to the United States. He was also a colonel in the 
Civil War under Stand Watie in the Cherokee Mounted Volunteers. Additionally, he was an advocate for 
the Texas Cherokees who had been forcibly removed from the Republic of Texas under President 
Mirabeau Lamar though the Texas Cherokees under Chief Bowles had drafted treaties with Mexico and 
with Texas President and adopted Cherokee Sam Houston. Adair wrote a book addressing the Texas 
Cherokees’ land claim called History of the Claim of Texas Cherokees (1873). Cherokee humorist and 
political commentator William Penn Adair Rogers, better known simply as Will Rogers, was named after 
Adair. For more about Adair, see Emmett Starr History of the Cherokee Indians, their Legends and Folklore 
(Oklahoma City: Warden Company, 1921). For a literary account of Sam Houston’s life and connection 
with the Cherokees, see Cherokee author John Oskison’s A Texas Titan: The Story of Sam Houston (Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday, 1929).  
 
63 Lewis Downing (1823-1872) served as Chief of the Cherokee Nation from 1867, after the death of John 
Ross, until his own death from pneumonia in 1872. Downing, a Keetoowah, had become a Baptist minister 
under the guidance of Evan Jones and served with a pro-Union Cherokee regiment during the Civil War. 
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After the war and Ross’ death, Downing, in his roles as Chief, attempted to restore relationships that that 
been fractured during the Civil War by leading through compromise. After his death, he was succeeded in 
office by William Potter Ross.  
 
64 Adley-Santa Maria’s grandmother told her: “‘If you do not sing the songs – if you do not tell the stories 
and if you do not speak the language – you will cease to exists as ‘Ndee’ (Apache)’” (62). This passage 
appears originally in Ines Hernandez-Avila (Nimipu) “The Power of Indigenous Languages and the 
Performance of Autonomy: The Case of Mexico” in Richard Grounds, George E. Tinker and David E. 
Wilkins, eds., Native Voices: American Indian Identity and Resistance (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2003), 35-76.  
 
65 The danger inherent in a view of American Indians as an apolitical race is that non-Indian politicians 
frequently make racial arguments as a way to rationalize terminating the state and federal governments’ 
responsibility to tribal nations as outlined in historic treaties. For example, Republican senator from 
Oklahoma Tom Coburn addressed an audience in 2012 and explained that he would not support 
legislation that would protect Cherokees because he believes Cherokees today are racially no different 
from other Oklahomans. He stated: “‘I was a congressmen where most of the Indians are in this state. The 
problem is that most of them aren’t Indians. The average Cherokee (blood) quantum is 1/512th. Most 
people in this room have more Cherokee in them than the Cherokee’” (qtd. in Snell par. 4). Out of his 
belief that his ostensibly white audience is in fact “more Cherokee than the Cherokees,” he vowed to 
them that he would “block every time” and “put on hold forever” the Five Nations Land Reform Act, 
which would give the remaining restricted allotments in eastern Oklahoma the same level of protection as 
trust allotments in western Oklahoma. Coburn likewise dismissed the political status of tribal nations by 
adding that the state should no longer uphold its end of treaty agreements with tribal nations. He states: 
“‘I mean, this is a joke. It’s one thing for us to keep our obligations to recognize Native Americans, but it’s 
a totally different thing for us to allow a primitive agreement with the Native Americans to undermine 
Oklahoma’s future’” (Snell par. 9). It’s worth noting that the population of the town in which Coburn 
delivered this speech – Altus, Oklahoma – is about 75 percent white, while Native American and Pacific 
Islanders, combined, make up less than 2 percent of the population, according to the 2000 U.S. Census. 
For a transcript of Coburn’s remarks and a rebuttal by Cherokee Phoenix writer Travis Snell (Cherokee 
Nation), see Snell “Coburn buried the hatchet – in our backs.” CherokeePhoenix.org. Cherokee Phoenix, 20 
Nov. 2012. Web. 22 Nov. 2012. Likewise, Chad Smith remarked about Coburn’s speech: “‘You might have 
expected Coburn’s comments 200 years ago, but not today” (par. 10). See “Tribal leaders dismiss Coburn 
as radical.” CherokeePhoenix.org. Cherokee Phoenix, 20 Nov. 2012. Web. 22 Nov. 2012. 
 
66 While Russell dismisses the idea of the Cherokee Nation, or other tribal nations, administering “culture 
tests” for citizenship, the U.S. requires that prospective citizens pass a test for naturalization that includes 
questions about U.S. geography, government and history. The test, however, is only for those wishing to 
naturalize, not those who are native born. For more on the U.S. naturalization test, including a self test, 
see U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “The Naturalization Test,”<www.uscis.gov/citizenshiptest>.  
 
67 “Terminal creeds” is a term coined by Anishinaabe writer Gerald Vizenor and refers to static ideas of 
supposed “real” Indianness such as Indians having to live on a reservation or having to look and behave a 
certain way, ideas that threaten to define tribal communities out of existence if taken too seriously and to 
an extreme. Vizenor engages this idea in his novel Darkness in Saint Louis Bearheart (1978), which was 
later reprinted in 1990 as Bearheart: The Hiership Chronicles. In the novel, character Proude Cedarfair 
says: “We become our memories and what we believe  . . . we become the terminal creeds we speak” 
(143). When another character, Belladonna, is asked about her tribal values, she asserts that to her being 
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Indian involves being “connected to mother earth and [that] our minds are part of the clouds” and that 
Indians are the products of dreams and visions (190). Belladonna’s definition of “tribal values,” a vexed 
term itself, is constructed on a litany of romantic stereotypes and clichés of Indianness. Belladonna 
eventually dies as a result of her embracing such “terminal creeds.” See Vizenor Bearheart: The Hiership 
Chronicles (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1990). I use Vizenor’s term to describe the risk of taking the 
elements of the People Matrix (shared land, language, history and ceremonial cycle) to a conservative 
extreme though as I argue these elements can also be broadened to the same extent.  
 
68 Daniel Justice and Jeff Corntassel are two Cherokees who live in Canada. Regardless of their current 
country of residence, however, both of these Cherokees have historical ties to Cherokee landscapes that 
inform who they are and the work they do for fellow Cherokees. Their historical, if not everyday 
contemporary, ties to Cherokee land, both in present-day Oklahoma and the Southeast U.S., are 
connections we could consider when articulating belonging through the framework of “shared land” in 
the Peoplehood Matrix. 
 
69 Descendants of the Cherokee Starr family live in the Philippines. David Cornsilk (UKB/Cherokee Nation), 
an employee of the Cherokee Nation’s tribal registration office, mentions this Filipino-Cherokee family at 
<http://www.network54.com/Forum/237458/message/ 1272487525/No+proof+of+citizenship--->. 
 
70 This passage from Jocks comes from a rebuttal to religious-studies scholar Sam Gill who wrote that he 
was leaving the field because it was becoming too racialized and politicized as more Indian scholars 
entered American Indian religious studies. Specifically Gill writes that Native scholars: “study (Native 
American religion) primarily because it has religious and political importance to their personal religious, 
racial, ethnic, or gender connection with it and whose studies are evaluated more on the authority 
granted by religion, race, gender, or ethnic identity than upon academic performance”(973).  Jocks points 
out, however, that Gill, in thinking that Indian scholars’ connection to their own tribal religions would 
undermine what he somehow feels is scholarship’s objectivity, fails to recognize that the kinship that 
elders value is not determined by race but rather demonstrated by act. Jocks adds: “[O]ne really needs 
not just to reside but to reside as a relative, since there are vast dimensions of meaning that are only 
acted out in this way. Even this is not a matter of blood, however. There are full-blood Indians who have 
lost this ability to participate in kinship, and in every Indian community I am aware of there are a few non-
Indians who have gained it” (172). Jocks also rightly adds that, contrary to Gill’s claim, Indian scholars are 
by far underrepresented in the field. See Jocks “American Indian Religious Traditions and the Academic 
Study of Religion: A Response to Sam Gill.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 65.1 (1997): 169–
76. For Gill’s original assessment of how he sees the field of Native American religious studies, see Gill 
"The Academic Study of Religion." Journal of the American Academy of Religion 62.4 (1994): 965-975. 
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‘Our memory has returned’: Queer Cherokee Roles as Survival Strategies in Daniel 
Heath Justice’s Way of Thorn and Thunder trilogy 
 
While the early 2000s was an era that saw Cherokee people and the Cherokee 
state contend with the place of Cherokee Freedmen in tribal history and the role of their 
descendants in tribal life today, another demographic of the tribe was having its history 
and role written into the margins by the state – queer Cherokees. However, unlike the 
Freedmen, who tribal authorities and some lay Cherokees questioned were even 
Cherokee at all, no doubt existed that the Nation’s queer citizens were in fact Cherokee or 
that they possessed rights as citizen Cherokees in a sovereign tribal state. The question at 
hand was whether queer Cherokees’ roles and relationships – marriage in particular – 
adhered to the state’s narrative of tribal tradition. These questions arose at a time when 
states across the country, Oklahoma included, were passing laws against same-sex 
marriage or amending their constitutions to define marriage as “one man, one woman” in 
the name of a supposed national Christian-informed, heteronormative tradition.1 The 
Cherokee Nation, likewise, found itself in a position to contemplate tribal tradition when 
two lesbian Cherokee citizens attempted to marry within the Nation’s jurisdiction and 
under its legal purview.2  
 Kathy Reynolds and Dawn McKinley, two Cherokees who had been together for 
years and were raising a child together, had experienced homophobia through the law and 
on a local level in the past when staff at a hospital once barred McKinley from visiting 
Reynolds in her room because the law failed to recognize them as family. Despite local 
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attitudes, the couple did not expect their marriage to incite controversy and make national 
headlines. McKinley said in a Washington Post article: “‘We were very naïve. We 
thought we’d get married under Cherokee law and that would be the end of it. We never 
thought it would turn into this’” (qtd. in Romano par 2). The Cherokee National Code 
(1892) states that “every person who shall have attained the age of eighteen years shall be 
capable in law of contracting marriage” (qtd. in Jacobi 827). Because Cherokee law did 
not explicitly outline marriage as an institution between a man and a woman, the couple 
was given a marriage license and was wed by a Cherokee minister. When the couple 
attempted to file their marriage license, however, they were told their wedding was not in 
line with Cherokee law. Legal action ensued when Todd Hembree, a tribal attorney 
acting as a private citizen, filed papers in the District Court of the Cherokee Nation to 
place an injunction on the marriage and to formally oppose it on the grounds that same-
sex marriage was an affront to Cherokee tradition.3 The court ultimately dismissed 
Hembree’s suit on the grounds that because he was not personally affected by the 
couple’s marriage, he could not seek damages in court. After a lengthy exchange in court 
between the couple and the plaintiff, the Cherokee Nation drafted its own version of the 
Defense of Marriage Act,4 which the tribal council passed in a unanimous 15-0 vote, and 
Reynolds and McKinely’s marriage license remains unfiled. In essence, the Cherokee 
Nation codified in law an implicit narrative that singly extols monogamous, heterosexual 
marriage. The new law casts straight marriage as Cherokee tradition, this marital make-
up being an institution privileged by Christians and brought by them to Cherokees.  
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 But it wasn’t always this way. Records from the past and reflections from queer 
Cherokees today indicate that at one time, before the imposition of Christianity, Cherokee 
gender and sexual norms occupied a wide latitude of construction and expression in the 
tribal community. And while taboos did exist such as the one forbidding intra-clan 
marriage, the community made allowances for individuals whose lives didn’t play out in 
a prescribed manner, allowances that began to erode as Christian missionaries and 
converts circumscribed gender and sexuality. Furthermore, these same records and 
reflections show that far from being outcasts, queer tribal community members enjoyed a 
place of reverence as a result of the roles they were responsible for in the community 
such as healing,5 leading some ceremonies6 and carrying on tribal tradition and history 
through storytelling.7  
 One example of this storytelling tradition – and one that reconciles queer 
Cherokees to the tribal body through traditional roles – is Daniel Heath Justice’s Way of 
Thorn and Thunder trilogy.8 Justice, a queer-identified9 Cherokee, writes a trilogy that 
conspicuously allegorizes the Cherokee fight for and ultimate removal from their 
homelands in the Southeast U.S. Unique to his retelling, however, is that the narrative not 
only makes visible queer Indians and their roles in protecting and preserving the Nation 
during a time of immense upheaval, but it also privileges those roles and reconciles them 
to an allegorized Cherokee tradition, a tradition that was heavily influenced by 
Christianity by the time the narrative takes place in his historic counterpart. Justice’s 
trilogy operates on a generic level as well because the fantasy genre gives him room to 
craft characters who are explicitly gendered in unconventional ways that might otherwise 
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be invisible in a traditional historic rendering of the events.10 Additionally, the genre 
gives him latitude to create and name characters based on their racial and cultural 
admixtures and their commitment to, or disdain of, traditional practices and beliefs, 
contexts that are more frequently implicit rather than explicit as Justice successfully 
makes them.  
 However, while Justice’s trilogy engages a significant event in Cherokee history 
through a queer lens and shows readers a history that is unaccounted for, the trilogy 
possesses great value and potential as a counter-narrative of critical, ethical nationhood 
for queer Cherokees whose traditional roles and reverence have not only been written off 
but also vilified through Christian contact. While several historical analyses attribute the 
split between the Ross and Ridge factions to racial and cultural conflict between 
traditional “fullbloods” who wanted to fight for the homeland and progressive 
“mixedbloods” who surreptitiously agreed to removal, Justice attributes the divide to one 
of the spirit between traditionalists (“Greenwalkers”) and Christians (“Celestials”), 
groups who, respectively, revere and revile queer and ambiguously gendered individuals 
in the trilogy.11 Scholars have pointed to the spread of Christianity, especially in 
mixedblood communities, as the root cause for the disintegration across the continent of 
the value of the roles taken up by queer indigenous people and for leaving in its wake a 
system of two genders in communities that often recognized more, a system that 
marginalizes those who don’t – or who can’t – adhere to European norms of gender and 
sexuality.12 Justice’s trilogy not only critically examines Christianity’s role in the 
marginalization of queer and Two-Spirit Cherokees, but it also reclaims the group’s 
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traditional roles and functions as a narrative of ethical Cherokee nationhood that resists 
the national narrative crafted and privileged by Cherokee state law that continues to 
ostracize queer Cherokees on the premise of Cherokee tradition.  
 
‘We don’t want gay marriages in the Cherokee Nation. It’s that simple.’ 
 Cherokee tribal councilmember Linda O’Leary plainly articulated that the 
Nation’s decision to prohibit same-sex marriage was a matter of the council simply not 
approving of it.13 And yet when we examine the sentiment behind her statement, and how 
homophobia14 developed in Cherokee communities through the spread of Christianity, 
the evidence suggests that her resentment toward queer Cherokees is anything but simple. 
It is only natural for any community’s traditions to change and adapt over time. That said, 
it is easy to lapse into nostalgia and misremember the ways things were and to lionize 
tradition as incontrovertible truth, much in the way Hembree did when he attempted to 
rationalize his contempt for same-sex marriage by appealing to what he imagines as a 
timeless Cherokee tradition.15 However we choose to construct and practice, and 
remember and invoke, Cherokee tradition at any point in Cherokee history, the influence 
of Christianity on how tradition is conceived of today, especially with regard to the place 
of queer Cherokees, is undeniable.  
 Several scholars have conducted studies on the way that Christianity dismantled 
the reverence queer indigenous people experienced in their communities. I will highlight 
a few key points that will serve as background to my readings of the Way of Thorn and 
Thunder trilogy. Because my focus is how the Cherokee state narrates its queer citizens 
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into the margins, my analysis in this section returns to the issue of Reynolds and 
McKinley’s marriage and Cherokee constructs of gender and sexuality to provide a 
Cherokee-specific framework through which to interpret Justice’s fiction. Though several 
records exist that detail the importance of queer indigenous sectors of larger Indian 
communities and their roles in tribal nations in the American West, scant few records 
exist that explicitly demonstrate the same for Cherokees.16 Enough records exist, 
however, to argue a preponderance of evidence for the presence of queer Cherokees in 
pre-Christian society and their incorporation in that society. Sarah Hill, for example, 
notes a historical document from a Spanish explorer who witnessed the incorporation of 
people in early Cherokee society who we might call queer or Two-Spirit today. She 
writes:  
 [Juan] Pardo . . . saw among those subsequently known as Cherokees a man who 
 ‘went among the Indian women, wearing an apron like they did.’ The startled 
 Spaniard summoned his interpreters . . . to ask the local chief about him. The man 
 was his brother, the chief explained, and not ‘a man for war.’ With neither 
 elaboration nor scorn for the scribe to record, the chief said his brother ‘went 
 about in that manner like a woman,’ doing ‘all that is given to a woman to do.’ 
 (66) 
While history demonstrates the incorporation of gender-diverse Cherokees into their 
communities, reflections from queer Cherokees today as well as traditionalists add 
another layer to support the argument of queer Cherokees’ traditional reverence in 
Cherokee communities. 
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 J.C. Lowe, a young Two-Spirit17 Cherokee and Nighthawk Keetoowah, says that 
Keetoowah tradition as practiced in hir community recognizes multiple genders, and 
Ryan Mackey, a Cherokee linguist and ceremonial grounds leader, says participants at his 
grounds can represent as any one of three genders. Likewise, Qwo-Li Driskill (Cherokee) 
adds that Cherokee Two-Spirits are charged with restoring duyuktv, or living on the right 
path, that colonization has eroded. Zhe writes: “Almost all of the Two-Spirit people I 
know are deeply committed to carrying on our lifeways, reviving traditions that have 
gone dormant . . . . I’ve become deeply invested in also relearning our language, songs, 
dances, and arts . . . . It is through this work that we rebalance the world” (“Shaking” 
129).18  Adding to the case that Cherokee history recognizes variance in gender and 
sexuality are the Cherokee terms for what English speakers call “husband” and “wife.” 
While English genders the terms used for spouses, their Cherokee counterparts simply 
translate to “companion I live with” and “cooker,” terms that are not necessarily gendered 
in Cherokee. Someone who is either biologically male or female can adopt either of those 
marital roles – or shift between them – thus opening the possibility of marriages between 
two men or two women, either coupling being sufficient to fill those titles.19  
 While the above examples demonstrate Cherokees who today account for the 
presence and acceptance of queer Cherokees in the past, the issue that still exists for some 
is whether documentation from early Cherokee history demonstrates the same, a 
possibility that Hembree denied in his litigation. Unfortunately for Cherokees who 
pretend that the Nation never recognized the role of queer Cherokees, early documents do 
exist that suggest otherwise. In an 1825 manuscript, C.C. Trowbridge, a white traveler 
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who visited the Cherokees, writes: “‘There were among them formerly, men who 
assumed the dress and performed all the duties of women and who lived their whole life 
in this manner’” (qtd. in Williams 4, emphasis mine). This passage suggests that by 1825, 
well into the era of Christian contact, the role of queer Cherokees might have begun to 
dwindle, which is not to say that the queer population declined with it. This assertion 
only suggests that Christian values that not only privilege heterosexuality but also, as 
some interpret the Bible, make an abomination of homosexuality,20 alongside Western 
gender norms, likely had begun to supplant their traditional Cherokee counterparts by the 
time of Trowbridge’s visit. Regardless of a decline in the prominence of queer Cherokee 
roles by 1825, Trowbridge’s account, contrary to Hembree’s assertion, does indicate that 
a queer population did exist openly in early Cherokee communities. 
But though Trowbridge’s manuscript suggests that queer Cherokees’ roles had 
declined by 1825, a journal entry dated 1835 by John Howard Payne,21 a white actor who 
lived with Principal Chief John Ross to document Cherokee customs, describes union 
ceremonies that he contends memorialize “perpetual friendship.” He writes: “‘While 
dancing, in the presence of all the people, who looking, they exchanged one garment after 
another till each had given the other his entire dress . . . and thus each of them publicly 
received the other as himself, & became thus pledged to regard and treat him as himself 
while he lived’” (qtd. in Driskill 133). Here, it is important to note that while this passage 
describes two men exchanging clothing and bonding in what Payne interprets as 
“friendship,” he adds that the community as a whole attended the ceremony, indicating 
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communal acceptance of such a pairing. Payne adds that sometimes the couple at the 
center of this ceremony would be two women or a man and woman.  
What makes this Cherokee ceremony pertinent to the readings of Justice’s work 
and to the contemporary issue regarding the status of queer Cherokees in the Nation is 
that it is proof that at one time Cherokees had a tradition of recognizing relationships and 
gender identities that today exist outside of the norm established by the national narrative 
that argues that same-sex marriage violates tradition. Payne adds about this ceremony: 
“‘Thus when a young man and woman fell in love with each other but were hindered 
from marrying, either by relation or by being of the same clan, they bound themselves in 
perpetual friendship’” (133). Driskill, who discovered this passage during hir own 
archival research, adds that such ceremonies institutionalized more than just friendship 
and has suggested that Payne likely lacked the vocabulary to express what we would 
identify today as a same-sex marriage. Driskill writes: “The fact that Payne mentions 
opposite-sex couples in love, but not able to have children because of clan laws, suggests 
that same-sex couples were likewise in love” (“Shaking” 134). There’s no way to 
historically ascertain whether the same-sex couples who were united in these ceremonies 
were in fact in love. However, we can be certain that regardless of the couples’ gender or 
sexuality, early Cherokees officially recognized and celebrated these couples through 
ceremony. 
While it’s impossible to ascertain if Payne in fact witnessed a same-sex marriage 
in Cherokee country, Payne’s and Driskill’s competing interpretations of this event lead 
us into the territory of what Rogers Smith calls “ethically constitutive stories” of 
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peoplehood. Smith explains that these are stories about a group of people that can neither 
be proved nor disproved by concrete evidence; however, the interpretation we choose to 
privilege leads to an outcome involving a people’s ethics. Likewise, these “ethically 
constitutive stories,” factual or not, can inspire action that can create a more equitable 
nation in ways that other narratives, such as singular political narratives, cannot. One 
example Smith points to of an “ethically constitutive” story would be when during 
wartime each group involved in a conflict imagines that God is on their side. Obviously it 
is impossible to empirically prove or disprove whether a higher power favors one group 
over any other, or even if such a being exists. However, if a people can imagine that their 
god is providing for them and supporting them, it can inspire them to keep fighting to 
protect themselves.  
We can likewise use Driskill’s account of Payne’s testimony in an ethically 
constitutive way. Based on the work of Walter L. Walters, Sabine Lang, Mark Rifkin and 
Brian Gilley (Cherokee-Chickasaw), among others, we know for certain that queer 
communities existed and continue to do so within the larger expanse of tribal 
communities throughout Indian Country. We also can ascertain that in many of these 
communities before the imposition of Christianity, the people incorporated their queer 
kin into the wider community and in many ways revered them.22 We also know that queer 
individuals were and still are responsible for vital roles within their home communities. 
Furthermore, from Trowbridge and Payne’s accounts, we know for certain that a queer 
demographic lived in Cherokee communities, and we can verify their queered status 
based on how they lived by examining Theda Perdue’s work in which she describes how 
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Cherokees gendered their communal labor. Finally, we know from Payne’s account that 
the “friendship ceremony” he witnessed was similar to other ceremonies that Cherokees 
practiced as a way to make allowances for couples whose relationships were taboo, such 
as a man and a woman from the same clan wanting to marry.  
Given all of these accounts, there is a preponderance of evidence that supports 
Driskill’s interpretation of the ceremony that Payne describes as akin to a contemporary 
same-sex marriage. I’m willing to go so far as to say that while the above evidence helps, 
if we consider the ethical effect that Driskill’s interpretation can have on queer Cherokees 
today, the evidence itself is unnecessary. Simply stated, neither Payne’s nor Driskill’s 
interpretation of the ceremony is empirically defensible. Did Payne witness two straight 
Cherokee men who just wanted to have their close, platonic friendship recognized and 
celebrated by their community? It’s possible. But given the aforementioned evidence, it’s 
equally possible that Driskill is correct in hir belief that the two men might have been a 
same-sex couple who were in love and wanted to have their relationship formally 
recognized by their Cherokee community though their coupling might have violated a 
communal taboo.  
The key to making Driskill’s interpretation work per Smith’s theory of ethically 
constitutive stories is determining the potential for Driskill’s and Payne’s interpretations 
to function in an ethical and empowering way. If we accept Payne’s view, the story ends 
in the moment he’s describing. Two guys who were best friends had their friendship 
celebrated. The end. However, if we accept Driskill’s interpretation, we establish a 
historical precedent for the existence and acceptance of same-sex marriage, and by 
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extension respect for queer Cherokees, that has the potential to subvert the Cherokee 
Nation’s oppressive national narrative and lead to the formation of a nation that is more 
equitable to its queer community. Regardless of whether Payne, unbeknownst to him, 
witnessed a same-sex marriage, what we can ascertain from his observation is that 
Cherokees routinely recognized that despite communal taboos,23 such taboos could not 
prescribe how one’s life would develop.  As a result of this recognition, Cherokees 
traditionally granted concessions in order to fully incorporate such individuals into the 
tribal body. Because Driskill’s interpretation is one that effects positive and necessary 
change in the Nation, and is supported by a preponderance of evidence, I privilege hir 
interpretation as part of my analysis of The Way of Thorn and Thunder.  
 Ignorance of these documents alone, however, does not account for the vitriol that 
is communicated by Cherokees who assert that they “don’t want gay marriages in the 
Cherokee Nation” or that same-sex marriage “would fly in the face of the traditional 
definition and understanding of marriage of Cherokee people” (qtd. in Jacobi 828). After 
all it’s one thing to simply be unaware that one’s tribal community might have in fact 
accepted “gay marriage” at one time and, as such, same-sex marriage as well as other 
taboo pairings, both in Cherokee and European belief systems, were made traditional. It’s 
another thing entirely to reconceive of tradition in a way that disparages a group who not 
only is an heir to that tradition but who also at one time played a role in maintaining tribal 
tradition.  
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The invention and anxiety of tradition: a brief look at “tradition” and Cherokee 
identity 
 
 The Cherokee Nation’s denial of the civil rights of its queer demographic, by 
itself, is enough of an affront against its citizenry that warrants a challenge. However, the 
fact that the Nation attempts to justify its marginalization of its queer citizens through a 
narrative of tribal tradition makes the legislation against same-sex marriage doubly 
insidious. The Nation’s invoking of “tradition” and its subsequent dissemination of its 
narrative of tribal tradition through law gestures at normalizing the legal circumscription 
of queer relationships and the rights of queer citizens in the community through the 
implied assertion that to follow Cherokee tradition is to espouse homophobic positions. 
However, as Eric Hobsbawm argues, what several communities consider traditions that 
date back to time immemorial are often more recent constructs that frame how a society 
thinks at the present moment and that shape how that society performs various functions 
at a given time in its history.24 While academics are quick to critically engage, and 
subsequently dismiss, the communally assumed validity and steadfastness of “tradition,” 
it is important to remember that lay communities often extol tradition and ascribe value to 
it, taking for granted that tradition, as they see it, is in fact real. As a result, communities 
frequently associate adherence to “tradition” with issues of authenticity and belonging 
within their social boundaries.25 A battle over tradition fought on the ground (or in the 
voting booth) won’t be won through semantic cavil, but rather by engaging the 
participants’ terms of “tradition” then undermining the image it creates through historical 
scrutiny. Finally, we must consider the anxiety that some Cherokees historically feel with 
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regard to their own authenticity as “Indians” and that recognizing and respecting – even if 
not always practicing – an idea of Cherokee tradition often tethers them to their sense of 
self as Cherokees. As such, challenging the Nation’s narrative of tribal tradition with 
regard to its stance on queer Cherokees is an obstacle that one must tackle in order to 
clear the ground for a counter-narrative of queer Cherokee belonging and ethical 
nationhood to take root.  
 While engaging ideas of tribal tradition on the community’s terms is paramount, 
complicating the idea of “tradition” itself is a useful first step into challenging policy for 
which legislators use tradition as the backbone of legitimacy. As Hembree argued in his 
case against same-sex marriage in the Cherokee Nation, the detractors of state-sanctioned 
queer relationships see such partnerships as violating a marital tradition that Cherokees 
have ostensibly followed since Kanati and Selu brought the tribe into fruition.26 In order 
to use Justice’s trilogy as a counter-narrative, then, it is useful to understand how 
tradition is seldom linear and unbroken, but rather fluid, which in turn challenges its 
frequent overstatement as a marker of authenticity or normalcy in a community.  
 Hobsbawm memorably demonstrates this ephemeral quality of tradition when he 
asserts that though traditions often arise out of contemporary needs, those who invoke 
tradition often attach it to a notion of continuity of time that is often tangential at best. He 
writes: “[I]nsofar as there is a reference to a historic past, the peculiarity of ‘invented’ 
traditions is that the continuity with it is largely factitious. In short, they are responses to 
novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations, or which establish 
their own past by quasi-obligatory repetition” (2). As Hobsbawm points out, the past that 
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one imagines through the framework of “tradition” is seldom distant and often in fact 
created in real-time with the practice of the tradition itself and that, at times, practicing 
the tradition is a matter of obligation, which only further cements the tradition as part of a 
people’s re-created past.  Indeed, as Hobsbawm adds, the key to tradition maintaining its 
temporal privilege is its imagined invariance and its ability to “impose fixed (normally 
formalized) practices” (2). Despite that communities frequently take for granted the long 
continuity of tradition, the invention of traditions and desire for the aforementioned 
invariability, or rather the stability of fixed tradition, often emerges within a community 
at times of rapid change. Hobsbawm further asserts that the invention of tradition 
“occur[s] more frequently when a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the 
social patterns for which ‘old’ traditions had been designed, producing new ones . . . 
when such old traditions and their institutional carriers and promulgators no longer prove 
sufficiently adaptable and flexible, or are otherwise eliminated” (2-3). Hobsbawm’s 
argument here is applicable to the history of Cherokees, a people who know all too well 
the upheaval of rapid transformation.  
As one of the earliest tribal nations to incorporate Euroamerican epistemologies, 
definitions of Cherokee “tradition” have been in flux as a result of Cherokees at times 
welcoming Europeans and at other times being encroached upon by them as well as the 
multiple removals of countless Cherokee families as the Nation’s territory declined 
through land cessions in various treaty negotiations. These changes to Cherokee tradition 
include the adoption of a centralized and constitutional nation,27 the institution of 
slavery,28 participation in a market economy29 and the acceptance of Christianity,30 a 
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point I revisit later as it pertains to the rejection of queer-identified Cherokees. As W. 
David Baird notes, while each of these changes to Cherokee culture, and by extension 
tradition, gradually entered Cherokee communities over generations, their inclusion as 
Cherokee “tradition” was crystallized after Removal, when the Nation literally had to 
rebuild itself from the ground up. Baird writes: “After removal to Indian Territory . . . in 
the 1830s, these adaptations quickly became ‘traditional’” (7).  This new Cherokee 
“tradition,” however, was by no means accepted across the board, as Cherokees then, as 
they do today, vary widely in their practices and beliefs. Most notably the Keetoowah 
Society rejected what they saw as an incursion of white ways into Cherokee life and 
chose to live apart from the growing mixed-blood population that tended to be Christian 
and to espouse Euroamerican values.31 Nonetheless, because mixed-bloods and 
intermarried whites had grown rapidly as a sector of the Cherokee Nation, and the Nation 
at the time was led by John Ross who, though he was backed by Cherokee traditionalists, 
was part of the developing aristocratic class in the Nation, the new tradition that Baird 
describes gained purchase as the Nation rebuilt itself west of the Mississippi River. At the 
time of Removal and rebuilding in Indian Territory, the Cherokee Nation was divided, as 
Justice’s trilogy alludes to, along lines of those fullbloods who maintained practices and 
beliefs that pre-dated the arrival of Europeans and the mixed-blood Cherokee contingent 
for whom the European traits adopted into Cherokee life, including Christianity, formed 
the only Cherokee tradition they knew. The reconstruction of the Nation after Removal 
also put the Nation in a position to reconstruct Cherokee tradition, lending a history to 
what was and is a modern nation. Hobsbawm argues that a nation’s development of a 
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tradition lends a sense of historical legitimacy to a modern political concept. He writes: 
“We should not be misled by a curious, but understandable paradox: modern nations and 
all their impedimenta generally claim to be the opposite of novel, namely rooted in the 
remotest antiquity, and the opposite of constructed, namely human communities so 
‘natural’ as to require no definition other than self-assertion” (14). Tradition, however a 
nation defines it, lends a sense of historic continuity and legitimacy to a nation, but, as 
Hobsbawm notes, it also lends a sense of the nation being “natural,” something that 
wasn’t constructed by man and, therefore, is above reproach. This deployment of 
tradition makes the Cherokee Nation’s decision to infringe on the civil rights of its queer 
citizens all the more deplorable because it threatens to make seemingly natural, and thus 
legitimate, the marginalization of queer Cherokees. The Nation using its sovereign power 
to disseminate a narrative of a singular “Cherokee tradition” allows the Nation to 
essentially define what it means to follow Cherokee tradition, namely opposing same-sex 
marriage, despite that Cherokees have historically accounted for multiple arrangements 
of marriage.  
At this point, it’d be easy to argue that because “tradition” as we know it is a 
mutable construct, we can abandon the idea altogether. And while in academic circles we 
can easily cast off the self-imposed shackles of tradition, in the communities that actually 
have the power to decide the fate of their marginalized kin, following tradition is often a 
marker of their own authenticity, and as such “tradition” retains a social capital with 
which one must contend. Indeed, Jocelyn Linnekin asserts that a community’s 
authenticity to itself and to outsiders, and individuals’ standing as members of a 
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particular community, often hinges on the existence, however implicit, of a tradition that 
is “an objectively definable essence or core of customs and beliefs” (446).32 This 
perspective complicates the application of academically-derived challenges to the 
concept of “tradition” in a legal conflict such as that over same-sex marriage in the 
Cherokee Nation because lay communities often hold a deeply ingrained idea of tradition 
not only as a vital feature of their very existence, but also because the idea of “tradition” 
itself is loaded with notions of timelessness and authenticity. This issue of authenticity of 
tradition and the fact that tradition has the ability to normalize practices in a nation makes 
challenging the Cherokee Nation’s narrative of tradition attached to its ban on same-sex 
marriage so crucial. Elaborating on the power that authenticity has over communities, 
Linnekin adds: “However effectively scholars deconstruct authenticity and reveal it to be 
an intellectual red herring, the concept remains nonetheless entrenched in popular thought 
and is an emotional, political issue for indigenous peoples, particularly for those who are 
engaged in a struggle for sovereignty” (447).33 Because the notion of authenticity as 
demonstrated through tradition, regardless of its problematic nature, does inform how 
some tribal members view themselves and one another, the Cherokee Nation’s tacking 
onto its legislation against same-sex couples an idea of “Cherokee tradition” necessitates 
challenging “tradition” as the Nation narrates it by engaging the Nation’s own framework 
of tradition and adding to it a more nuanced narrative of Cherokee history. In effect, the 
potential for Justice’s trilogy to counter the Nation’s narrative of a heteronormative34 
tribal tradition is best enacted when it can challenge that narrative using the terms that the 
Nation employs to construct it. 
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In addition to recognizing the Nation’s use of tradition to normalize homophobic 
policy as being truly Cherokee, it is important to note too how this disguising of the 
policy as Cherokee tradition can play on the anxieties of some Cherokees to be seen as 
part of the tribe by adhering to, or at least voting in favor of, the Nation’s idea of tribal 
tradition. Because Cherokees have historically been viewed throughout Indian history as 
assimilationists and remain the unfortunate punch line of many a joke35 in Indian 
Country, the Nation’s couching of its heteronormative policy as tribal tradition has the 
potential to coerce Cherokees into supporting the marginalization of queer citizens in the 
name of being identifiably Cherokee. In his defense of the Five Tribes as “real” Indians, 
Baird argues that the reason Cherokees frequently get challenged by outsiders and even 
other tribal nations with regard to their indigenous claims arises from the Nation’s 
reputation for accommodating Europeans. He writes: 
Nothing set the Five Tribes people apart quite so much as their outspoken 
 advocacy of assimilation with the white majority. Their historic willingness to 
 make alien cultural patterns their own prepared them for this role. And they had 
 the endorsement of reformers and government policy makers who continually 
 exhibited them as proof that assimilation programs worked. (11)36 
Given this reputation for the abnegation of tribal lifeways in favor of European customs, 
one can imagine the allure for some Cherokees to support the Nation’s ban on same-sex 
marriage in the name of upholding and appearing to practice what the Nation tells them is 
tribal tradition.  
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 This perceived loss of a tribal tradition is only one item in a laundry list of criteria 
that both Euroamerican detractors to tribal sovereignty and fellow tribal nations often trot 
out to question Cherokee indigeneity. In her work with Cherokees on the issue of 
identity, Circe Sturm identifies white phenotypes,37 the espousing of Euroamerican 
attitudes and behavior,38 inability to speak Cherokee,39 practicing Christianity40 and 
living outside of politically- and socially-drawn boundaries of Cherokee communities41 
as attributes that can raise doubt about a Cherokee’s claim of being Indian. Each of these 
externally- and internally-applied criteria for being a “real” Cherokee is hugely 
problematic for assigning identity, given Cherokees’ long history of change and 
adaptation, as every other community possesses incidentally. However, Eva Garroutte’s 
(Cherokee Nation) analysis of the criterion of tradition demonstrates that adherence to a 
set of tribal lifeways, one imagined as “pure” and lacking European influence, is not only 
paramount to establishing tribal identity but also has the potential of erasing doubt of 
one’s tribal identity that might be invoked with one or more of the items on the list in 
Sturm’s account. Respondents in Garroutte’s study elaborated on how they view the 
knowledge and practice of tradition in relation to one’s being Indian and belonging to the 
community. Cherokee respondent Joyce J. asserted that being raised without tradition 
makes one weak and likened the experience to a tree without other trees surrounding it to 
make it grow straight. Joyce J. elaborates: “‘[W]here you’ve got a lot of trees around this 
young tree, and that one tree grows straight up between those other trees to reach the sun, 
then it’s going to be strong . . . And that’s the way it is with Indian children. . . . Without . 
. . that circle of tradition, to raise that child in, it becomes weaker and weaker’” 
 291 
(Garroutte 74, original emphasis). While Joyce J. sees life without Cherokee tradition as a 
deficit in a Cherokee child’s development, Julie M., a bilingual Cherokee from a 
traditional community, argues that being Cherokee is to follow tradition. To Julie, 
Cherokees are “‘[p]eople who live in Cherokee homes, speak Cherokee, eat Cherokee 
dishes of food, and plant Cherokee gardens, and look at the world in a Cherokee way. 
Basically, that’s what it really boils down to: who walks in that way and sees the world in 
that way’” (Garroutte 73). This insistence, from two Cherokee women no less,42 that 
adhering to Cherokee tradition is the determining feature of one’s belonging to the 
community is an admirable gesture at privileging Cherokee epistemologies of being. 
However, when examined side-by-side with Sturm’s list of the traits that can mar one as 
not being authentically Cherokee, Julie M.’s list of those features that make one 
unequivocally Cherokee, again given the Nation’s complex history, can make being 
Cherokee by “tradition” seem unattainable and is equally problematic. 
 Julie M. and Sturm’s lists, respectively, demonstrate how arduous being Cherokee 
can be for one who isn’t raised traditionally and how easy it is to be derided as not truly 
Cherokee for the appearance of cultural infractions that are more often than not out of 
one’s control. However, lest one think that being Indian by tradition is a Sisyphean 
pursuit, one of Garroutte’s respondents, a Creek-Osage man named Melvin B., asserts 
that simply making an effort to embrace tribal tradition often suffices to remove doubt of 
one’s construct of identity and the subsequent anxiety of not being “Indian enough.” 
Melvin B. states:  
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 I’ve see some full-blooded Indians, that I know are full-blooded Indians, that are 
 not Indians. They don’t care about the Indian culture, they don’t attend Indian 
 functions. They don’t care about ‘em. . . . So I would say no, even though he’s a 
 full blood, he’s not a real Indian. . . . I see a blonde-headed person, blue-eyed, that 
 attends ceremonial things and goes to different tribal affairs and things like that. 
 And they try to uphold the Indian tradition. To me, that’s a real Indian.’ 
 (Garroutte 76, original emphasis)  
Here, Melvin B. argues that “tradition” is defined less by what a person is and more by 
what he or she chooses to do, specifically in the service of his or her tribal community. 
This framing of tradition as an action might motivate Cherokees such as Hembree and 
O’Leary to rationalize homophobia as a performance of tradition. However, it also opens 
the possibility of casting as tradition the performance of vital roles on the part of queer- 
and Two-Spirit-identified Cherokees and the recognition of this group’s historical 
reverence on the part of other Cherokees. In essence, Justice’s trilogy functions as a site 
that privileges a narrative of a Cherokee tradition that not only includes but also uplifts 
queer Cherokees and, as such, is a narrative of ethical Cherokee nationhood. 
 
Christianity’s role in the demise of the status of queer and Two-Spirit Indians 
Missionaries to Cherokee communities employed a pattern of demonizing 
traditional epistemologies and supplanting them with Eurowestern, Christian 
counterparts. Mary Young, for example, writes: “When any church attacked traditional 
practices – ballplaying, conjuring, or lively and prolonged ceremonial dancing – it 
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succeeded in relocating some celebrations and in making them disreputable among some 
of the ‘respectable’ class” (514). Likewise, missionaries subjected traditional 
epistemologies of gender and sexuality, and their attached social roles, to the same 
scrutiny. While queer- and Two Spirit-identified Indians are gradually reprising roles 
unique to their gender status in their communities, Sabine Lang argues this reclamation 
has as much to do with challenging local homophobia as it does fulfilling the duties that 
queer Indians identify as their communal obligations. She writes that before the onset of 
cultural change brought by Europeans, several nations saw their queer kin as possessing 
supernatural gifts at most and, at the very least, recognized a secular role and 
institutionalized gender status for them outside of a simple male-female binary. Lang 
writes: “An increasing number of urban Native American gays and lesbians have come to 
claim the women-men and men-women as their predecessors in the tribal cultures. Thus, 
they argue that there highly respected statuses for homosexual, ‘two-spirited’ people . . . 
and they use that argument to counteract homophobia in the Indian communities” (322). 
Lang and other scholars such as Wesley Thomas (Navajo), Walter Williams and Sue-
Ellen Jacobs have identified the imposition of Christianity as the source of the 
homophobia that frequently remerges in their fieldwork with queer Indians.  
Though frequently criticized for its focus on “berdache bliss,”43 Walter Williams’ 
foundational text on sexuality in Indian communities, The Spirit and the Flesh: Sexual 
Diversity in American Indian Culture (1982), goes into great detail of how various tribal 
nations accounted for queer communities, such as the nadlehs among the Navajos and the 
winktes among the Lakotas, and how Christianity eroded these groups’ esteem in the 
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greater community. As Williams notes, the early days of colonial settlement saw 
primarily two kinds of Western individuals heading out for indigenous territory: those 
loners who had grown tired of the hustle and restrictions of American life and who 
wanted to escape, and missionaries who saw themselves as exemplars of Western culture 
and Christianity and who felt compelled by God to “enlighten” the continent. Williams 
argues: “In its most extreme ethnocentric form, everything Western was sanctioned as the 
will of God, while everything belonging to the indigenous culture was evil” (181). One 
Western element that missionaries spread early on was patriarchy and the superiority of 
men, and by contrast the inferiority of women, as interpreted through Scripture such as 
the Adam and Eve story. This misogynist belief changed the way some tribal 
communities viewed not only the positions of men and women in relation to each other 
but the value of those individuals who did not conform to the dichotomous gender norms 
professed by their Christian interlopers.  
In addition to missionaries vilifying sex in general and more specifically sex with 
someone of the same gender on the ground that it supposedly violates Levitican law, 
missionaries further spurred the ostracization of queer Indians, male-embodied 
especially, on the belief that by choosing to appear and live as women, they, by default, 
were choosing to be inferior. Williams writes:  
Since Christianity views men as superior, with a creation story specifying a male 
 god creating a masculine being and only later the female from the rib of the male, 
 then the berdache44 is likewise inferior because he is ‘less than a man.’ No longer 
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 is he combining the power of both women and men; in Christianity he is seen as 
 subverting his natural male superiority to take an inferior female form. (189)  
As this Christian indoctrination, often facilitated by Western technology and material 
culture, grew over generations and was bolstered by intermarriage of white Christians 
into tribal communities, such beliefs became the norm – the tradition, some might say – 
and queer Indians’ status and roles came to be seen as an abomination, assuming converts 
chose to see them at all.   
Williams cites from stories told by members of various tribal communities that 
describe the downfall of the status of queer Indians. One Lakota man lamented that 
“‘missionaries condemned the winktes, telling families that if something bad happened, it 
was because of their association with a winkte. They would not accept winktes into the 
cemetery, saying ‘their souls were lost’” (183). Another Lakota man described the 
anguish that queer people in his community felt within themselves after having been 
made into pariahs by missionaries and some Christian Indians. He said: “‘A lot of them 
(Christianized Indians) forgot the traditional ways and the traditional medicine . . . The 
missionaries and the government said the winktes were no good, and tried to get them to 
change their ways. Some did, and put on men’s clothing. But others, rather than change, 
went out and hanged themselves’” (182). Likewise, Jacobs recounts a story that a Tewa 
man told her in 1992 about a queer teenage boy who was “carved open” at a party by 
another man. Fortunately, the boy survived, but she adds: “It will come as no surprise that 
this beautiful child’s self-esteem is at rock bottom, and he is a serious alcoholic whose 
life is at risk in many ways” (25). Jacobs writes that among those Tewas who happen to 
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be homophobic, the story goes that whites brought the “sin” of homosexuality to the 
community, despite that Tewas have long had a reverent term, kwido, for people who 
might identify as queer today.  
Further complicating the reverence, or lack thereof, with which tribal 
communities held their queer kin, Akimel O’oodham, a Pima elder, told Jacobs that queer 
individuals were part of the community. She states: “‘We have always had some of 
‘them’ around; nobody really hurt them. Oh, they were always teased  . . . but they are 
just part of life so no one really thinks anything about it. They are just part of the 
community’” (qtd. In Jacobs et al 15). While people throughout Indian Country argue 
whether queer and Two-Spirit individuals were revered, reviled or “just part of life,” the 
consensus in the research appears to be that the vitriol that queer Indians are assailed with 
today developed from the outside. With this thought in mind, one can conclude that 
Christianization played a major role in changing how queer Indians were perceived in 
their communities, and we can extend that into how some tribal nations view their queer 
citizens today. For this reason, it becomes necessary to first understand how Justice 
critiques Christianity’s role in the displacement and shaming of queer Indians, in his case 
Cherokees, through his depiction of the Celestials before examining how his narrative 
reconciles them to the tribal body. 
 
Celestials and Greenwalkers: Christianity and the Way of Thorn and Thunder  
 Much of the animosity that exists among the Kyn, or Cherokees in Justice’s 
trilogy, is predicated on individuals’ decision to either keep with the beliefs of the 
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Greenwalkers or to assimilate and take up the faith of the Celestials. The names of the 
religious factions allude to the traditional approach to understanding one’s existence by 
finding reverence in the natural world or through the Christian approach of revering a 
God in Heaven. While in Cherokee history religion was only one of several factors that 
divided Cherokees into groups of progressives and pullbacks and informed their desire to 
either remove or stay in the homeland, Justice focuses the conflict in the trilogy on 
religion and situates it as the catalyst behind the Expulsion and the queering of non-
normative Kyn. As evinced earlier, religion was the core of the newfound, assimilated 
mindset that ostracized queered people in tribal communities. Thus, analyzing the trilogy 
in a way that demonstrates Justice’s recovery of the roles of queered Cherokees through 
their fictionalized Kyn counterparts requires a focus on how destructive the new religion 
in the trilogy was on a greater scale.  
 While the appearance of individuals in the trilogy who have been shamed and 
marginalized because they retained the Greenwalker faith as opposed to accepting the 
Celestial route is frequently evident, the conflict between the faiths in determining if all 
the Kyn should remove is more subtle. In Kynship we learn that while the Greenwalkers 
remain living on their ancestral land in the Kyn Nation, the Celestials inhabit floating 
cities above the Nation, demonstrating their disconnect not only to the land, but also to 
the rest of the Kyn. As the two groups are negotiating whether to remove, Neranda, the 
Celestial lawmaker who stands in for the Ridge Party,45 intimates that the Greenwalkers 
are too naïve to understand why they should remove. Likewise, she argues that all the 
Kyn should not be forced to stay and face destruction from Men just to preserve the 
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spiritual beliefs of a few. While Neranda is addressing the Council, she asserts that 
mutual survival trumps the protection of any one spiritual belief. Justice writes: “‘The 
differing paths of the Celestial and the Greenwalkers have too long divided the Kyn . . . it 
would be both unfair and unwise to allow the unfortunate divisions among the Kyn to 
determine the fate of all Folk . . . The survival of everyone must hold precedence over the 
particular beliefs of any given Kyn’” (Kynship 206). In an earlier discussion between 
Neranda and Garyn, the leader of the Kyn Nation who stands in for Principal Chief John 
Ross, Neranda again points to the differing belief systems that divide the Kyn and adds 
condescendingly that the Celestials must make decisions for the Greenwalkers. Justice 
writes: 
 The Greenwalkers “are still held by barbarism’s allure. The Celestial path is a 
 difficult and demanding way . . . If they cannot be taught – and I’m afraid that too 
 many of our wayward kindred have proven themselves uneducable – it is our 
 responsibility to make these for their own best benefit . . . This is why we were 
 chosen to lead. Some must follow’” (Kynship 168).  
Here Justice demonstrates the conflict between Greenwalkers and Celestials and shows 
how Celestials imagine themselves to be more enlightened than their traditional 
counterparts. However, the Greenwalkers are the faction that accepts and reveres its 
queer members. Justice’s linking the Celestials with the Ridge Party, the group that 
surreptitiously agreed to Cherokee Removal, demonstrates that a nation that accepts its 
queer contingents is a nation that is ultimately on the right side of history.46  
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 One final example of the battle between the Greenwalkers and the Celestials 
occurs when Neranda absconds and secretly meets with Vald, the leader of the Dreyds 
who are looking to expel the Kyn, and signs the Oath of Western Sanctuary, an allusion 
to the Treaty of New Echota (1835) in which the Ridge Party signed away Cherokee land 
to the federal government. In discussing her decision to sign the Oath with Vald, Neranda 
again rationalizes that she is acting in the Kyn’s best interest, pointing out that the 
Greenwalkers’ belief system, one that privileges queer individuals, undermines Kyn 
progress and is one she dismisses as superstition. Justice writes:  
 ‘Most of the Folk are superstitious and ignorant of the wider world. They are 
 easily influenced, especially by the long discredited conjurors who use the fear of 
 ghosts and spirits the separate the People from their good sense . . . We have 
 come to make the difficult choice for all the People, even if it is against their 
 baser wishes” (Wyrwood 73).  
Neranda signs the Oath and in doing so initiates the Expulsion, an event that its historical 
counterpart, Cherokee Removal, led to the deaths of more than a quarter of the 
population. Though in history several factors informed Removal, in the trilogy Justice 
isolates religion as the driving force that determines whether the Kyn are saved or 
whether they’ll be destroyed. By shifting the focus squarely to religion, and knowing that 
the Greenwalkers revere queer individuals where the Celestials don’t, Justice highlights 
the history of how competing religions led not only to the marginalization of queer 
people in tribal communities, but also how that perspective can be damaging to the whole 
community in the future. 
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Social roles and queer and Two-Spirit indigenous communities  
 To understand how Justice’s trilogy functions as a counter-narrative that reclaims 
queer Cherokees to the tribal body in a narrative of ethical nationhood, one must 
understand how Cherokees conceived of gender to begin with.  To start, early Cherokee 
society communities constructed ideas of gender in part through communal labor. Theda 
Perdue, in Cherokee Women: Gender and Culture Change, 1700-1835 (1998), notes that, 
“Men hunted because the first man had been responsible for providing his family with 
meat. Women farmed because Selu first gave birth to corn in the storehouse and then 
became the source of corn” (17). Here, Perdue touches on the Cherokee story of Kanati 
and Selu, who are the primordial man and woman in Cherokee cosmology and who are 
responsible for the origin of wild game and corn, respectively, two staples in the 
Cherokee diet. Perdue argues that per the story, men assumed responsibility for hunting 
and women for agriculture, delineating gender roles for the purpose of providing 
sustenance for the community. She adds that even on the occasions that Cherokee men 
and women overstepped those boundaries and participated in the work of their gender 
counterpart, that labor was nonetheless limited to implied gender expectations. Perdue 
writes: “Men helped clear fields and plant crops, but the primary responsibility for 
agriculture rested with women. When women accompanied men on the winter hunt, they 
confined their activities to gathering nuts and firewood, cooking for the hunters, and 
perhaps preparing the skins” (17). She notes that while such a strict division of labor 
informed by gender did not lend itself to optimal efficiency, the labor itself was less 
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about the commodities and more about establishing oneself in the community on the 
basis of gender. In doing so, Cherokees used labor to maintain balance in the cosmos, a 
central tenet of Cherokee spirituality. Perdue writes: “A person’s job was an aspect of his 
or her sexuality, a source of economic and political power, and an affirmation of cosmic 
order and balance” (17-8). Perdue does, however, mention that on occasion men and 
women would cross the gendered labor division and perform the work of the opposite 
gender, but that nonetheless gender notions were firm. She adds: “On occasion, men 
could be found in fields, the realm of women, and sometimes women went on the winter 
hunt or even to war, normal pursuits of men. But Cherokees always understood their 
society in more absolute terms and tried to conform to those expectations” (17). Though 
Perdue makes a compelling case for Cherokees espousing strict ideas of gender, I have to 
wonder if this conclusion is ultimately clouded by her reliance on the travel recollections 
of white visitors to Cherokee communities as historical background.  
Further complicating the information derived from European source material, 
Lang adds that the way non-Indian researchers have treated gender and sexuality in tribal 
communities relies heavily on European definitions of these terms. She writes that “most 
ethnographers equated male-bodied ‘berdaches’ with (passive) homosexuals, and did not 
seem to have inquired about same-sex relationships outside of the ‘berdache’ institution. 
If ‘berdaches’ existed in a particular group, the topic of homosexuality was usually ticked 
off as having been dealt with. (323). Here, Lang demonstrates that many of the early 
studies of gender and sexuality in tribal communities are hobbled by the privileging of 
strict Western notions of gender. Reliance on these documents as primary sources, then, 
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only reiterates the Western gender binary that undergirds these studies, evidenced for 
example by knee-jerk conclusions of homosexuality where a more nuanced account of 
gender roles and relationships in tribal communities would’ve been more accurate and 
useful. Payne’s account doesn’t account for the possibility of a non-platonic relationship 
between the two men he observed. Instead, he relies on Western-derived gender 
assumptions. Just as we can argue that John Howard Payne might have misinterpreted a 
same-sex marriage as a “friendship” ceremony, we can extend that challenge to those 
narratives by other European visitors whose writings inform Perdue’s study that also 
lacked the vocabulary to identify queer individuals and imposed a European system of 
binary gender onto what they observed.  
 We can also see a lack of strict gender manifest in Cherokee language, especially 
in verbs, and perhaps use this absence of gender to gain a more nuanced understanding of 
how queer-identified and Two-Spirit Cherokees see themselves as part of Cherokee 
tradition, namely through their social roles. Take, for example, the phrase 
“Ganohalidoha”, which means “He/She hunts,” or “Adasdayvhvsgi,” which translates to 
“He/She cooks.” According to Perdue, hunting and cooking are gendered activities in 
Cherokee communities, and perhaps more men than women did in fact hunt, and more 
women than men cooked. However, when describing the action in Cherokee, gender is 
not explicit in the sentence. If a listener wanted to ascertain the hunter’s or cook’s gender, 
he or she would have to specifically ask for clarification. Furthermore, not only is gender 
not explicit in the language, it also isn’t confined to a male-female binary.  This feature in 
the language opens possibilities for alternate genders as the above phrases could just as 
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easily refer to someone who identifies outside the confines of male/female constructs of 
gender. In addition to a lack of gender with regard to the subject of a sentence, Cherokee 
verb conjugations also do not identify the gender of the object. Take, for instance, the 
phrase “Ageyu’a,” which means simply that one person loves another. This phrase on its 
own is a complete sentence, and without any added information to ascertain gender can 
translate to “He loves her,” “She loves him,” “He loves him,” “She loves her” or, again, 
an alternative gender can be introduced into the sentence as the subject, object or both. 
Considering that gendered forms don’t exist in Cherokee language, I again wonder if the 
whites who visited the Cherokees were seeing Cherokee social roles and interaction 
through a European lens of gender and if Perdue’s conclusion of Cherokees’ absolutist 
approach to gender is premature and demands further study. 
 Because the evidence for Cherokees’ strict gender roles is far from conclusive, a 
path exists to analyze Justice’s trilogy through the gender-queered roles of its central 
characters and examine it as a narrative that showcases queer Cherokees being central to 
the Nation’s survival. Indigenous Two-Spirits today are challenging contemporary ideas 
of binary gender norms and reconciling a place within their respective tribes primarily 
through social roles they attribute historically to queer communities. Brian Gilley’s 
(Cherokee-Chickasaw) study of Two-Spirits indicates that Two-Spirits today and in the 
past presided over ceremonial roles such as healing, leading sweats and blessing 
newlyweds.47 Other roles include conducting transformative ceremonies such as various 
coming-of-age rites or parenting orphaned children and working in HIV/AIDS education. 
Gilley notes that guardianship over children who have lost one or both parents is a vital 
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role that several Two-Spirits carry out. He writes: “Historically, Two-Spirit men were 
known for caring for children in their kin groups and taking on parental roles for children 
in their families, as well as to teach children about Indian cultural ways” (171). I 
elaborate on this role in particular because it is prominent in Kynship, in which the 
protagonist, Tarsa’deshae, is cared for after her mother dies and is forged into a warrior 
by her aunt and mentor, Unahi, who is a lesbian. Gilley adds that several Two-Spirits see 
taking responsibility for these roles as a way to not only maintain, and in some cases 
regain, traditions lost through generations of European contact, but that it also 
demonstrates that they are useful in their communities, some of which, like the Cherokee 
Nation, have measures in place that ostracize them.  Gilley interviewed a Two-Spirit 
named “Ben” who elaborated on Two-Spirits’ historic and contemporary roles, roles that 
appear in Justice’s trilogy. He writes: 
 Ben: The way I was taught, the men went to hunt, the women took care of the 
 house,  family, and the children, we as Two-Spirits were the ones who continued 
 the culture: the spiritualism, the naming, the ceremonies. There was nobody else 
 to do it. It takes a powerful person to be able to deal with both worlds [male and 
 female], to be spiritual for the people and conduct ceremonies. Being Two-Spirit 
 means being very traditional, it means connecting with the tradition of the tribe. 
 (97-8, italics original)48 
I quote “Ben’s” passage at length because it touches on several of the roles that zhe 
identifies as Two-Spirit that appear in Justice’s trilogy, namely maintaining spiritualism 
and officiating ceremonies, which, in turn, lead to the Nation’s survival during Removal. 
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By analyzing the trilogy through the Two-Spirit roles, we can see how the trilogy 
functions as a narrative that ties queer Cherokees to the tribal body and attributes the 
continued existence of the Nation to its queer people. 
 The Way of Thorn and Thunder trilogy is a fantasy retelling of Cherokee 
Removal, the fictitious nature of which allows for an empowering counter-narrative to 
the tribal national narrative to emerge. While the facts of Removal history as they appear 
in the narrative are accurately allegorized, an important theme that threads through it is 
the question of whether the Kyn, or Cherokees, can survive away from the Everland, the 
allegorical Cherokee homeland in what is now the southeast United States. The land is 
important in the trilogy because, among other things, it is the place where the Eternity 
Tree is rooted. In the trilogy, the Eternity Tree is a manifestation of Zhaia, the Kyn’s 
mother goddess, and signifies the Folk’s connection to the land. It is also the source of 
wyr, which is “the life source of the Everland, formed from the living voices and 
embodied memories of the ancestors, the spirits of the Eld Green, and the life-spark of 
the Folk themselves” (Justice Dreyd 258-9). Much of the plot involves who values the 
wyr, who has access to it and, finally, who is able to carry the wyr with them once the 
Kyn are forced to evacuate their land. In addition to the characters’ relationship with the 
wyr, the main characters, all of whom are queered in one way or another, also engage in 
the social roles outlined in Gilley’s study. I argue here that by writing characters who 
practice Two-Spirit roles, including the preservation of the wyr, and who live in the 
margins of binary gender constructs, Justice crafts a narrative that imagines queered 
Cherokees at the crux of the Cherokee Nation’s existence. 
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Unahi 
 Instead of analyzing each novel on its own, I am analyzing the trilogy in its 
entirety by focusing on the characters and the roles they play throughout the collection. 
This approach allows me to hone in more closely to the characters and follow them 
through the trilogy as opposed to being restricted to following the sequence of events. 
The first character analysis deals with Unahi, a queered she-Kyn who exemplifies the 
roles for which Justice, Driskill, Lang, Williams and Gilley argue that queer and Two-
Spirit communities were responsible. Specifically, by raising and mentoring Tarsa in the 
absence of her parents and other kin, presiding over ceremonies and teaching Tarsa the 
meaning and value of the wyr, Unahi’s roles align with those that Gilley describes in 
which Two-Spirits are responsible for ceremonies, and for raising orphans and teaching 
them Indian culture. 
 We are first introduced to Unahi when she is called to Red Cedar Town after the 
Kyn warriors have battled with Wears-Stones-for-Skin, or Stone Coat as he is referred to 
in Cherokee stories.49 Stone Coat is a man-eating monster whose skin is made of stone, 
but who can shape-shift as well. In the Cherokee story, Stone Coat introduces death to the 
Cherokees because of his violent and cannibalistic ways; however, the Cherokees are 
able to slay him and set him on fire. Before he dies, Stone Coat not only releases the first 
diseases into the world, but as he burns he also talks with the Cherokees who felled him 
and teaches them the dances, songs and formulas for how to deal with any incident that 
emerges in life. In Kynship, Downbriar Town is ravaged after the battle with Wears-
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Stones-for-Skin, and Unahi is called to return after a decades-long exile. We learn that 
she has been ousted from her family because they and the rest of Red Cedar Town 
became Celestial, or converted to Christianity, and Unahi was no longer welcome. This is 
the first instance that we see Unahi being queered as a result of her insistence on 
maintaining traditional practices. When Unahi visits her family, her sister Ivida doesn’t 
mince words with her: Justice writes: “‘Sit down, Unahi, but let’s not pretend that you’re 
welcome here’” (Kynship 22). Unahi explains that despite adhering to her family’s desire 
to disown her, she is compelled to return to Red Cedar Town and is trying to discover 
why she was called home. Ivida accuses her of witchery. Justice writes: “‘Witchery! . . . 
You don’t belong here! Your ways will bring nothing but pain and suffering to us again, 
to the entire town. Look at yourself, Unahi. Your back is bent, your face worn by age and 
marred with those wicked symbols on your skin. You’re a ragged ghost of what you 
could’ve been’” (Kynship 23). Unahi’s family disowned her when the youngest daughter 
fell ill to a disease – brought from the outside by a trader – that Unahi’s understanding of 
the wyr could not cure. Much of the town died, including the young daughter, Lan’delar, 
and Unahi’s family blamed her for the death.  This introduction to Unahi’s circumstances 
positions her in the margins, and her subsequent actions demonstrate that healing and 
strategies of survival often emerge from outside the periphery. 
 Before we get introduced to how Unahi has been queered by her society, we learn 
the role that Unahi plays among the Kyn. Justice writes that Unahi usually made her 
spring rounds and “assisted in a few dozen births, numerous marriages and love-
bondings, the removal of a handful of minor curses and harmful medicine chants from 
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meddling gossips and vindictive conjurors” as well as other rituals and ceremonies to 
ensure a bountiful harvest and cordial relationships among families (22). The reader 
learns, however, that Unahi returns sooner to preside over the mourning and purification 
rites at Downbriar Town after the Stone Coat attack.  Unahi is singly responsible for all 
aspects of the lives of her fellow Kyn – from cradle to grave. In Unahi, Justice writes a 
queered character who not only brings life into the world, but also ushers it on its way 
out. And in the middle, she is responsible for reconciling quarrels between neighbors and 
healing communities after war, essentially restoring the balance that is vital in Cherokee 
cosmology. While she doesn’t hunt or have a family to cook for, and as such does not fall 
into the gendered labor categories that Perdue details, she does take up the work of 
practicing and preserving ceremonies in a rapidly assimilating community and provides 
for the community’s spiritual, if not nutritive, sustenance.50 
   In addition to Unahi’s varied responsibilities to the community that show how 
she, a queered Kyn, holds the community together, Justice also demonstrates how Unahi 
forges Tarsa, the heroine of the trilogy, through mentorship. More than mentorship, 
however, the relationship between Unahi and Tarsa in which Unahi instills the beliefs of 
the Kyn resembles more a mother-daughter dynamic, similar to Gilley’s analysis of Two-
Spirits often acting as parents to orphaned children. The reader learns that while 
Lan’delar was suffering from the pox, she appealed to Unahi to watch after Tarsa and 
told her that her last words would be for Tarsa. Unahi explains that their family ousted 
her before she could see Tarsa all those years ago, and when Tarsa asks what her 
mother’s last words to Unahi were, Unahi replies: “‘Tell her to tend to her roots’” (Justice 
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Kynship 49). Though the family had mostly become Celestial, Lan’delar charged Unahi, 
the one sister who had remained a Greenwalker, to raise her daughter and instruct her in 
the ways of the Green, which stand in for traditional Cherokee practices and beliefs. 
Unahi’s primary guidance involves teaching Tarsa about the wyr, or Kyn life-force, and 
how to wield it responsibly. When she and Tarsa are on their journey to Sheynadwiin, the 
capital of the Kyn Nation, to discuss the threat of Removal at the council, Unahi instructs 
Tarsa with regard to what exactly she’s wielding when she uses the wyr. Justice writes: 
“‘It’s the language of creation, the voiced embodiment of the Ancestrals and their spirits. 
The words belong to another time and another world, but we continue to speak them, 
because they continually renew our world. Without the wyr, the Folk are rootless’” (66). 
Her explanation of the wyr indicates that Unahi is initiating Tarsa into their ancestors’ 
legacy, and she charges Tarsa with the care of the life-force that is the essence of the 
Kyn. As Tarsa comes into her role as keeper of the wyr, Unahi practices her role as her 
guide, and when Tarsa admits to being confused by the voices she’s hearing through the 
wyr, Unahi, again, instructs her on how to develop her own power and fill her social role. 
Justice writes: “‘Only those who walk in the Spirit World speak the wyr with full grace . . 
. It will come, with time. But you must be careful, youngling, because words are very 
powerful. They can hide or reveal truth with equal ease . . . You have a powerful tie to 
the wyr, Tarsa, but it’ll demand much’” (66). Unahi teaches Tarsa about the power of 
words and reminds Tarsa of the responsibility that she is tasked with, a duty that is 
possible because Unahi is mentoring her. But like a parent, Unahi also chastises Tarsa 
when she gets too aggressive with the wyr and abuses it. In one scene in which Men, who 
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stand in for Europeans, are firing their muskets in the woods and shoot a he-Kyn, Tarsa, 
in anger, uses the wyr in violent retaliation. After shouts of “Defiler,” “Grave Robber” 
and “Murderer,” Tarsa unleashes the wyr and both kills the Men and uproots the land. 
More poignantly, however, she relishes in the feeling of vengeance. Justice writes: “Tarsa 
brought the staff down on the Man’s struggling body. He screamed, but it was the 
satisfying crack of bone and the meaty splut of pulverized muscle that burst through the 
raging haze in her mind . . . Pain pulsed through the green world, and she could feel the 
plant people and their roots aching to get away from her” (Kynship 124). In a violent 
rage, Tarsa uses the wyr to spill blood when it was not necessary and in a way that 
poisoned the natural world around her. As Unahi is taking her to task for her abuse of her 
newfound power, Tarsa snaps back: “‘I saved our lives, didn’t I?’” (133). Unahi lambasts 
her and points out that fighting out of malice, not self-preservation, goes against her 
community’s beliefs:  
 ‘Through you the language of the wyr has become twisted; you turn it against 
 itself, against the green world that would gladly help you in its own way when 
 your heart and mind are balanced . . . You’ve destroyed many tree-people, warped 
 their spirits out all recognition. You uprooted the little green one, tangled them 
 together into weapons, fed them with the poison of Man-blood. Forcing spirits to 
 your will is Mannish witchery, Tarsa, not the way of a Wielder.’ (Kynship 133) 
Unahi’s scolding of Tarsa not only demonstrates her parental authority over Tarsa, but 
this passage also reflects another teaching moment in which Unahi shapes Tarsa’s 
identity.  Here, Unahi simultaneously informs Tarsa about one way that Kyn are different 
 311 
from Men –  that Kyn use their power for good, and Men use theirs for evil. Unahi’s 
lesson also reiterates to Tarsa the gravity of her role as a warrior and wyr keeper.   
 While Unahi uses her role as guardian of the orphaned Tarsa to forge the young 
she-Kyn into a warrior and to teach her Kyn lifeways, the fact that Unahi parents51 Tarsa 
outside of the strict confines of heteronormative definitions of parenting likewise speaks 
to the value of queer and Two-Spirit roles and relationships in the Kyn community and 
by extension Cherokee communities. To understand how Unahi’s role as parent, or her 
altruistic kinship, underscores the value of her position in the community as a queered 
Kyn, it is first necessary to understand how those who exclude queer and Two-Spirit 
individuals often do so on their belief that such relationships lack value because they are 
supposedly non-reproductive. Republican politician Rick Santorum, for example, told 
Fox News in 2003 that he believes marriage exists for the sole purpose of procreation 
and, therefore, should be exclusive to heterosexual couples. He asserts:   
 Marriage is not about affirming somebody’s love for somebody else. It’s about 
 uniting together to be open to children, to further civilization in our society. And 
 that’s unique. And that’s why civilizations forever have recognized that unique 
 role that needs to be licensed, needs [to be] held up as different than anything else 
 because of its unique nurturing effect on children. (par. 13-14)  
Here, Santorum devalues same-sex relationships on the basis of his erroneous assumption 
that such couplings are non-procreative, and that children cannot be adequately nurtured 
outside of a heterosexual marriage.52 He also invokes the claim that straight marriage is 
the cornerstone of “civilization,” suggesting that marriage defined outside of 
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heteronormative confines is the purview of barbarians, loaded language that settlers have 
historically used to marginalize indigenous communities. Santorum and others53 who 
support the marginalization of queer individuals often rationalize that by privileging 
heterosexual, and ostensibly procreative, relationships, they’re ensuring the perpetuation 
of civilized society. Kath Weston challenges this line of faulty reasoning and elaborates 
on how the assumed non-reproductive element of some same-sex relationships is used as 
a slippery slope that leads ultimately to the degradation of society as a whole. She writes: 
“By shifting without signal between reproduction’s meaning of physical procreation and 
its sense of the perpetuation of a society as a whole, the characterization of lesbians and 
gay men as nonproductive beings links their supposed attacks on ‘the family’ to attacks 
on society” (290). As such, according to those leaders such as Santorum, and even 
Cherokee leaders such as Hembree and O’Leary, support for same-sex marriage leads to 
a decline in families54 and a subsequent decline in society.  
 However, the reasoning employed by detractors of queer individuals and their 
relationships fails to take into account that same-sex couples can and do raise children in 
the “traditional” sense of family. But even if queer and Two-Spirit people choose not to 
model their relationships or family lives after the heteronormative, nuclear counterparts, 
the roles they play in societies such as the Kyn society that Justice imagines include 
child-rearing and mentorship of youth who are not biologically theirs. Such roles are 
examples of what Robert Trivers refers to as “kin altruism,” or more specifically 
“behavior that benefits another organism, not closely related, while being apparently 
detrimental to the organism performing the behavior” (35). By “not closely related,” 
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Trivers refers to individuals who are not related in a biological parent-child relationship 
because benevolent action between individuals in this relationship, according to Trivers, 
is an investment in protecting their own genetic material and, therefore, not truly 
altruistic. These altruistic behaviors that Trivers outlines include “helping in times of 
danger; sharing food; helping the sick, the wounded, or the very young or old; sharing 
implements and sharing knowledge” (45). Trivers and other evolutionary biologists like 
James Weinrich55 have suggested that a “gay gene”56 has evolved for the purpose of 
maintaining kin altruism in human societies. They further argue that avuncular 
relationships, in addition to maternal and paternal relationships, are equally vital to the 
development of society. For example, research by Paul Vasey and Doug VanderLaan on 
the Fa’afafines of Samoa, Samoan men who take up women’s roles, indicates that 
individuals who fall outside the scope of heteronormative identity do in fact participate in 
the overall wellbeing of their societies.57 I interpret Unahi’s care and guidance of Tarsa 
and other Kyn through this lens of “altruistic kinship,” or what I simply refer to as 
parenting as I would were the relationship biological and heteronormative.   
 But Tarsa isn’t the only Kyn who benefits from the roles taken up by Unahi. 
Tobhi, a Tetawa who is journeying with Tarsa and Unahi to Sheynadwiin, explains that 
Wielders, or protectors of the Old Ways, are the only ones who can make sense of the 
chaos with regard to the Shields’ desire to relinquish the Everland to Eromar. Eromar is 
the industrialized leviathan of a nation that surrounds the Everland on all sides, which 
stands in for the United States, and the Shields are practitioners of Christianity, some of 
whose members represent the Ridge Party, who want the Kyn to remove. When Tarsa 
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asks why the council wants to see Unahi, seeing as she isn’t a member of the Assembly, 
Tobhi explains that they desire her counsel because she is a Wielder. The Wielders are 
“‘the most important part of the whole thing, ‘cause they understand the Old Ways better 
than anyone . . . The Wielders is the only ones who can bring the Folk back to a sensible 
understandin’ of things – the whole world is out of balance right now’” (Justice Kynship 
74). Here, Justice positions Unahi as one of the few people who have a handle on the 
conflict between the traditional and assimilated Kyn and who can reconcile the Kyn to 
the Old Ways of understanding their connection to the Everland. As the trilogy 
progresses, the reader learns that Unahi maintained an intimate relationship with 
Biggiabba, another Wielder and the matron of the Gvaerg nation, further queering Unahi 
on the basis of her sexuality as well as her decision to remain a Wielder despite being 
banished from her family. Justice writes: 
 Biggiabba had wept with Unahi when [she was] exiled from her home, separating 
 her from her sisters and [her] young niece . . . Unahi in return nursed her friend 
 through the scourge that mottled her gray skin and killed her only child . . . 
 They’d gathered medicinals in the mountains together, planted trees and healed 
 wounded animals, driven poachers and other invaders from their homelands, and 
 often just sat beside the other’s hearth-fire in silence, content simply to smoke a 
 fragrant pipe and gaze into the fire with a friend close at hand. (Wyrwood 142)  
At the end of Wyrwood, the second novel of the trilogy, Unahi is slain when Neranda, a 
she-Kyn who represents the Ridge Party, takes an ax to her head as she’s protecting the 
Eternity Tree, the source of the wyr. By giving a queer character the responsibility of 
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forging Tarsa and by making Unahi a martyr of the Kyn Nation, Justice demonstrates 
both the importance of the roles that queer and Two-Spirit people play in preserving and 
teaching tradition and displays the sacrifices they make in the survival of the Nation. 
 
Fa’alik and Averyn 
 Alongside his portrayal of a queer female character, Justice also engages the vital 
roles upheld by Two-Spirits, those individuals who possess both male and female spirits 
and operate in both realms. Two-Spirits, or zhe-Kyns as Justice refers to them in the 
trilogy, are represented by Fa’alik and Averyn.  Fa’alik is the first zhe-Kyn the reader 
encounters in the trilogy, and we learn that the Greenwalkers revere hir as a ceremonial 
leader and storyteller. Fa’alik makes hir first appearance early in Kynship at the end of 
the war with Stoneskin when zhe is the one who kills the creature after Tarsa and the 
others warriors have felled him. Justice demonstrates that despite the aptitude of the 
warriors, Fa’alik was the only one at the scene who knew how to kill the Stoneskin. He 
writes: 
 [T]he zhe-Kyn, pox-scarred Fa’alik, stepped toward the Stoneskin’s body with a 
 burning cedar branch. The zhe-Kyn straddled the male and female worlds in all 
 things . . . , moving between the blood of war and the blood of the moon without 
 fear. Fa’alik drew the group together and, singing a song of healing and 
 reconciliation, drove the flames into the monster’s chest. (18) 
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In this passage, we learn that the Kyn who follow the Old Ways recognize the immense 
power associated with one who can traverse male and female worlds as evinced by the 
fact that Fa’alik is the only one who can kill the Stoneskin.  
We later learn that in addition to ending the Stoneskin’s life and his rampage, 
Fa’alik recognizes the value of the Stoneskin’s life and ushers it into the Spirit World. 
After the warriors go to water to cleanse themselves after battle, Fa’alik gathers them and 
tells them stories of their ancestral past and interprets the meaning behind their encounter 
with the Stoneskin. Fa’alik “shared stories from the time of the Ancestrals, when it was 
told that a Stoneskin, though brutal and bloodthirsty, was also one of the wise ones of 
long ago, and that with his death came great knowledge” (Justice Kynship 19). Justice 
adds that no one was alive who understood the Stoneskin’s knowledge because no one 
who had previously battled the creature lived to share it. He writes: “Those who might 
have once been able to tell them no longer lived in Red Cedar Town, where the 
Redthorns and Fa’alik were the last followers of the old ways of the Deep Green” (19). It 
is interesting to note that in addition to Justice establishing the Two-Spirit Fa’alik as one 
of the last traditionals and as possessing the aptitude to unpack the knowledge carried by 
Stoneskin, in this line he makes explicit the fact that Fa’alik is the only one in the 
community’s recent memory to have killed a Stoneskin and lived to tell about it. In this 
scene in Kynship, Justice shows Fa’alik, a zhe-Kyn, as the one who presides over the 
healing and cleansing at the battleground and interprets the Stoneskin’s knowledge. This 
rendering of Fa’alik, coupled with the fact that zhe was the only one who could slay the 
Stoneskin and protect the community, paints a powerful portrait of the importance of 
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Two-Spirits in the novel and, by extension, the world. Through Fa’alik Justice creates a 
narrative in which Two-Spirits, because of their cosmological position, are the ones who 
not only sacrifice on behalf of the community and can protect the community from 
various onslaughts, but who are also the ones who can create meaning from tragedy. The 
Two-Spirit’s roles and marginal position helps hir develop strategies for both contending 
with oppression and making sense of it in ways that garner knowledge that is necessary 
for the whole community’s further well-being.   
 In addition to Fa’alik’s ability to render meaning from tragedy in a didactic way, 
Justice also demonstrates Fa’alik’s role in forging Tarsa as a warrior when, after the 
Stoneskin slaying, zhe has sexual relations with Tarsa as part of her transformation. 
Lang’s analysis of male-embodied Two-Spirits supports the idea that Fa’alik’s liminality 
in terms of gender and sexuality functions to transfer power to Tarsa in a way that 
individuals confined to one gender cannot. She writes: “An aspect of sexual intercourse 
between women-men and men which has received little attention in the literature to date 
is the possibility of a transference of latent spiritual power by this means, analogous to a 
transference of power from one man to another by means of intercourse with the same 
woman” (255) Here, Lang describes the idea of men possessing spiritual power and 
women being a conduit of transference of this power. Returning to Kynship, we can apply 
Lang’s theory to Fa’alik in that Fa’alik, possessing both male and female spirits, can 
simultaneously carry the aforementioned spiritual power as well as transfer it to others. 
This idea is reflected in Lang’s research of Two-Spirit roles. She writes: “In accordance 
with his dual sexuality or dual gender, the woman-man could unite two roles within 
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himself: that of the donor of supernatural power and the woman functioning as a 
medium” (255). Though Lang refers specifically to “women-men” here having 
intercourse with men to transfer power, the same process can apply to the sexual 
encounter between Fa’alik and Tarsa in which sex with Fa’alik is the final stage in 
Tarsa’s transformation as a warrior.   
In addition to Fa’alik, Justice creates a second zhe-Kyn named Averyn who he 
describes as a healer and who is also the love interest of Garyn, the leader of the Kyn 
Nation, whose role in the narrative aligns with that of John Ross, the Principal Chief of 
the Cherokee Nation at the time of Removal. In one scene after an attack, Averyn 
communicates with a magpie and learns that the survivors are few. Zhe is determined to 
assist in the healing, but the reader learns that Averyn’s skill involves healing the spirit, 
not the body. Justice writes: “The injuries would be grievous, and likely beyond the zhe-
Kyn’s strength to heal . . . Although zhe could set broken bones [and] heal burns . . . 
Averyn’s greatest skills were with aching hearts and wounded minds. There would be 
plenty of such work with the survivors in the days to come” (Kynship 108). Despite 
Averyn’s limited ability to heal the body, zhe does attend to the wounds that she-Kyn 
warrior Jitani suffers. However, we later learn that one of Averyn’s most important roles 
in the narrative involves the counsel and comfort zhe provides to Garyn. Justice writes 
that part of Averyn’s role involves ameliorating the heartache that Garyn feels with 
regard to imminent removal and to how factious the Kyn Nation has become. He writes: 
“Zhe generally tried to bring good news to hir beloved, to lessen his burdens with the 
mundane pleasures and simple joys of the people who depended upon his strength and 
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wisdom. But Averyn couldn’t keep these unpleasant tidings from Garyn” (Kynship 112). 
Here Justice demonstrates the complexity of the relationship between Garyn and Averyn 
that extends beyond sex, a feature that could be an important factor in recovering the 
reverence of non-heteronormative relationships.58  
This complexity is essential to note because it facilitates reading the relationship 
between Garyn and Averyn in a way that speaks to the need recognize the importance of 
non-heteronormative relationships in the trilogy and, by extension, the Cherokee Nation. 
Garyn and Averyn are the only pair in the trilogy that one might label, at least 
superficially, as gay. The couple does have a sexual relationship, and Lang points out that 
such couplings between straight men and men who she refers to as “women-men” were 
common for a variety of reasons.59 However, to think of Garyn and Averyn as gay, or in 
primarily sexual terms, is shortsighted and overly simplistic, ignoring the cultural context 
through which such couplings manifested. Lang elaborates:  
To classify the relationships between men and women-men as homosexual in the 
 Western sense is not conducive to an understanding of the phenomenon within its 
 own cultural context. The men involved did not perceive themselves to be 
 homosexual, and they led a completely different daily life in general. The women-
 men likewise did not regard such relationships as homosexual, because they after 
 all did not possess a straightforwardly unambiguous masculine gender identity, 
 and their gender status differed from the masculine gender status of their partners. 
 (255)   
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A focus on sexuality also ignores how a relationship like Garyn and Averyn’s functions. 
By pairing Garyn with Averyn, who is explicitly described as a male-embodied zhe-Kyn, 
instead of another male cis-gendered Kyn, we’re compelled to consider their relationship 
not within the confines of sexuality, but with an emphasis on gender. A focus on gender 
and the social roles attached to it, such as those mentioned by Perdue and others, shifts 
the emphasis away from sexuality, the element on which those like Santorum and 
Cherokees O’Leary and Hembree who oppose non-heteronormative relationships fixate 
as a way to dismiss them and rationalize away their inclusion in an ethical nationhood. As 
such, we see how the relationship between Garyn and Averyn operates to effect the goal 
of Kyn (Cherokee) survival during their impending ousting from the Everland. By not 
focusing on sexuality, or on Garyn and Averyn as a “gay couple,” we can focus on the 
gendered role that Averyn plays and how Garyn, the leader of the Kyn Nation, reveres 
and benefits from Averyn’s place as a Two-Spirit. As the narrative progresses, we learn 
that Garyn has become frail with the stress of the chaos occurring in the Kyn Nation and 
that the Shields, who represent the Cherokee mixedblood, Christian planter class, are 
usurping more power. Averyn’s role as Garyn’s lover is to ensure his peace of mind so 
that Garyn might muster the strength to continue to lead the Kyn Nation and oppose the 
Folks’ removal from Everland.  
However, Averyn’s relationship with Garyn adds another layer to the idea of 
Justice’s trilogy functioning as a counter-narrative to the Cherokee Nation’s narrative that 
ostracizes queer Cherokees. Another interpretation of Averyn that supports this claim 
involves not what Averyn does as a Two-Spirit, but rather who zhe is – Garyn’s lover. As 
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I mentioned earlier, Garyn is the stand-in for John Ross in the trilogy. Without delving 
into elaborate detail of the history of Removal,60 John Ross is often viewed, in simple 
terms, as the “good guy” of Removal history. Ross, with the support of the traditionals, 
fought both the United States and his own people, the Treaty Party, to stay in the 
Cherokee homeland. Having also opposed allying with the South in the Civil War until 
circumstances forced his hand, Ross is often extolled as a hero of the Cherokee Nation. 
By pairing Averyn with Garyn in a love relationship, Justice essentially queers Garyn as 
well and as such queers the legacy of John Ross, the chief who many cite as the Nation’s 
greatest leader who led the Nation during Removal and presided over the rebuilding of 
the Nation in Indian Territory. If we accept this narrative queering of Ross’ legacy and 
analyze it alongside the Smith administration’s decision to marginalize the Nation’s 
queer citizens, we come away with the idea that a great Cherokee leader is one who 
recognizes the value of its queer citizens.  
 But offering emotional succor to Garyn isn’t the only way that Averyn heals in 
the trilogy. In the final battle against Vald, the prefect of Eromar who has tormented the 
Kyn throughout the trilogy, Garyn is severely wounded and Averyn comes to his aid. As 
the violence mounts, Averyn hears Tarsa sing an ancestral song and adds hir voice to it. 
Justice writes: “Zhe gasped as the words wove into hir deepest being . . . As the song 
opened hir spirit and zhe began to understand what had so long been forgotten, Averyn 
added hir own voice. . . . Zhe didn’t know what zhe was singing, but zhe knew that the 
words were right. And as zhe sang, the world changed” (Dreyd 219). Justice notes that 
the screaming stopped and “[m]usket shot fell harmlessly into the mud,” and that 
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Averyn’s song awakened Guraadja, a winged Bear-Snake that guards the Eld-Green, the 
Folks’ homeland, who proceeded to fight Vald. After initially mocking Averyn’s song, 
Vald realizes that “the words are everywhere: in his head, in his bones, in his quivering 
flesh. They seared him with an unimaginable pain, as though his very organs were 
aflame” (Justice Dreyd 222). As a result of Averyn’s song, the Eternity Tree began to re-
grow from the land and through Vald’s body, ripping him apart. Afterwards, the “air was 
filled with the smell of fertile earth and wyrwood leaves, the primal flush of life 
incarnate” (Justice Dreyd 222). Averyn’s song extinguishes the threat that Vald 
perpetuated and saves the Folk while also renewing and rebalancing the world.  
The placement of the Two-Spirit songs in the narrative is important to note 
because they bookend the action in trilogy. They also represent the theme of ethical 
nationhood when we consider how the songs function. The trilogy opens with Fa’alik’s 
song slaying the Stoneskin from which the Kyn reclaim and learn vital songs and dances 
they had previously lost. The trilogy ends with Averyn’s song that destroys Vald and the 
threat he posed of massacring the Folk entirely. The Kyn reconcile the Old Ways through 
Fa’alik and are able to use them to resist Vald through Averyn, demonstrating that the 
role of Two-Spirits in the trilogy are both didactic and transformative. Considering that 
the trilogy positions Two-Spirits as the ones who carry or re-create essential knowledge 
and meaning for the community and ultimately rescue the community from seemingly 
insurmountable threats, Justice crafts a counter-narrative that undermines the Cherokee 
Nation’s narrative that disregards the role queer Cherokees play and relegates them to 
perish in the margins.  
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Tarsa’deshae 
 While Unahi and the zhe-Kyns, Fa’alik and Averyn, play their own roles in 
shaping and protecting the Kyn, one of the end products of their teachings and 
ceremonial responsibilities is their forging of Tarsa’deshae, or Tarsa, into a warrior who 
carries the wyr and determines to help the Folk persevere. Throughout the trilogy, we see 
Tarsa further queered as she develops into a warrior –from the moment she participates in 
the slaying of the Stoneskin in Kynship, to her embodying the wyr in Wyrwood to her 
final act of continuing the Kyn Nation through her pregnancy in Dreyd. By queering not 
only secondary characters but also the central heroine, Justice’s trilogy asserts the 
pragmatic use of queering as a survival strategy and further attributes the endurance of 
the community to its queer contingents.  
 Tarsa first appears in the narrative with the name Namsheke, or “Storm-in-Her-
Eyes.” Namsheke is her youngling name that she goes by before she is formally initiated 
as Redthorn warrior in a ceremony officiated by Fa’alik, after which she takes the name 
Tarsa’deshae, or “She-Breaks-the-Spear.” Lisa Tatonetti, in her essay “Outland 
Cherokees Write Two-Spirit Nations,” identifies Tarsa’s queering at the ceremonial stage 
when Fa’alik transforms her from a youngling to a full-fledged warrior. However, I argue 
that evidence of Tarsa’s queer status appears at the outset of the narrative in that Tarsa, or 
Namsheke at that point, is fighting the Stoneskin to begin with. Perdue identifies the 
power ascribed to blood in Cherokee cosmology, and argues that based on gender 
delineations of labor, both men and women would have contact with blood in the form of 
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warfare and menstruation, respectively. However, a woman who traversed the gender 
boundary and went to war became doubly powerful because she now experienced blood 
in both realms. Perdue writes:  
 Such a woman was obviously an anomaly. . . . As an anomaly, she possessed 
 extraordinary power: through war and menstruation she had male and female 
 contact with blood. Each experience was singly a source of power and danger; 
 when the two came together, the power was phenomenal and permitted these 
 women to move between the worlds of men and women. (39)  
Perdue adds that on the other side, men who elected not to engage in warfare had neither 
battle nor menstrual experience with blood and, as a result, had no means to obtain 
similar power as women who crossed gender lines.61 This dichotomy might explain the 
conspicuous lack of queer men in the trilogy who are not male-embodied Two-Spirits.62 
Lang elaborates on the reverence that communities bestowed upon women who took up 
arms in their defense and asserts that a woman’s going to war at all complicated gender 
boundaries though it did not indicate a gender change. She writes: “To want to make 
one’s mark in the masculine prestige domain of warfare and raiding was regarded as 
thoroughly honorable for women, and not at all unseemly; their success demonstrated the 
power of their medicine and their personal bravery. This warlike behavior in women did 
not, however, involve gender role change” (278). Based on Perdue and Lang’s analyses 
of women at war, we can gather that because women could take up a masculine role 
without needing to fully subscribe to male gender expectations, fighting, for women, was 
indeed a queered activity. Lang also adds that women who proved themselves in battle 
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often maintained a permanent queered status in that while technically female in terms of 
gender, they could also take up other roles associated with men. She writes: “Once a 
woman had moved up into the status of a ‘brave,’ other domains of the masculine role 
were also open to her, depending on her personal inclination and ability. In isolated cases 
women would seize the opportunity, take up a masculine role, and achieve a quasi-
masculine status in their community” (278). If we consider Perdue and Lang’s analyses in 
a reading of Tarsa, we find that Fa’alik only further integrated Tarsa into the queer 
identity she already possessed rather than bestowed it on her after the ceremony. 
 However, Tarsa’s ceremony is important in establishing her queering because it’s 
transformative in that she receives a new name and she is officially made a warrior. After 
months of trials and training as a warrior, Fa’alik presides over a ceremony in which zhe 
sings an honor song and paints Namsheke’s skin. After the ceremony, Fa’alik presents 
Namsheke, now Tarsa’deshae, as a Redthorn warrior. Justice writes that Tarsa’s initiation 
into the Redthorns, a group that has been queered and marginalized by the growing 
Celestials, was the first time Tarsa felt like she belonged somewhere. He adds that the 
induction also marked the first time Tarsa felt useful to the community, a sentiment 
echoed by Two-Spirits in Gilley’s study. With the Redthorns, Justice writes, Tarsa’s 
“presence had been not just welcome, but essential; her strength, courage and cunning 
made the Redthorns more than they had been before, and they recognized the qualities 
she brought to them . . . with such gifts as she possessed, they had a chance against a 
world that was increasingly against their long-guarded skills and wisdom” (Kynship 31). 
Justice notes that after the songs, dances and feasts, Tarsa made love to Fa’alik, which 
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was also part of the ceremony. This sexual act not only reiterates Fa’alik’s role as a Two-
Spirit who is responsible for leading the warrior ceremony and, as a Two-Spirit, can use 
hir body to initiate both men and women as Redthorns; it also further queers Tarsa and 
marks Tarsa’s use of her body and sexuality as a tool for survival of the community that 
we encounter toward the trilogy’s end.  
 This ceremony of Fa’alik’s that forges Tarsa into a warrior, coupled with Unahi’s 
teaching Tarsa how to handle the wyr, combine when the Folk are being marched 
westward out of the Everland and Tarsa is able to heal with the wyr. While children and 
the elderly of several Folk nations are perishing during the forced exodus, Tarsa 
maintains her fortitude and uses her knowledge and possession of the wyr to restore hope 
in the Folk. Early in Kynship, we learn about the Eternity Tree, the source of the wyr. 
Though the second installment of the trilogy, Wyrwood, deals primarily with the 
Celestials’ signing away the land, it is also the point in the narrative when the Eternity 
Tree is destroyed. After a fierce and violent exchange between the Greenwalker and 
Celestials at the novel’s end, when Neranda slays Unahi, the Eternity Tree dies and from 
its remains fly screech owls, an omen of tragedy to come in Cherokee belief. Justice 
writes: “The Eternity Tree fell. From the lightless depths flew thousands of white-faced 
owls, as quiet as despair. And in their silent wake came Death” (Wyrwood 204). This 
passage reveals how the Kyn feel that the destruction of the Eternity Tree will lead to the 
destruction of the wyr, the Kyn’s life-force. Part of the Kyn’s resistance to removal was 
the Greenwalkers’ fear that if they were detached from their land, they would relinquish 
their source of corporeal and spiritual sustenance, especially if they lost access to the 
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Eternity Tree. But as Tarsa learned from Unahi, the wyr is not confined to the roots and 
braches of the Eternity Tree; the wyr is embodied in the Kyn and, most prominently, in 
Tarsa. 
 Justice reveals Tarsa’s embodiment of the wyr as the Folk are undertaking the 
arduous journey of Removal, known as The Expulsion in the trilogy. The first indication 
of the Folk regaining their strength and resolve occurs when the Men who are leading the 
Removal notice that the Folk are no longer suffering as before. Justice writes: “The 
soldiers couldn’t understand it, but something was clearly happening among the 
prisoners. It might have been the gradual revelation that the creatures weren’t walking 
with their heads bowed and shoulders stooped in despair . . . The troops were worried; the 
balance of power had shifted . . . Insurrection was inevitable” (Dreyd 130). In the above 
passage, Justice notes that other signs of resolve emerging in the Folk include a woman 
refusing to accompany a soldier to his tent, ostensibly to be raped; the sound of children’s 
laughter; the declining number of deaths despite a lack of food and clean water and a 
renewed strength in the Folk despite the increased brutality of whippings and beatings.  
While the Folk as a whole are beginning to heal psychologically from the trauma of 
Removal, we also see Tarsa using the wyr she embodies to physically heal the travelers. 
After being healed by Tarsa, Tetawa clan mother Molli Rose says: “‘I en’t never felt 
nothin’ like that before. . . . It’s like all of Creation is swimmin’ inside me’” (Dreyd 133). 
Tarsa has invoked the wyr to heal several travelers, and as she rests to gain strength to 
heal another group, she realizes that far from just carrying the wyr, she is the wyr. Justice 
writes: “‘The wyr is so much a part of me now; I am the wyr. It’s in everything I see, 
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everything I touch. I can feel its rhythms and songs even in this spirit-hungry land of 
Men’” (Dreyd 135).  In this passage, we see that Tarsa is not only singly responsible for 
physically healing the Folk as they suffer through the Expulsion, but we learn that she is 
the embodiment of the wyr. While the Eternity Tree in the Everland was the source of the 
life-giving power, after its destruction, and as a result of Tarsa’s mentoring by Unahi and 
Fa’alik, Tarsa herself has become the new source. Tarsa’s ability to heal with the wyr, 
with her touch, establishes the idea that the Folk can survive and thrive outside of the 
Everland because of her power. Tarsa, who is queer and was forged by queer mentors, 
becomes more or less singly responsible for not only mustering the Folks’ resolve, but 
also by using the wyr to attend to their needs.  
 In addition to healing the sick and weary, Tarsa finds her own path to healing by 
engaging in a polyamorous relationship with Jitani, a she-Kyn warrior, and Daladir, a he-
Kyn ambassador. At this point in the narrative, Tarsa is still developing as a leader, and 
she reflects on the times when she has felt out of place. She is conflicted between her 
feelings for Jitani and Daladir until Daladir announces that he wouldn’t ask Tarsa to 
“divide [her] heart” (139). This exchange between the three Kyn adds another layer to the 
narrative by not only demonstrating the value of queer individuals but also the 
transformative value of their relationships. Justice writes: “Her love wasn’t a finite, 
limited thing; it expanded and grew with the giving . . . her strangeness was a part of her, 
and they both loved it, too. They saw beauty when they looked at her, not the monstrous 
thing she so often saw in herself . . . She felt her passion flow through the world, and she 
made her choice. She would be whole again” (Dreyd 140).  The three of them then retire 
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to make love to which Tarsa says: “‘Let there be a healing’” (Dreyd 141). Here Justice 
shows Tarsa finally being made whole again through her sexual relationship with Daladir 
and Jitani, a wholeness that is essential in strengthening Tarsa, who is central to the well-
being of the Folk both as a healer and a warrior. By showing that love transcends gender, 
their exchange further supports the idea that the relationships between queer characters 
are just as vital as the individuals alone. If we also consider that part of Tarsa’s 
development as a warrior was making love to Fa’alik, then we see that queer 
relationships in the narrative not only impart knowledge but also give the individual the 
courage to deploy it because, in the end, the individual feels a place of belonging and 
regains a sense of love and self-respect. Finally, considering character development, 
Tarsa is further queered by being the only character in the trilogy who engages in sexual 
encounters with each of the three represented genders: male (Daladir), female (Jitani) and 
Two-Spirit (Fa’alik). Essentially, in Tarsa, Justice writes a character whose hero status is 
largely a result of not only being queer but also of being bold enough to engage in love 
relationships that, in turn, result in her being a central healer and protector – in short, an 
asset – to her community.  
 But a renewed sense of self and purpose isn’t all that Tarsa gets from her sexual 
relationship with Daladir and Jitani. At the end of Dreyd, we learn that Tarsa is pregnant 
and was with child as she battled Vald and helped to restore the Eternity Tree. Her 
pregnancy and subsequent family structure are another example of the value of queer 
relationships in the narrative. As the novel winds down, we learn that Daladir is away 
negotiating a new treaty for the Kyn in Chalimor, the capital of the Reach of Men and 
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stand-in for Washington, D.C., and that Tarsa will raise her daughter with Jitani. Through 
Daladir, the generation of Kyn is conceived, and through Jitani and Tarsa it will learn 
about the Deep Green ways that are important to the Kyn and how to protect them. Each 
of the individuals with whom Tarsa has sex intersects with her body and combines into 
the forging of the next generation. From Daladir, Tarsa is physically able to conceive and 
give birth to the next generation, and Jitani, being a warrior herself, will help mold the 
child into a warrior alongside Tarsa, whose own training was informed by her exchange 
with the zhe-Kyn Fa’alik.  
 Justice demonstrates the importance of this next generation, the first born outside 
the Everland, when Tarsa and Tobhi engage in a ceremony to simultaneously bless the 
unborn child and to plant a seedpod from the Forevergreen Tree, the reborn Eternity Tree. 
As they begin the ceremony, Tarsa announces: “‘Our memory has returned . . . We won’t 
forget again. We dance beneath the arbors, sing beneath the moon. The balance endures. 
Everywhere a seed takes root, the Deep Green will flourish, and so too will we. A healing 
is taking place at last’” (Dreyd 235, italics original). Because the dual ceremony occurs 
for Tarsa’s child and the seedpod, I interpret “seed” in this passage to refer to both of 
them. By conflating Tarsa’s child and the Forevergreen seedpod, we see that neither 
knowledge nor people alone can restore balance and ensure the Kyn’s continued survival. 
Success of the next Kyn generation will depend equally on the legacy of the wyr and the 
determination of the people to understand it and fight for it. By assigning the next 
generation – the very survival of the Kyn – to his most queered character, Justice writes a 
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narrative that establishes the vitality and inherent value of queer people and their 
relationship in ensuring that the people continue to thrive. 
 
Queer as a Cherokee survival strategy  
 Just as the survival of the Kyn Nation depends almost single-handedly on its 
queer characters and their social roles, Justice notes that for Cherokees centuries-long 
survival has also depended largely on a malleable and adaptive strategy of queerness, 
regardless of the vocabulary others might use.  In hir essay “Two-Spirit Cherokees 
Reimaging Nation,” Driskill discusses this idea in an interview with Justice as well as 
Justice’s reservations regarding the term “Two-Spirit.” Justice asserts that he prefers the 
term “queer” because he feels that “Two-Spirit” normalizes the identity in such a way 
that it potentially undermines an otherwise useful strategy of adaptation. “Queer works 
really well for me,” he says. “I like its ambiguity, and I like that it kind of shakes things 
up a bit . . . I like the idea that whatever roles we may have had in the past are roles 
today, that we could be really important in shaking up complacency and conservatism” 
(qtd. in Driskill 99). Part of this challenge to heteronormativity that the Cherokee Nation 
privileges today serves to remind Cherokees, as Justice puts it, that “being Cherokee is 
about a lot more than blood and it’s a lot more than breeding” (qtd. in Driskill 100). 
While privileging heterosexuality can ensure that Cherokees physically exist in the 
future, respecting queer Cherokees and what they have to offer the Nation ensures that 
those subsequent generations are equipped with the cultural knowledge that gives that 
existence meaning.  
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 In addition to maintaining culture for the future, recognizing how Cherokees are 
already “queered” in various ways and have been for some time lends insight into how 
far Cherokees have come and provides necessary strategies to engage the future. Justice 
argues that some of the ways Cherokees have been queered in the past include Cherokees 
being the only Iroquoian-speaking nation surrounded by Muskogeeans and, as a result of 
a long history of intermarriage, charges by other tribal nations and communities that 
Cherokees aren’t Indian enough. As such, the Nation’s pursuit in narrating itself as a 
steadfastly unchanging – and pure – nation at the expense of queer Cherokees could 
result in a devastating backfire. Justice adds: 
 [I]t’s been our transformative Indian-ness that has made us survive. And I find it 
 really troubling that there are so many people in the nation who would want to 
 take away that transformability out of some sort of weird misguided fear about 
 cultural purity, when we’ve always been inclusive, we’ve always been adaptive. 
 Not always happily . . . That’s also about being queer. That’s survival. And not 
 just surviving, but thriving. (qtd. in Driskill 106, italics original)  
To recognize queerness as a Cherokee survival strategy, then, is simply to recognize 
reality, a reality that to be Cherokee is to have a history, and likely a legacy, of being 
queered63 in one way or another. And while the Nation narrates queerness, at least in its 
sexualized form, as not only an anomaly but anathema to being Cherokee, that Cherokees 
have survived as a result of queerness indicates that, on the contrary, queerness is at the 
core of being Cherokee.  
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This idea of queer Cherokees effecting tribal survival through their social roles is 
masterfully told in the Way of Thorn and Thunder trilogy. When read as a counter-
narrative against the Cherokee Nation’s narrative that marginalizes its queer constituents, 
the trilogy does more than simply open an avenue of discussion with regard to their 
traditional roles. The trilogy serves as a reminder of everything they’ve given us and as a 
sobering warning of everything we stand to lose without them. Furthermore, the pairing 
also critically destabilizes the privileged history and culture that inform the vitriol and the 
mindset of people who can look their kin in the eye and say: ‘We don’t want you.’ When 
a nation passes a law, it effectively narrates what it values.64 Antonio Gramsci, in fact, 
states that the law is the tool that the state uses to manipulate, either by privileging or 
curtailing, behaviors within its borders. He writes: “If every State tends to create and 
maintain a certain type of civilization and of citizen . . . . and to eliminate certain customs 
and attitudes and to disseminate others, then the Law will be its instrument for this 
purpose” (246). Indeed, to learn about a community, one can open its law books and see 
laid out in black and white what that community believes is worth protecting. The 
Cherokee Nation today believes marriage is worth protecting. But from whom? From 
queer Cherokees – or, more simply put, Cherokees. 
 Though the law explicitly addresses marriage, what ends up communicated 
between the lines is a narrative that says the Cherokee Nation values heterosexuality. And 
by drafting this law under the pretense of protecting tribal tradition, the Cherokee Nation 
essentially says: ‘We are not only a heteronormative people today, but our tradition – 
since time immemorial – has been a heteronormative one,’ a postulation that utterly fails 
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when subjected to critical scrutiny. That said, even if some queer-identified Cherokees 
couldn’t care less about marriage as an institution, or whether the Nation ever legally 
recognizes their relationships, they are still citizens of a nation that today tells them: 
‘You’re not good enough for us. In fact, you never were.’ But by reading Justice’s trilogy 
as a recovery of queer Cherokees’ presence and role in protecting and building the 
Nation, the trilogy becomes a site of literary resistance by crafting a counter-narrative of 
ethical nationhood that tells queer Cherokee readers: ‘Yes, you are good enough. In fact, 
we wouldn’t be here today without you.’ 
 
Sharing a struggle 
 The struggles of Freedmen and of queer Cherokees might appear disparate, even 
worlds apart, but at the core of both is the same endeavor to reconcile themselves to the 
tribal body and to resist national narratives that marginalize them. And beneath the 
surface, their battles are entwined. Just as that Nation has attempted to elide the role of 
the Cherokee Freedmen who built, defended, rebuilt and contributed to the endurance of 
the Nation, so too are the traditional roles taken up by queer Cherokees who have in part 
ensured that Cherokees today have a tradition to call their own. Similarly, just as queer 
Cherokees have been ostracized on the basis of gender and sexuality that the Nation 
claims is aberrant to tribal tradition, so too have black Freedmen been queered on the 
basis of their skin color and their ancestors’ positions of forced servitude. But their 
writing offers the potential to undermine the privilege of a nation that was constructed in 
part as a buffer against U.S. oppression through the adoption of the very same oppressive 
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sentiments that the U.S. has long held against its own female, queer and minority citizens. 
Examining the Freedmen WPA narratives and the Way of Thorn and Thunder trilogy 
alongside Cherokee history and cultural epistemologies creates a counter-narrative that 
not only restores a sense of belonging and need of these oppressed communities; it 
destabilizes the narrative privilege of those who have simply employed a strategy of 
marginalization in an effort to wear their own oppression well.  
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1 Opponents of same-sex marriage often invoke the Bible in order to rationalize their belief that 
“traditional” marriage only exists between one man and one woman.  The irony, of course, is that the 
custom of marriage not only pre-dates the Bible, but the Bible also does not privilege any one 
arrangement of marriage over others. In fact, it accounts for several possible marital arrangements that, if 
one is making appeals to authority by invoking the Bible, are as “traditional” as marriage between one 
man and one woman. For example, while Genesis 2:24 does mention marriage between one man and one 
woman, the marriage is not one of love but rather is arranged, and the wife is not only expected to be 
subservient but could also be stoned to death if she’s proven to not be a virgin. Genesis 38:6-10 indicates 
that a woman who is widowed and has not given birth to a son shall be forced to marry her brother-in-
law, thereby making “traditional” biblical marriage a coerced arrangement between a woman and her in-
laws. Similarly, Numbers 31:1-18 and Deuteronomy 21:11-14 indicate that male soldiers can take female 
POWs as brides or “spoils of war,” in this case “traditional” marriage, again, being coercive. Deuteronomy 
22:28-29 states that a virgin who is raped must marry her rapist, and the rapist must pay her father 50 
shekels for “loss of property.” The Bible also indicates that slave owners could force marriage between 
their slaves, and a man could have one wife and countless concubines (Abraham, Nahor and Solomon to 
name a few). The Bible also accounts for polygamous arrangements in which one man can have as many 
wives as he wishes. This “traditional” biblical marriage is found in the stories of Lamech, Esau, Gideon and 
David among others. The point of this analysis is that if opponents of same-sex marriage insist on using 
the argument that the appearance of marriage between one man and one woman in the Bible makes 
heterosexual marriage “traditional,” and therefore privileges it over same-sex marriage, they have to 
account for and privilege the other elements of “traditional” marriage as outlined by the Bible that the 
rational among us abhor today, namely rape, coerced marriage and the treatment women as property.  
 
2 Though some states and two tribal nations have explicitly recognized the right of same-sex couples to 
wed, language in section 2 of DOMA indicates that “[n]o State, territory, or possession of the United 
States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of 
any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex 
that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession or tribe” (emphasis 
added).  While the federal law indicates that tribal nations can be exempt from recognizing same-sex 
marriages that are legal elsewhere, the law also undermines the sovereignty of those tribal nations who 
do allow same-sex marriage by making marriages that take place within their jurisdiction null in the rest of 
the U.S. where such marriages are illegal. This inclusion of tribal nations within the scope of, and under 
the protection of, DOMA is problematic considering that John Marshall ruled in Worcester v. Georgia 
(1831) that tribal nations are sovereigns that are not subject to federal laws or to the laws of surrounding 
states. Specifically, in his decision, Marshall wrote: “The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, 
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have 
no force.” See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1831).  
 
3 While members of the Smith administration attempted to bar Reynolds and McKinley’s same-sex 
marriage by making a case for traditional Cherokee marriage being between one man and one woman, it 
was revealed in 2007 that Principal Chief Chad Smith himself had a secret second family. Though legally 
married to Bobbi Gail Scott Smith, a Cherokee woman, and being the father of three children, Smith also 
fathered three other children with a second woman. In a strange irony, Smith attempted to defend his 
actions by arguing that having multiple partners was Cherokee “tradition.” Smith avoided bigamy charges 
because he was not married to his mistress. See Donna Hales “Cherokee attorney will run for chief again.” 
MuskogeePhoenix.com. Muskogee Phoenix, 4 Nov. 2007. Web. 10 Oct. 2009. 
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4 The Defense of Marriage Act 1996 (DOMA) was signed into law by President Bill Clinton to limit 
interstate recognition of marriage and federal benefits associated with marriage such as Social Security 
survivor’s benefits and the ability to file taxes jointly and receive a larger deduction to heterosexual 
couples. Pressure from conservative Christian lobby groups like the Family Research Council and 
challenges to state laws barring same-sex marriage such as Baehr v. Miike (1993) in Hawaii prompted the 
federal government to define marriage as a union between one man and one woman. In February 2011, 
however, President Barack Obama declared that the Department of Justice would no longer defend 
DOMA in court, and he expressed his support for the Respect for Marriage Act, a proposed bill that would 
repeal the Defense of Marriage Act. In that time, several states have legalized same-sex marriage at the 
state level, including Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington. Same-sex marriage is also legal in Washington, D.C. 
With regard to tribal nations, to date, the Cherokee Nation is only one of six tribal nations that 
have explicitly barred same-sex marriage, the others being the Navajo Nation, the Sault Tribe of Chippewa 
Indians (in Michigan), the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, the Chickasaw Nation and the Iowa Tribe (all in 
Oklahoma). However, two tribal nations passed laws that recognize same-sex marriage: the Coquille 
Indian Tribe in Oregon (2008) and the Suquamish Tribe in Washington (2011). Likewise the Mashantucket 
Pequot Tribe in Connecticut afford equal-opportunity employment for its LBGTQ members as well as 
extends medical benefits to same-sex couple in the nation. Trista Wilson notes that though six tribal 
nations do ban same-sex marriage, they only make up 5 percent of all the tribal nations within U.S. 
borders, whereas more than 80 percent of U.S. states still fail to recognize same-sex marriage, 
demonstrating that tribal nations are still more tolerant of difference than the U.S. She quotes Coquille 
Chief Kenneth Tanner: “‘We only as that people respect differences and all the Creator’s creations’” 
(Wilson 188). For more information on the Navajo Nation’s legislation against same-sex marriage, see the 
Dine Marriage Act of 2005 and the council’s resolution regarding the law at 
<http://www.navajocourts.org/Resolutions /29-50%20Marriage%20Act.pdf.> For more about the Coquille 
and Suquamish Indian Tribes’ decision to recognize same-sex marriage, see Bill Graves “Coquille Same-Sex 
Marriage Law Takes Effect.” OregonLive.com. The Oregonian, 21 May 2009. Web. 3 Jan 2012 
<http://www.oregonlive.com/news/index.ssf/2009/05/ coquille_samesex_marriage_law.html> and 
Manuel Valdez “Suquamish Tribe’s New law Recognizes Gay Marriage.” NativeTimes.com. Native Times, 8 
Aug. 2001. Web. 3 Jan 2012 <http://www.nativetimes.com/ news/tribal/5809-suquamish-new-law-
recognizes-gay-marriage?type=raw&format=pdf.> 
 
5 Several sources have accounted for individuals who might be described today as Two-Spirit caring for 
those wounded in battle. See, for example, E. Adamson Hoebel The Cheyennes: Indians of the Great Plains 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), 77; Williams, Spirit and the Flesh, 194 (Oglala Lakota); 
W.W. Newcomb, Jr. The Indians of Texas from Prehistoric to Modern Times (Austin: U of Texas P, 1961), 74 
(Karankawa) 
  
6 Two-Spirits throughout Indian Country have historically played a vital role in performing ceremonies for 
their respective communities, especially burial ceremonies owing to the fact that because they straddle 
the realms of male and female, they too are sometimes seen as straddling the realms of life and death; 
therefore, Two-Spirits are a natural choice to usher the dead into the next world. Williams cites a Lakota 
woman whose grandfather had been winkte who reports that, “When someone died, it was the winkte 
who was the first one people came to, to help out at the funeral and the ceremonies.” See Williams, The 
Spirit and the Flesh, 195. Lang also notes that nations such as Banklalachi, Mono, Tubatubalal and Yokuts 
also designated ceremonial roles to people who would be called Two-Spirit today. See Lang, Men as 
Women, Women as Men, 174-175. 
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7 A useful source detailing the role Two-Spirits play in ceremony and storytelling is Qwo-li Driskill’s 
“Shaking Our Shells: Cherokee Two-Spirits Rebalancing the World” Beyond Masculinity: Essays by Queer 
Men on Gender & Politics. Ed. Trevor Hoppe. Beyondmasculinity.com. 
<http://www.beyondmasculinity.com/articles/driskill.php> 
 
8 Justice writes as part a long legacy of LGBTQ2 American Indian writers, including Lynn Riggs (Cherokee 
Nation), Maurice Kenny (Mohawk), Beth Brant (Mohawk), Paula Gunn Allen (Laguna Pueblo), Chrystos 
(Menominee), Janice Gould (Concow) and Vickie Sears (Cherokee) to name a few. One of the earliest 
publications to feature writing from gay and queer American Indian writers was the anthology Living the 
Spirit: A Gay American Indian Anthology (1988), a collection of works compiled by the Gay American 
Indians (GAI) organization and edited by Will Roscoe. For more information about this history of GAI, see 
Roscoe Changing Ones: Third and Fourth Genders in Native North America (New York: St. Martin’s P, 
1998), 99-104. Justice is also a co-editor with Driskill, Deborah Miranda (Chumash) and Lisa Tatonetti of 
Sovereign Erotics: A Collection of Two-Spirit Literature (Tucson: U of Arizona P, 2011). While Paul Gunn 
Allen’s novel The Woman Who Owned the Shadows (1983) is frequently thought to be the first novel by 
an American Indian writer that features gay or queer characters, Michael Snyder argues that John Joseph 
Matthew’s (Osage) novel Sundown (1934) is a likelier possibility. See Snyder “‘He certainly didn’t want 
anyone to know that he was queer’: Chal Windzer’s Sexuality in John Joseph Matthews’ Sundown.” 
Studies in American Indian Literatures 20.1 (2008): 27-54. 
 
9 Though “queer” is sometimes a controversial term, I use it here because Justice himself says in an 
interview with Qwo-Li Driskill (Cherokee) that the abstract nature of the term accounts for the 
adaptability that individuals who don’t fit into a heteronormative category have had to employ as a 
survival strategy, a point I elaborate on later in the chapter. Likewise, Justice adds that terms like “Two-
Spirit” are too normalizing, which is why he prefers the term “queer.” Though younger generations of 
LGBTQ individuals have re-appropriated the term “queer” and frequently use it, I do understand that 
older generations of people in the LGBTQ community still find the term offensive as it has historically 
been used to marginalize them. Furthermore, I recognize that my being a straight male and using the term 
“queer” to describe people who don’t fit normative categories of sexuality and gender can be 
problematic. That said, I apply “queer” in this chapter broadly to include anyone who isn’t otherwise 
defined in heteronormative terms of gender or sexuality. However, because my aim is to privilege the 
voices and identities of people who have been historically marginalized, in those instances in which a 
source describes him-, her- or hirself with a more specific term such as gay, lesbian or Two-Spirit, I use 
their preferred term. See Driskill et. al, Queer Indigenous Studies, 99.  
 
10 While historical accounts can relay facts and speculate on possibilities, those possibilities as detailed in 
history are confined to what we can sense and know empirically. Fantasy, however, allows us to revisit 
the same historical narrative but imagine greater possibilities, engendering new thoughts that arise from 
perspectives that aren’t limited by the narrowness of the physical world. As Yi-Fu Tuan memorably 
observes, fantasy “can sometimes set us free from established culture. What fantasy envisages may be 
bizarre, yet a surpassing strangeness serves the cause of a larger truth if it is able to lift even for a 
moment deadening layers of habit and belief” (443). While a realistic historical telling of Cherokee 
Removal could certainly mention queer individuals, Justice’s use of the fantasy genre allows him to craft 
characters who explicitly embody Two-Spiritedness as well as make more explicit the social and political 
underpinnings of a complex history such as Removal. For example, a historical description of the Cherokee 
Nation at the time can demonstrate through their decisions the way that Cherokee traditionalists and 
mixed-bloods differed in their beliefs with regard to what the best course of action would be for the 
Nation. Justice, however, makes the detachment of mixed-bloods (and those characters who stand in for 
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the Ridge Party) from the land and their traditionalist counterparts more explicit by having them live in a 
floating city that hovers over the Nation. Fantasy enables Justice to delve into the story of Cherokee 
Removal, and more importantly re-establish the focus on queer and Two-Spirit individuals, without being 
confined to the limits of believability of history.  See Tuan “Realism and Fantasy in Art, History, and 
Geography.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 80.3 (1990), 435-446. 
 
11 Throughout Cherokee history, scholars have noted how the Ross and Ridge Parties were divided largely 
along a line of traditional/full-blood and “progressive”/mixed-blood, respectively. Robert J. Conley (UKB), 
for example, notes: “The Treaty Party people were largely mixed-bloods who had been plantation owners 
in the Old South. The Ross Party was made up mostly of more traditional full-blood Cherokees.” See 
Conley Cherokee Thoughts, Honest & Uncensored (Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 2008), 57.  
 
12 Many scholars of gender diversity in American Indian communities attribute the decline of the 
importance of Two-Spirit and queer individuals to the adoption or imposition of Christianity, which 
altered ceremonial culture. Brian Gilley (Cherokee-Chickasaw), for example, argues that “people who 
would have occupied these gender-diverse categories historically were still being born into communities, 
but the communities no longer had the words for these people and no longer had the roles. . . . Changes 
in the ceremonial culture over time had come to exclude gender diversity in many communities.” For 
more of Gilley’s perspective, see Wilhelm Murg “Momentum Mounts to Again Embrace Two-Spirits.” 
IndianCountryTodayMediaNetwork.com. Indian Country Today, 6 June 2011. Web. 4 May 2011. 
<http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/article/momentum-mounts-to-again-embrace-two-spirits-
35837>. See also Walter L. Williams, Spirit and the Flesh: Sexual Diversity in American Indian Cultures, 
(1992); William Roscoe, Changing Ones: Third and Fourth Genders in Native North America, (2000); Sue-
Ellen Jacobs, Wesley Thomas, and Sabine Lang, eds., Two-Spirit People: Native American Gender Identity, 
Sexuality, and Spirituality, (1997); Gilley, Becoming Two-Spirit: Gay Identity and Social Acceptance in 
Indian Country, (2006); Lang, Men as Women, Women as Men: Changing Gender in Native American 
Cultures, (1998); Mark Rifkin, When Did Indians Become Straight?: Kinship, the History of Sexuality, and 
Native Sovereignty, (2011).   
 
13 See “Council sues to prevent same-sex marriage.” CherokeePhoenix.org. Cherokee Phoenix, Sept. 
2005:8. Web. 6 March 2008 <http://www.cherokeephoenix.org/Article/Index/1102>. In addition to 
O’Leary, current Cherokee Principal Chief Bill John Baker, then a tribal councilor, was also named on the 
petition filed by nine of the 15 tribal councilors to block Reynolds and McKinley from filing their marriage 
license. Baker told the Cherokee Phoenix: “‘I think it's something the Cherokee Nation doesn't need to be 
involved in. . . . The Cherokee grandmothers out there are very concerned we'll be the only government 
to have same-sex marriage, and we're trying to protect our constituents’” (par 11). 
 
14 Gilley argues that the concept of “gay” is a European construct, a claim that problematizes the use of 
“homophobic” to describe those individuals today in tribal communities who disapprove of relationships 
between people of the same gender. As he notes, those who oppose the inclusion of queered individuals 
often claim to do so out of a respect for tradition. Technically, those opposed to queered identities in 
tribal society are correct in that there is no pre-contact equivalent of “gay.” Gilley writes, “[i]f same-sex 
relations did not turn Native social values on their head prehistorically and there were no gender 
associated categorization of sexuality then there is no ‘traditional’ equivalent to ‘gay’ in tribal societies” 
(56). Semantically speaking, if no such concept of “gay” existed traditionally, then those who oppose it 
today on the basis of maintaining tradition cannot be said to be homophobic, at least with regard to how 
the term is used today to refer to someone who fears or dislikes queer individuals. Gilley adds, however, 
that though Two-Spirits’ use of “homophobia” as a term might originate from the contemporary 
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definition of someone who hates gay people, their conceptual use of the term refers more to framing 
sentiments against gender diversity that did not exist before European contact. See Gilley “Native Sexual 
Inequalities: American Indian Cultural Conservative Homophobia and the Problem of Tradition.” 
Sexualities 13.1 (2010): 47-68. For another study that further complicates the idea that heterosexuality is 
“traditional” or that it extends from a long history, see Hanne Blank Straight: The Surprisingly Short 
History of Heterosexuality (Boston: Beacon Press, 2012).  
 
15 Several scholars have studied the problematic nature of nostalgia, specifically arguing that the past is 
seldom as ideal as we like to remember it, and that more often than not the past that we re-create bears 
little resemblance to the past that actually occurred. For a history of the development and deployment of 
nostalgia, see Helmut Illbruck Nostalgia: Origins and Ends of an Unenlightened Disease (Chicago: 
Northwestern UP, 2012). An analysis of how nostalgia operates in identity formation can be found in 
Janelle L. Wilson Nostalgia: Sanctuary of Meaning (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell UP, 2005) 
 
16 Alice B. Kehoe notes that because Western culture, and by extension anthropology being a Western 
science, takes for granted the existence of explicit and unambiguous boundaries, we should exercise 
caution when reading early anthropological studies on non-Western groups that engage questions of 
gender. She writes: “In contrast to Western culture, many other cultures values dynamic shifting, 
transformations, and existence in more than two dimensions” (266). Western anthropologists, thus, often 
privileged their own understanding of gender and imposed it on their subjects, which complicates 
assumptions of gender and sexuality with regard to indigenous groups, Cherokees being one of the 
earliest American Indian groups studied. For a concise analysis of how Western thinking complicates 
questions of gender in anthropological studies of non-Western communities, see Kehoe “The 
Incommensurability of Gender Categories,” Two-Spirit People, 265-271. See also Liam Hudson Cult of Fact 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1975) and Lee Irwin The Dream Seekers (Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 1994).  
 
17 “Two-Spirit” is a term used intertribally among some American Indians that refers to individuals whose 
genders not only exist outside of a Eurowestern male-female binary but also charge them with the 
responsibility of performing certain roles in the community. The term was coined in 1990 by indigenous 
people who attended the 3rd annual Native American/First Nations gay and lesbian conference in 
Winnipeg and is an English translation of the Anishinaabe term niizh manidoowag, referring to people 
who possess both a male and female spirit. Though some Two-Spirits also identify as gay, the two terms 
should not be conflated. Anguksuar [Richard LaFortune] (Yup’ik) notes that the term Two-Spirit “may refer 
to the fact that each human is born because a man and a woman have joined in creating each new life; all 
humans bear imprints of both, although some individuals may manifest both qualities more completely 
than others. In no way does the term determine genital activity. It dos determine the qualities that define 
a person’s social role and spiritual gifts. Some traditional teachers have expressed pointed concern that 
the term is being grossly equated with the concept of ‘homosexual.’ These teachers rigorously remind us 
that there is no resemblance between the two concepts” (221). Likewise, Lang adds being Two-Spirit has 
more to do with one’s inclination toward certain gender roles than with one’s choice a sexual partner. See 
Lang, Men as Women, Women as Men, 255. Finally, while “Two-Spirit” has become a widely accepted 
term among Indians who don’t define themselves in normative gender terms, some, including Daniel 
Justice, contend that the term might actually be too normalizing. For more about how the term came 
about and what identifying as Two-Spirit entails, see Anguksuar [Richard LaFortune], “A Postcolonial 
Perspective on Western [Mis]Conceptions of the Cosmos and the Restoration of Indigenous Taxonomies,” 
Two-Spirit People, 217-222.  
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18 For more about Cherokee Two-Spirit history, see Ch. 4 of Driskill Yelesahele hiwayona dikanohogida 
naiwodusv/ God taught me this song; it is beautiful: Cherokee Performance Rhetorics as Decolonization, 
Healing, and Continuance. Dissertation, Michigan State University. Ann Arbor: ProQuest/UMI, 2008. 
(Publication No. AAT 3331898.) 
 
19 David Cornsilk (UKB-Cherokee Nation), a Cherokee genealogist and historian, notes that the Trowbridge 
manuscript cited in this chapter goes on to explain that all Cherokees, including Two-Spirits, participated 
in marriage.  See Driskill, “Shaking Our Shells,” 5. 
 
20 Homophobic individuals who use Christianity to rationalize their anti-gay sentiments frequently cite 
Leviticus 20:13 as “evidence” against same-sex relations. The verse reads: “If a man also lie with mankind, 
as he lieth with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to 
death; their blood shall be upon them” (KJV). The irony, of course, is that the Bible forbids several 
practices that many of those opposed to same-sex relationships do every day. For example, Leviticus 11:7-
8 reads: “And the swine, though he divide the hoof, and be cloven-footed, yet he cheweth not the cud, he 
is unclean to you. Of their flesh shall ye not eat” (KJV). While the consumption of pork is explicitly barred 
by the Bible, “hog fries,” communal cookouts involving copious amounts of pork, are enjoyed all over 
Cherokee country. Other practices banned by the Bible that people do every day include blending fabrics 
(Leviticus 19:19), eating crustaceans like crawfish, or tsisdvna in Cherokee, (Leviticus 11:10); and planting 
different crops in the same field, a practice that Cherokees have long used to ensure the crops’ vitality, 
(Leviticus 19:19). When examined collectively in their historical and cultural contexts, the laws outlined in 
the Old Testament tend to bar practices that would unnecessarily endanger a group that was constantly 
on the move and that struggled at the time to last into the next generation. The prohibitions in the Bible 
serve as a “survival manual” of sorts to ensure that the Jewish people at the time could carry forward into 
the next generation. Prohibitions on mixing fabrics and consuming meat and dairy together, for example, 
encouraged wise use of limited resources. Banning the consumption specifically of pork and shellfish 
ensured that people didn’t consume pathogens like trichinosis, which, before modern food inspection, 
were common in shellfish and pork. Finally, the barring of same-sex relationships and sexual relations 
with menstruating women (Leviticus 15:19-30) can be explained by the fact that these relations don’t 
result in procreation, quite the predicament at a time when it was believed that a man’s seed was finite. I 
note these other prohibitions in the Bible and offer a short reading of my interpretation of the Old 
Testament as a way to point out the hypocrisy of people, some Cherokees here specifically, who invoke 
the Bible to rationalize homophobia and to offer another context in which to suggest that these rules 
operated at a very specific time for a very specific group of people, neither of which includes 
contemporary Cherokees.  
 
21 For more about Payne himself and his sojourn in the Cherokee Nation, see, respectively, Rosa 
Pendleton Chiles “John Howard Payne: American Poet, Actor, Playwright, Consul and the Author of ‘Home 
Sweet Home’” Records of the Columbia Historical Society, Washington, D.C., vol. 31/31 (1930): 209-297 
and E. Merton Coulter “John Howard Payne’s Visit to Georgia” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 46.4 
(1962): 333-376.  
 
22 Lang lists several tribal nations that she notes revered members who might be identified today as queer 
and had communal roles for them. These nations include Achomawi, Acoma, Atsugewi, Diegueno, 
Flathead (Salish), Hare, Klamath, Laguna, Ingalik, Kootenai, Mandan, Maricopa, Nisenan, Nootka, Ojibwe, 
Paiute, Papago, Piegan, Quinault, San Felipe, Shasta, Shoshone, Sinkaietk, Tubatulabal, Ute, Wailaki, 
Wintu, Yana, Yokuts, Ysleta, Yuki and Yoruk to name a few. For a breakdown of other tribal nations’ 
attitudes toward non-heteronormative individuals, see Lang, Men as Women, Women as Men, 314-318. 
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23 Because Cherokee clans are matrilineal, individuals of the same clan are linked by blood, making 
marriage and birthing children between two members of the same clan a taboo akin to incest. While 
Cherokees traditionally belong to their mother’s clan, they are also related, by extension, to Cherokees 
from their grandparents’ clan too, making Cherokee endogamy a challenge if one wants to respect clan 
taboos. Sturm, for example, describes the predicament of a Cherokee man who struggled to find a 
suitable Cherokee woman to marry. The Cherokee man told Sturm: “‘Of course, the first person to meet 
her (the women he’s interested in) when I brought her to the door was my old grandma. She really asked 
her the questions, boy did she! At dinner, I kept hoping grandma would just pipe down and be quiet, but 
it didn’t happen. It was like my grandma was after something. Well, sure enough, she was. After I finally 
took the girl home, my grandma pulled me aside and she said, “you can’t date that girl no more. I hate to 
tell you this, honey, but she’s kin to you.” I was so disappointed that evening . . . . I really wanted to be 
with a Cherokee woman, but I just got more and more frustrated, because it seemed that every Cherokee 
woman I dated was kin to me.’” See Sturm, Blood Politics, 158.  
 
24 I see “tradition” operating here as a form of confirmation bias. Instead of accepting evidence that 
shows that various groups throughout Indian Country, Cherokees included, valued their queer kin in the 
past and that their argument to the contrary is flawed, they retreat to the assumed steadfastness of what 
they imagine is tradition, which allows them to rationalize around perspectives that challenge their 
preconceived biases against LGBTQ2 individuals. Brian Gilley notes that both those who support and 
those who oppose the inclusion of queer individuals in tribal communities today invoke an idea of 
“tradition,” the former noting the acceptance of gender-diverse people in the past and the former 
emphasizing a need to preserve ceremonial and social culture. I prefer to see the acceptance of gender-
diverse individuals in the past not as “tradition,” but rather as “practice.” With the label of tradition 
comes the onus to both prove that the behavior was somehow lionized in the past and that we should 
continue to lionize it today for the sake of maintaining an imagined cultural or historical integrity. By 
referring to a behavior as a “practice,” it exists on its own without the semantic baggage that “tradition” 
carries. Tactically speaking, approaching the acceptance and inclusion of queer individuals as a “practice” 
makes a superior case than does arguing it as “tradition” because we can look at the historical record and 
see that, indeed, gender diversity was a part of our communities in the past as was the reverence the 
community showed these individuals. Because we can verify this practice, detractors are put in a position 
to explain why they wished to discontinue this practice and begin instead to marginalize this group. Those 
who would argue against the full inclusion of gender-queer individuals in the name of “tradition” are left 
to prove that marginalizing queer people was indeed a defining characteristic of what it meant to be 
Cherokee in the past and that being Cherokee today demands that we maintain that ostracization in 
perpetuity. See Gilley “Native Sexual Inequalities: American Indian Cultural Conservative Homophobia and 
the Problem of Tradition.” Sexualities 13.1 (2010): 47-68. 
 
25 Elizabeth Cook-Lynn (Crow Creek Sioux) has been outspoken against fixating on issues of American 
Indian authenticity, especially as it appears in scholarly work, because it detracts from more pertinent 
issues in tribal communities and circumvents the sovereignty of tribal governments to determine for 
themselves who their citizens are. However, the process by which tribal nations are recognized as 
sovereigns within the U.S. is rife with questions of authenticity, a construct developed by the U.S. with the 
onus of proving it placed on tribal nations themselves.  
Likewise, Cherokees especially contend with questions of authenticity as a result of several 
people who are neither enrolled Cherokee citizens nor Cherokee descendants with genealogical proof 
claiming Cherokee identity. The question of authenticity with regard to who belongs either politically or 
socially to a tribal nation began to emerge in the 1970s as the Red Power Movement made American 
 343 
                                                                                                                                                 
Indians more visible and began to empower them more than in the past, making a claim to Indian identity 
more desirable. Similarly, images of American Indians in pop culture as noble warriors and stewards of the 
environment romanticized American Indian identity, leading more people to claim their tribal heritage, 
real or imagined. Many of these “adult onset Indians,” as Cherokee lawyer Steve Russell calls them, 
choose to self-identify as Cherokee. Circe Sturm argues that this racial shifting toward an ersatz Cherokee 
identity on the part of people who claimed to be white in the past can be explained by the fact that 
Cherokees are one of the most widely known tribal nations, Cherokees have been historically known as 
“civilized” and therefore acceptable to claim, and the Cherokee Nation doesn’t have a minimum blood 
quantum requirement, which helps them explain their often white phenotypes. So while, as Cook-Lynn 
points out, issues of authenticity are best left out of serious inquiry into American Indian issues, for 
Cherokees especially, authenticity and fears of appropriated identity are very much a part of our lived 
experience. For more about the phenomenon of racial shifting and questions of Cherokee identity, see 
Sturm Becoming Indian: The Struggle Over Cherokee Identity in the Twenty-first Century (Santa Fe: SAR 
Press, 2011).  
 
26 Kanati, the hunter, and Selu, the corn mother, are the primordial man and woman of Cherokee 
cosmology. Kanati was a respected hunter who stored his game in a hole in the ground until his two sons, 
in an act of mischief, let the animals out into the wild, forcing Cherokees to hunt for themselves. Likewise, 
Selu created corn, and her boys, who thought she was a witch, killed her and dragged her body seven 
times across the ground from whence the corn later grew, feeding the People. For more about the Kanati 
and Selu story, see G. Keith Parker, ed. “Kana’ti and Selu: The Origin of Game and Corn.” Seven Cherokee 
Myths: Creation, Fire, the Primordial Parents, the Nature of Evil, the Family, Universal Suffering, and 
Communal Obligation (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2006), 58-86, Appendix C. 
 
27 For a study detailing the Cherokee’s transition from clan law to a centralized nation with a constitution, 
see Rennard Strickland (Cherokee-Osage) Fire and the Spirits: Cherokee Law from Clan to Court (Norman: 
U of Oklahoma P), 1982. See also Michelle Daniel “From Blood Feud to Jury System: The Metamorphosis 
of Cherokee Law from 1750-1840.” American Indian Quarterly 11.2 (1987): 97-125. 
 
28 For more information about slavery in the Cherokee Nation, see Ch. 3 in this study. Also see Daniel F. 
Littlefield, The Cherokee Freedmen: From Emancipation to American Citizenship, (1978); Rudi Halliburton, 
Red Over Black: Black Slavery Among the Cherokee Indians, (1977); Theda Perdue, Slavery and the 
Evolution of Cherokee Society, 1540-1866, (1979); Tiya Miles, The Ties that Bind: The Story of an Afro-
Cherokee Family in Slavery and Freedom, (2005) and Celia Naylor, African Cherokee in Indian Territory: 
From Chattel to Citizens, (2008). 
 
29 Cherokees traditionally farmed on small plots of communal land, which allowed them to live in close-
knit communities, and they only farmed and hunted what they needed to survive. However, increasing 
trade with Europeans led to an increasing demand for surplus goods, which meant Cherokees had to 
spread out geographically. Over time and with increasing European influence through intermarriage, this 
dispersal led to the breakdown of some of these previously close-knit communities, and the new 
economy based on surplus shifted some Cherokees’ view of the land from an entity that provided 
sustenance and must be cared for to a commodity used for pecuniary gain. I elaborate on this change in 
Cherokee economy in Chapter 1, and more information can be found in the Part 1 of Robert K. Thomas 
“The Origin and Development of the Redbird Smith Movement.” 1953. The Selected Works of Robert K. 
Thomas. < http://works.bepress.com/robert_thomas/29>. 
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30 An early book detailing American Indians’ experiences with missionaries and Christianity is Robert 
Berkhofer’s Salvation and the Savage: An Analysis of Protestant Missions and American Indian Response, 
1787-1862 (1965). While Berkhofer’s study is one of the foundational texts on the subject of Christianizing 
American Indians, it suffers from being one-dimensional and asserting that Indian Country passively 
accepted Christianity. Many Cherokees in particular readily adopted Christianity, especially the Baptist 
faith that continues to be widely practiced today, because of some similarities between Christian and 
Cherokee practices such as that between baptism and going to water. The Moravian Mission, the first 
permanent Christian mission, was established in 1801 in what is now Georgia. Though Christianity spread 
quickly in Cherokee territory, especially among the mixed-blood population, some Cherokee 
traditionalists like White Path adamantly resisted the faith, while others like some of the early 
Keetoowahs incorporated some elements of Christianity into their revitalized Cherokee faith during the 
Redbird Smith Movement. For more about Cherokees’ experience with Christianity, see William G. 
McLoughlin, The Cherokees and Christianity, 1794-1870: Essays on Acculturation and Persistence, (1994) 
and Cherokee and Missionaries, 1789-1839, (1984). See also Patrick Minges Slavery in the Cherokee 
Nation: The Keetoowah Society and the Defining of a People, 1855-1867 (New York: Routledge, 2003), Ch. 
2-3. These texts offer more nuanced analyses of Cherokees’ rejection and ultimate adaptation of 
Christianity.  
 
31 For more about his topic, see Ch. 1 of this study. Other sources that analyze the development of the 
Keetoowah Society include Robert Thomas (Cherokee), The Origin and the Development of the Redbird 
Smith Movement, (1953); Benny Smith (UKB), The Keetoowah Society of Cherokee Indians, (1967); Howard 
Q. Tyner, The Keetoowah Society in Cherokee History, (1949) and Janey B. Hendrix, Redbird Smith and the 
Nighthawk Keetoowahs, (1986). For more about the development of the UKB, see Georgia Rae Leeds The 
United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2000).  
 
32 Richard Handler argues that “authenticity” is a Western-derived cultural construct that is used today by 
both indigenous and non-indigenous communities as “proof of national being.” Both groups see an 
imagined continuity with the past as proof of legitimate being, a concept deployed both in favor of and in 
opposition of indigenous sovereignty. For more on the issue of authenticity, see Handler “Authenticity.” 
Anthropology Today 2.1 (1986): 2-4. An engaging analysis of how continuity with the past and authenticity 
are applied by indigenous communities and those opposed to indigenous sovereignty to, respectively, 
validate and invalidate indigenous claims can be James Clifford The Predicament of Culture (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard UP, 1988.)  
 
33 Allan Hanson, writing specifically about Maoris, discusses how the notions of authenticity and cultural 
invention are frequently deployed by both supporters and detractors of indigenous sovereignty. He 
argues that people tend to view “invention” as synonymous with “made-up,” or otherwise not genuine. 
While people might erroneously conflate invention and inauthenticity to dismiss cultural continuity, 
Hanson argues that, on the contrary, invention is proof of cultural continuity. He writes: “[I]nventions are 
common components in the ongoing development of authentic culture. . . . invention is an ordinary event 
in the development of all discourse” (899). See Hanson “The Making of the Maori: Culture Invention and 
its Logic.” American Anthropologist 91 (1989): 890-902. Likewise, Roy Wagner argues that symbolic 
invention is a cultural process and that traditions are invented in the present to address contemporary 
concerns, not passively inherited cultural practices. See Wagner The Invention of Culture. (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1975). 
 
34 “Heteronormativity” assumes that people fall into one of two genders, male or female, and that 
heterosexuality is the “normal” sexual orientation out of various others that, ostensibly, deviate from it. 
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The term is thought to have originated in Michael Warner’s introduction to Fear of a Queer Planet. See 
Warner, ed. Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics and Social Theory (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 
1993), 3-17. 
  
35 Because Cherokees have long intermarried with whites, and the Cherokee Nation does not use blood 
quantum as a criterion for citizenship, many Cherokees today have white phenotypes. Several jokes 
abound in Indian Country that poke fun at Cherokees’ phenotypes and low blood quanta such as, “What 
do you get when you put 100 Cherokees in a room? One fullblood,” or “Have you seen the new Cherokee 
Barbie? It has blond hair and blue eyes.” 
 
36 Cherokees, as well as the other nations who make up the Five Tribes, even opposed the Indian New 
Deal, which was set up in part to stop the allotment of remaining tribal and redistribute it back to tribal 
citizens. Cherokee O.K. Chandler wrote in the Muscogee Daily Phoenix in 1934 that John Collier, through 
the Indian New Deal, wanted to drive “‘the red man from the channels of commerce and send . . . him 
scurrying back to his tepee’” (qtd. Baird 13). Likewise, Cherokee writer John Oskison, in his 1925 novel 
Wild Harvest: A Novel of Transition Days in Oklahoma, creates a scene in which a Texas cattleman who is 
leading a herd across Cherokee land marvels at how similar Cherokees are to whites in terms of 
government, education and religion, and that whites and Cherokees need to “get both races pullin’ 
together for the same thing” (255). Examples such as these demonstrate the willingness of mixed-blood 
Cherokees to adopt a lifestyle and values similar to those of American whites, which explains why, 
through time, Cherokees have been associated with assimilation. See Oskison Wild Harvest (Appleton: 
New York, 1925).  
 
37 Sturm identifies the importance of phenotype among some Cherokees and how it is viewed as a marker 
of being a “real” Cherokee. One of her Cherokee consultants who has a white phenotype stated: 
“‘Growing up, the ones that looked Cherokee treated me like a white kid in school, because they didn’t 
know I was one half. I was shunned, too, after I ‘came out’ as a Cherokee.’” Still another Cherokee who 
appears white said: “‘You’re frowned on if you’re not identifiable. The stigma is that you’re yonega 
[white]. Some people have a lot of problems, especially younger kids, if you’re not identifiable. That’s 
sad.’” See Sturm, Blood Politics: Race, Culture and Identity in the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma (Berkeley: 
U of California P, 2002), 114.  
 
38 Sturm demonstrates the importance of social behavior in how someone is regarded, or not, as 
Cherokee when she describes the conflict that a full-blood Cherokee woman had with her traditional 
family who began to treat her differently when she wanted to get an education and when she married a 
one-quarter Cherokee husband who looks white and isn’t traditional. The woman states: “‘My family felt 
that I had married out, which was a real no-no, and they have never fully accepted him or forgiven me. 
Our children have made some difference. Still, they’re not treated in the same way as my cousin’s 
children, who are full-blooded and traditional’” (Sturm 116). The woman adds that appropriate social 
behavior included living for the moment, wanting only your basic needs met, being family and community 
oriented, and being socially reserved. Sturm asks the Cherokee woman if, based on social behavior, she 
considers her own husband and children Indian. The woman replies: “‘Oh, no, not at all. In fact, of our 
four children, only two seem Indian to me. As for the other two, one is dark, but too outgoing. And the 
youngest girl, she’s too light and gregarious. There are some people like my husband, with one-quarter 
blood, who could be Indian. But for me, they would have to look Indian and have Indian values, to have 
grown up traditional’” (117). Sturm adds that social behavior is key among many Cherokees when it 
comes to identifying others as belonging with the community. It isn’t simply having specialized knowledge 
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of Cherokee language or religion, but appropriate Cherokee social behavior also manifests in daily 
interactions. See Sturm, Blood Politics, 116-119.  
 
39 Sturm’s study shows the importance of having a command of the Cherokee language in order to be 
accepted as Cherokee. One woman who participated in her study said of language: “‘I would accept a 
non-identifiable Cherokee would speaks, more than a pure- or full-blood who doesn’t’” (122). Likewise, a 
Cherokee man stated: “‘If they keep the language, even if they had red hair and blue eyes, then they 
could go to any community and be accepted. Even non-Indians would be accepted by the community if 
they spoke (Cherokee)’” (123). Finally, a young Cherokee who doesn’t speak the language added: “‘There 
are a few white neighbors who speak (Cherokee) who are considered to be a part of the community. 
They’re more Cherokee than a lot of the actual citizens!’” (123). See Sturm, Blood Politics, 120-124. 
 
40 Several Cherokees are Christian, follow traditional Keetoowah spirituality, or practice both, and, Sturm 
adds, Cherokee-informed religion plays an integral part in whether someone is accepted as Cherokee. 
Whether Cherokees dance and sing at a gatiyo (stomp grounds) or pray in a Cherokee Baptist church, 
Sturm writes, that “(m)ost Cherokees perceive religion as a critical aspect not only of Cherokee culture 
but also of Cherokee identity” (126). An older Cherokee man told Sturm: “‘Spirituality is the most 
important thing in the traditional Cherokee world because we use it to maintain life as we know it and to 
survive through periods of turmoil’” (126). Another Cherokee man added: “‘Cherokee religion is real 
important to me . . . Me and my family, we visit with the medicine man and the little people. I know the 
difference between good and bad medicine, even though I have a college degree’” (127). Here, Sturm 
notes that the man contends that, despite his Western education, he still sees himself as Cherokee 
because of his traditional religious practices. See Sturm, Blood Politics, 124-131. 
 
41 Community participation also plays a role in whether a Cherokee is identified as being “truly Cherokee.” 
Many of Sturm’s consultant stressed the importance of community as an element of Cherokee identity 
and belonging. One female Cherokee tribal employee told Sturm: “‘The most important thing about being 
Cherokee is being raised in a community. I’ve been an Indian all my life and it’s all about community 
recognition. You can’t be a newcomer. You just have to understand the community and the needs of the 
Cherokee people’” (134). Similarly, a Cherokee man told Sturm: “‘It’s important to have a sense of 
community, a place where you belong. The tribe is a big extended family, anyway. If you’re completely 
removed from the community, in the broader society, then there’s no way for things to be handed down. 
A Cherokee’s roots are in his community’” (134). See Sturm, Blood Politics, 131-136. 
 
42 Cherokee women traditionally (and still do) held positions of power in their communities as a result of 
the matriarchal structure of Cherokee clans. Before the Cherokee Nation adopted a constitutional 
government in the 1820s, nearly everything, including marriage, divorce, child custody, property 
ownership and even revenge killing came down through women. By denying Cherokee women the 
franchise, instituting a national police force (the Cherokee Lighthorse) and legislating that children born to 
Cherokee men and a white mother could be Cherokee citizens, the shift to a constitutional government 
gradually stripped Cherokee women of the power they traditionally held. I emphasize the fact that the 
two Cherokees who Garroutte mentions are women because women still hold much clout in defining and 
practicing Cherokee tradition, which makes Joyce J. and Julie M.’s assertions about adhering to Cherokee 
tradition more pertinent. For more about how Cherokee women started to lose status as the Nation 
adopted Western modes of law-making and legislation, see Carolyn Ross Johnston (Cherokee) Cherokee 
Women in Crisis (Tuscaloosa: U of Alabama P, 2003).  
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43 While Williams’ study has been criticized by Jacobs and Lang for promoting a “berdache bliss” that they 
claim they didn’t find in their own work, Lang adds that Williams’ study does follow a trajectory, which 
also appears in earlier studies of queer and Two-Spirit American Indian culture. The trajectory begins with 
the early acceptance of non-heteronormative individuals in tribal communities, followed by their 
marginalization, which began to appear in scholarship in the 1940s, and their subsequent re-emergence 
and reclaiming of their roles in the 1970s and 1980s, which Williams’ study focuses on. For early studies 
that demonstrate reverence, or at the very least tolerance, of queer tribal individuals, see Janet Mirsky 
“The Dakota.” Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive People. Margaret Mead, ed. (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1937), 382-427. For studies that demonstrate a community’s disdain for queer tribal 
members, see Thomas H. Lewis “Oglala (Sioux) Concepts of Homosexuality and the Determinants of 
Sexual Identification.” Journal of the American Medical Association 25.3 (1973): 312-313 and Raymond 
DeMallie “Male and Female in Traditional Lakota Culture.” The Hidden Half: Studies of Plains Indian 
Women. Patricia Albers and Beatrice Medicine, eds. (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 
1983), 237-266. 
 
44 “Berdache” is an outdated anthropological term to refer to individuals who do not fit heteronormative 
roles and expectations. The term is considered insulting today. According to Sue-Ellen Jacobs, the term 
“berdache” comes from the Persian bardah and through Arab migration spread throughout the 
Mediterranean where terms are known as bardasso, bardache and bardaje in Italian, French and Spanish, 
respectively. Jacobs notes that the earliest use of the term appeared in the Jesuit Relations, a text from 
the 1700s in which individuals who might be described as “queer” today were condemned. The Oxford 
English Dictionary cross-references “berdache” with “catamite,” which refers to a male prostitute or a 
kept boy. Understandably, the term has fallen out of favor, and I only use “berdache” here in direct 
quotations from sources that originally used the term. See Jacobs “Berdache: A Brief Review of the 
Literature.” Colorado Anthropologist 1.2 (1968): 25-40. Other historiographies of the term “berdache” 
include Charles Callender and Lee M. Kochems “The North American Berdache.” Current Anthropologist 
24.4 (1983):443-470 and Will Roscoe “Bibliography of Berdache and Alternative Gender Roles among 
North American Indians.” Journal of Homosexuality 14.3-4 (1987):81-171. 
 
45 The Ridge Party, or Treaty Party, was comprised of mostly mixed-blood Cherokees who, as a result of 
continuing European settlement in Cherokee lands, felt that negotiating removal west of Cherokees 
through a treaty was the only way to save the Cherokee Nation. While Chief John Ross and the majority of 
Cherokees wished to remain in their ancestral homelands, and Ross tried to negotiate his own treaty with 
Andrew Jackson, the Ridge Party, including John Ridge; his father, Major Ridge; and his cousin, Elias 
Boudinot, surreptitiously signed the Treaty of New Echota (1835), which ceded to the U.S. all Cherokee 
land east of the Mississippi River and was used to facilitate forced removal of the Cherokees. After 
Removal, John Ridge, Major Ridge and Elias Boudinot were executed as traitors to the Cherokee Nation. 
John Ridge, specifically, was killed in an attack by a vigilante group who stabbed him 48 times in front of 
his family. To this day, members of the Ridge Party are often depicted in Cherokee history as traitors. 
However, other sources offer a more sympathetic narrative that offers that the Ridge Party suspected 
that resistance to the U.S. military would be futile and that peaceably removing west was a better option 
than forced removal. See Thurman Wilkins Cherokee Tragedy: The Ridge Family and the Decimation of a 
People. (Norman, OK: U of Oklahoma Press, 1986). Similarly, Justice writes a more sympathetic account of 
the Ridge Party through Neranda by depicting her signing the Oath of Western Sanctuary, a stand-in for 
the Treaty of New Echota, as the lesser of two evils and with the best interest of the Kyn in mind. See 
Wyrwood, 80-86. Neranda also redeems herself in Dreyd. See also Robert J. Conley (UKB) The Cherokee 
Nation: A History (Albuquerque: U of New Mexico P, 2005), esp. Ch. 15-16, 19. 
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46 While one can argue in retrospect whether Ross’ decision to try to negotiate for Cherokees to stay in 
their homelands was wise, given that more than 4,000 Cherokees died during Removal, Cherokee history 
does tend to cast Ross as being on “the right side of history” for having tried to resist forced removal and 
having presided over the rebuilding of the Nation in Indian Territory. Furthermore, Cherokees saw 
members of the Ridge Party as traitors, and the party’s leaders were lynched after Removal. This 
resentment of the Ridge Party, for having surreptitiously treated with the U.S. and relinquishing Cherokee 
land, is also widely noted in Cherokee history. For more about John Ross, see Gary E. Moulton John Ross, 
Cherokee Chief (Athens, GA: U of Georgia P, 2004) and Rachel Eaton (Cherokee Nation), John Ross and the 
Cherokee Indians, (1914). For more about Ross’ leadership after Removal, see also Morris L. Wardell, A 
Political History of the Cherokee Nation, 1838-1907, (1938). 
 
47 For academic studies of the roles that Gilley’s consultants indicate they are charged with through their 
Two-Spirit identities, see Williams, Spirit and the Flesh: Sexual Diversity in American Indian Cultures, 
(1992); Roscoe, Changing Ones: Third and Fourth Genders in Native North America, (2000); Jacobs, Wesley 
Thomas, and Sabine Lang, eds., Two-Spirit People: Native American Gender Identity, Sexuality, and 
Spirituality, (1997); Lang, Men as Women, Women as Men: Changing Gender in Native American Cultures, 
(1998); Rifkin, When Did Indians Become Straight?: Kinship, the History of Sexuality, and Native 
Sovereignty, (2011). See also Robert L. Trivers “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism.” The Quarterly 
Review of Biology 46 (1974): 35-57.   
 
48 “Ben” himself only cites as evidence that he was taught by elders that the roles he takes up for his 
community are ones that historically belonged to people who would be identified as Two-Spirits today. 
“Ben” does not refer to academic studies to support his claim; however, I do privilege communal 
knowledge that is passed down on which the fulfillment of several of these roles relies. Because this 
communal knowledge gives “Ben” and others like him a sense of fulfillment as well as a place in and path 
to participation in their communities where elsewhere they might be marginalized, I don’t make it my 
place to challenge or attempt to undermine their claims here. Nonetheless, research by scholars such as 
Lang, Roscoe, Driskill, Gilley, Rifkin and Williams do support “Ben’s” claim in a more academically legible 
way.  
 
49 Stonecoat is a creature in Cherokee cosmology whose skin is made of stone and who has a penchant for 
eating Cherokee hunters. One story of Stonecoat goes that a hunter observed Stonecoat and with the 
help of a medicine man and seven menstruating women was able to subdue him and stake him to the 
ground. After lighting Stonecoat on fire to kill him, Stonecoat began to share stories and knowledge that 
formed the foundation of Cherokee epistemology, as depicted in the beginning of Kynship. Driskill lists 
Stonecoat as one of several “queered” beings who, like queer and Two-Spirit Cherokees, created and 
shaped the Cherokee world. Zhe writes: “Cherokee stories talk about beings that were the most hated, 
(like Buzzard), the most mocked, (like Water Spider) and sometimes the most feared (like Uktena and 
Stonecoat), and how they were the ones that created the world, our lifeways, and formed the landscapes 
of our homelands. It is important to remember people from our history (like Sequoyah) and present (like 
Wilma Mankiller), who have had to overcome skepticism, prejudice, and disdain – and how important 
they are to our survival and identity as a people.” See Driskill, “Shaking Our Shells,” 134. For a brief 
recounting of the Stonecoat story, see James Mooney Myths of the Cherokee (New York: Dover, 1995), 
319-320. Reprint. 
 
50 Lang also argues that women would often take up masculine occupations and remain single so they 
could retain their independence and autonomy. In such cases, though women took up the duties 
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associated with men, they did not necessarily take on a full masculine gender role. See Lang, Men as 
Women, Women as Men, 284-285. 
 
51 While it might be more correct to place parenthesis around the term parenting since Unahi isn’t Tarsa’s 
biological mother, to do so would only re-inscribe the biological, heteronormative privilege that I aim to 
challenge. I see any adult who chooses to take on the challenge and make sacrifices in the pursuit of 
raising and guiding a child a parent regardless of biology, and, therefore, I leave the term in the text as it 
is. I include a note here to clear up any confusion regarding Tarsa’s parentage in the novel that might 
result from my use of the term.  
   
52 For a more thorough analysis that debunks the assumptions about the purpose of marriage, especially 
with regard to having children, that Santorum makes in this statement, see Jonathan Rauch Gay Marriage: 
Why It Is Good for Gays, Good for Straights, and Good for America (New York: Holt, 2011), Ch. 1. 
 
53 While Santorum is a public figure and in many cases an extreme example of a politician who holds 
homophobic positions, he unfortunately isn’t alone in his belief that straight marriage must be protected 
or that the only purpose for marriage is procreation. See David Blankenhorn “Protecting Marriage to 
Protect Children” LATimes.com. Los Angeles Times, 19 Sept. 2008. Web. 3 Feb. 2013 
<http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/19/ opinion/oe-blankenhorn19>; Ralph Reed “Conservative 
Activist: Marriage is for Procreation.” Ed Schulz Show: Blog. 25 March 2013. Web. 27 March 2013 
<http://www.wegoted.com/blog/?NID=2135> and John C. Eastman “The Constitutionality of Traditional 
Marriage.”Heritage.org. The Heritage Foundation, 25 Jan. 2013. Web. 28 Jan. 2013. 
<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/01/the-constitutionality-of-traditional-marriage>. 
While these and other conservatives stand steadfastly by the “marriage is for procreation” argument, this 
claim is easily undermined by the legal marriages between straight couples who either cannot or choose 
not to have children. Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan made a similar argument. See Michael Kelley 
“Justice Kagan Destroyed the Idea that Marriage is Only for Having Babies.” BusinessInsider.com. Business 
Insider, 26 March 2013. Web. 1 April 2013 <http://www.businessinsider.com/justice-kagan-takes-down-
the-procreation-argument-2013-3>. 
 
54 Mark Rifkin notes that the imposition of European family norms, namely nuclear and patriarchal traits, 
on tribal communities led to the formation of a statist relationship with the federal government, which, in 
turn, facilitated colonization since many of the practices and policies such as tribal leadership, treaty 
negotiating and allotment over time began to center on a single, male head and male-led nuclear families. 
He writes that a return to kinship, one that accounts for a variety of family compositions, genders and 
sexualities, can operate as a strategy to balance the relationship between tribal communities and the 
federal government that the state model has tipped in the federal government’s favor. He writes: “The 
‘straightening’ and ‘queering’ of indigenous populations occur within an ideological framework that takes 
the settler state, and the state form more broadly, as the axiomatic unit of political collectivity, and in this 
way, native sovereignty is either bracketed entirely or translated into terms consistent with state(/ist) 
jurisdiction . . . . ‘Kinship’ provides a way of redefining what constitutes governance by seeing dynamics of 
family formation and household construction, for example, as central aspects of the kinds of collective 
identification, spatiality, decision-making, and resource distribution that conventionally are understood as 
outlining the contours of a polity. That shift potentially opens room for attending to other modes of 
sovereignty without translating them as an aberration or diminished alternative within the dominant 
structure of the settler state. The rhetoric of kinship, then, can enable a rethinking of the ways the 
component parts of ‘sexuality’ may index forms of native political autonomy that are distinct from settler 
policy logics, this thwarting efforts to represent indigenous peoples as merely domestic subjects of the 
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state” (10). See Rifkin, When Did Indians Become Straight?, (2011). Likewise, Elizabeth Povinelli notes love 
relationships as a site for oppressive power with regard to economics and politics. She writes, “If you want 
to locate the hegemonic home of liberal logics and aspirations, look to love in the settler colonies” (17). 
See Povinelli The Empire of Love: Toward a Theory of Intimacy, Genealogy, and Carnality (Durham, NC: 
Duke UP, 2006). For other studies on the role of family in the history of Cherokee-U.S. relations, see also 
Johnston, Cherokee Women in Crisis, (2003) and Rose Stremlau Sustaining the Cherokee Family: Kinship 
and the Allotment of an Indigenous Nation (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 2011).  
 
55 In addition to Trivers’ extensive work on the subject, see Weinrich Sexual Landscapes: Why We Are 
What We Are, Why We Love Whom We Love (New York: Scribners, 1987), 
 
56 Trivers, Paul Vasey and Doug VanderLann argue that because gay men, for example, do not reproduce 
as frequently as their straight counterparts, evolution should have extinguished any genetic material that 
led to same-sex attraction. However, they hypothesize that the gene has survived because of kin altruism. 
By caring for their nieces and nephews, non-direct, non-procreative kin ensure that their family genes, 
which would include some of their own genetic material, survive overall. For more about the idea of the 
“gay gene,” see Richard Pillard “The Genetic Theory of Sexual Orientation.” Harvard Gay and Lesbian 
Review (Winter 1997): 61-67.   
 
57 Some of the roles the Fa’afafines play in their communities include caretaking and teaching, similar to 
other queer and Two-Spirit indigenous people. See Paul Vasey and Doug VanderLaan “An Adaptive 
Cognitive Dissociation Between Willingness to Help Kin and Nonkin in Samoan Fa’afafine.” Psychological 
Science 21 (2010): 292-296. 
 
58 I want to note here that I don’t believe that relationships between gay and queer individuals must focus 
on performing needed social roles before we value them. Even those relationships that are primarily 
sexual need no more justification than their heterosexual counterparts. However, I distinguish here 
between readings of the relationships based on gender and sexuality as a way to highlight the role that a 
reading based in gender gives to Garyn and Averyn’s relationship because those who legislate against 
same-sex relationships frequently use the fact that the sexual nature of such relationships is non-
procreative as a way to rationalize their opposition. By eschewing sexuality and focusing on gender, my 
aim is not only to demonstrate the social value and transformative possibilities of same-sex relationships 
for Cherokees but also to undermine the argument, based in terms of sexuality, that same-sex 
relationships are shallow and not worth protecting because they’re not supposedly biologically 
procreative.  
 
59 Lang notes that “women-men” were popular as sexual because of their feminine gender role and their 
non-masculine status. This duality meant that they could be visited when the men’s wives were not able 
or allowed to have sexual intercourse as a result menstruation or being pregnant, which would be taboo. 
See Lang, Men as Women, Women as Men, 255. 
 
60 For studies of Cherokee Removal, see Theda Perdue and Michael Green The Cherokee Nation and the 
Trail of Tears (New York: Penguin Books, 2007) and Cherokee Removal: A Brief History with Documents 
(New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2004); Robert Remini Andrew Jackson and His Indian Wars (New York: 
Viking, 2001); Grant Foreman Indian Removal: The Emigration of the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians 
(Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 1989). For a study of how the Cherokee Nation rebuilt itself post-Removal, 
see William G. McLoughlin After the Trail of Tears: The Cherokees’ Struggle for Sovereignty, 1839-1880 
(Pembroke: U of North Carolina P, 1994).  
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61 Driskill notes, however, that Perdue’s analysis does not consider other possible blood rites for queer 
Cherokee men, including ritual scratching and tattooing. Likewise, Roscoe adds that some Two-Spirit men 
practiced simulated menstruation, another activity that could connect Two-Spirit men to the community 
through a shared connection with blood. See Driskill, “Shaking Our Shells,” 133 and Roscoe, Living the 
Spirit, 38.  
 
62 Justice’s short story “Ander’s Awakening” tells the story of the transformation of a male Strangeling 
(someone with Kyn and Human parentage) named Ander who is an outcast in his family because of his 
effeminate mannerisms. Ander later ceremonially transforms into Denarra, a character who appears in 
the Way of Thorn and Thunder trilogy. While Denarra is a male-to-female transgender, this fact is not 
evident in the trilogy and only appears in the short story. Because my focus here is on the trilogy, I have 
not analyzed Denarra as a transgendered character here. See Justice, “Ander’s Awakening,” Sovereign 
Erotics, 150-177. 
 
63 While I’m mindful of the fact that some LGBTQ2 scholars and activists have argued that divorcing the 
word “queer” from its roots in sexuality depoliticizes the term, I retain Justice and Driskill’s use of the 
term here, which I read as more broadly applied in terms of being othered, out of respect for them. 
Because Justice and Driskill identify, respectively, as gay and Two-Spirit, I acknowledge that the term 
“queer” is theirs to use as they see fit in ways to empower themselves. As a straight, cis-gendered man, I 
do not see it as my place to admonish someone who identifies as LGBTQ2 with regard to how they use the 
term.  
 
64 For an analysis of how tribal governments can use the law to shape their ideal citizenry, see Scott Lyons 
(Ojibwe) X-Marks: Native Signatures of Assent (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2008), Ch. 3. 
 352 
Conclusion 
 
Throughout the years several authors have periodically and publicly declared the 
“Death of Literature.” For example, in a 2001 interview, novelist Jonathan Franzen 
dismissed literature as “useless.” Specifically, he argues: “‘This uselessness is intrinsic, 
of course, and that’s part of art’s charm. But it’s useless nonetheless. . . . [W]hen the 
world refuses to be changed by what you’re writing – when the world takes, essentially, 
no notice of it – it gets harder and harder to persuade yourself that . . . your head-on 
engagement with Big Issues is meaningful’” (qtd. in Antrim par. 12). Likewise, British 
literary critic Frank Kermode, as early as 1965, declared that the fate of the novel is “to 
always be dying” (par. 1). He further opined that literature has been struggling for its 
final gasp as a result of the worlds on the page and off the page being irreconcilable in the 
pages of a book. He writes: “The most intelligent novelists and readers are always 
conscious of the gap, consisting of absurdity, that grows between the world as it seems to 
be and the world proposed in novels” (par. 1). Despite their own cultural capital and 
pecuniary success that they acquired from the written word, Franzen and Kermode are 
two authors in a list that also includes Mark Edmundson; David Foster Wallace; and John 
Robert Lennon, who states that “too many people are (writing), and most of them are 
bound to be bad at it” (par. 5), among others who summarily discount the state of 
literature and storytelling in general. 
Common among those writers who are ready to inscribe a tombstone for literature 
as a whole, as Joel Breuklander notes, is that they’re more often than not straight, white 
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males. Breuklander ascribes to these writers’ assertion of the decline in literature a 
decline in their authorial privilege, noting that “despite wracking my brain and looking 
through online media and academic archives, I could find no female or non-white writers 
who have made comparable statements, none who have similarly contributed to this 
literary despair” (par. 6). Indeed, as access to publishing opened up to more women, non-
white and queer writers after World War II, and as the popularity of work by writers from 
these historically marginalized groups steadily increases, it’s not exactly unsurprising that 
some straight, white, male authors would say the party is over once queer, minority and 
women writers arrive for the festivities. 
However, given the power and potential of narratives to shackle or free people, 
these perennial declarations on the part of straight, white, male authors that literature is 
dead, I believe, has more to do with the fact that they no longer need stories. They have a 
state. As this study has demonstrated, a group that has a state has an apparatus that 
privileges its narrative over those of marginalized groups. As Edward Said (Palestinian) 
suggests, narratives are the foundation from which privileged groups assert their power. 
He writes: “The main battle in imperialism is over land, of course; but when it came to 
who owned the land, who had the right to settle and work on it, who kept it going, who 
won it back, and who now plans its future – these issues were reflected, contested, and 
even for a time decided in narrative” (xii). As a state develops around the narrative of a 
dominant group, the group acquires a “history,” a state-sanctioned narrative made official 
through the silencing of other narratives that would otherwise challenge its privilege. 
Those who have access to the state and can control it can then subsequently enshrine the 
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norms and values that unfold in their narrative as law, then deploy state agents to exercise 
and enforce their will. Because straight, white males in the U.S. have a history of state 
privilege that makes their narrative official, they can flippantly dismiss literature as 
“irrelevant,”1 even “boring.”2 They no longer need stories. 
And yet for those who fall outside of the privileged state narratives, literature 
flourishes because stories are needed more than ever. The transformative quality of 
stories allows writers and readers from marginalized communities to imagine themselves 
in their own terms and to imagine a world outside of one that thrives on their silence. To 
tell stories, then, is to create possibility. As Daniel Heath Justice (Cherokee Nation) 
argues, indigenous people have long used stories to revitalize their cultures as settlers 
attempt to supplant them with theirs, ultimately “untangling colonialism from our minds, 
spirits, and bodies” (“Conjuring Marks” 5). He writes:  
Even from the beginning, when literacy in English, French, and Spanish was 
 being imposed upon Indigenous communities and used to erase the ancient 
 languages of the Americas, it was also being used by Indigenous peoples to 
 preserve their cultures against the onslaught of imperialism. Words themselves 
 matter, but so do the purposes to which they are directed. (5) 
As Justice mentions, stories have the potential to decolonize, and this role of stories also 
appears among other indigenous communities who use literature as a tool to imagine 
themselves outside the oppressive constructs imposed by an imperial nation. Likewise as 
Ngugi wa-Thiongo (Kikuyu) notes, language is the channel through which all other 
elements of a community’s culture and experience come into being. He writes: 
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“Language carries culture, and culture carries, particularly through orature and literature, 
the entire body of values by which we come to perceive ourselves and our place in the 
world. How people perceive themselves affects how they look at their culture, at their 
politics and at the social production of wealth, at their entire relationship to nature and to 
other beings” (16). Finally, while Ngugi states that language, through orature and 
literature, functions as the lens through which listeners and readers perceive themselves 
in their world, another African indigenous writer, Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie (Igbo), 
adds that stories are a conduit of power. She writes:  
 It is impossible to talk about the single story without talking about power. There 
 is a word, an Igbo word, that I think about whenever I think about the power 
 structures of the world, and it is “nkali.” It's a noun that loosely translates to “to 
 be greater than another.” Like our economic and political worlds, stories too are 
 defined by the principle of nkali: How they are told, who tells them, when they're 
 told, how many stories are told, are really dependent on power. (par. 17) 
She further describes how this power element inherent in stories of those who deploy 
privileged, marginalizing narratives normalizes oppression by making their stories of 
“Others” the definitive account of who they are – and who they can be. She adds: “Start 
the story with the arrows of the Native Americans, and not with the arrival of the British, 
and you have an entirely different story. Start the story with the failure of the African 
state, and not with the colonial creation of the African state, and you have an entirely 
different story” (par. 18). She goes on to add that appropriating the power of story, in her 
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case by telling stories of “the incredible resilience of people” in Nigeria, can repair the 
damage done by the privilege narratives that malign its subjects. 
 But while, as Achidie points out, stories have been used by imperial states to 
colonize the indigenous populations inside the state’s fictive borders, this study has also 
examined how, in the case of the Cherokee Nation, a people’s state can marginalize 
demographics of their own. This internal marginalization of some Cherokees, effected the 
through state narrative, has dispossessed gay and gender-queer Cherokees and the 
descendants of Cherokee Freedmen, demonstrating the need for critical, ethical narratives 
of Cherokee nationhood outside the narrative privileged by the state.  
 One group of Cherokees who have had to imagine critical tribal nationhood 
outside of the state model are unenrolled Cherokees, those who are of Cherokee descent 
and might maintain social and cultural ties, but do not meet certain citizenship criteria for 
enrollment in the Cherokee Nation, the United Keetoowah Band or the Eastern Band of 
Cherokee Indians. Reasons for their inability to enroll include low Cherokee blood 
quantum in the case of the UKB and EBCI, who require ¼ and 1/16 Cherokee blood, 
respectively, or their ancestors, though found on earlier Cherokee rolls, do not appear on 
the Final Dawes Roll, usually because their Cherokee ancestor(s) left the Nation prior to 
1898.3 In recent times, because of the surge in people claiming to be Cherokee,4 those 
non-citizen Cherokees who actually are descended from the Nation are often dismissed as 
“wannabes” or their ancestors labeled as traitors for having left the Nation.5 As such, 
non-citizen Cherokees have relied on stories, usually passed down through their families, 
as a way to imagine a place for themselves as part of a wider Cherokee nation that does 
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not operate within the confines of the Cherokee state narrative. As a result, unenrolled 
Cherokees, at least those of legitimate Cherokee heritage, are uniquely suited to practice 
“imagined sovereignty,” a way for Cherokees to continue to imagine themselves as 
Cherokee amid the onslaught of settler culture outside of the statist model established by 
the federal government and the delimiting Cherokee state narrative that marginalizes 
Cherokee citizens as well. Craig Womack (Creek) engages the idea of literary production 
as sovereignty and argues it has tangible effects on a tribal community. He writes: “A 
tribe can win all the court cases in the world, but if its members are not sovereign inside 
their heads, the court victories will not do them much good. Stories provide key 
opportunities for community members to present images of themselves on their own 
terms, another powerful form of sovereignty” (362). While unenrolled Cherokees do not 
possess a political voice in the Cherokee state and, at best, can only influence U.S.-
Cherokee politics in a tangential way, storytelling offers this community of Cherokees a 
voice and a medium through which to practice nationhood not only by reconciling 
themselves as Cherokee through those stories, but by using the Cherokee stories as a 
narrative to assert a distinct sovereign nation of Cherokees. In the end, unenrolled 
Cherokees have had to find ways to try to culturally survive through story.  
 As an example of the didactic potential of the experience of unenrolled Cherokees 
in imagining critical and ethical nationhood, Qwo-Li Driskill, hirself an unenrolled 
Cherokee, in an unpublished poem called “Unenrolled Indians,” writes about the 
challenges of existing as Cherokee outside of the Nation and how unenrolled Cherokees, 
as always, carry their stories with them. Driskill writes: 
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 Let's face it, mama 
No one wants us 
  
 What kind of Indians 
 are we anyway 
 all kinky haired 
 and blue eyed 
 Red and blond 
 and brown and black hair 
  
 Governments don't care about stories 
 they care about allotments 
 documents 
 census numbers 
  
 Listen to our mottled tongues 
 and you will hear 
 the dust of Southeastern Colorado 
 clanging against the hoofbeat 
 of nightriders burning crosses 
 in front of Quaker houses 
  
 and before that the mines 
 of Southwestern Missouri 
 farms in Kansas and Indian Territory 
  
 and before that 
 homes in Tennessee 
 and North Carolina and Georgia 
  
 Look at our mixedblood faces 
 and you see 
 the granddaughter of a French colonist slave owner 
 marrying a Black Indian 
 indentured servant trying to live 
 free in the North Carolina swamps 
  
 And before that there 
 was Giduwagi 
 and even there 
 we came from 
 somewhere far south 
 somewhere far north 
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 made a people 
  
 It's been awhile since we stayed anywhere long 
 Genocide does that 
 Slavery does that 
 Land theft 
 and Jim Crow 
 and Indian Territory 
 and allotments 
 do that 
  
 At night 
 I dream 
 the Mali Empire 
 Muslims from West Asia mixing 
 with Yorubas and Mandikas 
  I dream a song from a madrasah filling southern Europe 
 I dream migrations from India 
 and Ethiopia 
  
 I dream Pictish 
 I dream Cherokee 
 I dream all of us 
 home 
  
 Let them have their Nation 
 We'll build our own 
 like we've always done 
 out of whatever 
 we can carry 
 on our backs 
 
I quote Driskill at length here because hir poem depicts how unenrolled Cherokees, like 
their citizen counterparts, have also endured the long histories of colonization and 
dispossession, and also because Driskill connects the unenrolled Cherokee experience 
with those of other indigenous nations, such as the Yorubas and Mandikas, even the 
Picts, who also do not have a state. As a result, these nations have had to find ways to 
imagine themselves as uniquely indigenous and to revitalize their cultures through the 
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power of story, a medium through which culture is remembered, communicated and, 
ultimately, can be reborn. 
 Just as Driskill notes that having to exist as Cherokee through story outside the 
Cherokee state can be marginalizing, another unenrolled Cherokee, Thomas King, asserts 
that being unenrolled, and living in Canada at that, frees him to think more critically 
about tribal issues that he might otherwise shy away from were he beholden to the tribal 
state. In an interview with Jace Weaver, who is himself an unenrolled Cherokee, King 
expands on this idea of his unenrolled status being liberating. He writes:  
I’m in a position where I don’t have anything to lose – or anything to gain – by 
 asking  some of the questions I ask. You know, in some ways, I’m this Native 
 writer who’s out in the middle – not of nowhere, but I don’t have strong tribal 
 affiliations. I wasn’t raised on Cherokee land. . . . If I were Pueblo, very much 
 tied to the culture, part of a kiva society, I think I would have a hard time asking 
 some serious questions because I’d be so close to it and the responsibilities 
 would be much larger. (qtd. in Weaver, That the People, 149-150) 
While I can appreciate King’s position that by not being a citizen he is not beholden to 
the state, I do disagree with his claim that because he is unenrolled he has “nothing to 
lose” or that his responsibilities are somehow lesser than those who have closer tribal 
ties. On the contrary, by writing as a Cherokee, regardless of his citizenship status, he is 
responsible to Cherokee people because his story is their story as well. By writing as a 
Cherokee, the nation(s) he imagines and the service in which he uses his talent can either 
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contribute or detract from Cherokee people as a whole, even if his work and his position 
as unenrolled do little to affect the Cherokee state. 
 Indeed this focus on people is paramount in that, just as unenrolled Cherokees and 
stateless nations know, states are a fiction that can easily be erased while a people, if they 
continue to imagine and demand their existence, can be timeless. One way stories can be 
used to shift the focus from attempting to exist within the confines of a state’s legal 
fiction to a narrative that simply portrays and celebrates a peoples’ existence is by 
focusing on peoplehood. As Robert Thomas notes, Cherokees did not need a state to 
know they were Cherokee. Elements of peoplehood that he outlines in his Peoplehood 
Matrix – shared land, language, sacred history and ceremonial cycle – long pre-date the 
imposition of a European state model, and they’ll long outlast it. Stories are the vehicle 
through which the abovementioned elements are shared and how they endure. Likewise, 
the legal strictures of a state that threatens to marginalize its own can be neutralized by 
returning to a governing structure based not on the punitive nature of state laws, but 
rather on restoring and retaining the primordial harmony that Thomas notes existed prior 
to the centralizing of the Cherokee state. The focus on writing peoplehood through story 
opens channels for the inclusion of gay and gender-queer Cherokees, as well as Cherokee 
Freedmen descendants, and it allows Cherokees to continue to see themselves as 
Cherokee beyond a state model that in many ways was designed to delimit them. 
Likewise, a return to Cherokee epistemologies of maintaining primordial harmony 
creates a self-governing structure in which race and love are not legally circumscribed, 
and the only crime is deliberately upsetting communal balance. This approach likewise 
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offers a way for Cherokee communities to govern themselves outside of the state model 
that, as the earlier section of this study shows can easily be undermined.  
 Such a move, however, requires an investment in culture, which, by extension, is 
an investment in storytelling. Indeed, just as state narratives and the laws that extend 
from them are designed to put strictures around belief and behavior, counter-narratives 
have the ability to celebrate otherwise circumscribed lives. Gloria Anzaldúa (Chicana), 
for example, explains how stories allowed her to escape the burdensome values in her 
community that marginalized her as a gay woman. She writes: “Books saved my sanity, 
knowledge opened the locked places in me and taught me first how to survive and then 
how to soar” (i). This is not to say, however, that the challenges to state narratives are 
without risk, but they’re risks that responsible writers and storytellers are charged with 
taking. Ben Okri (Igbo), in describing how oppressive orthodoxy in privileged narratives 
can impede a community’s ability to be fulfilled human beings, writes that stories save 
lives. He writes: “The only hope is in the creation of alternative values, alternative 
realities. The only hope is in daring to re-dream one's place in the world - a beautiful act 
of imagination, and a sustained act of self-becoming. Which is to say that in some way or 
another we breach and confound the accepted frontiers of things” (55). Here Okri asserts 
that writers must break down the boundaries that consign some communities to the 
narrative – and in many cases lived – margins. But in addition to dismantling barriers, 
storytellers have an ability and an obligation to heal those individuals who were written 
to the margins to begin with. As Ngugi notes after all, writers are “the surgeons of the 
heart and souls of a community” (ix).  
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Through this study, I have aimed to show how privileged state narratives from the 
federal government and the Cherokee Nation have, respectively, cast Others and their 
own into the social margins. But I also aimed to demonstrate the potential of narratives of 
critical, ethical Cherokee nationhood to challenge the state narrative and imagine a nation 
in which everyone has the right to exist as they are and is afforded the potential to 
contribute to their nation’s vitality and well-being. We need stories because such a nation 
remains possible. Cherokee storytellers and readers need only imagine it, speak it or put it 
to paper, and live it into being. 
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1 Cultural critic Lee Siegel argues that contemporary literature is irrelevant, stating: “Memorable stories, 
long and short, continue to be created. Without a doubt, the next male or female Hemingway, Faulkner or 
Fitzgerald is out there somewhere, hard at work. But with the exception of a few ambitious-and 
obsessively competitive-fiction writers and their agents and editors, no one goes to a current novel or 
story for the ineffable private and public clarity fiction once provided” (par. 2). Notice that he extols 
Hemingway, Faulkner, Fitzgerald and Mailer as his examples of great writers and goes so far as to suggest 
that a female version of these male writers can still write relevant fiction, insinuating that women as 
themselves cannot be great writers. See Siegel “Where Have All the Mailers Gone?” Observer.com. New 
York Observer, 22 June 2010. Web. 10 April 2013. <http://observer.com/2010/ 06/where-have-all-the-
mailers-gone/>. 
 
2 Writer J. Robert Lennon dismisses contemporary literature as “hackneyed” and “boring.” He further 
adds: “Let’s face it: Literary fiction is fucking boring. It really is. It’s a genre as replete with clichés as any. 
And when you’re as deeply immersed in it as many of us are, it’s all too easy to stop noticing the clichés. 
They no longer stand out. They’re just What People Do. And so, we do them. If a writer of literary fiction 
wants to be great, she needs to poke her head up out of the echo chamber every now and then and 
absorb the genuine peculiarity of human striving. And that means reading stuff that is not literary fiction, 
and, sometimes, not reading at all” (par. 10). The feminine pronoun “she” in his rant against 
contemporary literature is telling at a time when women writers are growing more popular. See Lennon 
“Most contemporary literary fiction is terrible.” Salon.com. Salon, 29 March 2013. Web. 10 April 2013. 
<http://www.salon.com/2013/03/29/most_contemporary_literary_fiction_is_terrible/>. 
 
3 The Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians in North Carolina require a 1/16 Cherokee blood quantum from a 
direct lineal ancestor listed on the Baker Roll (1924) while the UKB requires a ¼ Cherokee blood quantum 
from a direct ancestor listed on any Cherokee roll, though only the Baker and Dawes Rolls list Cherokee 
blood quanta. There are more than 30 historical Cherokee rolls and Cherokee censuses that actual 
Cherokee descendants trace from; however, if their ancestors do not appear on the Dawes or Baker Rolls, 
they are not eligible for citizenship in the Cherokee state. While many people, especially in the American 
South claim Cherokee ancestry, most of those whose Cherokee ancestry does not trace to any historical 
Cherokee record are in fact descended from smaller, possibly defunct tribal nations in the South and, 
sometimes, trace to African-American ancestors. For more about unenrolled Cherokees and those whose 
ancestry has been erroneously attributed as Cherokee, see Circe Sturm Becoming Indian: The Struggle 
over Cherokee Identity in the Twenty-first Century (Santa Fe: SAR Press, 2011). 
 
4 According to the 2010 U.S. Census, more than 800,000 people claimed Cherokee heritage, which is more 
than twice the number of citizen Cherokees enrolled in the Cherokee Nation, UKB and Eastern Band of 
Cherokee Indians. Often in conversation and on social media, this figure is used as proof of the large 
“wannabe” population. While the census figures leaves about 400,000 Cherokee claimants who are not 
citizens, this figure is less than one-tenth of one percent of the total U.S. population. This figure also 
includes those non-citizens of legitimate Cherokee descent as well as those who descend from other non-
Cherokee Indian nations whose tribal heritage has been erroneously labeled as Cherokee, making the 
number of “wannabes” – people with no Cherokee or other Indian ancestry who are simply inventing 
their tribal heritage – much lower. See Todd Crow “Census shows increase in Cherokee respondents.” 
CherokeePhoenix.org. Cherokee Phoenix, 21 Feb. 2012. Web. 23 Feb. 2012 
<http://www.cherokeephoenix.org/Article/Index/5990 >. 
 
5 The claim by some citizen Cherokees that those Cherokees who left the Nation prior to allotment as a 
result of Removal, exogamy or fleeing the violence of the Civil War are traitors, as are their descendants, 
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ignores the fact that many Cherokees also left the Nation after allotment, primarily as a result of the 
Great Depression, service in the World Wars or to seek employment in the booming oil industry in areas 
like Louisiana and Texas and that their Cherokee descendants are welcomed in the Nation. Likewise, the 
Nation has in the past acknowledged the contribution of unenrolled Cherokees. See “Undocumented 
Cherokees Contribute to Cherokee Nation.” Cherokee.org. 22 Sept. 2000. Web. 3 Mar 2006 
<http://www.cherokee.org/News/Stories/22800.aspx>. 
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